Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. From the Doctor Subtilis we find that in any created thing there is a twofold difference, namely specific and individual. The first is between those things which differ essentially, as between man and horse, and this difference is found only between distinct species, or individuals of different species: also between those things which agree neither in species nor in proximate genus, as between man and whiteness. The second is between two individuals, as between two men, or between two stones, and universally between those things which agree with one another in the most special species, each of which is multiplied through individual differences. But from whom this numerical difference is to be sought, Authors disagree among themselves in various ways, as is evident from our Logic q. 3. De differentia individuali: for some derive it from the existence of the thing; some, with S. Thomas, from matter, whether affected by quantity and other accidents, or considered only in itself; others think differently; but the Doctor Subtilis in 2. distinct. 3. teaches that this difference is some positive entity, but formally indistinct from the nature which it individuates.

Note 2. That although an angel is not physically composed of matter and form, nor of quantitative parts; nevertheless he is truly composed metaphysically of act and potency, whether of genus and difference, or of nature and supposit. For no substance besides the divine nature is pure act; for this belongs to God alone on account of his supreme singularity and necessity of being, since it constitutes him in ultimate actuality and unity: hence the divine essence is not determinable, nor contractible to many individuals, as specific natures are in created things; whence it involves a contradiction for it to be conceived as indifferent to several gods. But whether the angelic nature is likewise so singular that it cannot be multiplied into various individuals is disputed among theologians.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there are three opinions of theologians. The first is that of S. Thomas, quaest. 50. art. 4. and in q. de spiritualibus creaturis art. 8., of Cajetan De ente, et essentia c. 5. q. 9., and of others affirming that all angels differ from one another in species: and that it is impossible for there to be many angels distinct in number alone. Impossible, I say, either absolutely and simply, as Cajetan and others cited by him hold, or by ordinary power, which seems to be the view of S. Thomas in Opusculo 16. The second, contrary to the former, wills that all differ in number alone. The third opinion, intermediate between the preceding ones, affirms that angels differ partly in species, partly in number alone.

First conclusion. — Specific distinction must be admitted between the angels.

It is proved first from S. Dionysius c. 5. De Coelesti Hierarchia, where he says: The traditions of the holy volumes declare that the superior substances differ from one another in degrees of loftiness. But gradual difference at least signifies specific diversity: for many individuals differing in number alone do not differ from one another by different degrees, or loftiness of degrees: therefore from S. Dionysius there can be specific distinction among the angels.

Alensis proves this conclusion in 2. Quaest. 20. membr. 6.:

The Angels of the supreme Hierarchy differ more with respect to those who are in the lowest than they do from those who are in the supreme Hierarchy: but those who are in the same Hierarchy are either specifically the same, or the same in genus, and they differ in species; therefore the Angels who are in the higher Hierarchy, since they differ more from those who are in the lowest, differ in species. Likewise those who are in the Seraphic order agree more among themselves than they agree with those who are of the order of Cherubim or Thrones: therefore since those who are of the order of Seraphim agree among themselves in species, and differ according to number, or agree according to genus, and differ in species; so those who are of the order of Seraphim differ from those who are of the order of Cherubim. Moreover orders are distinguished according to offices; but offices are different in genus, or in species: therefore also the Angels.

It is proved besides: that above all must be asserted to have been established by God which most redounds to the commendation of his divine power and wisdom, and to the beauty of the Universe, and which does not conflict with its own nature: but that there are many angels distinct in species nowise conflicts, and this especially tends to the commendation of God and the ornament of the Universe, therefore etc. The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that it does not conflict; for that repugnance would have to be derived either from the side of God, or from the side of the angel: but none can be devised on the side of God, since God is infinite in the respect of spiritual substance, just as in every other perfection: therefore in such a respect he is participable and imitable in infinite variety; and consequently it is fitting that he be participated by several species of spiritual substance: add that it seems incredible that so great a variety and multitude of species could have been created in bodily things, while only a single one in the complete spiritual degree. Nor does it conflict on the side of the angels; for this repugnance, if there were any, would have to be derived from the fact that it cannot be explained what would be that specific diversity of one angel from another: but this reason is nil, for they can easily be conceived to have specific differences by which they are distinguished from one another: for just as they differ more than specifically both from God and from the rational soul — inasmuch as it is surpassed by God in substantial intellective perfection more than specifically, and itself exceeds rational souls even insofar as they are spiritual and intellectual — so others can exceed others specifically in the complete intellectual degree, and consequently in operation, so that they understand more things at once, and more nobly and more perfectly: whence also they have ampler species, whether infused or acquired, and consequently excel in a greater faculty of willing and operating. Which indeed is confirmed by the fact that theologians everywhere teach with S. Damascenus lib. 2. De Fide c. 3., that the angels received grace proportionate to their natural endowments, namely that according to the differences of their natures God bestowed on them greater or lesser gifts. This also contributes greatly to the beauty of the Universe, for just as the diversity of corporeal species adorns the visible and sensible world in a wondrous manner, so the variety of spiritual substances illumines the spiritual and intellectual world.

You will say 1. Very many Holy Fathers affirm that the angels are of the same nature and species: thus Athanasius, or whoever is the Author of the Quaestiones ad Antiochum q. 3., affirms that the essence of the angels is the same as that of the demons, just as of men: but men do not differ in species: therefore neither do the angels. Damascenus subscribes, lib. De Decretis cap. 1., Anselmus lib. 2. Cur Deus homo, cap. 21. And Basilius lib. 3. Contra Eunomium, saying: Priority in the Persons does not impede the unity of essence: for some Angels are prior to others, and yet they are of the same essence.

I answer. The Holy Fathers by the name of essence, nature, or species understand the grade of a subaltern species, namely spirituality and intellectualism, in which all the angels agree univocally; on which account all corporeal creatures can be said to be of the same nature, for they plainly have the common respect of body and matter.

You will say 2. All rational souls are of the same species: therefore also all angels. The consequence seems excellent from parity of reason; for just as rational souls agree in the degree of rationality, so all angels agree in the degree of pure spirituality and intellectualism.

I deny the parity, and this reason of disparity can be brought forward: because rational souls, being forms ordered by their nature to inform a body so as with it to constitute man, who is of himself mortal; therefore, lest the Universe should be deprived of some whole species, or of several, by the death of one man or another, the whole multitude of men had to be of one and the same species. But it is not thus with the angels, since each one by his nature is incorruptible, and has no need for his conservation of multiplication, or any propagation of individuals within his own lowest species; hence it is that the angels could be of diverse species.

You will say 3. The whole distinction which is established between the angels appears to us only from the very gifts granted by God; or from the offices to which they are deputed: but these can subsist in angels of the same nature and species: therefore no specific distinction seems to exist between them.

I answer. Indeed the distinction of the angels appears and is gathered from those assigned headings a posteriori and as it were through a certain extrinsic locus: but far better is that specific diversity of the angels intimated to us by those reasons designated above by us.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that the angels are many of the same species, differing in number alone.

This is the opinion of the Doctor [Scotus], and of nearly all theologians, excepting a few Thomists, who defend the contrary with Cajetan. The Seraphic Doctor had taught it before in dist. 3. first part of the distinction, art. 2. quaest. 1., where he says:

certain persons said, that in the Angels there is personal distinction, but never pure; rather there are as many species as individuals; they say the like concerning the luminaries. But although this has probability in heavenly bodies, yet it does not seem reasonable in spirits, that none should communicate with another in spiritual and specific nature: for as is made known by Scripture, many Angels are ordained to the same office, and seem to have the same common operation: but neither by Scripture, nor by the sayings of the Saints, nor by their offices is so great a diversity made known: therefore it seems nothing but presumption to say this, especially since no compelling reason appears at hand. There is another position, sober and catholic, which places distinction in the Angels as regards personality only, either in all, or in some.

S. Thomas also subscribes, Opusc. 16. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, where he says:

Thus therefore the intellect, if it were naturally one for all, since it would not have a natural cause of multiplication, could nevertheless obtain multiplicity from a supernatural cause, nor would there be involved an implication of contradiction: which we say not so much on account of the matter proposed, but rather lest this form of arguing be extended to other things: for thus they could conclude, that God cannot make the dead rise again, and that the blind be restored to sight.

Nor is it valid to reply with Goneto, that the intent of the Angelic Doctor in the aforesaid place is only that it does not conflict with an intellectual nature, from the fact that it is intellectual, to be multiplied, provided it say an order to matter: but about the angels, he says, he treats nothing there, because the repugnance of their multiplication arises not from the intellectual nature, from the fact that it is immaterial and incorporeal, but from the fact that it is altogether separate and unreceptive, such that it includes neither matter nor says an order to it. This reply, I say, is naught: since the Angelic Doctor pronounces absolutely, that if an intellectual substance did not have a natural cause of multiplication, it could nevertheless obtain multiplication from a supernatural cause. That is, even though it did not say an order to matter, which in his mind is the natural cause of individuation, it could nevertheless by supernatural power be multiplied into number, because this implies no contradiction: but whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done by God. Add that in the year 1325, by the sacred Faculty of Paris, with Stephen the Bishop acting, the following articles were proscribed and condemned: 1. Because the intelligences have no matter, God cannot make many of the same species: 2. God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter. 3. Forms do not receive division except according to matter. And deservedly indeed were the aforesaid three Articles proscribed: for nothing must be denied to divine power which involves no manifest contradiction; because every word is not impossible with God. Although however we do not perceive fully and evidently how those two Angels would be distinguished within the same species; nevertheless God knows how to do more things than we understand; for the Philosophers judge that from perfect and consummate privation there is no possible return to habit; but God has taught us that the dead can rise again, and the blind be restored to sight. The Philosophers also judge impossible that an accident can be without a subject, and that God should become man, that he should suffer etc.: nevertheless, though the philosophers clamor against it, God afterward accomplished all these things in deed.

The Doctor Subtilis proves the conclusion in the praised place number 3.: To no lowest species does it conflict that it be capable of being communicated to many: therefore neither will it conflict that it have beneath itself many inferior things distinct in number alone; and thereupon God will be able to produce many angels numerically distinct under the same ultimate (atoma) species. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved: if it conflicted with any lowest species to be communicated to many, this repugnance would arise either from the perfection, or from the imperfection of such a species: not from perfection, because communicability belongs to the nature or quiddity of God, which is nevertheless most perfectly perfect: not even from imperfection, because being communicated to many belongs to the lowest species of corporeal substance, which are nevertheless more imperfect than the lowest species of angelic nature: therefore it conflicts with no lowest species to be communicated to many; and consequently it will not conflict with the angelic one.

That the more recent Thomists may respond to this reason, they observe with Cajetan in Opusculo De ente, et essentia cap. 5. quaest. 9., that there is a threefold communicability of the lowest species or quiddity. The first is that which occurs with a limitation of it to a certain degree of its perfection, and is called the communicability of universal nature with respect to its inferiors. The second is that which occurs without limitation of the nature to a certain degree of its perfection, whereby the divine nature or quiddity is said to be communicable to three Persons. Finally the third is that which occurs through the assumption of some nature to hypostatic union, and thus human nature is said to be communicable to the three divine Persons, inasmuch namely as each one of them can assume it to hypostatic union. These things premised, they deny the antecedent, howeversoever it be taken of those three modes; for if in the first mode, it is false, because the divine essence is not communicable in the first mode. If in the second mode, it is also false, because no created lowest essence or quiddity, or species, is communicable in this mode. If finally the antecedent be understood of the third communicability, it is false also, as is evident from the example of the divine nature, which cannot be assumed by several supposits to hypostatic union.

Against this. the reasoning of the Doctor proceeds rightly; for it is founded on that maxim: Whatever belongs to the genus or predicate, belongs to the species or subject: for communicable in that antecedent is taken in common, and insofar as it is indifferent to those three modes: as if the Doctor were to say, every quiddity is communicable: the angelic nature is a quiddity: therefore it is communicable; which argument is excellent, because it is from the whole, as genus to species, for quiddity is the genus, and the angelic essence is one species of it: therefore the predicate which belongs to that genus, namely quiddity, ought to belong also to its species; from which it follows, that since the angelic nature is a quiddity, it is also communicable in one or other of those modes; but since it conflicts with it to be communicated in the first mode, from a sufficient division it follows that it is communicated in the second mode, or is communicable. For although from the superior to the inferior affirmatively the consequence does not hold; for it does not follow: it is an animal: therefore it is a man: yet it holds well from the superior descending to the inferior through distribution. For it follows excellently: Peter is an animal: therefore he is a man, or brute; but he is not a brute: therefore he is a man: so in the present case, the angelic nature, which is a species, is communicable to many: therefore either without division, or numerical distinction of itself, or with it: but not without division of itself numerical, because this belongs to the divine nature alone: therefore with division of itself numerical.

These things are confirmed: that some specific nature lack individuals and be incommunicable to another, either imports and connotes perfection or imperfection. If imperfection, this is not to be attributed to the angelic nature, most excellent of all created natures; if perfection, thence it would be licit to infer that the angelic nature is more perfect than the divine, because it would be more incommunicable. For the divine nature, although it is incommunicable to very many individuals, is nevertheless communicable to several persons. But the angelic nature would be communicable only to one person, and consequently would be more incommunicable than the divine. It is added that if a nature of an angelic species, (for instance), cherubim, be wholly at once and according to its every perfection in one single individual, suppose saint Michael or Gabriel, it will be of infinite perfection. But this consequence is absurd, therefore etc. The sequence is proved: because for this reason the Thomists deny the multiplication of individuals in the Angels from the fact that that multiplication would tend to infinity; for individuals with respect to the same species are interminated: since therefore Gabriel or Michael would have a nature corresponding to infinite individuals, hence it becomes manifest that he himself would also be equivalent to infinite Angels, since he would actually have the species which by its common notion ought to extend itself to infinite Angels.

But you will say: that reason concludes not at all; otherwise any individual whatever of another nature than the angelic, suppose the human, since it has the whole human nature infinitely multipliable, ought to be said to be of infinite perfection, because it would have a nature of infinite power in its communicability.

Against this. that response does not lighten the force of the argument, for there is a difference between an individual of human nature and of angelic nature, that the individual of human nature embrace in itself a nature which is not actually but only potentially multipliable to infinity, and consequently does not actually have its entire multipliability. But truly if the angelic nature be incommunicable to several individuals, the consequence is that the individual in which it resides contains the entire multipliability of it, and accordingly has multipliability to infinity. Since indeed the nature in that individual has all that which it would obtain in infinite individuals, if it were multipliable into several individuals.

The Doctor proves secondly: every nature which can be conceived under a universal aspect without contradiction is multipliable in number; for if it were of itself this particular thing, it would be repugnant to it to be conceived under a universal aspect, just as it is repugnant to the divine essence that it be conceived under a universal aspect, because the divine essence is of itself this particular thing: but every created nature can be conceived under a universal aspect without contradiction; because no created nature is of itself this particular thing, otherwise it could not be multiplied by God's absolute power, even specifically: therefore, etc. It is confirmed. For although the Sun, for example, be one in number within its species, nevertheless it is understood in the universal, since a definition is assigned of it, which would belong to other individuals of the Sun if such were given: therefore every created nature is multipliable in number.

The Thomists reply: that something can be called universal in two ways, namely either on the part of the thing, or on the part of the intellect: in the first way, when the thing which is said to be universal is really in many things, as animality in man and brute animal, or humanity in Peter and Paul: in the second way, when that thing is perceived by the intellect according to itself and apart from its being found in many things, but is only represented without individuating conditions, which are matter and quantity: these points premised, they say that the angelic nature cannot be conceived under a universal aspect in the first way, but only in the second way, because that angelic quiddity is understood only without individuating conditions, yet it is not found in several individuals: whence it has no foundation of universality in the first way: now that proposition's major is true in the first sense, but then the minor is false; while in the second sense the minor is true, but the major is false.

On the contrary: every created being is either universal and common, or particular, or an individual: but the quiddity of an angel is not of itself this particular thing and individual: therefore it is universal. The major is clear. The minor is proved: where there is not the reason and cause of individuation, there is no individuation, nor is such a thing individual: but in the quiddity of an angel, as the Thomists will have it, there is no principle of individuation: therefore that quiddity is not individual, nor of itself this particular thing: therefore it is universal. Moreover, if it were of itself this particular thing, it would be, like the divine essence, unplurifiable even by the divine power into more species, which is absurd. The consequence also is evident, since between the universal and the individual there is no middle ground, because the universal is that which is in many things and is said of many things; whereas the singular is said of only one thing, namely of itself. From this I infer that the quiddity of an angel is intelligible under a universal aspect not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the thing, because on the part of the thing it is not of itself this particular thing and individual: therefore it is universal, or common, and consequently multipliable into several things distinct in number. Next, (says Rada), Cajetan's distinction implies a contradiction, because it belongs to the notion of the universal precisely to be said of many things and to be in many things: therefore to divide the universal into that which is in many things and that to which it is repugnant to be in many things, is to divide the universal into itself and into its opposite.

It is confirmed. The intellect cannot truly apply the intention of universality to anything unless a foundation be found in the thing; otherwise indeed the second intention of species could be applied to a generic nature just as well as to a specific one, and the intention of genus to an individual just as well as to a genus: therefore it is necessary that something in the thing be the foundation whereby the intellect conceives the thing under a universal aspect: therefore when the intellect conceives the nature of the angel Michael, for example, under a common aspect, or one communicable to many, it finds a foundation in it, and can apply to it the second intention of species without contradiction and repugnance.

The Doctor proves thirdly: God can, after annihilating one angel, reproduce his species in another individual. Not in the same one who was before, because the same angel in number, once annihilated, cannot be reproduced, in the opinion of the Thomists, who assert that if the same soul in number did not remain incorrupt, but the soul were destroyed together with the body, the same man in number could not rise again, as St. Thomas expressly teaches at dist. 44, art. 2, qu. 2, ad tertium of Book 4: therefore in an individual different from the one he had been before; and thereupon several individuals are possible under the same ultimate species of the angelic nature, at least by God's absolute power.

The Thomists answer: by conceding that God, after annihilating one angel, could reproduce his species in some individual: yet by denying that that individual would not be that very same one that had been annihilated, but different. To the proof brought forward to the contrary they say that although the same man in number, his rational soul having been annihilated, cannot rise again, he can nevertheless again be created or reproduced; and the reason for the disparity, they say, is because resurrection, unlike reproduction or repeated creation of a man, requires the existence of part of him, namely the rational soul.

On the contrary, first: the Subtle Doctor argues ad hominem against St. Thomas, namely that reproduction of anything cannot take place unless some part of it subsisted incorrupt; but if an angel ceased to be, since no part of him would subsist incorrupt, God could not reproduce the same one: he ought therefore to create another distinct from him in number: and thus it would be true that the same specific nature would be common to two angels distinct in number. Next, either God can create another angel of the same species as Gabriel, or he cannot: if so, we have our point; if not, then against it, God can do whatever involves no contradiction: but that two angels should be of the same species involves no contradiction: therefore, etc. The assumption is proved: if there were a contradiction, it would arise from the fact that numerical difference would have to be sought from matter: but this is false: both because one angel differs from another angel not only in species but also in number: yet no angel has matter: therefore numerical difference in angels is not taken from matter; and also because rational souls separated from the body are distinguished in number, yet have no matter; and finally because two lights of glory, two beatific visions, two acts of the angelic intellect or will tending in like manner toward the same object, and likewise two supernatural habits of faith, or hope, or charity, differ in number, and yet lack matter.

The Thomists reply: that although those things do not consist of matter, they nonetheless connote it and refer to it: for rational souls connote an order to the different bodies which they inform, while spiritual accidents connote the subject in which they inhere, which subject, though immaterial, nevertheless plays the role of matter inasmuch as it receives and sustains them.

On the contrary: if the numerical multipliability of the soul arose from its habitude to the body, it would follow that given that habitude, that multipliability would also be posited: but this is false, for if only one soul were possible, it would have a habitude to a body, and yet would not be distinguished in number from another. Next, the inclination toward the body is an aptitude of one thing to another: therefore it presupposes something prior, and accordingly the substance of the soul ought to be conceived as priorly distinct in number from another soul before it is conceived as bearing an order to a body. Finally, if souls are distinct in number because they can inform different bodies; so too can several angels exist in number, because they can be in different places and have diverse operations.

The Subtle Doctor confirms these arguments by the authority of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, where he says:

It therefore pleased the Creator and Moderator of the universe, God, that since the whole multitude of angels had not perished by deserting God, that portion which had perished should remain in perpetual perdition: while that which had persevered with God, when the other deserted him, should rejoice in its most certain knowledge of its felicity ever to come. But that rational creature which was in men, since it had wholly perished through sins and punishments both original and personal, being repaired on that side, should supply what that diabolical fall had diminished from the angelic society.

From these words I argue thus: that totality and partiality among the angels cannot be saved except because some angelic species, with respect to all its individuals, had not perished totally, and thus some of every species fell, and some persevered: therefore in the same species not only can there be several individuals, but in fact several appear to exist.

You will say 1. It is repugnant that a simple form, separate from matter both actually and in aptitude, or which bears no order whatever to matter, be multiplied by number alone: such is the angelic nature: therefore it is repugnant that it be multiplied within the same species by number alone. The minor is evident from what was said in article 1. The major, which the adversaries deny, is shown in many ways from Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, chapter 6, near the end, where he says: Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy.

I answer, with the Doctor, that Aristotle there takes matter for that individual entity which is constituted in material being, not however in formal being, insofar as the quiddity is called form, because that entity is not quidditative. This exposition is clear from what he subjoins: Those are one in species whose account is one; for account is there taken for the quiddity, which is called form with respect to individual being; for just as matter is not the principal part of the physical composite, so the individual difference is not the principal part in the metaphysical composite: for the specific nature is the whole nature of the individual.

I answer 2, that even if Aristotle really speaks of physical matter, theologians need not therefore listen to him; the inference would indeed be true according to his principles, namely that angels could not be multiplied in number within the same species, because he teaches that immaterial substances are necessary beings, and consequently that they possess in act whatever can belong to them: hence if they could have several individuals, they would necessarily have them: and since there would be no reason why they might not have infinite ones (if, as Aristotle supposes, they were necessary beings), if they could have several individuals, they could also have infinite ones, and thus there would necessarily be infinitely many angels: which, being absurd, makes it equally absurd, on the Philosopher's principles, that the angelic nature should be multipliable in number. But since the principle from which such an inference is drawn is false, namely that every quiddity lacking physical matter is a necessary being, the conclusion drawn from it is likewise altogether false, and not to be used by theologians.

You will say 2. Every formal difference is specific: but angels differ from one another by formal difference, because they are distinct forms: therefore necessarily all differ in species, and consequently there is no numerical difference among them.

The Doctor answers that formal difference can be taken in two ways: first, for the difference which is made through form: second, for the difference of forms, or for the forms themselves which make the difference. In the first way the major is true, but the minor false: in the second way, however, the major is false. As for the proof that could thus be framed — an angel differs from an angel, which is form: therefore they have formal difference between themselves — the Doctor says there is the fallacy of the consequent: for it does not follow: forms differ; therefore they differ formally or through form: just as it does not follow: several men are distinguished from one another; therefore they differ from one another by humanity; for they differ from one another by their individual differences from others, not by their humanity. Hence it is one thing for something to be distinguished, and another to be the reason of the distinction: for Peter is distinguished from Bucephalus by humanity, but he is not himself the reason of the distinction, but his humanity is.

You will say 3. Every form separated from matter has the whole perfection of its species: just as whiteness, if it were separated from every subject, would have the whole perfection of whiteness: but an angel is a form separated from matter: therefore it has the whole perfection due to its species; and consequently there cannot be several angels distinct in number within one species. The major is proved: if it did not have the whole perfection due to its species, it would have to participate it: but this cannot be; for in order to participate, the form itself would have to have the character of perfectible matter, since it would be perfectible by that perfection which it received. Since it does not have the character of matter, neither can it participate the perfection of its species; and accordingly it must contain that entire perfection of its species in itself, and thus there cannot be another angel of the same species.

He denies the major, the Doctor does, together with its proof; for from the fact that something lacks matter it does not follow precisely that it must have the entire perfection of its species, since that specific nature is multiplifiable to infinity, if one of its individuals must have the whole perfection of its species, it would necessarily have infinite perfection, at least extensively, which is absurd. He answers secondly that, the major being denied, he distinguishes its proof: if it participated the perfection of the species, it would have to have the character of first physical matter, which is ordered to physical form — this he denies: the character of metaphysical matter, that is, of the specific nature, which is ordered to metaphysical form, namely to the individual difference by which it is contracted and determined to the being of an individual — this he concedes: but nothing follows from this against the truth of the conclusion.

You will say 4. In perfect beings, such as the angel is, there is nothing that is not intended per se by nature: but numerical plurality is not intended per se by nature, because such plurality, of itself, can be infinite; but the infinite cannot be intended per se by nature, because nature does not intend what it cannot produce: and since it is limited in entity and in operation, it cannot produce the infinite.

The Doctor answers by denying the minor together with the consequence of its proof; for although numerical plurality can be infinite, it does not necessarily have to be infinite; and consequently, although nature does not intend per se an infinite plurality, it does not follow that it does not intend some plurality which is not actually infinite, such as the multitude of the angels really is, as was proved in the preceding Question.

You will say 5. The multitude of individuals is intended only for the conservation of the species, which in corruptible things would fail unless propagated in several individuals, as Aristotle says in De Anima, book 2: but this reason holds nothing concerning angels; for since they are immaterial and incorruptible, the species could be preserved in a single one. It is confirmed. Within the genus of incorruptible corporeal substance, God produced a single individual in number, namely one Sun, a single Moon, and stars individually distinct in species from one another: therefore by parity the same must be said of the angels, which are incorruptible spiritual substances.

He denies the major, the Doctor does; for since, he says, the Artificer of all things chiefly intends the good and order of the Universe in forming creatures, he ought to intend not only their diversity according to species, but also their multitude according to individuals; because each conduces above all to the order and beauty of the Universe. For, says St. Augustine lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, cap. 13., Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning to each its fitting place: where by unequal things he understands the essences of things, which cannot be equalized in quidditative perfection, otherwise they would not be different species and essences: but by equal things he understands the individuals contained under the same species, which are called equal for that reason because they share entirely the same essential perfection. Add that, says holy Damascene In Elementario, chapter 12, it was fitting to produce several angels in the same species, so that, sharing nature with one another, they may rejoice in one another; and joined in natural beatitude, be disposed toward one another securely and amicably.

To the confirmation. I deny the antecedent: for it is more likely that the heavens all, and the many stars, are of the same species, although some may also differ in species, as can be gathered from their varied and diverse influx.

Or else I deny the consequence: for the disparity lies in this, that the production of several individuals in those celestial bodies would either be useless, or would harm the Universe; useless, I say, because whatever light could be furnished by two Suns, for example, would be sufficiently lavished by a single one: and it would also harm the Universe: for those two Suns, since they could not shine at once, it would be necessary that, one setting, the other rise, and thus there would be no alternation of days and nights, and consequently no time of rest for animals, nor of cooling for the earth, seeing that the alternating heats of the Sun would scorch everything. Not so, however, with the angels, who, since they hold distinct offices toward governing different men and administering various affairs, can also be many with the greatest utility for the Universe. All this William of Paris lucidly weighs and confirms in part 2 of the first part De universo, chapter 21:

It is not likely (he says) that the most wise Creator made all the simple and spiritual substances equal in every respect and alike in all things: just as it did not please him to do this in any species of sensible substances, as neither all men, nor all horses; and the same holds in all other species of sensible substances. For the wisdom and goodness of the Creator foreknew and foresaw that from that very inequality, dissimilitude, and variety the comeliness of that most resplendent and noblest City of his, supercelestial, would be increased beyond estimation. For just as diversity adorns and beautifies an army, and just as a variety of ministers and vestments renders the throng more pleasing to beholders: so the multiform comeliness of natural gifts, that is, of knowledges and virtues, renders those hosts of simple and spiritual substances more beautiful, and contributes much delight and adornment to their universality, after the manner of a most lovely meadow, in which the greater the diversity of flowers and the more multiform their variety and loveliness, the more grateful it is to the eyes of beholders, and the more outstanding its beauty. So variety of colors behaves in a garment; so too in paintings, and in all other things that are made for beauty and adornment. And a manifest example of this is the variety of the fixed stars of heaven, which bestows upon it so great a spectacle of beauty.