Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

I suppose 1. That as certain, the angel naturally knows many things, namely himself, other angels, and every kind of corporeal object, whether by themselves or through their species moving the angelic intellect to knowledge of them; indeed even God Himself, not only by abstractive knowledge, which comes about by way of discursive reasoning — whereby not only the existence of God but also His divine pre-eminence are gathered from created things by all, and can in turn be gathered by angels in a far more perfect manner — but also by that abstractive knowledge which would come about through a species representative of the divine essence: for, as the Doctor says in book 2. dist. 3. quaest. 9. n. 7.

it does not seem unfitting to posit such a species representing the divine essence for the angelic intellect, implanted in the intellect of an angel from the beginning: so that although it is not natural to the intellect in such a way that this intellect could acquire it from its natural powers; nor yet that it could have it from the action of some naturally acting object, because it cannot have it from the presence of some finite object acting upon it, except the divine essence alone, which causes nothing else from itself by natural causation: nevertheless, just as perfections given to an angel in his first creation, although they do not necessarily follow from his nature, would be called natural, distinguishing them against those merely supernatural, namely of grace and glory; so this perfection given to the angelic intellect, by which the divine essence would be present to him distinctly, though abstractively, can be called natural, and belong to the natural knowledge of the angel: so that whatever the angel knows of God by the power of this species, he knows in one way naturally, and in another way not naturally: naturally, inasmuch as this is not the principle of any gratuitous or glorious act; but not naturally, inasmuch as he could not attain to it from his natural powers, nor by any natural action.

That is, that distinct representative species of the divine essence, whose possibility we demonstrated when treating of the beatific vision in section 2. quaest. 1., would be natural as to substance, since it would not be of the same order with the qualities which are of the order of grace or of glory; but it would be supernatural as to mode, because neither would it be required of the intellect naturally as a perfection owed by its natural complement, nor could it be obtained by the intellect's own powers.

— The Doctor persuades himself that this species was implanted in the angel from the beginning of its formation by these reasons. 1. Because the natural happiness of the angel was more excellent than the native happiness of man ever was: but it is likely that man before sin had a somewhat distinct natural knowledge of God: therefore the angel ought to have had a more perfect one, namely quidditative. 2. Such a species, being possible, does not exceed the natural receptive capacity of the angel himself, and contributes supremely to his perfection, which is most of all completed by the knowledge of truth, and in turn that is more excellent which is gathered from the most excellent truth, such as the distinct knowledge of God. 3. St. Aug. lib. 4. De Gen. ad litteram cap. 21. attributes to all the angels before the fall the morning knowledge of created things in the Word, besides the evening knowledge of the same things in themselves: now that knowledge of things in the Word either accompanied intuitive knowledge of God, or abstractive knowledge through a species: the first cannot be said, otherwise the demons also would have had intuitive knowledge of God, and thus would truly have been blessed, especially in the opinion of the Thomists, who place formal beatitude in the beatific vision. But none of the Theologians admits this, and therefore it is necessary to confess that that knowledge of things in the Word existed together with abstractive knowledge of God through a species. Moreover, from that act of knowledge habitual knowledge could remain, and the species itself causing memory of it, such as St. Paul had while recalling what he had heard and seen when rapt to the third Heaven.

— Here therefore we inquire only whether the angel can know by the powers of nature God as the Author of nature and of grace, as well as those things which are contained within either order, or which are supernatural both as to substance, e. g. grace, the light of glory, etc., and as to mode, e. g. the resurrection of the dead, the changing of water into wine, etc.

I suppose 2. That future contingents are of three kinds: for some proceed necessarily from natural causes, and in no way depend on free will, such as the motions of the heavenly bodies and the courses of the stars, indeed even all the natural events that occur in these lower regions, whether from the influence of the heavens or from other lower natural causes, where free will intervenes in no way. Other futures are those which follow from their causes not necessarily but for the most part, without any intervention of free will, such as health from such a medicine. Finally, other futures are those which come about or happen entirely contingently, and from free causes. Now it is certain that the angels naturally know necessary things, which are contained in causes determined toward their production by nature, and by ordinary law not to be impeded by God the Maker of all things. For the angels have a universal and marvelous knowledge of natural causes, and consequently of the effects proceeding from them naturally and necessarily. It is equally certain that the angels can perceive future contingents, and free ones, that is, ones proceeding from contingent and free causes, by a kind of conjectural knowledge and by certain indications; and this in four ways, as the Seraphic Doctor teaches concerning demons from St. Augustine lib. 5. De Genesi ad litteram, in 2. d. 1. p. 2. a. 1. q. 3. namely:

by keenness of intellect, or much experience, or crafty caution, or the doctrine of others: keenness of sense, as when they see carefully and consider toward what our affection inclines, or what things lead us on or hold us back. Experience of times, because from such circumstances they see such things happen. Crafty caution when he proposes something done, and predicts that someone will do something. The doctrine of others, when by the just judgment of God he is permitted to learn it from the angels.

I suppose 3. That the greatest difficulty among Theologians concerns whether the angels can naturally know the secrets of hearts, or the affections and thoughts freely elicited either by men or by other angels. For although all agree, against Durandus, that those internal and free affections, not only future but even present, are in fact hidden from the angels and open to God alone, since He reserved this knowledge to Himself alone; nevertheless they are split into various parties regarding the power and activity of the natural angelic intellect: namely, whether of itself it possesses sufficient power by which it could detect these free affections and internal thoughts. All Thomists commonly deny this. But the disciples of the Doctor Subtilis affirm it with him in 2. dist. 9. n. 27. and in the Reportata dist. 10. Observe with the Seraphic Doctor in 2. dist. 2. parte 2. q. 6. from St. Augustine lib. 12. De Genesi ad litteram cap. 17.

That just as corporeal substances have certain coverings by which they hide themselves from alien gazes, so spiritual substances also have them in their own way. This obstacle indeed must not be understood as the interposition of some opaque nature, as happens in our bodily vision, whether obscurely or less clearly; but to hide in them is the same as to be unwilling to manifest. And although there are not there foldings of diversity arising from the composition of diverse natures, yet in the soul there are grades of powers and states, according to which certain things are said to be more intimate to the soul, namely those which regard the higher and simpler powers, or purer ones, according to which the soul gathers itself more into itself, and is united to and simplified with that which is supremely one; and by means of these the secret of conscience resides least of all. Thence he inferred above, that no creature, neither human nor angelic, can know the secrets of human conscience, except by signs and conjectures, unless it knows them by God's revelation, or by the denunciation of man. And because few things are so secret that they do not come forth into exterior works, or appear through exterior signs of the face, or through signs of the heart, which is moved variously according to the diversity of actions: hence it is that many of our thoughts and affections can be detected by evil spirits, unless they are kept away by the power of God; but this knowledge is rather conjecture than certain science.

These suppositions therefore having been thus pre-stated, First, it must be determined whether the angels can know by natural power those things which are supernatural as to entity and as to mode. Second, whether they can certainly apprehend future contingents depending entirely on free causes. Third, whether they can know the internal thoughts and free affections both of angels and of men, not only by conjecture but also by certain science.

First conclusion. — The angel cannot know things supernatural in their entity, and those which are truly within the order of grace and glory, by the powers of nature: but well can it know those which are supernatural only as to mode.

This is the most received opinion among Theologians as regards each part, of which the first is proved from that passage of 1. Corinthians 2. Who of men knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him? and the things of God no one has known except the Spirit of God; as if to say, those things which depend on the sole and free will of God, no one knows except Him bestowing them: and so the Apostle adds forthwith: But we have not received the spirit of this world; but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God. Where the spirit of the world is rightly interpreted by Theodoret as the created spirit. For this was the Apostle's purpose, namely that the mysteries of the Christian faith could never have been attained by the understanding of any created thing, even of the angels, but were known only by the revealing Spirit of God. Then he sets the spirit of the world in opposition to the Spirit of God. To this purpose serve the words of Ambrose in his commentary on that passage: The sense of God no one knows, except the Spirit of God who is of God. For inferior things cannot know the counsel of superiors, nor can a creature discern the will of its Creator. — It can likewise be proved from that passage of Ephesians 3. where the same Apostle says: That to him was given this grace, to illuminate (that is, to instruct and teach) what is the dispensation of the Sacrament hidden from ages in God, who created all things, that the manifold Wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers in heavenly places through the Church. Explaining which, St. Chrysostom copiously demonstrates that the Principalities and Powers, that is, the highest orders of the angels, were enlightened by the Apostles revealing those mysteries, and learned from them what they had hitherto been ignorant of.

But this was chiefly true of the knowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation, as Gregory of Nyssa expressly weighs in hom. 8. in Cant.

For indeed, he says, until now the angels understood the simple and single-moded power of God and His efficiency, who had seen that whole variety of created things to have existed by the one and simple will of God and by His word alone. But that varied and manifold kind of Wisdom, which consists of contraries mutually joined and fitted together, they had clearly known through the Church: how the Word was made flesh, inasmuch as life is mingled with death: how by His bruising He heals our wounds, how by the weakness of the cross He overturns the strength of the enemy: how that which cannot be seen is manifested in flesh, so that He who redeems captives is at once the buyer, and the price; and then how He underwent death in such a way that life did not depart.

— Anselm also favors this in his Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul, where he says: He asserts that even the angelic spirits advanced in the knowledge of this wisdom through the Church; because while Christ instructed her either by Himself or through the Apostles, the angels learned many secrets which they were ignorant of.

— Marvelous indeed is what Ambrose says rather more strongly lib. 4. De init. cap. 7. when he says: Even the angels doubted whether Christ would rise, the Powers of the heavens doubted seeing that flesh would ascend into Heaven; finally they said: Who is this King of glory? And while some said, Lift up the gates etc.; others doubted, saying: Who is that King of glory? etc.

Yet I can by no means be brought to believe that the mystery of the Incarnation was then unknown to the angels; for St. Paul himself writes to the Hebrews 1.: And when again he brings the First-begotten into the world he says, and let all the angels of God adore him: and therefore at that moment when the Son was brought into the earth, that is, into fellowship of flesh, the Father proposed Him to His angels to be adored. Then, not only Gabriel announced that He would be born of God and of the Virgin, as Son, but the rest also afterward frequently celebrated the same One as born with repeated and festal acclamations, as in Luke, announcing His birth to the Shepherds: Because this day is born to you a Savior, who is Christ the Lord, in the City of David. Finally, long before He assumed flesh, the angels' knowledge of it is persuaded by this reason: since the Prophets predicted that God and man would come, such as Isaias, it is not credible that this lay hidden from the angels, who were almost the Ministers and Interpreters of the heavenly prophecies.

Although these things are true concerning the most holy Spirits, nevertheless it appears more likely that this mystery of the Incarnation lay hidden from the demon: for St. Augustine openly declares this in De Civitate Dei cap. 21. where, speaking of the knowledge of the angels and demons and the difference between them:

Only so much, he says, was made known to them as He willed: and He willed only so much as was fitting: but He made it known, not as to the holy angels, who enjoy it in participated eternity according to that which the Word of God is; but as it had to be made known to terrify them, namely through certain temporal effects of His power, and most hidden signs of His presence, which could be conspicuous to the angelic senses even of evil spirits rather than to the weakness of men.

Finally, when He judged that these things should for a little while be suppressed, and He sometimes lay hidden more deeply, the Prince of the demons doubted concerning Him, and tempted Him whether He were Christ, etc.

To this truth gives support what the Apostle writes 1. ad Cor. 2. when speaking of the incarnate Wisdom he says: Which none of the princes of this world knew. For if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory: for by the princes of the world most of the Fathers understand the demons, especially St. Leo, serm. De Passione, where concerning Christ the Lord he writes thus:

That He might loose mankind from the bonds of deadly transgression, He concealed from the serving devil the power of His majesty, and set before him the humility of our infirmity. For if the cruel and proud enemy could have known the counsel of the mercy of God; he would have determined to temper the minds of the Jews with gentleness, rather than to inflame them with unjust hatred: > lest he should lose the servitude of all his captives, while he pursued the liberty of one owing nothing to him.

This very thing the theological reason proves. 1. Indeed the angel can know only that which is proportioned to his natural power: but the mysteries of grace are not proportioned to the natural activity of the angelic intellect, since they are of a higher and superior order, nor are they called supernatural for any other reason than that they entirely exceed the powers of the natural agent. Then, since all mysteries depend on the mere will of God, they cannot be known through their native species, nor through anything which has connexion with them: for the angelic intellect receives those species either from the things themselves, or from God infusing them divinely. Not the former, since those things are of an inferior order, to which the native power of the angels cannot apply itself; much less will it be able to borrow species from them. If the latter: therefore those species cannot naturally claim for themselves, and consequently cannot know those mysteries by the powers of nature.

You will say 1. The demons truly knew the Incarnation of the Word, not by revelation, nor by a species divinely implanted in them: therefore, etc.

— The sacred Interpreters answer that they spoke flatteringly, in order to elicit the truth whether He was the Son of God and the Messiah sent into the world or not; yet it does not follow from this that they knew the mystery of the Incarnation by their natural powers.

You will say 2. Created being does not exceed the activity of the angelic intellect; but those supernatural things are created beings: therefore, etc.

— I distinguish the major. that it does not exceed the activity of the angelic intellect under whatever aspect considered, I deny; under some aspect, I concede. For being is the term and object of the intellective faculty, inasmuch as it is limited and finite, and under this aspect it is proportioned to every created and limited intellect; but not as to the degree of supernaturality, under which it exceeds the power and activity of the same faculty, and consequently it is no wonder if it cannot be attained by it.

The second part is also evident, namely that things supernatural as to mode do not exceed the natural power of the angelic intellect. Those things which are truly within the order of natural things can easily be perceived by the angelic intellect: but those which are supernatural only as to mode are, according to their entity, truly within the natural order of things, as is evident: therefore etc. Nor does it matter that they possess a degree and mode of supernaturality: since the angel has clearly perceived the divine omnipotence, and knows that God can do many things which entirely surpass the activity of natural causes, in no way knowing the natural entity of the effect produced, he will still be able to know even the supernatural mode of that production at least conjecturally. For seeing a man who had previously been blind now given sight, he will be able to understand not only that this sight has been restored, since that sight according to its entity is purely natural; but he will also be able to judge that it was restored divinely, since the angel knows more perspicaciously than the Philosophers that there is no return from privation to habit by the powers of nature: and consequently it was necessary that that man, deprived of his eyes, received them by the donation of a supernatural power. By this reason the angel will be able to know naturally that the humanity of Christ the Lord lacks its own subsistence, and that the eucharistic accidents are deprived of inherence, and that Christ is under the species after an indivisible mode. For these things, as to entity, are natural, although they come about in a supernatural mode.

You will say. If the angel can detect that the humanity of Christ the Lord is stripped of its own subsistence; he will also be able to know that it subsists in the divine [nature], which is praeternatural as to substance; but this is against the first part: therefore one or the other must be false.

— I deny the consequence of the major. For although God could conserve a substance stripped of every subsistence, as some hold, and although he could at least suspend his concourse so that an angel, seeing the humanity, would not also see its subsistence really distinct from it; if it happened that an angel saw the humanity of Christ the Lord stripped of its proper subsistence, he could not conclude from this that it subsists divinely, since he might doubt whether God denies him his concourse precisely so that, in seeing the humanity, he does not at the same time see its subsistence.

Second conclusion. — Angels do not in fact know the secrets of hearts: yet they could perceive them if God did not prevent it.

Proof of the first part. By all those texts of Scripture by which it is signified that knowledge of the secrets of the heart is reserved to God alone: thus 3 Kings 8. Thou alone knowest the heart of all the children of men: and 2 Paralipomenon 6. Render to everyone according to his ways, which thou knowest him to have in his heart: for thou alone knowest the hearts of the children of men, Solomon says to God: and Jeremiah 17. The heart of man is perverse and inscrutable; who shall know it? I the Lord search the heart and prove the reins. Which question and its answer seem to deny knowledge of the human heart to anyone else besides God alone, and to refer the difficulty of knowing it not to God's good pleasure, but to God's very nature.

This same truth, besides the testimonies of Scripture, the Holy Fathers also teach us, above all Origen, Homily 7 on Genesis, where he denies that angels know the purpose of our mind;

For example, he says, I have a resolve to suffer martyrdom; from this an angel will not be able to say to me, because now I have known that you fear God. For the purpose of the mind is known to God alone: but if I come forward to the contests, produce a good confession, endure steadfastly all that is inflicted upon me, then the angel can say, as confirming and strengthening me: now I have known that you fear God.

Hilary subscribes, on Psalm 139.

To know the thoughts of the heart, he says, is not ours, but his of whom it was said: searching hearts and reins, O God: and his too who said, knowing their thoughts, why do you think evil in your hearts? He beholds all the hidden senses of the wicked in their hearts with a penetrating and open entrance, going forth by the nature of his power.

— Other Holy Fathers urge this very point, while they prove that Christ was true God from the fact that he knew the inner thoughts of the mind: but if knowing the secrets of hearts were not an action proper to God, and fitting to another than God, it would not be well inferred from it that Christ is God: therefore knowing the secrets of hearts is an action proper to God, which belongs to no creature, human or angelic. The major is proved from John 2.¹ where it is said that Christ did not commit himself to any who professed that they believed in him, because he knew their hearts were alien to himself. From this the Evangelist infers, indicating Christ's divinity: He had no need that anyone should bear witness to man, for he himself knew what was in man: on which Cyril, book 2 on John, says, This dignity also, as well as the others that are in Christ, belongs to God; nor is it found in any created thing. For the Psalmist attributes it to the true God alone, saying: He who formed the hearts of them severally, who understands all their works. Hence Ambrose, on chapter 5 of Luke; The Lord, he says, wishing to save sinners, shows himself to be God by his knowledge of things hidden. S. Chrysologus subscribes, sermon 5, where, addressing the Pharisee whose thought Christ had disclosed in Luke 7, he says, Take the insignia of his Divinity, hear that he has penetrated the secret of your breast: behold that he has reached the recesses of your thoughts. Understand that he lays bare the silent counsels of your heart. And sermon 94. While he laid open the secret of the Pharisee's heart, he demonstrates himself to have been the Author of the whole prophetic office. From all this it is clear that the angels are truly denied knowledge of the secrets of the heart, since it is proper to God alone.

You will say 1. Several Holy Fathers even affirm that angels naturally know one another's affections, and also the thoughts of men. Thus Philip the Priest in his commentaries on the book of Job seems to have thought that angels know their own intimate thoughts and affections mutually. For, he says, spirits cannot conceal anything of their affections from one another. For simple creatures, having as it were no obstacle of corporeity, are transparent to one another. So likewise S. Gregory seems to think, book 18 of the Morals, chapter 27. In the beatitude of the risen, he says, each will be transparent to the other as to himself; and while each intellect is attended, conscience is simultaneously penetrated. Whence he concludes that the City of the Blessed is called allegorically pure glass. And immediately after he adds: But now our hearts, so long as we are in this life, because they cannot be seen by one another, are enclosed within vessels of clay. Beda also subscribes, book 2 on Job, chapter 7, where he says: For spirits cannot conceal anything of their affections from one another: for simple creatures, having as it were no corporeal obstacle, are transparent to one another.

— I answer 1. The Holy Fathers must be understood either of conjectural knowledge, which angels can have, especially from men through a certain excitation of their body, as S. Augustine at times had said in book On the Divination of Demons: An angel learns men's dispositions with entire ease, not only when uttered in speech, but even when conceived in thought, provided certain signs are expressed in the body. Which he afterwards retracted in book 2 of the Retractations, chapter 30.

I said, he says, a most obscure thing with more boldness than I ought; for that these things reach the knowledge of demons has been discovered by several experiments: But whether certain signs are given from the body of thinkers, perceptible to them but hidden from us; or whether they know these by another force, and that a spiritual one; or whether it can be discovered by men only with the greatest difficulty, or not at all.

— I answer 2. The praised Holy Fathers only want that angels are not impeded by the corporeity of their members, as men are, from penetrating one another's mind.

You will object 2. Experience establishes that even evil angels often know and disclose internal thoughts and secrets of hearts. For Magi and energumens sometimes reveal what men have deliberated among themselves or thought; as concerning a certain Magus named Albericus S. Augustine testifies in book 1 against the Academics, chapter 6. Delrio also reports other cases, book 4 of the Disquisitions on Magic, chapter 2, question 2.

— I answer. Demons indeed know these things and disclose them by conjecture, because of the excitation they see in the body; or from the fact that those inner affections of mind and heart are represented in the phantasm, or in the sensitive appetite excited by inner motions; for as was observed in the second supposition from S. Bonaventure, demons can uncover hidden and occult things in four ways, or as he adds there:

I say that no creature, neither human nor angelic, can know the secrets of human conscience, except through signs or conjectures, or unless it knows them by God's revelation or man's denunciation. And since few things are so secret that they do not come forth into outward works, or appear through outward signs of the face, or through signs of the heart, which is moved variously according to the diversity of the affections, hence it is that many of our thoughts and affections can be detected by wicked spirits, unless they are kept off by God's power; but this knowledge is rather conjecture than certain science.

Proof of the second part. Namely, that an angel could by natural power uncover the secrets of hearts if God did not prevent it, as the Doctor seems to assert in dist. 3, q. 9, n. 27, and in dist. 10, q. 8, *where, answering the argument of S. Thomas proposed at the beginning of the question from the first part, question 57, article 4, and question 17, article 3, by which the Angelic Doctor contends that the thoughts and affections of intellect and will are known to God alone, because the rational will of a creature is subject to God alone, and he alone can act upon it who is its principal object and last end, he attacks it thus: although some say that an angel can hide his intellection by an act of his will, and unhide it, and this unhiding is to speak; still it does not seem why anything actually intelligible would be present to a passive intellect and yet could not change it: nor does there seem a greater reason why by his will he can hide his intellection more than his essence. And in dist. 4, q. 45, question 4, n. 7, where he disputes whether the Blessed know the prayers we offer, having proposed according to the argument on the denying side, namely that God alone knows the secrets of hearts, such as mental prayer, he answers thus: I say that there is nothing in the mind, that is, any operation whatever of intellect and will, or any property, or real condition of this or that, but that the whole lies open thus to an angel proportionally present and not impeded, or to a soul not impeded proportionally present, just as whiteness present appears to the conjoined soul through the senses. From these things it is established that the Doctor's opinion is that angels could naturally know not only men's but one another's thoughts and affections of mind, unless they are prevented by God.*

— Every object actually intelligible, and proportionate, and sufficiently present to the angelic intellect, can be naturally perceived by it: but the secrets of hearts and the affections of mind are of such a kind: therefore, etc. The major is evident: the minor is proved: that is actually intelligible, and proportionate to the angelic intellect, which truly exists; for every real being is actually intelligible, contained within the order of nature: but those affections of mind and secrets of hearts are supposed to actually exist: they are also within the order of nature, for they are not supernatural acts, as is supposed, and accordingly are proportioned to the angelic intellect.

Some reply. Those affections of mind are indeed naturally knowable by the angelic intellect, unless they are hidden by the will of the other angel having such affections: but since the will of every angel is free and mistress of its own actions, it can hide or manifest them at pleasure: and accordingly another angel could not detect them by any natural power unless the other consents.

— On the contrary, the Doctor says, there is not a stronger reason why an angel could hide by his volition an affection of mind and an internal thought, than his essence: but he cannot bring it about that another angel does not see his essence: therefore neither will he prevent him from seeing his affections. The major is evident: for those affections are as real as the essence, and are equally intelligible. Next, that volition by which he would be said to hide his affections is itself a natural being, actually intelligible, and accordingly either it would lie open together with what it is said to hide, or it would need to be hidden by another volition, and that again by another, and thus there would be a process to infinity.

The Thomists answer 2. The angelic intellect can indeed naturally attain every natural entity belonging to the physical order, but not that which belongs to the moral order. Free acts, they say, belong to the moral order, not to the physical order; and accordingly it is no wonder if they cannot be naturally perceived by the angelic intellect. For, they say, the angelic intellect can perceive an object only insofar as it is part of the Universe; but things belonging to the moral line, the line of freedom, are not parts of the Universe, and thus are not within the object proportionate to the angelic intellect.

— Against 1. Every real being, whether physical or moral, is of itself actually intelligible in the mode in which a real being exists, whether of the physical or of the moral order: but those affections of mind are real natural beings: therefore naturally intelligible, and consequently can be naturally known: for what is naturally knowable can be naturally known. Next, the Thomists themselves concede that Michael, for example, can naturally know his own affections and his own internal thoughts: therefore by equal right Gabriel will be able to know them; for those thoughts are as naturally knowable with respect to Gabriel as with respect to Michael himself: and accordingly, by the same reason by which Michael conceives them by natural power, though they are within the moral line, Gabriel will be able to perceive them. Finally, one angel can perceive the affections of another angel revealing them to him; for, as will appear below, angels in speaking to one another can express internal thoughts and affections of mind: therefore that reason of moral being does not prevent those thoughts and affections of mind from being naturally known, if they are made duly present; whether meanwhile they are manifested voluntarily or not. Truly therefore one angel could know the internal affections of another's mind, unless God prevented it. — That God prevents that knowledge is gathered both from Scripture and from the Holy Fathers praised above.

You will say 1. The aforementioned sayings of Scripture and the Holy Fathers simply affirm that internal affections of mind cannot be known by another than God: but this manner of speaking would not be true if they could be naturally known, as we assert: therefore our opinion seems to oppose both Scripture and the Holy Fathers. The minor is proved: First, because what can happen naturally is said to be able to happen absolutely; for although God can prevent fire from burning, nevertheless fire is truly said to be able to burn, because it has a natural power of burning; therefore if it can be said simply that those internal affections can be known by the forces of nature, contradictory propositions can be formed, namely that they can be known naturally, and cannot be known naturally. Second, because if a created intellect could naturally see the affections of another mind, it would follow that it is always in a state of violence, and that perpetual miracles are wrought; as it would be a miracle if fire, duly applied, did not burn, which certainly seems less congruous, especially since God does not seem to deprive any whole genus of cause of the concourse connaturally due to it (at least from the beginning of its formation) for some action toward which it has a natural inclination and a proportionate power: otherwise that inclination and power would be frustrated. Thirdly finally, because from the sayings of the Holy Fathers, in which God is asserted to be absolutely invisible, it could not be gathered that he cannot be seen naturally. For by similar reason God would be said to be invisible, not because he cannot be seen naturally, but because God has not decreed to concur to the vision of himself until after this life: but the consequent seems absurd: therefore also the antecedent.

— I deny the minor. And to its first proof I say that, although an angel does not in fact perceive the affections of another mind, toward the knowing of which he nevertheless has natural knowledge and power, it does not follow from this that he can naturally perceive those affections of mind, which would be contradictory. For propositions to be truly contradictory, they must be made of the same thing regarded in the same way, which does not occur here. For while we concede that angels have the power for perceiving the affections of another mind, we concede in them a faculty and potency expedited only in first act for eliciting this operation: while we deny that they in fact perceive the affections of mind, we also deny that that native faculty of knowing is expedited for this operation in second act, because of the divine concourse denied to them: and therefore our affirmation and negation, although they are about the same thing, are not however about it considered in the same way. For the affirmation is about the potency of the angel in first act; but the negation about the same potency considered in second act; and so those propositions are not truly contradictory.

To the second proof I deny the minor. For a thing is not judged to be in a state of violence except while its natural power is suspended and prevented in every way, not merely with respect to some operation; for we can naturally execute many things according to the native propensity of the rational and sensitive appetite, which nevertheless we do not do, God forbidding; nor are we for that reason said to be in a state of violence: nor would it be congruously said that God does violence to us while, to demonstrate his supreme dominion over us and obtain our reverence and observance toward himself, he forbids many things to be done, toward which natural appetite throws a propensity. So similarly, although God denies an angel his concourse for detecting the affections of another mind, he is not for that reason to be said to inflict violence upon him, since he makes him free for knowing everything else. Nor does it equally follow that that natural intellective power is frustrated; for it is not necessary that an innate power be said to be frustrated because it can be exercised around whatever objects and in whatever subjects: for the inclination which God implanted in angels and men at the beginning toward beatitude is not fulfilled in demons and the damned, and yet it is not said to have been given in vain; for, the Doctor says, it suffices that it be fulfilled in certain individuals of the angelic and human nature, as truly happens in the blessed Angels and holy minds.

To the third proof, I deny the consequence. For the reason of the disparity is that God is said absolutely and simply to be invisible to the forces of nature, since intuitive cognition of him is not within the line of the natural order, but of the supernatural; and accordingly when he is said to be invisible, it is sufficiently understood that he is outside the sphere of the activity of a created mind, and cannot be attained by it unless it is illuminated and strengthened by divinely given aid: but it is otherwise with the affections of mind to be known by an angel; since they are within the line of the natural order and do not exceed the ingenerate activity of a created mind, from the fact that they can be naturally perceived by it and yet are not perceived, it does not follow that they are naturally imperceptible, as it follows that God is invisible; not precisely because he is not seen by the forces of nature, but because he cannot be seen, for the reason that he is not within the line and order of nature, but of the supernatural.

You will say 2. Whenever no individual of some species has in fact some effect, however aptly it stands disposed toward that effect as it can stand disposed toward producing other effects, it ought not be affirmed that it has a natural power for that effect, unless it is elsewhere established by reason or authority that the negation of the production of that effect arises not from its natural activity, but from the divine concourse denied to it; but no angelic intellect, however much it exerts its powers to perceive the affection of another mind, will ever perceive it anywhere without the voluntary manifestation of the other, or a special revelation of God: therefore if by reason or authority it is not elsewhere established that this negation of knowledge arises solely from the negated divine concourse, it will have to be confessed that it arises from the impotence of the knowing angel, who has no native activity for perceiving those affections of mind: but this can be urged neither by authority nor by reason; therefore, etc.

— I concede the first argument, but deny the assumption. Since it has been proved by sufficient reason that angels have sufficient natural power for perceiving the affections of another mind: and since both the authorities of Scripture and of the Holy Fathers clearly establish that they do not in fact perceive such affections of mind, it follows that that non-perception arises not from the impotence of the intellective power, but from the concourse divinely denied to them. *For, as the Doctor speaks in the Reportata, dist. 9, q. 2, n. 6: Therefore God alone is said to know volitions, because he does not co-act in the knowing of volitions, so that one angel might act upon the intellect of another. Therefore God does not concur with any angel for uncovering the volitions of another, unless that other angel freely wills to signify his volition to another through speech; whereas that volition is by its nature intelligible and knowable, and would easily be known by the other angel unless God suspended that actual knowledge by the denial of concourse.

You will insist. In the same place the Doctor signifies that that suspension of divine concourse regards only moral and meritorious acts; for he speaks only of volitions that are meritorious or demeritorious, because, he says, volitions are ordered to punishment and reward, which belong to God alone, according to that text: Vengeance is mine, and I will repay. And therefore he reserved that knowledge to himself, because primary and judiciary power belongs to him. But that reason does not conclude in the same way of intellections as of volitions: for intellections are not ordered to reward and punishment, whence they are not meritorious.

— I answer. Truly the Doctor holds that good angels can in fact know one another's operations insofar as they are purely natural, or according to their natural entity; but not as they are morally free and good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, namely insofar as they are ordered to a good or evil end, by which reason they are properly called the secrets of hearts. But the Doctor judges that God denies both kinds of knowledge to wicked angels, as he himself distinctly teaches in dist. 4, q. 10, question 8, n. 12, where he writes:

Regarding the evil angels I say that, if any evil angel were permitted absolutely to use his natural cognitive power, he could understand whatever caused intelligible there is, and consequently the thoughts of hearts and the mysteries of grace, once these have been brought into effect. But, as the Master says, book 1, d. 7., many things are possible for them by their nature which are not permitted to them. And so it is supposed that an evil angel is not permitted to see the secret of the heart, and in this way, and no other, could he see the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Therefore it is supposed that they are not permitted to see the mysteries of grace.

By these words the Doctor denies evil angels knowledge of the secrets of hearts, both as regards their moral being and as regards their natural being. — Therefore, when it is objected: God alone knows the secrets of the heart, one must answer with this distinction: God alone knows the secrets of the heart insofar as they belong to the purely natural order, I deny, since on that basis they are manifest even to the good angels; insofar as they are supernatural and moral and ordered to him as rewarder and avenger, I concede. For this seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor.*

You will say 3. From what has been said it is clear that the Holy Fathers proved the Divinity of Christ the Lord from the fact that he knew the secrets of hearts and the inward affections of the mind: therefore it is a sign that they judged such knowledge to be proper to God alone and not able to belong to any other in any way, otherwise their inference would certainly have no force.

— I deny the consequence, just as I deny its inference: for the efficacy of the argument of the holy Fathers required only that it be clear from Scripture that God alone in fact had knowledge of the thoughts of hearts: and since Christ also in fact had it, it followed that he was God. Add that this argument for the Divinity of Christ seems indeed sufficient, but not efficacious: for even if he had not truly been God, he could still have known the inward affections of the mind, namely through divine revelation, as happened to many Prophets, especially since Sacred Scripture does not explain whether the mode of that knowledge is natural and proper, or supernatural and received from elsewhere.

*So that the other things that are usually objected against the opinion of the Subtle Doctor on this point may be more easily dissolved, it should be carefully noted that he attributes knowledge of the secrets of the heart variously to God, to angels and to demons: so that God, by his infinite power of understanding, knows them not only according to their natural being, but also according to their moral and supernatural being; nor merely some of them, but absolutely all, and not by knowledge received from another but as most properly his own. The good angels indeed, by the power granted to them by God, can know them according to their natural being, but not according to their moral being and in the order to the supernatural end. The demons, however, know only some of them by conjectural knowledge, especially in those matters that pertain to the inward affections of men, which they surmise and infer from certain movements and agitations of the body.

— The Doctor himself must be heard in book 4, dist. 45., question 4., n. 7., where, answering the second argument proposed at the beginning of this question, whether the blessed know the prayers we offer, when it had been objected that God alone knows the secrets of the heart and that consequently he alone has the mental prayers that are made, he answers thus:

I say that there is nothing in the mind, namely any operation whatever of intellect or will, or any property, or real condition of this or that thing, but that the whole of it lies open proportionally to an angel proportionally present and unimpeded, or to a soul unimpeded and proportionally present, just as present whiteness appears to the soul united to the body through sense. That saying, then, that God alone knows the hidden things of hearts, is universally true and from his own perfection, so that it is impossible that anything impeding should hide them from him. He also knows them as universal Judge of all such hidden things, in that way in which neither the good angels, nor the evil ones, nor separated souls know them. Indeed in fact the Blessed did not know many such movements, because of the lack of due presence. But the evil, even with proportional presence, did not know many such things, God impeding them; because of whose impediment they cannot do many things which, if unimpeded, they could naturally.

Thus the Doctor.*

Third conclusion. — Angels do not know future contingents dependent on free causes.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture, especially from that passage of Isaias 41., Announce the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods: and chapter 46.² I am God, and there is no God besides, neither is there anyone like me announcing from the beginning the things that shall be at last, and from the beginning things that are not yet made, saying. And Daniel 2.: There is a God in Heaven revealing mysteries. The same is taught commonly by the Holy Fathers. Hilary, in book 9.: What is proper to God, rather than knowledge of things to come? And Cyril too, book 4. on John: To none other, he says, than to the one and only natural God does it befit to know things to come. And Jerome, weighing that passage of Isaias 46., where at length he proves that demons could not predict future outcomes of events through idols, since indeed they did not foreknow the ruin of their own temples. Wherefore Origen, book 6. Contra Celsum, rightly concludes that the prediction of things to come is the character of the divine word. And St. Damascene, book 2. De Fide, chapter 4., affirms that prescience of things to come depending on liberty is denied not only to demons but also to the holy angels: the good angels indeed can know it from God's revelation, but the demons from conjecture alone.

The Seraphic Doctor proves this truth, book 2, dist. 7., question 3.: These future contingents are either known by angels in their causes or in themselves: not in their causes, because free will is of itself indifferent to one part and to the other, and regards one part no less than the other: therefore from it the event is no more understood as future than as not future. Not in themselves, because this seems proper to God alone, who, being eternal, holds all things in his eternity, both future and past, as present.

Whence, he says, divine cognition does not depend on any thing: rather, it knows all things that it knows according to the mode of its own truth, and because its truth is most certain, it knows contingents most certainly, as necessary; but as it knows most certainly, so can it announce and reveal with certainty; therefore this foreknowledge of things to come is either God's or from God: and therefore when such things are predicted, the prediction is called Divination, because such is a divine act; and because demons, being proud, desire above all to be honored as God, they strive above all to show that they have this in themselves, and to say this; therefore to say that demons of themselves foreknow future contingents with certainty is to attribute to them what belongs to God; therefore there is infidelity there, and idolatry is frequently annexed to infidelity; therefore Divination is prohibited.

Yet this argument, common among all Theologians, can indeed persuade that angels do not in fact know those futures that depend on the free choice of God or of rational creatures; but it does not effectively demonstrate that angels have no natural activity toward their knowledge. For although free will is free, nevertheless the truth of either proposition about a thing to come necessarily determines it, and since that truth lies within the limits of the natural order, it does not seem to transcend the angelic grasp; and therefore the reason why the angel does not know that truth of a future thing is not to be sought from anywhere else than from the very will of God reserving to himself the knowledge of the future thing, which he sometimes announces and reveals to creatures as he pleases.

You will say. Experience establishes that demons, either by themselves, or through men whom they inspire, announce many things freely to come, for instance the outcomes of wars, the changes of kingdoms, and other things like these, which depend on the free wills of men; yet these are not excepted from God revealing: therefore by their own natural power they can foresee future contingents.

I answer to the major. Truly indeed demons sometimes announce these things, but they receive them either from God, who reveals many things to the wicked and impious, as he once predicted many things through Balaam, and Caiphas, and the Gentile Sibyls, and idolaters, as Augustine teaches, book 2. De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 17., and who deigns sometimes to address demons, as is clear from chapters 1. and 2. of Job, and who, as it were ministers of his justice, can reveal some future things through himself immediately, or through the holy angels; or I say that demons predict true things through revelations made not to themselves but to holy men, which they can gather from their words or writings. For, says Tertullian in the Apology, chapter 22.: they pick out also the dispensations of God, now while the Prophets preach, and now while the readings resound. Thus taking from hence certain lots of times, they emulate Divinity, while they steal divination. Or thirdly I say with St. Augustine, book 2. De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 17., that sometimes the nefarious spirits even predict by divining those very things they themselves are about to do: wherefore the good Christian must beware of mathematicians, or of any impious diviners, above all when speaking truths, lest the soul, deceived, be ensnared in a moment by the fellowship of demons into a bond of association. Fourthly, finally, I say that demons sometimes know future things from conjectures and from the influences of the stars, which they know excellently well: For, says Tertullian in the same place, from their dwelling in the air, and from their nearness to the stars, and from their commerce with clouds, they prepare themselves to know heavenly things: so that they promise rains which they already feel. But since they know from elsewhere that the greatest part of men follow the passions excited by the influences of the stars rather than reason, they frequently speak truths, although they know those things not certainly, but only conjecturally. Add that God, in vengeance for the impious curiosity of those who consult them, sometimes permits that either Demons or Magi predict truths: For, says St. Augustine, book 2. De Doctrina Christiana chapter 23.: it comes about that, by some hidden divine judgment, men greedy of things to come are given over to be mocked and deceived according to the merits of their pleasures, by mocking and deceiving Angels; and through these illusions and deceptions it happens that in those superstitious and pernicious kinds of divinations many things present and future come to be known, and that many things happen according to their observations just as they said; entangled in which they become more curious, and insert themselves more and more into the manifold snares of pernicious error.

You will object 2. The rational soul sometimes also discloses many future things during sleep, and when it is free from the operation of the senses, especially the exterior senses; for we think many things in dreams which are afterwards proven by the event to have been thought truly. Therefore this must be attributed much more to angels purified of every body.

The Seraphic Doctor praised above answers, that

Dreams are of fivefold kind. Some occur from the disposition of the body: some from anxiety of mind: some from diabolical illusion: some from angelic revelation: some from divine vision. The first two Dreams are presages of futures which have their cause in us: thus Dreams that occur from causes of the body are signs of infirmity: Dreams that occur from anxiety of mind are signs of those things to be done or desired toward which our inclination tends. But the others are not signs of themselves; rather, if of themselves they are applied to other things, they offer occasion for erring rather than for foreknowing. Dreams, which if they are from diabolical illusion, are of no strength, just as neither are the divinations of Augurs. But Dreams, which are from the good angels, or from God, are true and right signs in us; and so from this it is not obtained that foreknowledge of future contingents is had in any other way than from God.

* You will ask. — Of how many kinds, and what, is angelic knowledge? I answer that a twofold knowledge of the angels is assigned by St. Augustine, one of which he called Matutinal (Morning), the other Vespertinal (Evening), taking the occasion from the creation of the universe closed within six days of evening and morning; so that, in his opinion, those days of the creation of the world were not in the succession of flowing time, but in angelic cognition, which he distinguished as twofold, wherefore he called the first Matutinal because through it they knew things produced or to be produced in the divine Word as in a mirror, in which those things were represented, but far more clearly and distinctly than they are and appear in themselves: but the other, which the angelic intellect had regarding the things themselves considered according to their entitative and natural being, since it was somewhat obscure, or less splendid than the preceding, he therefore named Vespertinal.

— On this matter St. Augustine himself must be heard, book 4. De Genesi ad litteram, chapter 31., where, speaking of angelic cognition and inquiring whether the angels knew all things at once, he answers:

Was it not through all six days, while those things which it pleased God to create individually were being created, that first he received these in the Word of God, so that they would first come to be in his knowledge — already it was said, and thus it was done. Then, when they had been made in their own proper nature which they have, and had pleased God because they were good, then likewise he knew them by another certain lower cognition, which was signified under the name of Evening, and then evening having been made it became morning, when God was praised for his work, and the knowledge of another creature that was next to be made was received from the Word of God before it came to be. Not therefore then all things at once, and day and evening and morning, but singly in the order which Scripture records. Then, when he had established the difference between human and angelic cognition — that the latter is compared with slowness, difficulty, and delay of time on account of the corruptible body, whereas the angelic mind apprehends what is to be known most swiftly — he adds: before these things were made he saw them in the Word of God to be made, before they were made: as if they were first coming to be in his knowledge, when God was saying that they be made, before they were in their own proper nature, which likewise, when made, he knew even in those very things. With the lesser knowledge, therefore, which was called Evening — and surely the things being made preceded that knowledge, because whatever can be known precedes cognition; for unless what is known exists first, it cannot be known — after these things, if it so pleased him that he delighted more in himself than in his Creator, morning would not be made, that is, he would not rise from his cognition into praise of the Creator. But when morning was made, another thing was to be made and known by God saying: Let it be made, so that previously it would likewise come to be in the cognition of the angelic mind, and it could again be said, and so it was done; and then in its own proper nature, wherein it would be known upon the ensuing evening.

— He explains this matter far more clearly and distinctly in book 11. De Civitate Dei, chapter 7., where, having said that on the first day of the creation of the world, under the name of Light, the holy city was signified in the holy angels and blessed spirits: he adds that in that recital of the work of the days mention is indeed made of evening but not of night, and he brings forward this reason:

When Scripture numbered those days in order, nowhere did it interpose the word night. For it does not say anywhere: night was made, but evening was made, and morning was made, one day. So the second and the rest. For the cognition of a creature in itself is, so to speak, more faded than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made. Thus evening can more fittingly be said than night, which, however, as I said, when referred to praising and loving the Creator, returns to morning. And when it does this in the cognition of itself, it is one day. When in the cognition of the firmament, which between the lower and upper waters is called heaven, the second day is made. When in the cognition of earth and sea and of all things generated, which are continued to the earth by roots, the third day. When in the cognition of the greater and lesser lights, and of all the stars, the fourth day. When in the cognition of all swimming and flying animals from the waters, the fifth day. When in the cog> nition of all terrestrial animals, and of man himself, the sixth day.

— Ludovicus Vives, weighing the aforesaid passages of St. Augustine in his commentary on the aforementioned chapter 7., book 11. De Civit. Dei, writes, concerning these things, in book 4. De Gen. ad litt. where he calls morning:

when the angels raise themselves up from the aspect of created things known in those very things — where there is darkness and deepest night — to the charity of God: and if, loving God and gazing on all things in him, they know them, which is a surer science of all things than if the things themselves were seen, then it is day. But it inclines toward servant when the angel turns himself from God to created things, and beholds them not in God, but in themselves: yet even here evening does not pass into night, because never do they prefer the work to their Artificer, which would be the darkest night. So much from Augustine, who first introduced the matutinal and vespertinal sciences.

Thus he.

To these things must be added what the Subtle Doctor hands down, book 2, dist. 3., qu. 9., num. 9. and 10., where, weighing the former passage of St. Augustine's De Gen. ad litt., he writes thus:

Those six days were not in the succession of time, but in the angelic cognition of creatures having an order of nature, so that the angel first naturally knew the creature in the Word, secondly in its proper genus: and, not standing there, he returned to the Word, praising it for its work: and in it again he saw naturally the rationale of the following creature, so that when God said: Let there be light, the angel saw himself in the eternal Word: when light was made, and when evening was made, he saw himself in its proper genus: and when evening and morning were made, one day, he rose from himself into the praise of God, in whom he saw the second creature: so that that vision was the term of the preceding day (inasmuch as from the cognition of the first creature in the Word he rose into the cognition of the Word — nay, it is the rest of all creatures in the first Artificer and Maker; thus Augustine distinguishes each day up to the seventh day, of which the morning was of the last creature in the Word, and no evening followed) and it was the beginning of the following day inasmuch as he saw that creature in its proper genus. And although he himself placed that cognition of things in the Word as beatific cognition, as appears there at the beginning of chapter 22.: Since the holy Angels always see the face of God and enjoy his unigenitate Word, equal to the Father, in the Word of God they first knew the whole universal creature in which they themselves were principally created: fruition therefore pertains to beatitude. Similarly in the same chapter: Then the night pertains to the day, not the day to the night, when the lofty and holy angels refer what they knew of the creature in the Creator himself to his honor and love, in which they contemplate the eternal reasons by which it was created, and by that most harmonious contemplation they are one day, which the Lord has made. To which the Church, freed from this pilgrimage, is joined, that we also may exult and rejoice in it. — Yet it can be proven from his sayings that the cognition which is called most commonly matutinal cognition is natural, and not precisely beatific: because according to him, that order existed in angelic cognition, creature after creature, in that the angelic cognition of creatures in the Word naturally preceded prior their cognition in their proper genus. But when the creatures had been made in their proper genus, the angel could immediately have cognition of them in their proper genus. Therefore: all those cognitions in the Word naturally preceded the cog> nition of creatures in their proper genus: therefore all of them, according to him, were produced simultaneously. Therefore that cognition in the Word naturally preceded their production in the proper genus, but then the angels were in the state of innocence, and not blessed, because there was some little delay between their creation and fall. There was, therefore, some matutinal cognition of the angels, namely of creatures existing in the Word in natural things, or at least not of the blessed: and so it seems that one must posit a distinct cognition of the angel standing in natural cognition, or in grace, because otherwise, with the cause alone known, he could not know creatures and ordered effects before knowing them in their proper genus. For the ratio of knowing a thing confusedly is not the ratio of knowing it distinctly, and its ordered effects. — And if it be objected how he could know other things in the Word, known not intuitively but abstractively, I answer: the whole of natural science is now about passions abstractively through the intellect, so that not only the subject intuitively known, but also abstractively, is that in which the passion is known.

— Thus the Doctor, who, since he explains this matter amply, we shall refrain from expounding it more fully.*