Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

A celebrated controversy exists among the disciples of the Angelic Doctor and of the Subtle Doctor in resolving this Question: for although the Subtle Doctor in 2. d. 3. q. 10. and 11. grants that the angel had infused into him by God from the very beginning of his formation the species of universal things, and indeed even of those individuals which existed along with him at that time, and therefore that he did not receive them from objects of that kind; he contends nevertheless that the species of those singulars which are produced in the course of time, and were not known even to the angel from the beginning, are borrowed from the individuals themselves: indeed, that the angel, by the power of understanding implanted in him, could even draw all species whatsoever from the objects, if he did not have them infused from elsewhere. But the contrary opinion the Angelic Doctor teaches in 2. d. 3. q. 2. art. 1. and 2. contra Gentes c. 96., whom all his disciples follow. Now, in order that the resolution of this Question may appear more evident, and the present controversy be settled by an easier calculation

Note 1. It is customarily distinguished, in the usual way, that knowledge of things is twofold: namely Intuitive, and Abstractive. Intuitive knowledge is knowledge of a thing present and moving as present, in its actual existence. But abstractive knowledge is knowledge of an object moving insofar as it abstracts from all presence and actual existence. Now all confess that this twofold knowledge is in the angels. For first, certain things are present to them in their actual existence, and they know them intuitively, nor do they need any species to perceive them, for the object present suffices for that intellection, concurring as an efficient cause together with the intellect, according to that common saying: from the object and the power is born all knowledge. But things which are not present, nor move the angelic intellect by their actual existence duly proportioned to knowledge of themselves, the angel knows only abstractively, namely in the impressed species representing the thing itself. For, as the Doctor says in the cited question 10., in order that the object concur together with the power, it must be present either in itself, or in something else. Now since the object, with respect to abstractive knowledge, is not present in itself, it must necessarily be made present by its species and image. Hence intuitive knowledge precisely is knowledge of an existing thing moving the intellect to knowledge of itself insofar as it is present: abstractive knowledge, however, is knowledge of an object present only in species and image, through which it is represented.

Note 2. Or, to sum up from what we said in sect. 2. q. 1. on the beatific vision, the representative species of an object is customarily distinguished as twofold: for one is called impressed, the other expressed. The former is a virtual similitude of some object, or a certain intentional quality effectively concurring with the intellect to produce knowledge, completing the power itself, as it were, and determining it on the side of the object to produce this knowledge. It is called a similitude because it represents the object and exhibits it as present to the knowing power: it is called virtual, for it does not represent the object formally, but virtually, because it takes the place of the object in concurring to form knowledge. For since all knowledge is born from the power and the object, the power indeed always concurs of itself to form knowledge, but the object sometimes through its vicarious species, as has been said. It is called an intentional quality, because it is ordered to knowledge and the intellect, whose operation is sometimes called an intentio. The latter species, namely the expressed one, is the internal term of knowledge, which in the intellect is called the Word of the mind, in the imagination a phantasm, and it is itself formed by the intellect and the object concurring, as the image and expression of that object.

Note 3. All Theologians concede that the species of things, at least of universals, and also of the more excellent individuals, which God had formed or was about to form, were concreated with the angels: for this truth is drawn first from Sacred Scripture, whereby Ecclesiasticus ch. 17. affirms that God filled the first Parents with the discipline of understanding, created in them the science of the spirit, and filled their heart with sense: and it is right to hold the same of the angels, of one of whom, namely the Prince, the Holy Fathers interpret allegorically that passage of Ezekiel 28. You Cherub... the seal of similitude, full of wisdom, and perfect in beauty, you were in the delights of the paradise of God, etc. You Cherub extended and protecting.... perfect in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you. Hence S. Dionysius c. 5 and 7. teaches that the rationes of things and the exemplars were implanted in the angels by the divine Mind and communicated to them; and S. Augustine, lib. 4. De Gen. ad litteram, c. 24. expressly teaches that before time, or by nature, than when material things were created, the angels had knowledge of all things, not only in the Word, but also in their proper genus, that is, through the species of those things. Which indeed can be confirmed by this reasoning of S. Thomas q. 55. art. 2: thus, with proportion observed, the intellective power ought to have been related to intelligible forms, as prime matter to substantial forms, for both are of themselves pure potency, and need a form through which they may be reduced to act: therefore just as the matter of lower and corruptible things was not always in act, but is successively actualized through diverse forms; while the matter of incorruptible heavenly bodies received from the beginning its substantial forms congenital to it: so the heavenly angels, spiritual and immortal, had from the beginning congenital to them the species or intentional forms necessary for their perfection, whereas human intellects receive them gradually from things.

With these things premised, three points above all come to be determined in this Question:

First, whether the angels necessarily need intelligible species in order to perceive things of any kind: Second, whether they had singular species of each thing, or rather perceived all things through one species, or not so many universal species: Third, whether they could have received species of things from objects, if God had not implanted them; and whether they can borrow some anew from the individual things themselves, which are formed from day to day: Fourth, whether they understand themselves through their substance, or through species.

First conclusion. — The angel needs impressed species for abstractive knowledge of things possible, or past, or future, or not sufficiently present: but not for knowledge of things present. This is the Doctor's teaching in 2. dist. 3. q. 10. n. 16. as regards both parts, of which

Proof of the first. For knowledge of possible things, and of things not duly present, the human intellect requires intelligible species: therefore also the angelic. The consequence is proved, because it appears easier how the human intellect could be determined to knowledge of those things without species, than the angelic: therefore if species are admitted in the human intellect notwithstanding this, much more must they be admitted in the angelic. The antecedent is proved: if intelligible species were not present to the human intellect, it could be said to be determined to knowledge of things through phantastic species: but nothing can be assigned in the angel which, with the species set aside, would determine its intellect to knowledge of things: therefore if species seem necessary in the human intellect with respect to things to be known abstractively, much more will they be necessary in the angelic intellect. Further, every object ought to inflow into the faculty and determine it to knowledge, either of itself, or through something else acting in its place and representing it: but those things to be known abstractively cannot of themselves move the intellect, since they neither really exist, nor are duly present to it: therefore, etc. Finally, the angel does not understand necessarily all possible things, for this would doubtless argue an infinite power in him: therefore in order to understand some of them, some determinant of that understanding must be admitted, whereby he may perceive that possible thing: but that determinant cannot be the possible thing in itself, because the possible thing, as such, is necessarily possible, and, as far as its nature goes, is applied always in the same manner; nor can any other determinant be assigned besides the impressed species: therefore it must be conceded.

— The same judgment must be given concerning absent things; that the angels cannot see corporeal things existing at whatever distance, Sacred Scripture seems to intimate in several places, especially Job 1. v. 7. I have gone round about the earth, and walked through it, etc. Have you considered my servant Job? And Matth. 12. v. 43. where Christ says, that

the unclean spirit, that is, the devil, when he has gone out of a man, walks through dry places seeking rest, and not finding it, he returns to the house from which he went out: And coming he finds it empty, swept, and adorned. Then he goes, and takes with him seven other spirits worse than himself, and entering in they dwell there, and the last things of that man (the energumen) become worse than the first.

From which it is clear that things are not found out by the angels at whatever distance: for if, says Martinonus disp. 36., the demon sees all things everywhere, he could have considered Job attentively, without traversing the earth, and yet on the occasion or presupposed cause of that perambulation God questions the demon whether he has considered Job his servant. Nor was there need for him to seek another dry place to find rest, if before he betook himself there he could see that there was no place of rest there; nor, in order to return to his former lodging, having learned its favorable disposition, to return to his companions, and, taking them with him, to enter it again together. For what purpose all those peregrinations, if from the dry place he could discern the disposition of the lodging, and from there summon his companions, and then together take up his abode in it? Nor does it stand in the way that some object — namely, that the rich man (Epulo) saw Abraham and Lazarus existing in the limbo from hell; for either that distance was not great physically, although a great chaos is interposed morally, on account of the impossibility of passage or aid; or rather this vision was not natural as to mode, but supernatural, like many other things pertaining to the divine justice and to the state of the Blessed and of the damned.

You will say. Although the angel had species of many things, he would not necessarily be carried toward the objects of those species, nor would he necessarily understand them: therefore he would have to be determined to understand them in particular by something else distinct from the species: but that other determinant could determine his intellect with the species set aside just as well as with them present: therefore those species do not seem necessary. The antecedent is evident, for if the angel necessarily understood the things whose species he has, since he has implanted species of almost all things, it would follow that he understands all things at once, which certainly would imply a greater perfection than befits an angelic intellect. The consequence likewise is evident: since the intellect is a faculty and power indifferent of itself, as it were, and undetermined as to whether it be occupied with this or that object, it cannot be applied to understanding one thing before the others, unless it be determined to this knowledge by something.

— I distinguish the antecedent. that he would not necessarily be carried toward the objects whose species he has, when those species are duly represented to the intellect itself and shine in it in act, and are clearly set before it as images of the things whose species they are, I deny: for since the intellect is a natural faculty, it is also naturally and necessarily carried to the knowledge of things duly present to it, either of themselves, or through their species: that he is not carried necessarily toward the objects whose species he does not have thus shining in him in act, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. For although our intellect has the species of many things stored up within it; yet because not all, but only some, appear shining in act in it by alternating succession, and are set before it to be beheld, thence it comes that it has knowledge only of some things, not of all things whose species it embraces. The same must be said in like manner of the angelic intellect, which although it embraces and preserves the species of many things divinely implanted in it; yet because all of them are not equally set before its gaze to be beheld, thence it comes that it does not perceive all objects at once whose species it embraces within itself.

You will insist. therefore our intellect does not perceive in act all the species it embraces stored up within it, because, to be sure, it is determined by phantasms and objects newly applied to the knowledge of one thing before another: but these things cannot be said of the angelic intellect, since, as we said, it has nothing besides the species by which it could be moved and determined to knowledge of an object: therefore, etc.

— I answer. the major being conceded, I distinguish the minor: the angelic intellect has nothing similar, corporeal, and sensible, I concede: immaterial and spiritual, I deny. For since the angelic intellect is of finite entity, and cannot know all things at once, it is necessary that it perceive objects by alternating concept, either through the presence of the same objects newly exhibited to it, or through the excitation of species, which is made either by superior angels illuminating, or by the will of the same angel; which, since it is always illumined and supremely free, nor, like ours, is as it were obscured or held captive by phantasms, or by the operation of the senses, both internal and external, can move the angel's intellect at its pleasure, so that it may gaze upon this or that object in the species which it sets before it.

You will say 2. If the angel has species, or receives them either from things, or implanted from God: but neither can be asserted: therefore, etc. The major stands: the minor is proved: if the angel were to receive those species from things, he would have to be moved by external objects to receive those species: but the objects themselves could sufficiently concur of themselves with the angelic intellect for knowledge of themselves, even with the species set aside: therefore for this reason they do not seem to be admitted. Nor do those species seem to be infused by God, for either those species, produced from the beginning together with the angel, were divinely implanted in him; or as due perfections of the angelic nature, or as forms flowing from his substance in the manner of a property: the first does not seem admissible, for it would follow that God could deny species to the angels without any prejudice to the angelic nature; nor would it be violent and imperfect for the angel to have knowledge of no thing, just as it is not violent for him not to see God naturally, although he can gaze upon him by another supernatural light.

— I deny the minor. for indeed the angel could receive those species from things, as we shall soon prove, or have them implanted in him divinely by God: nor would it thence follow that they must be called supernatural forms; since indeed the naturalness or supernaturalness of forms is not precisely attended to on the side of the producing principle; for if God were to produce heat anew in water, that heat would not for that reason be called a supernatural form, nor specifically distinct from that which is produced by fire: but it is attended to, either with respect to the receptive power, which of its nature does not require such a form for its perfection and operation, or on the side of the end and object transcending the forces of nature, namely that by its natural power it could in no way attain it. But these things cannot be said of the species of things implanted by God in the angels; since indeed those species could be naturally acquired by the angelic intellect, if it did not have them implanted from elsewhere: nor are they beyond the natural state of the angel, for since he is naturally understanding, he also requires knowledge of things as his natural perfection, and that knowledge which he has of objects through the mediation of species is purely natural.

Proof of the second part. namely that for knowledge of things existing and present the angel has no need of species; for objects, whether they be corporeal or spiritual, can sufficiently move and determine the angelic intellect, either in the manner of a cause partially concurring to form knowledge, or in the manner of a term, or condition without which not: therefore for knowledge of those objects species do not seem to be necessarily required. The consequence is evident: for if they were fruitless, there is no necessity to grant them; since nature suffers nothing empty and fruitless. Proof of the antecedent. By the very power by which a present object could concur to produce its species when it is set before the angelic intellect, by the same power it could concur to produce, or terminate, knowledge of itself: therefore for knowledge of it species do not seem to be required.

You will say 1. If the angel could understand present objects without species, the inferior angel would know the superior, or the superior the inferior, of itself: but neither can be affirmed. Not indeed the first, because the determinant principle for knowledge must be commensurated to the power, nor exceed it in immateriality; for by this reason the divine essence cannot be seen by an angel naturally: but a superior angel is not commensurated to an inferior: for he is far more immaterial, or more perfect, than he, and therefore cannot naturally concur with him for knowledge. Nor the second; because the object born to concur with the intellective faculty for knowledge of itself must be equally immaterial as the intellect itself: but an inferior angel is not equally immaterial as a superior.

— I deny the minor. for by the very reason by which an object could not concur with a power that was more or less material, neither could it concur with it to produce its species, nor would such an intellect naturally require such a species: but no one has said this: therefore neither ought what follows from it to be admitted. Or say, that the proof of that minor is to be distinguished: the object must be of the same perfection and equally immaterial as the power, according to its entity, I deny: it must be immaterial and commensurated according to the mode of operating, so that namely for a spiritual operation the object, however perfect or imperfect, must concur according to the mode of the operating faculty, and be so tempered to it, that a more excellent object with a less perfect faculty does not effect a more excellent operation than a less perfect one would effect, I concede. For the dignity of the operation is to be drawn not only from the side of the object, but also from the side of the operating faculty.

You will insist. If one angel could determine immediately the intellect of another angel to knowledge of himself (the same must be said of any other object), it would be necessary that he slip into his mind, since he would have to be made intimately present to it, and really change it: but no creature can slip into another creature: for this is proper to God alone by reason of his divine immensity: therefore, etc.

— I deny the major. for indeed in order that an object move a power, it need not be made present to it substantially, and by the insinuation of substance: but it suffices that it be made present by an intimate and immediate motion of itself, even if this be made by the mere external apposition and presence of the object. Add that, in order that one angel can determine and move another, that presence is not required by which it is made as it were in the manner of physical contact, which the intimate presence of bodies must be. For since the angel does not depend on a material medium in order to exert his power upon another, he can also, physically and substantially distant from him, move him and determine him to knowledge of himself, as we shall more fully teach below, when treating of angelic speech.

You will say 2. In order that an object cause intellection together with the intellect, it must be one with it, and therefore its form: but the object cannot be such of itself immediately, but only through the mediation of a species: therefore the species of the object is necessarily required.

— I deny the major. for just as a phantasm can concur with the agent intellect to the impressed species, although it is not its form, nor one with it, except in that manner in which two partial causes can be said to be one cause, to which it is not required that one be in the other, or be the form of the other: so plainly must it be said in our case, that in order that a proportionate object cause with the possible intellect the intellection itself immediately, it is not necessary that it in another way make one with the intellect, or be in it as its form.

Second conclusion. — The angel does not have universal species by which he could know many distinct things, but for knowledge of diverse things he needs diverse species. So the Doctor in the cited q. 10. num. 8.

Proof 1. No created thing can be the ratio of knowing things infinite in number: but a universal species, if it were given, would be the ratio of knowing things infinite in number: therefore, etc. The minor stands, for since the individuals of species are possible infinite in number, it follows that if a universal species be given, e. g. representative of all men, both existing and future and possible, that species must have the power of representing infinite things. The Doctor proves the major: it implies that some creature could be admitted which is of infinite perfection: but a representative species of infinite things would necessarily have to have infinite perfection; for where numerical plurality imports perfection, a greater plurality connotes a greater perfection; and therefore an infinite plurality argues infinite perfection. For indeed if a power capable of bearing two pounds is more perfect than that which can bear one, and capable of bearing six more perfect than that which bears two, it follows that that which can bear infinite things will be of infinite perfection: therefore similarly, since a representative species of two things is more perfect than that which reports only a single one, it follows that that which would have the power of representing infinite things would also be of infinite perfection. He confirms by a simile, because from the fact that the divine essence is representative of all intelligibles, we gather that it is infinite: therefore in like manner if any species could represent infinite things, it would truly also be of infinite perfection.

Proof 2. If any species could represent several distinct things, above all the species of common nature, e. g. the species of the nature of man, which would represent all men whatsoever: but this cannot be said. It is proved: in order that the species of human nature could represent all men whatsoever, it must be that all men are contained in human nature: but this is false. It is proved: if human nature contained men inferior to itself, either maximally, or formally, or eminently: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, for that which contains something formally is also formally that very thing: but no nature is formally all its individuals: therefore it does not contain them formally. Nor the second: for that which contains eminently is far more excellent than that which it contains: therefore if any nature eminently contained all its individuals, both existing and possible, since these are infinite in number, it would follow that that nature is infinitely perfect: but this implies a contradiction: therefore also that from which it follows. Further, in order that something represent another perfectly, it must involve all its characters and degrees, otherwise it will represent it only partially and imperfectly: but no species of universal nature can refer all the characters of its inferiors. It is proved: no species of universal nature can represent another thing otherwise than what it itself contains in itself entitatively and exhibits to be represented: but no common or universal nature entitatively contains all the degrees of its inferiors, since individuals add a distinct entity and difference above the specific nature: therefore since the grade of individuality is not contained in the specific nature, neither can it be represented through it.

Proof 3. Those universal species seem useless and superfluous: therefore they are not to be admitted. The antecedent is proved: whatever the angel could understand through a universal species, he could know far more excellently through the particular species of it: for the species of a particular thing more perfectly represents it, than a merely common species would represent it. Therefore universal species do not seem useful for that. Further, through those universal species, either the angel would necessarily understand all things whose species he has, or he would not understand all things at once, but now these objects, now those, according as he is moved and determined either by his own will, or from elsewhere. If the first, it is certain that a particular species could effect this as perfectly as a universal species. If the second, the intellect will be able far more easily to turn from one object to another to be understood, where those various objects are represented through diverse species, than if through one: for how could it come about, that the intellect, by gazing upon one and the same species entitatively, insofar as it was representative of whiteness, e. g., would no longer gaze upon it as referring to whiteness, but as to blackness, while that same species is exhibited to it unchanged as present?

Proof 4. Those species are to be ascribed to the angel which seem more connatural to him: but particular species are of this kind: therefore etc. The major is evident: for perfections befitting its natural activity and entity must be granted to a most excellent nature, such as the angel is. The minor is proved: those species seem more connatural to the angel which the angel himself could procure for himself by his own power, if he did not have them implanted from elsewhere: but the angel could procure particular species from the things themselves, just as in fact he acquires those species of particular things which were not concreated with him: but he could in no way acquire universal species: for the Thomists will that they be of such entity that they can be produced neither by the angel himself, nor by any other created cause: therefore particular species are more connatural than universal.

You will say 1. Those species are to be granted to the angel which befit his nature more: but universal species befit the angelic nature more than particular: therefore, etc. The minor is proved: angels are in the supreme grade of created intellectual substances: therefore they must have the greatest efficacy and power of understanding, and therefore of understanding many things through one species: for a power united is more perfect than divided: therefore the angelic intellective power will be more excellent, if it perceives many things through one species, than through many species corresponding to diverse things.

— I deny the minor. and to its proof I say, that the greatest power of understanding of the angels is not to be drawn from this, that it could understand many things rather through one species than through several species, but from this, that they understand things more evidently and perspicaciously than the intellective natures inferior to themselves, or that they could know more things than men, whether they know them through many species, or through one. Add that it would not be of greater perfection in the angel to understand many things through one species rather than through many, unless that knowledge which would be made through one were more perfect than that which would be made through many: but it does not appear how it is more perfect to understand diverse things, e. g. whiteness and blackness, through one species, than through their particular species, as we have already said. But as to what is added, that a power united is more perfect than one not united: that indeed is true, when from a defect of union or unity there would follow a lesser application of the intellect to the object; which does not happen in the present case, since the intellect would be applied just as perfectly, indeed more efficaciously, to understanding many objects through their distinct species, than through one.

You will say 2. For this reason universal species seem to deserve to be proscribed, because they would represent most perfectly all the inferiors of the same nature: but from this nothing absurd follows: therefore for that reason they ought not be denied. The major is clear from what has been said. The minor is proved: if no species of a common nature could represent all the individuals of the same nature, chiefly because that is finite while these are infinite in number; and the infinite cannot be represented by the finite, since the representer must be like what is represented: but this argument has no force: since God himself is perfectly and distinctly represented by a created and finite species or quality, namely by the light of glory, or by the impressed species representative of the divine essence, whose possibility we proved in the Disputation on the beatific Vision: therefore, etc.

— I deny the minor. and in proof of it I say there is no parity: First because here we are speaking of natural representation, not of supernatural representation, which comes about through a supernatural medium, for example through that impressed species of the divine Essence, which would be created and infused by God acting supernaturally, or through the light of glory, which is of a higher and divine order: but this representation of infinitely many individuals is supposed to be entirely natural, and to occur in an angelic intellect operating naturally: and so between each representation there is no parity. Then also because an object unique in number but entitatively infinite can more easily be represented and seen than things infinite in number and finite according to their entity; because, as the Doctor says in 1. dist. 2. quaest. 2.

knowledge is the more perfect the more things it knows; for to know some things is a perfection, but to know many things signifies a greater perfection and a more perfect impressed species: therefore to know infinite things signifies infinite perfection: but not so when the object is unique in number yet infinite in entity, for then it is perceived only under the aspect of an infinite object, not indeed according to every degree of infinite perfection.

Third conclusion. — Angels can know something anew, and receive species from external things. This is the teaching of the Doctor in 2. d. 3. quaest. 11. num. 11. where * he lays down three points: first, that an angel can know anew some singular of which he does not have connatural knowledge; but he cannot know this singular through the connatural universal species, and therefore he must procure for himself that knowledge through a species newly received. Second, that even if he had knowledge of the singular from elsewhere, he still ought to receive knowledge of existence and of the accidents which accompany existence, because, he says, from knowledge of quiddities and universals, which are necessary, a contingent proposition cannot be known; but the existence or non-existence of things is contingent; therefore it does not suffice to have knowledge of quiddities and universals in order to know that this singular exists. Third, that however much he might have connatural knowledge of the singular and of contingent existence, nevertheless he necessarily receives intuitive knowledge of singulars from things: for not everyone knowing the existence of something knows it intuitively, since he can know it abstractively. To these he adds a fourth reason, namely that even if angels did not have the universal species of things concreated with them, they could nonetheless know all created things by the operation and benefit of the agent and possible intellect. But before we weigh all these reasons of the Subtle Doctor, by the authority * The conclusion must be proved, first indeed from sacred Scripture: for S. Paul says to the Ephesians 3.;

He sent me to illuminate all what is the dispensation of the Sacrament hidden from ages in God, who created all things, that is, that I should announce the mystery of the Incarnation not only to men, but also, he says, that the manifold Wisdom of God might be made known to the Principalities and Powers in heavenly places through the Church.

As if he said that he was deputed by God to teach the mystery of the Incarnation not only to men but also to angels; for, as S. Chrysostom says on that very passage, The angels were ignorant of this mystery: for if the Principalities were ignorant, much more the angels. Whence then were they to know, by whose revelation, namely when Paul knew it, then through him these others too: Paul, the Evangelist of the angels, illuminated them. To him S. Ambrose accords on the same passage, saying that God gave Paul not only as teacher to the Gentiles but also to the angels. Cyril of Alexandria subscribes, affirming that while Paul preached, the angels learned the mysteries of the Gospel. S. Augustine also favors this truth in lib. 12. cap. 7. where he teaches that when some thing comes about anew, the carnal senses of men and animals are affected, as well as the celestial senses of angels. God, he says, does not see for a time, nor does anything new come about in his vision and knowledge when something is turned temporally. Just so are affected the senses, either carnal of animals and men, or even celestial of angels: but this new affection of the angels cannot be brought about by those things unless the angels receive species from them: therefore, etc.

The Conclusion is proved. First, an angel has an agent intellect and one capable of being acted upon: therefore he can acquire and receive into himself anew species from the things themselves. The antecedent was proved in the previous Question. The consequence moreover is manifest per se: for the agent intellect is a faculty acquisitive of species, and the possible one receptive of those same species.

— Con- firmatur.** if an angel were created by God in the pure state of nature, namely endowed and illumined with no intelligible species, either he could know something by himself with the ordinary and common concourse of God through his own powers, or he could not. If the first: therefore an angel left to his own nature could borrow from the things themselves knowledge, and thereupon species. If the second: therefore an angel will be, according to his own natural powers, less perfect than our soul, which with the common influx of God can procure for itself knowledge of things through intelligible species received from them.

The Thomists reply. it is no wonder that in that case an angel would perceive nothing and would be less perfect than our soul, since he would lack some debt of his nature: just as it would be no wonder that our soul, created without an agent intellect and sensitive powers, could understand nothing, and would thereby be baser per se than a brute animal.

— On the contrary. this reply does not weaken the force of the argument, since it is false that species are owed to angels by the same right by which the agent intellect and sensitive faculty are owed to man. Indeed these faculties belong to the intrinsic perfection and constitution of man, and are really distinct from his soul: but those intelligible species are adventitious to angels and impressed from without, and therefore with them set aside the angelic nature can remain safe and intact according to substance and operative faculties: and therefore absent those species, its intellect is in the same state as the human: but, as was said, the human intellect not illumined by intelligible species can procure them for itself: therefore much more the angelic.

— It is confirmed. whatever things among inferiors signify perfection must be admitted to exist with greater right in the superior: but abstracting species from sensible things imports a perfection in the rational soul, which by the benefit of the agent intellect can vindicate for itself all knowledge of natural things: therefore much more is that power to be granted to an angel.

Proof 2. An angel can know Peter and Paul and any other individuum newly produced: but he cannot know them through any infused species: therefore either he knows them immediately, or through species borrowed from them. The major is clear; for who would affirm that an angelic intellect could not know some individuala newly produced and duly present to it? The minor is proved: if it knew them without species procured by itself, it would know them especially either through universal species of their common nature, or through particular species, by which those singulars and individuals are themselves represented: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first; both because, as was proved in the previous Conclusion, those universal species must be altogether proscribed; and because just as the universal nature does not contain determinately under itself Peter and Paul more than the other individuals of human nature, so its species cannot determine and move toward knowing Peter and Paul rather than other singular men: therefore in order that the angelic intellect understand Peter and Paul determinately, it must have another mover and determiner than the species of human nature. Nor can the second be said; for although it be conceded to the Adversaries that angels have divinely impressed species of certain individuals, it does not seem probable that there were concreated in them species of absolutely all individuals whatsoever that would ever exist. For since angels can intuit objects sufficiently present per se without the aid of a species, or borrow species from them while they are presented as present, what need was there for God to infuse into them from the beginning species representing all the blasts of winds, the motions of leaves, marine waves, all genera of idioms whatsoever, and all significations of words, and the like, which the angels certainly do know? Add that since an angel knows futures when they exist, and all their circumstances of time and place, it would follow that if he had had from the beginning impressed species of all these, he could have known free futures no less certainly, just as he intuits things present, and can recall pasts whose species he retains: but it is against faith that angels naturally foreknow certainly, and more than conjecturally, future contingents before they exist, as will be proved below: therefore, etc.

Proof 3. That although an angel might have infused species by which he understands singulars, both material and spiritual, those species would not suffice for him to know the real existence of those same objects; but he ought to receive that knowledge either from the things themselves immediately and without species, or mediately and through a species: therefore truly he can receive a species from things and know something anew. The antecedent is proved: actual existence is joined with the singular not necessarily but only contingently: for Peter, e. g., does not exist necessarily: therefore the species that represents Peter as such an individuum of human nature does not represent him necessarily as existing: and consequently in order that he be thus represented to the angelic intellect, something is necessarily required by which that intellect is moved to knowing Peter now existing, whom before it knew only as future: but this determiner cannot be anything other than a newly acquired species, or the individual thing itself, which by its own species moves the angelic intellect to the knowledge of its real existence: therefore, etc.

The Thomists reply together with S. Bonaventure in 2. d. 3. p. 2. art. 2. q. 1. that while the thing is present and existent, the angel can direct his gaze toward it, and thus through mediating infused species know it as really existing, whom before he knew only as future.

— On the contrary. to that extent can he direct his gaze toward a present thing as he has species representing it as really existing: but species concreated with them cannot represent that thing as existent, since from the beginning of the world the species of Peter, e. g., not yet produced, represented him only as future: therefore an angel who before saw Peter, through the species concreated with him, only as future, necessarily needs some determiner and motive principle by which he may intuit him as present. Otherwise the Doctor brings forward arguments of this kind which I pass over for brevity's sake.

• Fourthly finally the Subtle Doctor proves the conclusion from the fact that through those concreated species contingent propositions of things cannot be known, for this contingent proposition, e. g., Peter will tomorrow pray to God, is contingent, since it can be or not be. But it is known by an angel before it is, determinately or not determinately. If the first, it is not known as contingent; if the second, another ratio cognoscendi besides those concreated species is required; for those species represent only those terms, Peter will tomorrow pray, but not their contingency. Therefore through those concreated species the knowledge of the contingency of that thing which is known only certainly when that thing exists cannot be had. For in order that the future existence of that thing would be known certainly, it would be necessary that the free decree of God concerning the futurition of that thing be likewise known; but it is not probable that God manifested to the angels all his decrees concerning the production, direction and administration of things. Therefore through those concreated species an angel cannot know certainly the contingency of things.

— It is confirmed. because those concreated species of angels are not more perfect than the divine ideas in representing: but the divine ideas do not represent the contingent or contradictory propositions of things certainly and determinately: therefore neither will those species represent this contingency. The major is evident: for whatever is created and finite both on the part of the subject and on the part of the term is far less perfect than that which is uncreated and infinite in entity. But those species concreated with the angels are truly something created and in a finite intellect, as is clear; whereas the divine ideas are uncreated and in an infinite intellect: therefore etc. The minor is likewise manifest; for the divine ideas antecede the free decree of the will without which there is no determined future contingent. *

You will say 1. The heavenly bodies had concreated with them all the qualities and perfections they can have: therefore in like manner angels from the beginning of their formation had every perfection and knowledge due to them, and therefore can know nothing anew.

— The Doctor answers first. by retorting the argument in this way: the heavenly bodies ought not to have had concreated with them, nor impressed by God alone, the perfections which either they themselves or other secondary causes could produce in them: therefore in like manner angels ought not to have had species or knowledges infused by God which they themselves could procure and acquire anew. Then, if parity must be posited between the heavenly bodies and Spirits with respect to the matter at hand, it must be inferred that just as none of the heavenly bodies failed to have concreated the perfections naturally due to them, so similarly there ought to be no Spirit who would not vindicate for himself the natural perfection due to him impressed from the beginning of his formation; and thereupon our soul, since it is truly a Spirit, ought to have had from the beginning every perfection compossible with it. Finally, the heavenly bodies have their perfections concreated with them precisely because those perfections emanate from their substance as properties: but angels do not have a similar productive and emanative power of species and knowledges: therefore there is no parity there.

The Doctor answers 2. I distinguish the consequent: angels must have concreated with them all perfections which they cannot easily and readily acquire, he grants: which they can procure for themselves without difficulty, he denies.

You will say 2. * An angel is middle according to nature between God and the rational soul: therefore he must have a manner of operating medium between each; and thereupon, just as God does not understand through intelligible species, while the soul understands through species acquired and received from the senses, so the angel ought to understand in a middle way, that is indeed through species but innate and concreated, not however adventitious nor acquired,

— I deny the sequel of the major. for although it be granted that an angel is middle between man and God, it does not follow from that that he must have a manner of being and operating medium between each. Nor indeed does this inference hold: An angel is medial between God and man: but God is pure act in being and in operating; man however is something potential in being and in operating: therefore an angel must be partly pure act and partly something potential both in entity and in manner of operating. The same inept and unbecoming manner of arguing appears from this argument: man is middle between an angel and a horse: but an angel is not moved by progressive motion, while a horse is moved by it: therefore man must have another manner of moving than progressive. Therefore that absurd sequel of the major must be denied. It is added that the argument can thus be retorted against the adversaries. An angel is medial between God and man: therefore between each there must be held a medium manner of operating in which he partly agrees and differs with the extremes. Therefore just as he differs from man in the manner of understanding through universal species concreated, so he must agree with man in the manner of understanding and knowing singulars, existents and contingents through species newly procured. *

You will insist. an intellectual creature cannot derive species from a material object unless it have sense and phantasy: but an angel lacks those powers: therefore he cannot derive species from material objects. The minor is proved: a created power cannot naturally pass from extreme to extreme except through a medium constituted by nature between each: but if an intellectual creature lacking senses and phantasy were to derive a species and knowledge from a material object, such an object would pass from one extreme to the other without passing through the medium constituted by nature between them. It is proved: to be imaginable, or phantastic, is the medium constituted by nature between being wholly sensible, which is perceived by the bodily senses, and being intelligible which can be attained by the intellect: but if an intellectual creature lacking senses and phantasy were to receive species from a sensible object, then such an object would pass from the material and sensible being it has in itself to the intelligible being it has in the angelic intellect, without passing through the intermediate and phantastic being: therefore there would be a passage from extreme to extreme without transit through the medium constituted by nature.

— The Doctor denies the major, and distinguishes the proof of its minor. to be imaginable is the medium between the sensible and the intelligible with respect to the human intellect, he grants; with respect to the angelic, he denies. For it can happen, he says, that something be a medium with respect to one power but not with respect to another, e. g. there could be some heating agent of lesser power which could not induce eight degrees of heat in the subject at once and simultaneously, and unless it first heats it sensibly as one, then as two, so those intermediate degrees up to the eighth will be as media with respect to producing that eighth: but there could be another heating agent of such power that as soon as it were applied to the subject it would produce those eight degrees of heat, not first making it sensibly hot as two or as three, and so with respect to those two or three degrees of heat it would not be counted a medium: therefore pari ratione, being imaginable and phantastic can be a medium with respect to the human intellect, but not the angelic. And the Doctor confirms this: for if the imaginable were a medium absolutely to be passed through from sensible being to intelligible being, either it would be such a medium from the nature of the object itself, or from the nature of the knowing power. The first cannot be said, otherwise no intellect, even the divine, could know sensible being unless it first had imaginative being. If you say the second, from that it also follows that an angel could in no way understand material things, since it cannot receive the imaginable and phantastic being. Add that although the imaginable is a necessary medium with respect to the inferior and weaker power which is bound to the senses, it does not follow from that that it must also be a medium with respect to the superior and more vigorous power wholly exempt from corporeal concretion.

The Thomists reply. That indeed a sensible object can be perceived without its having imaginative and phantastic being; but that it cannot imprint its species into the intellect except by passing through the imagination; from which it follows, they say, that just as the divine and angelic intellect can know the sensible object itself without its imprinting such species, so it can have perfect knowledge of it without that object first having being in some imagination or phantasy.

— On the contrary. the sensible object could not for that reason imprint its species immediately into an intellect separated from a body, namely because it is purely corporeal and material; but nothing material can be received nor attained immediately by a spiritual thing: but this argument has no force, since that phantastic and imaginable being is truly corporeal; for it is the object of phantasy and of the common sense, which are truly corporeal, nevertheless it is perceived immediately by the human intellect, since at its aspect the agent intellect mints intelligible species; why therefore should not the angelic intellect equally be able to attain corporeal objects and at their aspect mint intelligible species? Moreover the human intellect cannot deal immediately with external objects because, being bound to the senses, nor able to operate except dependently on them, hence it is no wonder if the sensible being must first be made imaginable and phantastic before it becomes intelligible by the human intellect.

Fourth conclusion. — An angel can know himself through his essence, with no intelligible species mediating: he could nevertheless know himself through his own species, and abstractively. So the Doctor 3. dist. 3. q. 8. n. 8. * where he writes:

I say that an angel can understand himself through his essence according to the understanding expounded at the beginning of the question. Which I prove first: because the object has some partial causality with respect to intellection, and this insofar as it is actually intelligible; and the intellect has its causality with respect to the same act, according to which it concurs with the object toward perfectly producing such an action, so that these two when they are perfect in themselves and united are one integral cause with respect to intellection.

But in order to prove this assertion the Doctor repeats from 1. d. 3. q. 7. that the intellect is not the total cause of any cognition, nor is the object either, but that each is a partial cause essentially subordinated to the other, which doctrine is far more common and is granted by all concerning the human intellect at least as conjoined, and was proved in the Disputation on the soul.

These things having been premised, he thus proves the conclusion: every partial cause which is in act according to its own proper perfection, and according as it is such a cause, can cause by the causality corresponding to it an effect, and when it is united to another partial cause in its act can with it cause perfectly: but the essence of an angel is of itself in the first act corresponding to the object, because of itself it is actually intelligible, and also of itself is united to the intellect, as the object in the conjunction of both partial causes, therefore it can immediately, with the other partial cause united, have the perfect act of intellection with respect to its essence. That he may confirm and explain this, he brings forward the example of an intelligible species together with the intellect causing intellection, in which he says the object is in diminished being, that is, represented; and he concludes that the object causes much better in true being, and simply, and absolute, such as the essence of an angel has per se immediately as object of the angelic intellect. Wherefore there is no room for doubting that from essence and intellect one and adequate, nay even a nobler principle is constituted.

With these things premised the Doctor seems to argue thus: *

every agent acting by an immanent action, having the total cause productive of some effect, can produce that effect itself, whatever else be set aside; but an angel has within himself the total cause of his own intellection, having only his own intellect and his own essence, all extrinsic things and species being set aside; therefore he can understand himself through his essence.

The major is evident. The minor is proved: whoever has an intellect endowed by its native activity, and an intelligible object proportioned to that intellect in the ratio of its object and united to it, can truly understand it; but so it is with the angel regarding knowledge of himself; for the activity of his own intellect regarding knowledge of himself is no less than regarding other things; likewise his essence is actually intelligible and proportioned to his intellect, since they are of the same order of degree of spirituality; it is also intimately united to and approximated to it, nor can there be any greater union of any species with that intellect than the union of the same essence with it, for they are really identical; but species and intellect really distinguish from one another; therefore, etc.

— Next: the impressed species, in which the object is contained only according to its diminished, or intentional, being, suffices together with the intellect to produce knowledge of the object; therefore much more will the object itself duly applied and proportioned suffice to form the same knowledge; but the essence of the angel, as we said, is duly proportioned to the intellect of the same; for it is in the same order of immateriality with it, and consequently will suffice to form knowledge of the angel himself.

— Finally: if for some reason the essence of an angel could not be the ratio cognoscendi of itself, especially because it is a form existing per se and not inhering in the intellect; but such per se existence, or non-inherence, is no obstacle; therefore it can be the ratio of knowing itself in its own intellect. The major is well known; the minor is proved: First of all, that per se existence is no obstacle, because the divine essence is more per se existing, and yet is the ratio of understanding in the divine intellect, both uncreated and created blessed. Moreover, for some form, or something having itself after the manner of a form, to be the principle of physical operation, it is not necessary that it inhere: for heat, which would be in a subject only by way of assistance, could heat that subject as expediently as if it inhered in it; therefore similarly, for something to be the principle of operation in the genus of intelligibles, there is no need that it inhere in the intellect, but it suffices that it be objected to the intellect, proportioned to it, and intimately united with it. Finally, all confess that an angel can know things intimately present and proportioned to him without any species; but those things so known cannot inhere in the intellect of the angel knowing them; therefore, in order that something be the ratio of knowing, there is no need that it inhere in the intellect.

• The Doctor objects first. if any object sufficiently present to the intellect could concur with it in forming an intellection, it would follow that a sensible object exposed to the intellect could cause knowledge without an impressed species, because whiteness has being simpliciter of itself, and consequently a more perfect being than the being secundum quid which it has in the impressed species.

— To the first. I say, num. 10., denying the consequence, because the sensible object is not actually intelligible according to its real being; and therefore cannot determine the intellect to knowledge; but in the impressed species it is actually intelligible, and therefore, shining forth as it were in it, can determine to intellection. In the present case, however, the essence of the angel is, according to its real being, as actually intelligible, and as proportioned to the intellect, as it is in the intelligible species; whence if in the species it can determine to intellection, it follows that according to its real being it can so determine.

The Doctor objects secondly. nothing can concur partially with the intellect in forming an intellection, nor can it be the ratio of acting immanently, unless it inform it or inhere in it. But the essence of an angel can neither inform the intellect nor inhere in it; therefore it cannot be for the intellect the ratio of acting immanently and concur with it partially in forming an intellection.

— The Doctor distinguishes the major: that such a ratio cannot be total, he concedes; partial, he denies; and the minor granted, he similarly distinguishes the consequent: the essence of an angel is not the total ratio of that intellection which the intellect itself has, he concedes; that it is not partial, he denies. And since the essence of an angel is no less present to the intellect than the expressed intelligible species would be, it likewise has no less power to move the intellect itself to eliciting knowledge of it. For, says the Doctor there, num. 10., the intellect has its own proper activity, whether the subject is present to it in itself, or in its species concurring with it to cause the common effect of both, so that the union and approximation of these partial causes suffices. Nor is it required that one inform the other, because neither gives to the other an act pertaining to its own partial causality.

You will insist. Since the essence is distinct from the angelic intellect, it cannot concur with it, whether as a partial cause or as a total one, unless it be united with it in intelligible being. But it cannot be so united except through an expressed species. Therefore neither can it concur with it, without this, in forming knowledge of itself.

— I answer. this instance indeed presses the Thomists, who contend that the intellect is really distinguished from the essence and does not concur partially with the object in forming an intellection, but holds itself merely passively in that operation. But it does not thus press the disciples of the Subtle Doctor, who contend with him that the intellect is distinguished from the essence formally only, and that it is a co-principle concurring with the object in forming an intellection. For the identity of the angelic intellect with the essence is greater in Scotus's doctrine than in the doctrine of St. Thomas; and accordingly it is more easily understood why the essence of an angel can move the intellect to knowledge of itself. For that essence is knowable of itself like light, and hence per se manifest and evident; and since it is intimate to the intellect and really distinct from it, it illustrates and illuminates it. And just as it communicates life to it, so also it grants it intellection, which is nothing other than the action by which the intellect lives: which, since it is of itself active and is in the soul like a form, does not need to receive anything from the essence intimately present to it and illuminating it, in order to know that essence distinctly. Hence, just as the will is moved to the choice of the good represented, without receiving anything from it. For what would the will receive from it, except illumination? But it is not capable of receiving spiritual light and intelligence. Nevertheless it operates by loving, or abhorring, the object proposed and represented by the intellect. Why then should not the intellect, from the immediate and perspicuous presence of the angelic essence, be able to know it without any mediating species emitted from the essence and received in the intellect, so much so that that knowledge is quasi facial and intuitive, and like the beatific vision, in which the divine essence concurs with the blessed intellect without any mediating species in forming that vision? Thus the present difficulty, which seems the gravest of this whole disputation, is easily untangled and solved. *

You will say 3. What is the ratio cognoscendi must be subordinated to the intellect; but the essence of an angel cannot per se be subordinated to its own intellect; therefore neither can it be known by it per se. The minor is evident, because subordination implies dependence; but the essence of an angel cannot depend on its own intellect; rather here the latter depends on the former as a property, and faculty, emanating from that essence, which is the fount, and root, of all its properties, and faculties. The minor is proved: the principle by which is subordinated to the principle that; but the ratio cognoscendi is the principle by which, while the intellect is the principle that; therefore the former must be subordinated to the latter.

— I distinguish the minor. When the ratio cognoscendi is something accidental received in the intellect and really distinct from it, I concede; when it is something substantial, and really undistinguished from the intellect, I deny; for the divine essence is not subordinated to the divine intellect, although it is the ratio cognoscendi of itself and of all other things; therefore similarly, the essence of an angel ought not to be subordinated to the intellect of the angel himself, because it is really undistinguished from it, and is its fount, and origin.

You will say 4. If an angel recognized himself through his essence, it would follow that he would always be in the act of knowledge of himself, such that he could not cease from it; but the consequent seems absurd, and contrary to the most free manner of acting of the angels; therefore, etc.

— I deny the consequence of the major. For although the angel always has his substance duly applied and present under the ratio of an object, he can nevertheless, if he wishes, refrain from gazing upon it: for the angel can indeed, at the command of the will, be recalled from the intuition of his own substance, so as to apply himself to other objects proposed, just as our intellect is called away from one object present to the intuition of another.

• You will say finally. The essence of an angel is something singular; but no singular is per se intelligible; therefore neither can it per se be the ratio of its own knowledge.

— St. Thomas answers that the major is true of corporeal things, not by reason of singularity, but by reason of matter, which is in them the principle of individuation, but otherwise of spiritual things and those separate from matter, such as the angels.

— But the Doctor rejects this reasoning and shows that if therefore an angel cannot know the material thing because it is individuated through matter, neither will he be able likewise to know the immaterial thing, because it is far more difficult to know the individuating principle of a spiritual thing. It is proved; because the principle of individual difference is more remote in a spiritual thing than in a material one, since in a spiritual thing there are far fewer signs and indications of diversity than in a corporeal one. Next, according to the opinion of St. Thomas the principle of difference is in one alone, whereas in a corporeal species it is in many. Whence from that very multitude the facility of knowing them is derived. Moreover, in the cognition of a singular spiritual thing the knowledge of the species through its specific difference must necessarily intervene, and these are not so easy to know as genera and individuals are. Finally, on the principles of St. Thomas the principle of individuation is detected far more easily in a corporeal thing than in a spiritual one. For in the latter matter with quantity at once presents itself, together with its certain and determinate accidents, which display and show forth individual diversity. But in a simple spiritual thing, similar in the nature of spirit, lacking physical composition, act and matter do not readily stand forth as principles of distinction.

— Therefore I answer with the Doctor that certain knowledge can be had even of individual things, especially when due circumstances are added, namely the intimate presence of the object and its manifestation either per se, or through a vicarious species of itself. * He will also be able to cease from that cognition by non-application; just as, for example, it sometimes happens that we have our eyes open, and the object duly present and illuminated, and yet do not see it, because the powers, and faculties, both sensitive and rational, are occupied and detained elsewhere.

Proof of the second part. A superior angel can know an inferior through the latter's species; therefore in like manner that inferior angel will be able to know himself. The antecedent is clear; for angels know one another through species divinely infused into them, as all confess; although they can also know themselves immediately through their own presence. The consequence is proved: while a more perfect intellect can have imperfect knowledge of some object, a less perfect intellect will be able to have equal knowledge; therefore if a superior angel can have abstractive knowledge (which is less perfect than intuitive) of an inferior angel, why can an inferior angel not have equal knowledge of himself? Next, every angel is knowable, and intelligible, through a species by an intellect capable of receiving that species; but the intellect of that very angel is truly capable of receiving that species emitted by his own substance; indeed for receiving it he seems more apt than others, since he is more intimate to that substance emitting the species, and penetrates and conceives it, and all that flows from it, better than anyone else; therefore he can receive that species emitted from himself, and thereupon know himself abstractively.

You will say 5. The essence of an angel is necessarily joined with his existence; therefore he cannot be known according to essence without being known as existing; but he cannot be known through a species, as existing, except intuitively; therefore by no means can an angel know himself abstractively.

— I deny the consequence of the major. For just as there could be given a proper species of man representing him as animal, without its representing him qua rational, although animal and rational are two degrees intimately united in man; so there could be given a representative species of the substance of an angel, without its representing the degree of existence, especially if God should wish to suspend his concurrence, lest while the essence emits its species, existence also flow into such an emission.

You will insist. By the very fact that an angel knows himself as being such a singular thing, he must know himself as he himself is; therefore if he exists in himself, he must know himself as existing, and consequently intuitively. The consequence is proved, because in a thing actually existing, existence is not distinguished from the singular essence.

— I distinguish the antecedent. As it is in itself with respect to its singular nature, I concede; as it is in itself with respect to all the rest that pertain to it and are not necessarily involved in the concept of such a singular nature, I deny the antecedent, and the consequence together with its proof. And indeed it is marvelous that some think the concept of existence is not distinct in an existing thing from the concept of singular nature, when it is certain that we in fact have knowledge of some singular man who exists, even if we do not know whether he exists or not; add that one angel could doubtless have a concept of another singular existing angel, at least during great absence, without knowing him formally as existing.

You will say 3. An angel, through the same species unvaried in act first, knows a singular thing to exist when it exists, and not to exist, when it does not exist; therefore whenever he knows quidditatively another angel, or himself, he necessarily knows intuitively. The antecedent is proved: for by the very fact that he contemplates the singular thing, and does not see it existing, he knows that it does not exist; therefore through the same species unvaried he knows both.

— Pontius answers in his Commentary on Scotus's book 2, dist. 3, q. 8. First indeed by denying the consequence: for although through the same species one could know some singular thing existing, and not existing, still this ought not to be true of every species, but of the species sufficient for intuitive knowledge; but for the consequence to hold, it would have to be true of every species. He answers secondly by denying the antecedent: for that species which is apt to represent the thing as singular, and existing, will always so determine it, nor can it represent that thing otherwise: hence if one having such a species contemplates that thing when it does not exist, and does not see it existing, he will not see it mediated by that species, but mediated by another; nor will he be able to know with certainty that it does not exist, because he can thus reason: this thing could truly be existing, even though it is not known by me to be existing. Indeed, although the same species which would represent the thing existing could also represent it when it did not exist; nevertheless even if the angel did not see it existing, he could not infer that the thing itself did not exist; for seeing it not existing, he could doubt; perhaps because it had been transferred elsewhere by God, or because divine concurrence for detecting the existence of that thing was denied to him.

— * These points are confirmed: if anything stood in the way of the material species of a corporeal subject being able to concur with the angelic intellect as a co-principle in forming knowledge of an existing thing, namely either because that species, since it is material, cannot flow into a purely spiritual faculty and operation, such as the intellect and knowledge of an angel, or because it could not be joined with the angelic intellect itself so as to be made by it subtler and spiritual. But from neither head does this conflict: certainly not from the first, because the species of corporeal things taken in by the senses, although it remains material and resides in phantasy, which is a material faculty. Nevertheless it moves the agent intellect and concurs with it in forming a spiritual and intelligible species, and is made more subtle by it and becomes as it were spiritual. Why then should not those species of material things likewise be able to move the agent intellect of the angel, and be restored by it into a state spiritual and fitting, so that they concur with it in forming an intellection? — Nor does it conflict from the second head. For a material species to concur with the agent intellect of the angel in producing knowledge, it is not necessary that it be received in the intellect itself, but it suffices that it be fitly joined to it and accommodated to receive that purification and subtilization, as appears from the example of the phantastic species, which although it remains within the phantasy is nevertheless sufficiently applied to the agent intellect so as to be purified by it and become immaterial. — Nor does it help to allege the disparity in the fact that phantasy is a faculty intermediate between the external sense and the agent intellect, and consequently that its phantasm, or species, is by nature more purified and subtler, and consequently more apt to produce an immaterial species. This answer, I say, does not help; for, as we said above with the Doctor, only this follows from it, that greater virtue is required in the angelic agent intellect, to purify that species which is offered to it by corporeal objects, than is required in the human intellect to attenuate that which is proposed to it by phantasy; for although the latter is less gross and material than the former, nevertheless it is always material; therefore on this account there is no conflict that it be spiritualized by the intellect of an angel, which is more vigorous than the human.*

COROLLARIES.

From these Conclude 1. That a rational soul dissolved from the body can understand itself even through its own substance; for then it will know in the angelic mode, nor will it need species received from sensible things, or conversion to phantasms; but otherwise while bound to the body; for since it is the form of the body and cannot know anything except by benefit of the senses, thence it comes about that it needs a certain accidental species, by which it may attain knowledge of itself through discourse, by removing, namely, from its own substance all the defects of corporeal things, and coming to know itself as immortal and immaterial.

Conclude 2. That although an angel recognizes himself through his own proper substance, which is entirely similar to the substance of another angel, he nevertheless cannot know another angel abstractively through the intuition of his own proper substance, as through a species. For a species is the formal and perfect likeness of the object; but the substance of one angel is not perfectly assimilated to the substance of another according to absolutely all degrees. For although they are of the same species, and differ in number alone; each of them has his own characters, and individual degrees, which the other does not possess, and accordingly one cannot perfectly represent the other. Add that in order that one object be the ratio cognoscendi of another, it must contain it, either formally, or eminently; but in neither way does the substance of an angel contain another: not indeed formally, since they have distinct forms, and various personal characters; nor yet eminently, for this eminent containment of things according to their entity, and perfection, belongs to God alone, by reason namely of his infinite entity, and his being the principle of all entities.

Conclude 3. That since the species of universal things, and of the more excellent individuals, have been granted to the angels by God, it follows that those species do not emanate from their substance; for species, since they are the seed of the object, must be produced either by the object itself, or, it failing, by the Maker of all things. Next, by what reason the species of certain things would emanate from the essence of an angel, the species of the others too would emanate, even possible ones, and therefore infinite ones. Finally, by equal reason it could be said that the very cognitions of things would emanate from the essence of an angel.

Conclude finally. That even if those species were divinely infused, they nevertheless ought not on that account to be judged supernatural as to their substance; but only as to the mode of acquisition, no differently than was the knowledge granted by God to the first parents, and to Solomon; for those species were entirely like those which the angels themselves could have acquired from the presence of the objects, if they had not had them infused from elsewhere; nor were they beyond the lot, and natural exigency, of the angel himself, since their native cognitive virtue naturally demands of itself what can conduce to its natural perfection; but those species confer in this way, and therefore ought not to be judged preternatural.