Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Name: Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis
Author: Claude Frassen

Quaestio I: An certo cognosci possit multiplex Angelorum numerus

Note 1. That the angels are of the greatest number, and of an immense and utterly astonishing multitude, is taught everywhere in the Scriptures; thus Daniel 7, cap.: Thousands upon thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him: Apocalypse 5: I heard the voice of many angels, and their number was thousands upon thousands: and Hebrews 12: You have come to the company of many thousands of angels; therefore it is an established truth that the multitude of the angels is immense and very great.

— Now it was most fitting that the angels be created in the greatest number: both in order that God might communicate himself most liberally to the more perfect creatures, and also in order that he might show forth his omnipotence the more, creating so many spirits at once, and so noble, in a single instant: which indeed S. Chrysostom, observing, hom. 2 De Incompre. says: There are ten thousand times ten thousand angels above, and hundreds of thousands of archangels: likewise Thrones, and Dominations, and Principalities, and Powers, and infinite peoples of bodiless Virtues, and countless tribes; and yet he founded all these Virtues with such ease as no speech can attain. Another most congruent reason is added, namely that it befits the supreme Prince and most powerful Emperor to have a most numerous family and an abundant army; for Prov. 14: In the multitude of the people is the glory of the king, and in the smallness of the folk is the ignominy of the prince: but God is the greatest King, namely King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Apoc.: therefore it befitted him to have very many angels assisting him.

Note 2. The number of the angels can be inquired into in two ways: First absolutely, and precisely: Second comparatively, namely whether it is greater than the whole multitude of men, or even than all corporeal substances. It is certain, however, that the number of the angels cannot be designated by us absolutely and precisely. For Scripture, when with the words related above it posits a certain number of angels, does not speak of all, the good equally with the bad, and it posits a determinate number for the indeterminate, as the Interpreters and holy Fathers acknowledge there: but no other certain tradition is brought forward: indeed the holy Fathers themselves confess that that number is precisely unknown to us, and so immense that, with respect to us, it can be called innumerable and infinite, as will appear below: there remains, then, to investigate whether a determinate number of the angels can be known from a comparison made, both with men and with the other created beings.

Note 3. Concerning this determination, the opinion of Authors is varied and manifold. For there are those who think the angels are infinite in number: some wish them to be more numerous than all corporeal creatures, considered both in species and in individuals. The Author of the questions to Antiochus (which exist among the works of Athanasius) reports also that some think the angels are related to men as ninety-nine to one, from the parable of the hundred sheep: others as nine to one, according to the other parable of the ten drachmas; others finally think both are equal in number. There are also those who judge that the elect men unto eternal felicity will be as many as the angels who fell. But what seems truer to us in so manifold and doubtful an opinion, let us set forth distinctly: three things are to be determined in this Question: First, whether the number of the angels is truly infinite: Second, whether there are more angels than all corporeal things, considered both in species and in individuals: Third finally, whether they exceed at least the number of men.

First conclusion. — The angels are not infinite in number. This is the common opinion among Theologians, and Guillaume of Paris proves it admirably, part 2 of the second part de Universo cap. 17, from the fact that the number of created things must necessarily be determined and limited.

First indeed (he says) determination itself is so essential to number that by every addition or diminution a new species of it is constituted. For example, if you add unity to three, another number than three is constituted, and of another species, namely four: but if you take unity away from it, another number, and of another species, remains from it, namely two. This determination, therefore, which I called essential, forbids every number to receive more and less, and greatness and smallness. Second, this determination constitutes each of the numbers in its own species. Wherefore where determination is changed, the species of any number whatever is changed, that is, it is another a priori: because therefore it is necessary that each of the numbers be in some species of number, or under some one, as an individual: it is necessary that each of the numbers be dete>rmined, and limited, and be two or three or one of the other determinate numbers: wherefore it is impossible by every mode that any number be infinite. Third, if the number of substances of this kind were infinite, since it would be a number, it would of necessity be either even or odd: but if it were even, it would have a half, which would be either finite or infinite: if finite, therefore the whole number would be finite, since it would be an aggregate of finite parts: if it were infinite, it would not be less than its whole, since no number could be found or even thought which would be exceeded by its whole. Fourth, everything that receives addition upon itself is finite and terminated by addition of this kind, since the whole is short of it, having nothing at all beyond. Therefore, since every number receives the addition of unity upon itself, or even of a number of another species, it is necessary that every number be finite. Wherefore it is impossible that this number be infinite. Fifth, it is necessary that every number, and every measure, be quantity in genus; but quantity is everything making how much, and number is that making how many; therefore the whole company of substances of this kind is in number how much, and in number how many, that is, some definite amount; just as there is no one of whom it is not possible to assign or answer who, nor what sort, nor of what kind, of whom it is not possible to assign and answer the inquirer of what kind he is. Therefore, since you cannot assign or answer concerning the whole company or the totality of the substances of which we treat, how much it is in number, or how many it is: it is manifest there is no number of substances of this kind: therefore the number is not infinite. Sixth, the Creator formed all things in weight, number, and measure: but those things which are in number are numerable, and those things which are numerable are in some determinate number; for it is not intelligible that some things be in number and yet be innumerable.

Therefore, since an infinite number is repugnant, it is also repugnant that created things be infinite in number. Add that an infinite multitude of angels can be urged neither from holy Scripture, nor from the SS. Fathers, nor from any reason.

You will say 1. Job cap. 25 says: is there any number of his soldiers? As if to say: there is no number of his soldiers, namely of the angels, whom he therefore calls the soldiers of God, because for the glory of God and the salvation of men they fight against the Demons from the time when the great battle was made in heaven by the faithful Angels against the foes: therefore, since the number of the angels is not determined, it must necessarily be judged infinite.

I distinguish the antecedent. The number of the angels is not determined with respect to us, I concede: with respect to God, I deny; for, says S. Gregory the Great on the aforesaid text of Job, In the cognition of human reason there is no number of the supernal spirits, because it knows not how great is that company of the invisible army; and lib. 27 Moral. cap. 9, comparing the aforesaid text of Daniel with what was said above, he adds: The number of supernal citizens is infinite, and it is defined, and expressed: that he who is numerable to God may be shown to be innumerable to men. I confess, therefore, that only God can know that immense number of angels determinately, and therefore it appears to us as if infinite, as it is also not rarely named by the SS. Fathers; although truly in itself it is determinate and finite.

You will say 2. Very many of the sacred Doctors judge the number of the angels to be infinite, and in no way able to be detected by men wayfarers. So especially Origen lib. 1 De Principiis, cap. 5, where, weighing this text of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, vers. 21: above every name that is named not only in this age, but also in the future, after he had recalled the orders of angels declared by the Apostle, he adds:

From this, namely, he shows, he says, that there are certain ones besides these which he recalled, which are indeed commemorated in this age, yet were not enumerated by him, perhaps not understood by anyone else: and that there are others which indeed are not named in this age, yet will be named.

Nor did Origen alone persuade himself of this besides those orders of angels which are named in Scripture, that there are others infinite in number and unknown to men. For Chrysostom wrote, homil. 4 De Incompr.: For there are, there are also other virtues whose names even we do not know. Which he professes shortly after to gather from the above-remembered place of Paul to the Ephesians, and he repeats the same in Orat. 5 contra Anomoeos, and Homil. 3 on the epistle to the Eph. Theodoret, on the same place of his epistle, agree with Chrysostom, and Oecumenius and Theophylactus.

I answer. that the aforesaid writers were indeed of that opinion that they thought there were other orders of angels besides those declared in holy Scripture, that it did not yet sufficiently plainly appear, as it now appears among Theologians, the series and distribution of the angels into three hierarchies and nine orders, although truly they judged there to be far more angels than are those whose characters, offices and names become known to us. Yet from this it is not permitted to gather that they thought the angels to be infinite in number; for it is one thing to assert the number of some things to be immense and greater than mortals can detect, another thing that it be infinite.

You will say 3. If the number of the angels were finite, especially since limited and determinate, it would have been so either on the part of God the creator, or on the part of the creatable angel, or from both: but from neither side does it seem necessary that the angels ought to have been produced in a certain and determinate number. Not indeed on the part of the Creator; for this would come about either because he could not, or because he would not produce the angels in infinite number: but neither seems rightly to be asserted;

for none (says Guillaume praised above) was so weak and brief of intellect who has thought upon the virtue and power of the Creator, but that it is itself in the ultimacy both of amplitude, and of fortitude, and of liberty; and on account of the ultimacy of fortitude unthinkably able toward that which it does not will, and unprohibitable by that which it wills, likewise unfatiguable and undefectible. Also that very constriction or determination does not come from the part of his goodness; for since creation of many was equally easy to him as of few of such substances, and of infinite as of finite, who imposed this end upon the Creator? who so limited him and made him stand in a finite number? who prohibited him from being extended into infinity? who, of even the least largess, if he could give great things with the same facility as small, and many as few, and infinite as finite, especially since he could laudably give all things, restricted and narrowed himself to finite goods? How much more strongly, therefore, could the largess of the Creator not give in some number or even quantity of giftable things? Nor can that limitation and determination be demanded from the part of the angels, since among them there would be no contrariety or opposition by which they might impede one another in any way. For there is not among them, as among corporeal substances, the straitness of place, by which it comes about that they expel one another.

— The same Guillaume answers, that this indeed comes not from the part of the Creator, but of the creature:

just as (he says) virtue or power did not fail the Creator, so that he could create an infinite world, but power failed the world, by whose defect it could not be created infinite; for there failed it the receptibility of infinite magnitude. For some body cannot be of infinite magnitude, therefore the corporeal world, as a body, or aggregate of corporeals, had need to be finite. Therefore the divine power was not straitened, so that it could not bestow on it a greater magnitude. But when it saw that it could not receive an infinite one, it provided for it a finite one most congruent to its nature, which would suffice to contain all other bodies, and hold them together among themselves. So also it provided for all other corporeal natures quantities most congruent to their natures. For not without cause did he will the ant to be smaller than the Elephant, and the fly so far from the magnitude of the crane or eagle. If however an infinite multitude cannot be, that finition was from the part of the multitude: wherefore the largess and goodness of the Creator stood in a determinate number, since it could not be indeterminate or infinite.

Second conclusion. — The angels are more numerous in number than the corporeal species, and the individuals of the more excellent species: but they do not seem to be so many as the individuals of the less noble corporeal species. This seems the more probable as regards each part.

The first part holy Dionysius indicates cap. 14 De Coelesti Hierarchia, where he says:

Many are the blessed armies of the heavenly minds, which surpass and pass over the weak and contracted measure of the corporeal numbers which we use, and are knowingly defined by their sole summit and celestial intelligence, and science, which is granted to them most abundantly by the Divinity, and by the cause of infinite cognition, which at once, after the manner of the nature of all things surpassing the principle, is the principle and deficient cause of essence, and the containing and embracing force of determination.

And Dionysius adds there that Scripture is wont to set forth the number of the angels by the greatest numbers repeated in themselves, and by Myriads of Myriads. Aeneas Gazaeus subscribes, tome 2 biblioth. Graec., whose words in Theophrastus are of this kind:

Yet the universe of heaven is full of intelligible virtues, full are the earth, the sea, and all things under the earth, and as one of our Wise men said, nothing is empty, not even so little as that a blade of grain and a hair could be inserted. So much so that even if God should will to prolong the life of men to thousands of years of ten, still I do not think the souls of men will be equal in number to the multitude of angels and demons.

It is proved also by theological reason: for since the perfection of the Universe was chiefly intended by God in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, the greater excess were they created in. Wherefore just as God founded the incorruptible and more perfect heavenly bodies in that mode of being, in a mass almost infinitely greater than sublunary things, so he created the angels incorruptibly in a far greater quantity: not indeed continuous, but discrete, that is, in a greater number than all the rest inferior to them.

The second part also stands; for who would bring himself to believe the angels to be more numerous than all the sands of the sea, the atoms of the air, the leaves of herbs and trees, gnats, flies, ants, and all the fish of rivers and sea, and likewise all the grains of wheat, barley, and of all legumes, whose immense number verges almost into infinity?

Third conclusion. — It is probable that the number of the angels exceeds the multitude of men, who are, have been, and are to come forth.

It is first proved from that parable of the good Shepherd, who, leaving ninety-nine sheep, went to seek one lost, and carries it found on his shoulders, as we read Luke 15. For that unique sheep is said to be human nature: but the remaining ninety-nine the angels. So S. Hilary on Matthew:

The sheep, one, (he says) is to be understood as man, and under one man the whole universality is to be understood: but in the error of one Adam the whole race of men went astray: therefore the ninety-nine not erring are to be reckoned the multitude of the heavenly angels, for whom there is joy in Heaven, and care of human salvation.

S. Ambrose subscribes, lib. 7 on cap. 15 of Luke:

Rich therefore is the shepherd (he says) of whom we all are the hundredth portion, who has flocks of angels, archangels, dominations, powers, thrones, and others innumerable, which he left in the mountains, who, since they are rational, rejoice not unworthily in the redemption of men.

— Cyril of Jerusalem also, cath. 15, gathers the same not only from that parable, but uses moreover this argument, that from the magnitude of a place the multitude of inhabitants ought to be estimated: but the whole earth is like a point in the middle of one heaven, in which the angels dwell:

For according to the magnitude of places (he says) the dwelling of men is to be reckoned, that if this our earth is as a center in the midst of heaven, and has so great a multitude, how great a multitude will the heaven have, which surrounds the earth, and the heaven of heavens? They surely have an immense multitude.

Another reason is also supported, sought from the common opinion of Theologians affirming that a guardian angel from the lowest order is deputed by God to each man; so that each of the men who have been from the beginning of the world and are to exist unto the end has had, or will have, his own peculiar angel; indeed we read in the Revelations of S. Bridget lib. 4. cap. 11. that there are so many S. Angels in that lowest order, that from it more than ten could be deputed to each man in guardianship. Since, however, there are more angels in the higher orders, there is no doubt that all of them far exceed the number of men.

You will say. The men to be saved are as many as the evil angels, because there will be as many blessed men as angels fell, who were to repair their ruin by an equal number: but it stands that a third part of the angels fell, when the Dragon drew the third part of the stars, Apoc. 12. but men, who will be gifted with beatitude, are not the third part of men, since Many are called, but few chosen: therefore there seem to be more men than angels; since the men to be damned are far more than those to be saved, who will equal the third part of the angels.

I answer first. that it is false that men were destined to salvation only from the accident of the ruin of the angels, and not per se; and therefore to be saved precisely in that same number.

Secondly. it is uncertain whether those seats of the angels are to be restored by men only in the same number, and according to the same proportion. For perhaps (says S. Augustinus in the Enchiridion c. 29.) that heavenly city will not be defrauded of the numerosity of its citizens, but will perhaps reign with even richer abundance. Because we do not know how great is the number either of the men to be saved, or of the evil angels.

Thirdly finally I say. it is uncertain whether Lucifer precisely drew the third part of the angels: for Apoc. 12. a certain number is posited for the uncertain. And the literal sense is about Antichrist, about to lead into error and perdition a great part of the faithful, even the more learned and more excellent, who shine like stars in the firmament of the Church, as the Interpreters of the cited chapter teach, especially Richard 1 t. on Apoc., our Lyranus on the same place, and very many Recentiores after them.

You will say 2. There are as many men as angels: therefore the angels do not exceed the multitude of men. The antecedent is proved from that of Deuteronomy 32: He established the bounds of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God, as the seventy Interpreters read: for instead of that which is in the Vulgate According to the number of the sons of Israel they read sons of God, by whom the angels can be understood, so that God established the number of the multiplication of men according to the number of the angels.

I answer. that the reading of the Vulgate is to be preferred, as is gathered from the Hebrew over against the seventy interpreters, as Origen and others testify. And the sense is that God, when he confounded the tongues at Babylon, and scattered men into various parts of the earth, already then destined the land of Canaan to the sons of Israel for a sufficient and commodious dwelling: then also because although it may be read properly, According to the number of the sons of God: from this the ancient Fathers gather only that human Kingdoms and Empires are divine according to the number of the angels, who were deputed to their guardianship, as Theodoret expounds Orat. 10. on Daniel around those words; The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me, etc. And according to the same sense Clement of Alexandria said lib. 7 Strom. a little from the beginning: There are angels distributed through the Nations by divine and ancient command.

Quaestio II: An inter Angelos plures sint specie, et solo numero distincti

Note 1. From the Doctor Subtilis we find that in any created thing there is a twofold difference, namely specific and individual. The first is between those things which differ essentially, as between man and horse, and this difference is found only between distinct species, or individuals of different species: also between those things which agree neither in species nor in proximate genus, as between man and whiteness. The second is between two individuals, as between two men, or between two stones, and universally between those things which agree with one another in the most special species, each of which is multiplied through individual differences. But from whom this numerical difference is to be sought, Authors disagree among themselves in various ways, as is evident from our Logic q. 3. De differentia individuali: for some derive it from the existence of the thing; some, with S. Thomas, from matter, whether affected by quantity and other accidents, or considered only in itself; others think differently; but the Doctor Subtilis in 2. distinct. 3. teaches that this difference is some positive entity, but formally indistinct from the nature which it individuates.

Note 2. That although an angel is not physically composed of matter and form, nor of quantitative parts; nevertheless he is truly composed metaphysically of act and potency, whether of genus and difference, or of nature and supposit. For no substance besides the divine nature is pure act; for this belongs to God alone on account of his supreme singularity and necessity of being, since it constitutes him in ultimate actuality and unity: hence the divine essence is not determinable, nor contractible to many individuals, as specific natures are in created things; whence it involves a contradiction for it to be conceived as indifferent to several gods. But whether the angelic nature is likewise so singular that it cannot be multiplied into various individuals is disputed among theologians.

Note 3. Concerning the present Question there are three opinions of theologians. The first is that of S. Thomas, quaest. 50. art. 4. and in q. de spiritualibus creaturis art. 8., of Cajetan De ente, et essentia c. 5. q. 9., and of others affirming that all angels differ from one another in species: and that it is impossible for there to be many angels distinct in number alone. Impossible, I say, either absolutely and simply, as Cajetan and others cited by him hold, or by ordinary power, which seems to be the view of S. Thomas in Opusculo 16. The second, contrary to the former, wills that all differ in number alone. The third opinion, intermediate between the preceding ones, affirms that angels differ partly in species, partly in number alone.

First conclusion. — Specific distinction must be admitted between the angels.

It is proved first from S. Dionysius c. 5. De Coelesti Hierarchia, where he says: The traditions of the holy volumes declare that the superior substances differ from one another in degrees of loftiness. But gradual difference at least signifies specific diversity: for many individuals differing in number alone do not differ from one another by different degrees, or loftiness of degrees: therefore from S. Dionysius there can be specific distinction among the angels.

Alensis proves this conclusion in 2. Quaest. 20. membr. 6.:

The Angels of the supreme Hierarchy differ more with respect to those who are in the lowest than they do from those who are in the supreme Hierarchy: but those who are in the same Hierarchy are either specifically the same, or the same in genus, and they differ in species; therefore the Angels who are in the higher Hierarchy, since they differ more from those who are in the lowest, differ in species. Likewise those who are in the Seraphic order agree more among themselves than they agree with those who are of the order of Cherubim or Thrones: therefore since those who are of the order of Seraphim agree among themselves in species, and differ according to number, or agree according to genus, and differ in species; so those who are of the order of Seraphim differ from those who are of the order of Cherubim. Moreover orders are distinguished according to offices; but offices are different in genus, or in species: therefore also the Angels.

It is proved besides: that above all must be asserted to have been established by God which most redounds to the commendation of his divine power and wisdom, and to the beauty of the Universe, and which does not conflict with its own nature: but that there are many angels distinct in species nowise conflicts, and this especially tends to the commendation of God and the ornament of the Universe, therefore etc. The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that it does not conflict; for that repugnance would have to be derived either from the side of God, or from the side of the angel: but none can be devised on the side of God, since God is infinite in the respect of spiritual substance, just as in every other perfection: therefore in such a respect he is participable and imitable in infinite variety; and consequently it is fitting that he be participated by several species of spiritual substance: add that it seems incredible that so great a variety and multitude of species could have been created in bodily things, while only a single one in the complete spiritual degree. Nor does it conflict on the side of the angels; for this repugnance, if there were any, would have to be derived from the fact that it cannot be explained what would be that specific diversity of one angel from another: but this reason is nil, for they can easily be conceived to have specific differences by which they are distinguished from one another: for just as they differ more than specifically both from God and from the rational soul — inasmuch as it is surpassed by God in substantial intellective perfection more than specifically, and itself exceeds rational souls even insofar as they are spiritual and intellectual — so others can exceed others specifically in the complete intellectual degree, and consequently in operation, so that they understand more things at once, and more nobly and more perfectly: whence also they have ampler species, whether infused or acquired, and consequently excel in a greater faculty of willing and operating. Which indeed is confirmed by the fact that theologians everywhere teach with S. Damascenus lib. 2. De Fide c. 3., that the angels received grace proportionate to their natural endowments, namely that according to the differences of their natures God bestowed on them greater or lesser gifts. This also contributes greatly to the beauty of the Universe, for just as the diversity of corporeal species adorns the visible and sensible world in a wondrous manner, so the variety of spiritual substances illumines the spiritual and intellectual world.

You will say 1. Very many Holy Fathers affirm that the angels are of the same nature and species: thus Athanasius, or whoever is the Author of the Quaestiones ad Antiochum q. 3., affirms that the essence of the angels is the same as that of the demons, just as of men: but men do not differ in species: therefore neither do the angels. Damascenus subscribes, lib. De Decretis cap. 1., Anselmus lib. 2. Cur Deus homo, cap. 21. And Basilius lib. 3. Contra Eunomium, saying: Priority in the Persons does not impede the unity of essence: for some Angels are prior to others, and yet they are of the same essence.

I answer. The Holy Fathers by the name of essence, nature, or species understand the grade of a subaltern species, namely spirituality and intellectualism, in which all the angels agree univocally; on which account all corporeal creatures can be said to be of the same nature, for they plainly have the common respect of body and matter.

You will say 2. All rational souls are of the same species: therefore also all angels. The consequence seems excellent from parity of reason; for just as rational souls agree in the degree of rationality, so all angels agree in the degree of pure spirituality and intellectualism.

I deny the parity, and this reason of disparity can be brought forward: because rational souls, being forms ordered by their nature to inform a body so as with it to constitute man, who is of himself mortal; therefore, lest the Universe should be deprived of some whole species, or of several, by the death of one man or another, the whole multitude of men had to be of one and the same species. But it is not thus with the angels, since each one by his nature is incorruptible, and has no need for his conservation of multiplication, or any propagation of individuals within his own lowest species; hence it is that the angels could be of diverse species.

You will say 3. The whole distinction which is established between the angels appears to us only from the very gifts granted by God; or from the offices to which they are deputed: but these can subsist in angels of the same nature and species: therefore no specific distinction seems to exist between them.

I answer. Indeed the distinction of the angels appears and is gathered from those assigned headings a posteriori and as it were through a certain extrinsic locus: but far better is that specific diversity of the angels intimated to us by those reasons designated above by us.

Second conclusion. — It is more probable that the angels are many of the same species, differing in number alone.

This is the opinion of the Doctor [Scotus], and of nearly all theologians, excepting a few Thomists, who defend the contrary with Cajetan. The Seraphic Doctor had taught it before in dist. 3. first part of the distinction, art. 2. quaest. 1., where he says:

certain persons said, that in the Angels there is personal distinction, but never pure; rather there are as many species as individuals; they say the like concerning the luminaries. But although this has probability in heavenly bodies, yet it does not seem reasonable in spirits, that none should communicate with another in spiritual and specific nature: for as is made known by Scripture, many Angels are ordained to the same office, and seem to have the same common operation: but neither by Scripture, nor by the sayings of the Saints, nor by their offices is so great a diversity made known: therefore it seems nothing but presumption to say this, especially since no compelling reason appears at hand. There is another position, sober and catholic, which places distinction in the Angels as regards personality only, either in all, or in some.

S. Thomas also subscribes, Opusc. 16. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, where he says:

Thus therefore the intellect, if it were naturally one for all, since it would not have a natural cause of multiplication, could nevertheless obtain multiplicity from a supernatural cause, nor would there be involved an implication of contradiction: which we say not so much on account of the matter proposed, but rather lest this form of arguing be extended to other things: for thus they could conclude, that God cannot make the dead rise again, and that the blind be restored to sight.

Nor is it valid to reply with Goneto, that the intent of the Angelic Doctor in the aforesaid place is only that it does not conflict with an intellectual nature, from the fact that it is intellectual, to be multiplied, provided it say an order to matter: but about the angels, he says, he treats nothing there, because the repugnance of their multiplication arises not from the intellectual nature, from the fact that it is immaterial and incorporeal, but from the fact that it is altogether separate and unreceptive, such that it includes neither matter nor says an order to it. This reply, I say, is naught: since the Angelic Doctor pronounces absolutely, that if an intellectual substance did not have a natural cause of multiplication, it could nevertheless obtain multiplication from a supernatural cause. That is, even though it did not say an order to matter, which in his mind is the natural cause of individuation, it could nevertheless by supernatural power be multiplied into number, because this implies no contradiction: but whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done by God. Add that in the year 1325, by the sacred Faculty of Paris, with Stephen the Bishop acting, the following articles were proscribed and condemned: 1. Because the intelligences have no matter, God cannot make many of the same species: 2. God cannot multiply individuals under one species without matter. 3. Forms do not receive division except according to matter. And deservedly indeed were the aforesaid three Articles proscribed: for nothing must be denied to divine power which involves no manifest contradiction; because every word is not impossible with God. Although however we do not perceive fully and evidently how those two Angels would be distinguished within the same species; nevertheless God knows how to do more things than we understand; for the Philosophers judge that from perfect and consummate privation there is no possible return to habit; but God has taught us that the dead can rise again, and the blind be restored to sight. The Philosophers also judge impossible that an accident can be without a subject, and that God should become man, that he should suffer etc.: nevertheless, though the philosophers clamor against it, God afterward accomplished all these things in deed.

The Doctor Subtilis proves the conclusion in the praised place number 3.: To no lowest species does it conflict that it be capable of being communicated to many: therefore neither will it conflict that it have beneath itself many inferior things distinct in number alone; and thereupon God will be able to produce many angels numerically distinct under the same ultimate (atoma) species. The consequence is evident: the antecedent is proved: if it conflicted with any lowest species to be communicated to many, this repugnance would arise either from the perfection, or from the imperfection of such a species: not from perfection, because communicability belongs to the nature or quiddity of God, which is nevertheless most perfectly perfect: not even from imperfection, because being communicated to many belongs to the lowest species of corporeal substance, which are nevertheless more imperfect than the lowest species of angelic nature: therefore it conflicts with no lowest species to be communicated to many; and consequently it will not conflict with the angelic one.

That the more recent Thomists may respond to this reason, they observe with Cajetan in Opusculo De ente, et essentia cap. 5. quaest. 9., that there is a threefold communicability of the lowest species or quiddity. The first is that which occurs with a limitation of it to a certain degree of its perfection, and is called the communicability of universal nature with respect to its inferiors. The second is that which occurs without limitation of the nature to a certain degree of its perfection, whereby the divine nature or quiddity is said to be communicable to three Persons. Finally the third is that which occurs through the assumption of some nature to hypostatic union, and thus human nature is said to be communicable to the three divine Persons, inasmuch namely as each one of them can assume it to hypostatic union. These things premised, they deny the antecedent, howeversoever it be taken of those three modes; for if in the first mode, it is false, because the divine essence is not communicable in the first mode. If in the second mode, it is also false, because no created lowest essence or quiddity, or species, is communicable in this mode. If finally the antecedent be understood of the third communicability, it is false also, as is evident from the example of the divine nature, which cannot be assumed by several supposits to hypostatic union.

Against this. the reasoning of the Doctor proceeds rightly; for it is founded on that maxim: Whatever belongs to the genus or predicate, belongs to the species or subject: for communicable in that antecedent is taken in common, and insofar as it is indifferent to those three modes: as if the Doctor were to say, every quiddity is communicable: the angelic nature is a quiddity: therefore it is communicable; which argument is excellent, because it is from the whole, as genus to species, for quiddity is the genus, and the angelic essence is one species of it: therefore the predicate which belongs to that genus, namely quiddity, ought to belong also to its species; from which it follows, that since the angelic nature is a quiddity, it is also communicable in one or other of those modes; but since it conflicts with it to be communicated in the first mode, from a sufficient division it follows that it is communicated in the second mode, or is communicable. For although from the superior to the inferior affirmatively the consequence does not hold; for it does not follow: it is an animal: therefore it is a man: yet it holds well from the superior descending to the inferior through distribution. For it follows excellently: Peter is an animal: therefore he is a man, or brute; but he is not a brute: therefore he is a man: so in the present case, the angelic nature, which is a species, is communicable to many: therefore either without division, or numerical distinction of itself, or with it: but not without division of itself numerical, because this belongs to the divine nature alone: therefore with division of itself numerical.

These things are confirmed: that some specific nature lack individuals and be incommunicable to another, either imports and connotes perfection or imperfection. If imperfection, this is not to be attributed to the angelic nature, most excellent of all created natures; if perfection, thence it would be licit to infer that the angelic nature is more perfect than the divine, because it would be more incommunicable. For the divine nature, although it is incommunicable to very many individuals, is nevertheless communicable to several persons. But the angelic nature would be communicable only to one person, and consequently would be more incommunicable than the divine. It is added that if a nature of an angelic species, (for instance), cherubim, be wholly at once and according to its every perfection in one single individual, suppose saint Michael or Gabriel, it will be of infinite perfection. But this consequence is absurd, therefore etc. The sequence is proved: because for this reason the Thomists deny the multiplication of individuals in the Angels from the fact that that multiplication would tend to infinity; for individuals with respect to the same species are interminated: since therefore Gabriel or Michael would have a nature corresponding to infinite individuals, hence it becomes manifest that he himself would also be equivalent to infinite Angels, since he would actually have the species which by its common notion ought to extend itself to infinite Angels.

But you will say: that reason concludes not at all; otherwise any individual whatever of another nature than the angelic, suppose the human, since it has the whole human nature infinitely multipliable, ought to be said to be of infinite perfection, because it would have a nature of infinite power in its communicability.

Against this. that response does not lighten the force of the argument, for there is a difference between an individual of human nature and of angelic nature, that the individual of human nature embrace in itself a nature which is not actually but only potentially multipliable to infinity, and consequently does not actually have its entire multipliability. But truly if the angelic nature be incommunicable to several individuals, the consequence is that the individual in which it resides contains the entire multipliability of it, and accordingly has multipliability to infinity. Since indeed the nature in that individual has all that which it would obtain in infinite individuals, if it were multipliable into several individuals.

The Doctor proves secondly: every nature which can be conceived under a universal aspect without contradiction is multipliable in number; for if it were of itself this particular thing, it would be repugnant to it to be conceived under a universal aspect, just as it is repugnant to the divine essence that it be conceived under a universal aspect, because the divine essence is of itself this particular thing: but every created nature can be conceived under a universal aspect without contradiction; because no created nature is of itself this particular thing, otherwise it could not be multiplied by God's absolute power, even specifically: therefore, etc. It is confirmed. For although the Sun, for example, be one in number within its species, nevertheless it is understood in the universal, since a definition is assigned of it, which would belong to other individuals of the Sun if such were given: therefore every created nature is multipliable in number.

The Thomists reply: that something can be called universal in two ways, namely either on the part of the thing, or on the part of the intellect: in the first way, when the thing which is said to be universal is really in many things, as animality in man and brute animal, or humanity in Peter and Paul: in the second way, when that thing is perceived by the intellect according to itself and apart from its being found in many things, but is only represented without individuating conditions, which are matter and quantity: these points premised, they say that the angelic nature cannot be conceived under a universal aspect in the first way, but only in the second way, because that angelic quiddity is understood only without individuating conditions, yet it is not found in several individuals: whence it has no foundation of universality in the first way: now that proposition's major is true in the first sense, but then the minor is false; while in the second sense the minor is true, but the major is false.

On the contrary: every created being is either universal and common, or particular, or an individual: but the quiddity of an angel is not of itself this particular thing and individual: therefore it is universal. The major is clear. The minor is proved: where there is not the reason and cause of individuation, there is no individuation, nor is such a thing individual: but in the quiddity of an angel, as the Thomists will have it, there is no principle of individuation: therefore that quiddity is not individual, nor of itself this particular thing: therefore it is universal. Moreover, if it were of itself this particular thing, it would be, like the divine essence, unplurifiable even by the divine power into more species, which is absurd. The consequence also is evident, since between the universal and the individual there is no middle ground, because the universal is that which is in many things and is said of many things; whereas the singular is said of only one thing, namely of itself. From this I infer that the quiddity of an angel is intelligible under a universal aspect not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the thing, because on the part of the thing it is not of itself this particular thing and individual: therefore it is universal, or common, and consequently multipliable into several things distinct in number. Next, (says Rada), Cajetan's distinction implies a contradiction, because it belongs to the notion of the universal precisely to be said of many things and to be in many things: therefore to divide the universal into that which is in many things and that to which it is repugnant to be in many things, is to divide the universal into itself and into its opposite.

It is confirmed. The intellect cannot truly apply the intention of universality to anything unless a foundation be found in the thing; otherwise indeed the second intention of species could be applied to a generic nature just as well as to a specific one, and the intention of genus to an individual just as well as to a genus: therefore it is necessary that something in the thing be the foundation whereby the intellect conceives the thing under a universal aspect: therefore when the intellect conceives the nature of the angel Michael, for example, under a common aspect, or one communicable to many, it finds a foundation in it, and can apply to it the second intention of species without contradiction and repugnance.

The Doctor proves thirdly: God can, after annihilating one angel, reproduce his species in another individual. Not in the same one who was before, because the same angel in number, once annihilated, cannot be reproduced, in the opinion of the Thomists, who assert that if the same soul in number did not remain incorrupt, but the soul were destroyed together with the body, the same man in number could not rise again, as St. Thomas expressly teaches at dist. 44, art. 2, qu. 2, ad tertium of Book 4: therefore in an individual different from the one he had been before; and thereupon several individuals are possible under the same ultimate species of the angelic nature, at least by God's absolute power.

The Thomists answer: by conceding that God, after annihilating one angel, could reproduce his species in some individual: yet by denying that that individual would not be that very same one that had been annihilated, but different. To the proof brought forward to the contrary they say that although the same man in number, his rational soul having been annihilated, cannot rise again, he can nevertheless again be created or reproduced; and the reason for the disparity, they say, is because resurrection, unlike reproduction or repeated creation of a man, requires the existence of part of him, namely the rational soul.

On the contrary, first: the Subtle Doctor argues ad hominem against St. Thomas, namely that reproduction of anything cannot take place unless some part of it subsisted incorrupt; but if an angel ceased to be, since no part of him would subsist incorrupt, God could not reproduce the same one: he ought therefore to create another distinct from him in number: and thus it would be true that the same specific nature would be common to two angels distinct in number. Next, either God can create another angel of the same species as Gabriel, or he cannot: if so, we have our point; if not, then against it, God can do whatever involves no contradiction: but that two angels should be of the same species involves no contradiction: therefore, etc. The assumption is proved: if there were a contradiction, it would arise from the fact that numerical difference would have to be sought from matter: but this is false: both because one angel differs from another angel not only in species but also in number: yet no angel has matter: therefore numerical difference in angels is not taken from matter; and also because rational souls separated from the body are distinguished in number, yet have no matter; and finally because two lights of glory, two beatific visions, two acts of the angelic intellect or will tending in like manner toward the same object, and likewise two supernatural habits of faith, or hope, or charity, differ in number, and yet lack matter.

The Thomists reply: that although those things do not consist of matter, they nonetheless connote it and refer to it: for rational souls connote an order to the different bodies which they inform, while spiritual accidents connote the subject in which they inhere, which subject, though immaterial, nevertheless plays the role of matter inasmuch as it receives and sustains them.

On the contrary: if the numerical multipliability of the soul arose from its habitude to the body, it would follow that given that habitude, that multipliability would also be posited: but this is false, for if only one soul were possible, it would have a habitude to a body, and yet would not be distinguished in number from another. Next, the inclination toward the body is an aptitude of one thing to another: therefore it presupposes something prior, and accordingly the substance of the soul ought to be conceived as priorly distinct in number from another soul before it is conceived as bearing an order to a body. Finally, if souls are distinct in number because they can inform different bodies; so too can several angels exist in number, because they can be in different places and have diverse operations.

The Subtle Doctor confirms these arguments by the authority of St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, where he says:

It therefore pleased the Creator and Moderator of the universe, God, that since the whole multitude of angels had not perished by deserting God, that portion which had perished should remain in perpetual perdition: while that which had persevered with God, when the other deserted him, should rejoice in its most certain knowledge of its felicity ever to come. But that rational creature which was in men, since it had wholly perished through sins and punishments both original and personal, being repaired on that side, should supply what that diabolical fall had diminished from the angelic society.

From these words I argue thus: that totality and partiality among the angels cannot be saved except because some angelic species, with respect to all its individuals, had not perished totally, and thus some of every species fell, and some persevered: therefore in the same species not only can there be several individuals, but in fact several appear to exist.

You will say 1. It is repugnant that a simple form, separate from matter both actually and in aptitude, or which bears no order whatever to matter, be multiplied by number alone: such is the angelic nature: therefore it is repugnant that it be multiplied within the same species by number alone. The minor is evident from what was said in article 1. The major, which the adversaries deny, is shown in many ways from Aristotle, Metaphysics book 5, chapter 6, near the end, where he says: Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy.

I answer, with the Doctor, that Aristotle there takes matter for that individual entity which is constituted in material being, not however in formal being, insofar as the quiddity is called form, because that entity is not quidditative. This exposition is clear from what he subjoins: Those are one in species whose account is one; for account is there taken for the quiddity, which is called form with respect to individual being; for just as matter is not the principal part of the physical composite, so the individual difference is not the principal part in the metaphysical composite: for the specific nature is the whole nature of the individual.

I answer 2, that even if Aristotle really speaks of physical matter, theologians need not therefore listen to him; the inference would indeed be true according to his principles, namely that angels could not be multiplied in number within the same species, because he teaches that immaterial substances are necessary beings, and consequently that they possess in act whatever can belong to them: hence if they could have several individuals, they would necessarily have them: and since there would be no reason why they might not have infinite ones (if, as Aristotle supposes, they were necessary beings), if they could have several individuals, they could also have infinite ones, and thus there would necessarily be infinitely many angels: which, being absurd, makes it equally absurd, on the Philosopher's principles, that the angelic nature should be multipliable in number. But since the principle from which such an inference is drawn is false, namely that every quiddity lacking physical matter is a necessary being, the conclusion drawn from it is likewise altogether false, and not to be used by theologians.

You will say 2. Every formal difference is specific: but angels differ from one another by formal difference, because they are distinct forms: therefore necessarily all differ in species, and consequently there is no numerical difference among them.

The Doctor answers that formal difference can be taken in two ways: first, for the difference which is made through form: second, for the difference of forms, or for the forms themselves which make the difference. In the first way the major is true, but the minor false: in the second way, however, the major is false. As for the proof that could thus be framed — an angel differs from an angel, which is form: therefore they have formal difference between themselves — the Doctor says there is the fallacy of the consequent: for it does not follow: forms differ; therefore they differ formally or through form: just as it does not follow: several men are distinguished from one another; therefore they differ from one another by humanity; for they differ from one another by their individual differences from others, not by their humanity. Hence it is one thing for something to be distinguished, and another to be the reason of the distinction: for Peter is distinguished from Bucephalus by humanity, but he is not himself the reason of the distinction, but his humanity is.

You will say 3. Every form separated from matter has the whole perfection of its species: just as whiteness, if it were separated from every subject, would have the whole perfection of whiteness: but an angel is a form separated from matter: therefore it has the whole perfection due to its species; and consequently there cannot be several angels distinct in number within one species. The major is proved: if it did not have the whole perfection due to its species, it would have to participate it: but this cannot be; for in order to participate, the form itself would have to have the character of perfectible matter, since it would be perfectible by that perfection which it received. Since it does not have the character of matter, neither can it participate the perfection of its species; and accordingly it must contain that entire perfection of its species in itself, and thus there cannot be another angel of the same species.

He denies the major, the Doctor does, together with its proof; for from the fact that something lacks matter it does not follow precisely that it must have the entire perfection of its species, since that specific nature is multiplifiable to infinity, if one of its individuals must have the whole perfection of its species, it would necessarily have infinite perfection, at least extensively, which is absurd. He answers secondly that, the major being denied, he distinguishes its proof: if it participated the perfection of the species, it would have to have the character of first physical matter, which is ordered to physical form — this he denies: the character of metaphysical matter, that is, of the specific nature, which is ordered to metaphysical form, namely to the individual difference by which it is contracted and determined to the being of an individual — this he concedes: but nothing follows from this against the truth of the conclusion.

You will say 4. In perfect beings, such as the angel is, there is nothing that is not intended per se by nature: but numerical plurality is not intended per se by nature, because such plurality, of itself, can be infinite; but the infinite cannot be intended per se by nature, because nature does not intend what it cannot produce: and since it is limited in entity and in operation, it cannot produce the infinite.

The Doctor answers by denying the minor together with the consequence of its proof; for although numerical plurality can be infinite, it does not necessarily have to be infinite; and consequently, although nature does not intend per se an infinite plurality, it does not follow that it does not intend some plurality which is not actually infinite, such as the multitude of the angels really is, as was proved in the preceding Question.

You will say 5. The multitude of individuals is intended only for the conservation of the species, which in corruptible things would fail unless propagated in several individuals, as Aristotle says in De Anima, book 2: but this reason holds nothing concerning angels; for since they are immaterial and incorruptible, the species could be preserved in a single one. It is confirmed. Within the genus of incorruptible corporeal substance, God produced a single individual in number, namely one Sun, a single Moon, and stars individually distinct in species from one another: therefore by parity the same must be said of the angels, which are incorruptible spiritual substances.

He denies the major, the Doctor does; for since, he says, the Artificer of all things chiefly intends the good and order of the Universe in forming creatures, he ought to intend not only their diversity according to species, but also their multitude according to individuals; because each conduces above all to the order and beauty of the Universe. For, says St. Augustine lib. 19. De Civit. Dei, cap. 13., Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning to each its fitting place: where by unequal things he understands the essences of things, which cannot be equalized in quidditative perfection, otherwise they would not be different species and essences: but by equal things he understands the individuals contained under the same species, which are called equal for that reason because they share entirely the same essential perfection. Add that, says holy Damascene In Elementario, chapter 12, it was fitting to produce several angels in the same species, so that, sharing nature with one another, they may rejoice in one another; and joined in natural beatitude, be disposed toward one another securely and amicably.

To the confirmation. I deny the antecedent: for it is more likely that the heavens all, and the many stars, are of the same species, although some may also differ in species, as can be gathered from their varied and diverse influx.

Or else I deny the consequence: for the disparity lies in this, that the production of several individuals in those celestial bodies would either be useless, or would harm the Universe; useless, I say, because whatever light could be furnished by two Suns, for example, would be sufficiently lavished by a single one: and it would also harm the Universe: for those two Suns, since they could not shine at once, it would be necessary that, one setting, the other rise, and thus there would be no alternation of days and nights, and consequently no time of rest for animals, nor of cooling for the earth, seeing that the alternating heats of the Sun would scorch everything. Not so, however, with the angels, who, since they hold distinct offices toward governing different men and administering various affairs, can also be many with the greatest utility for the Universe. All this William of Paris lucidly weighs and confirms in part 2 of the first part De universo, chapter 21:

It is not likely (he says) that the most wise Creator made all the simple and spiritual substances equal in every respect and alike in all things: just as it did not please him to do this in any species of sensible substances, as neither all men, nor all horses; and the same holds in all other species of sensible substances. For the wisdom and goodness of the Creator foreknew and foresaw that from that very inequality, dissimilitude, and variety the comeliness of that most resplendent and noblest City of his, supercelestial, would be increased beyond estimation. For just as diversity adorns and beautifies an army, and just as a variety of ministers and vestments renders the throng more pleasing to beholders: so the multiform comeliness of natural gifts, that is, of knowledges and virtues, renders those hosts of simple and spiritual substances more beautiful, and contributes much delight and adornment to their universality, after the manner of a most lovely meadow, in which the greater the diversity of flowers and the more multiform their variety and loveliness, the more grateful it is to the eyes of beholders, and the more outstanding its beauty. So variety of colors behaves in a garment; so too in paintings, and in all other things that are made for beauty and adornment. And a manifest example of this is the variety of the fixed stars of heaven, which bestows upon it so great a spectacle of beauty.

Quaestio III: Quid, et quot sint Angelorum hierarchiae, et ordines

Note 1. The word Hierarchy is Greek, and means a sacred principate, or a collection of persons in some way sacred under some Prince. Now St. Dionysius distinguishes a threefold Hierarchy in book 3 of The Celestial Hierarchy. The first (says Hugh of Saint-Victor in his explanation of that same book),

principal over all, and the form, and exemplar of the rest, is the supreme and ineffable power of the Trinity: simple, and one, and uniform, without grade, and difference, and comparison, supreme, and eternal, and perfect, and true, omnipotent by its own power in creating and governing all its works; receiving nothing external, losing nothing of its own. The second Hierarchy was formed in the angelic nature, by adoption, and participation, and gracious favor from the first and supreme, and, in a second similitude to the first, holds a lofty grade, and receives difference, and admits comparison: after the supreme Trinity, distinguished by a second emulation, in a threefold division. The third, and last Hierarchy was ordered in human nature: imitating the second in the first place, and the first in the second place, and receiving and referring back the supreme and superexcellent image of similitude through the participants in the midst, and by that very thing so that all may be from one, and to one, and all in all one.

Note, however, that in God there is not properly a Hierarchy, since among the three divine Persons there is neither principate, nor order, nor superiority or inferiority of dignities. Hence St. Dionysius teaches in the same place that God is outside, and above every Hierarchy; for every Hierarchy exists in imitation of, and likeness to him.

Note 2. A threefold Hierarchy of the angels is distinguished by the holy Fathers and Theologians, namely the supreme, the middle, and the lowest, each of which is made up of three distinct orders. For the first, says our own Le Petit, ch. 6, De Angelis, comprises the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. The Seraphim are so called from the ardor of love, and the most fervent love of God in which they surpass the others, and to which they excite those within; so that they are continually ardent, inflamed, and kindled with the fire of love with which in an excellent manner they pursue God, while they contemplate him more closely, so great and admirable is his majesty, as St. Gregory, St. Dionysius, St. Thomas, etc., write. The Cherubim are so called on account of the fullness and excess of knowledge by which they surpass the other, inferior angels, and they pour out that most splendid light upon the others like most radiant Suns. The Thrones are so called because in them God rests in a certain more placid manner in a special way; whence they are called the seat of God for receiving the divine splendors into themselves, and transfusing them into the other, inferior angels. The second Hierarchy comprises the Dominations, Principalities, and Powers. The Dominations are so called on account of the excellence of their lordship, namely because they surpass the others in commanding the things to be done. The Principalities are so called because they preside over Kingdoms and Provinces, and with respect to the inferior angels can be called princes; they instruct, illuminate, and move them in those things which pertain to the salvation of all men, according to the will of God manifested to them. The Powers are so called on account of the great power with which they are endowed, and especially for coercing the infernal Spirits, lest they inflict harms upon men. The third Hierarchy comprises the Virtues, Archangels, and Angels. The Virtues are so named because it belongs to them to accomplish miracles, and to work signs and prodigies; for although all Spirits can work miracles, this is nevertheless attributed to the Virtues in a spiritual manner: moreover they are given that name because these Spirits are prompt and ready for the divine service with a certain manly fortitude; and they also bestow aid on the other angels inferior to themselves. The Archangels announce greater things to men by the command of God, and dispatch weightier business, and guard important persons. But the Angels, because they announce lesser matters or accomplish them, since they have no particular name of their own, are given the common name shared by all the other Spirits: their office is to guard men.

Note 3. Although the aforesaid names express characters peculiar to the individual orders of angels, nevertheless they are sometimes taken as common to all, so that the proper name of one order is bestowed on the angels of another order: thus St. Chrysostom, Homily 3, Contra Anomoeos, calls all those most blessed spirits Angels indiscriminately: Hilary also takes the Virtues universally in this way, book 3: The Virtues, he says, are many in Heaven, and efficacious, and eternal, but only one is the only-begotten Son. But why the Angels, and the Virtues are thus used of all, St. Gregory sets out the cause of the former appellation in Homily 34 on the Gospels, namely that some things are announced through them; for not only Spirits of the lowest order, but sometimes also of the highest, are thought to be several in number who fulfill the office of messengers to men. But all angels are called Virtues, says St. Dionysius, ch. 11, because those blessed minds have these three things: essence or substance, power or virtue, and efficacy.

St. Gregory the Great explains this expressly in Homily 34 on the Gospel:

Very often, he says, the very orders of the blessed Spirits take on the names of the orders neighboring to them: for we said that the Thrones, that is, the seats of God, are a special order of the blessed Spirits, and yet through the Psalmist it is said of him who appears seated above the Cherubim: namely because, while in those distinctions the hosts of the Cherubim are joined to the Thrones, the Lord is also declared to sit above the Cherubim by the equality of the neighboring host. For so it is in that supreme city, that certain things are special to individuals, and yet are common to all, and what each possesses in himself in part, he possesses in the other order: but for that reason they are contained under one and the same name in common, so that that order should be called by the private name of each thing which has received it more fully in its gift.

With these things premised, it must be determined by what grounds it is established that those three hierarchies and nine orders of angels exist.

Single conclusion. — In truth there are three hierarchies, and nine distinct orders of the holy angels.

This is the common view among the holy Fathers and Theologians, and St. Dionysius weighs and explains it in the whole book De Coelesti Hierarchia, where in ch. 6 he speaks thus about those divine Intelligences:

These, he says, our divine initiator in the sacred mysteries, St. Paul, distributed and distinguished into three ternions: and first indeed he wills those to be so who always stand about God, and of whom it has been handed down that, with their whole mind and with nothing interposed before the others, they are joined to him; for he says that it has been handed down in the divine writings that the most holy Thrones, and those that have many eyes and many wings, the Cherubim and Seraphim, called so in the Hebrew tongue, stand most closely about God. This distinction, then, which consists of three, our most illustrious Teacher handed down as one, and of the same kind, and as truly the first Hierarchy, than which there is none more like God, and which is occupied above all, without interval, with the greatest zeal in the primary illuminations of the Divinity in acting. He says the second is that which the Powers, Dominations, and Virtues fill. The third is the description of the Angels, Archangels, and Principalities in the last celestial Hierarchies.

The same truth St. Bernard sets forth lucidly in book 5 of De Consideratione, ch. 4, where, having enumerated all the orders of the blessed angels, he writes:

What, then, does this gradual distinction mean? Let us suppose the Angels are so called — unless you have considered something more fitting — because single ones are believed to be given to single men: Sent forth to ministry, according to the doctrine of Paul, for the sake of those who shall inherit salvation. Of whom the Savior: Their angels always see the face of the Father. Let us suppose the Archangels preside over these, who, conscious of the divine mysteries, are sent only for outstanding and greatest causes; among whom that great Archangel Gabriel is read to have been sent to Mary; for a cause, certainly, than which there could be none greater. Let us suppose above these are the Virtues, by whose nod or work signs and prodigies made in the elements, or from the elements, appear for the admonition of mortals. Hence perhaps it is that when you read in the Gospels: There shall be signs in the Sun, and Moon, and stars, a little later you have: For the Virtues of the heavens shall be moved. These are doubtless the Spirits through whom signs are made. Let us suppose the Powers, superior to these, by whose power the power of darkness is compressed, and the malice of this air is coerced, so that it may not harm as much as it wills, nor be able to do mischief except so as to profit. Let us suppose the Principalities set over these also, by whose governance and wisdom every principality on earth is constituted, governed, limited, transferred, mutilated, changed. Let us suppose the Dominations so far surpass all the aforesaid orders, that with respect to these all the others seem ministering Spirits, and are referred to these as to Lords: the governances of the Principalities, the protections of the Powers, the operations of the Virtues, the revelations of the Archangels, the care and providence of the Angels. Let us suppose the Thrones have flown aloft even beyond these by a great retreat, who from the fact that they sit are called Thrones, and from the fact that they sit because God sits in them. For neither could he sit in them, if they did not sit. You ask what I think that session is? The highest tranquility, the most placid serenity, the peace which surpasses all understanding. Such is he who sits upon the Thrones, the Lord of hosts, judging all things with tranquility, most placid, most serene, most peaceable. And such he constituted the Thrones to himself, most like himself. Let us suppose the Cherubim drawing from the very fountain of wisdom from the mouth of the Most High, and pouring back the streams of knowledge to all their fellow citizens. And see whether he is the one of whom the Prophet spoke; the rush of the river making glad the city of God. Let us suppose the Seraphim Spirits wholly kindled with divine fire, setting all things aflame, so that each citizen may be a single lamp, burning and shining, burning with charity, and shining with knowledge.

This same truth St. Gregory the Pope proves and concludes thus from holy Scripture, Homily 34:

Nine orders of angels we have named, he says, since indeed so many there are, the sacred eloquence testifying: at once we know Angels, Archangels, Virtues, Powers, Principalities, Dominations, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. For that there are Angels and Archangels almost all the pages of sacred eloquence testify. But the books of the Prophets often speak of the Cherubim and Seraphim, as is known. The Apostle Paul also enumerates the names of four orders to the Ephesians, saying: above every Principality, and Power, and Virtue, and Domination. Who again writing to the Colossians says: whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers. But the Dominations, and Principalities, and Powers he had already described speaking to the Ephesians. But about to say those things also to the Colossians, he premised the Thrones, of which he had as yet said nothing at all to the Ephesians. When, therefore, the Thrones are joined to those four which he said to the Ephesians, that is, to the Principalities, Powers, Virtues, and Dominations, there are five orders, which are expressed specially. When to these the Angels, and Archangels, Cherubim, and Seraphim are joined, without doubt nine orders of angels are found.

From these things it is evident how shamefully Erasmus, and Beza hallucinate in their Scholia on ch. 8 of the Epistle to the Romans, while they deny that those different orders of angels can be gathered from the Apostle; for from the words of St. Gregory praised above, all the holy Fathers, both Greek and Latin, teach with the fullest consensus the certain grades and orders of the angels. Above all St. Ignatius, Epistle to the Trallians: I (he says), because I am able to understand heavenly things, and the orders of angels, and the differences of angels and of hosts, and the distinctions of Virtues and Dominations, and the varieties of Thrones and Powers, the magnitudes of Aeons, the excellences of Cherubim and Seraphim... These things, I say, I know; yet am I not on that account altogether perfect, etc.

St. Irenaeus likewise numbers the same orders, if you except the Seraphim and Cherubim; for he says in book 2, ch. 54: They tell us what the nature of invisible things is, they recount the number of angels, and the orders of Archangels, they demonstrate the mysteries of the Thrones, and teach the diversities of Dominations, Principalities, Powers, and Virtues. St. Basil in his Liturgy enumerates them in this order: Thee the Angels and Archangels praise, the Thrones, Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Virtues, and the many-eyed Cherubim, the Seraphim stand about thee in a circle.

Similarly St. Athanasius teaches the same thing in several places, but especially in the book De Communi essentia:

Just as, he says, we have acknowledged a distinction among the supernal Virtues, so also of station and knowledge. The Thrones indeed, and the Seraphim, and the Cherubim learn immediately from God, as being superior to all, and nearer to God. These further teach the inferior orders, and so on, the superiors teach the inferiors. But the lowest order is that of the Angels, who are also the teachers of men.

The Latins also subscribe. St. Augustine in the book contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas, ch. 10, weighing that word of the Apostle to the Colossians 1, Whether Thrones, or Dominations, etc., says: That therefore there are seats, Principalities, Dominations, Powers in the celestial apparatuses, I most firmly believe, and that they differ in something I hold with undoubting faith. But — that you may not despise me, whom you think a great doctor — what those things are, and what they differ among themselves, I do not know. Nay, he even not obscurely condemns the inquiry into these things, saying: Rather in these things rash presumption than cautious ignorance seems to be blamed, and soon after, signifying clearly enough that they exalt themselves above the divine writers, those who think they know something about these things beyond what has been briefly touched upon and prescribed in the Scriptures. And in the Enchiridion, ch. 58, he doubts whether the Archangels are the same as those who are called virtues, and what the four words differ among themselves, by which the Apostle seems to have embraced the whole celestial society, saying: whether seats, or dominations, or principalities, or powers: let them say, he says, who can, if however they can prove it, let them say; I confess that I am ignorant of these things. And in book 2 contra Maximinum arianum, rebuking him because he had written that angels indeed can be seen by archangels, but archangels not by angels: from whom, he says, did you hear this? whence did you learn it? where did you read it? Would you not better have applied your mind to the divine Books, where we read that angels were seen by men when they willed, and in the manner they willed to appear?

St. Jerome seems to have been in the same doubtful opinion; for when in book 11 contra Iovinianum he had numbered seven orders of angels, namely the Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominations, Powers, Cherubim, and Seraphim, he adds: And every name that is named, not only in the present age, but also in the future; embracing the matter indefinitely, as if there were innumerable other grades of angels, and names of grades. Which he indicates more clearly in his commentary on ch. 1 of the Epistle to the Ephesians, where, when he had inquired whence Paul received that among the angels there are Principalities, Virtues, Powers, and Dominations, and had said that he had known, from what is related of Kings and Princes, and also Dukes, Tribunes, and innumerable Centurions in the books of Kingdoms, the image of other Princes and Kings, he adds:

Namely, that in the heavens there are Principalities, there are Powers, there are Dominations and Virtues, and the other names of ministries which we are not able to name; nor do I think that Paul himself, placed in so heavy a bodily frame, wished to enumerate them.

As if he said that neither had St. Paul come to know, nor could he have enumerated, all the orders of the blessed angels. — St. Cyril of Jerusalem was also in doubt in this matter, Catechesis 11 to the Illumined, where, rebuking the audacity of the Arians, who busied themselves rashly and curiously about the generation of the Son:

Tell me first, he says, most audacious man, what a throne differs from a domination, and then inquire into the things that pertain to Christ. Tell me what a principality is, what a virtue, what an angel, and then curiously search out the Maker himself.

— Into the same doubt St. Chrysostom fell. Homily 1, De incomp., where, carping at the audacity of the Heretics, who rashly inquire into the nature of God:

Consider, he says, in your mind how great is the insolence of the Heretics; we do not know even the names of the servants, and they inquire rather curiously into the substance of the Lord. For there are Angels, and Archangels, and Thrones, and Dominations, and Principalities, and Powers: but those are not the only companies in the heavens, but infinite peoples, and ineffable nations, which speech cannot unfold.

Which he proves from that word of the Apostle to the Ephesians 1, He made him sit above every Principality, and Power, and Virtue, and every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in the future; from which he infers: You see that there are certain names which will be manifest there, when now they are unknown: for therefore he said, not only those which are named in this age, but also in the future. From these things it is established that the orders of the angels were not defined by very many of the holy Fathers.

— Which things nevertheless do not detract from the certainty of our Conclusion, since constantly the other holy Fathers teach the contrary, and we already hold it as undoubted by all Theologians, who prove the truth itself in various ways. For in the first place William of Paris expressly deduces it in part 2, part 2 of De Universo, ch. 112, a comparison having been made of the heavenly Kingdom with the Ministers, Followers of an earthly King:

It seemed to me (he says) that the closest and lateral companions of the King must necessarily constitute certain orders of men, who must assist the King himself unceasingly and at his side. The first, then, is the order of the Most Loving, that is, of those loving the King most greatly and burning with love for him above all others: and this is manifest, because this is the custom of all kings, namely, that they both wish to have, and do have, near themselves and close to them those whom they believe to be their most faithful friends. The second is the order of the Wise, with which order nothing is more fitting for a king, nothing more becoming, especially since Wisdom herself says that kings reign through me, and that King of the Hebrews, wisest of all, preferred wisdom to all other gifts, and asked for it singularly, the others being set aside. You also know how necessary the wise are for the governance of kingdoms, as that same most wise King said, that the multitude of the wise is the salvation of the world. You know also that through wisdom laws are founded, and salutary statutes enacted, most useful to men. The third order is that of Judges, namely, those who render justice, who settle controversies and disputes. The fourth order is that of the Most Eminent and the Magnates; among whom are the king's subjects and tribute-paying men of the king, or those who are usually called the nobles of the kingdom and barons, in whom consists a great part of the strength and power of the kingdom. The fifth order, governors of provinces. The sixth order, leaders of legions and instructors of wars, and captains of battle lines. The seventh order is that of centurions, namely, ministers who execute vengeance and justice. The eighth, that of great messengers, who are otherwise called Legates, namely because they announce great things, things not to be revealed to other messengers, and carry reports concerning great matters and affairs, to whomsoever the King shall command. The ninth and last order is that of lesser messengers running throughout the whole kingdom, whether horsemen or footmen, bearing the orders and commands of the King. Since, therefore, this number of orders, and their arrangement, and this whole arrangement of an earthly kingdom, is most becoming and most beautiful.... and every good king is an example and likeness of the first and highest King, who is the blessed Creator, it will necessarily follow that every well-ordered kingdom is an example and likeness of that kingdom, and the ordering of this his ordering, and the orders of these his orders. This also appears evidently in the likeness and proportionality, and in the comparisons of the parts or orders to the parts or orders of the first and noblest one himself. For the first order, namely, the order of those burning most fervently with love for the King, is assimilated and proportioned to the order of the Seraphim, as appears from its very name itself, which means wholly burning, or a conflagration of love. And the order of the Wise, which is the second order, corresponds by similitude and proportion to the order of the Cherubim, which the name of the same, interpreted from Hebrew into Latin, shows, which means fullness of knowledge, or flowing forth of wisdom. Similarly the third order, which is that of Judges, is assimilated and proportioned to the third order of that illustrious and most noble Kingdom, which is named Thrones or Seats; for in them, as it were in the kingdom of his royal excellence, sits that King and Lord of ages, and thence through them he exercises his judgments. The fourth order, of the Most Powerful, those pre-eminent in the kingdom in honor and sublimity of power, corresponds by the same ways to the fourth order of the aforementioned kingdom, which is named Dominations, because in them shines forth most of all the most supereminent dominion of the Creator, just as in the very power and glory of the Magnates the power of the earthly kingdom appears most of all. But the governors of provinces, through whom namely the provinces are ruled, are compared to the Principalities with a most fitting similitude.... To the sixth order, which is that of Powers, are most rightly compared the dukes of legions, instructors of battle lines, and Princes of armies, since through them those are brought back and reduced to the King's power who have withdrawn from his authority or rebel against it. The seventh order, which is of those exercising vengeance and executing justices or judgments, such as Centurions usually are: is fitted to the order of Virtues, which ought to be so hostile to vices as to appear sworn to their death, and seem to oppose vices so far as to be worthy to be called not only Virtuous men, but even Virtues. But the last two orders, namely those > of the greater and lesser messengers, have a most evident proportion and similitude to the Angels and Archangels.

Some prove the diversity of Hierarchies among the angels from the hierarchic operations, which are to purify and be purified, to illuminate and be illuminated, to perfect and be perfected, as St. Dionysius says in chapter 3.; for according to this threefold office the angels are rightly distributed into three Hierarchies. For the first Hierarchy is purified, illuminated, and perfected by God alone, and in turn purifies, illuminates, and perfects the middle one. But the middle, having been purified, illuminated, and perfected by the superior, bestows those same divine effects upon the inferior. The first is purified, illuminated, and perfected by no other superior Hierarchy, but purifies, illuminates, and perfects the inferiors; the second is purified by the superior, illuminated, and perfected, and purifies, illuminates, and perfects the third: the third and last perfects, illuminates, and purifies no other except the human.

This purification, however, is not to be understood as if it were made from sin, or from error, or from ignorance; for these can have no place in the most holy angels, who see God clearly and intuitively; but it is made from a lack of knowledge (nescientia), which is found in them. Indeed, they do not know all supernatural truths through the activity of their natural powers, nor through the beatific vision itself, which is terminated only to the object of beatitude, namely, to the divine essence and its divine excellencies: but not to external things, whether those pertaining to the disposition of the universe, or to the governance of the Church, or to the mysteries of grace, which the lower angels can learn from the higher, and the Higher from God himself, as William of Paris, in the second part of the first part de Universo chapter 198., expounds this point learnedly very nearly in this manner:

Among the angels some are more resplendent than others, and nearer to the divine light, and therefore purer, not because they have less filth, or none at all, but because from the inexhaustible fountain of light they receive larger and clearer draughts of truth: just as if several crystals, or mirrors, were set before the Sun, which are not placed in the same position, but one catches his rays more fully and more directly than another; so since some angels contemplate God more perfectly than the rest, they are flooded with a more abundant light than those others, and on that account are purer than they, and illumine them by the abundance of their own light: which communication of more copious light is called purification; not that there is anything of darkness and gloom in them which would be extinguished by the approach of greater light, but because, as I said, there comes about an addition of light to light. For the remission of light does not consist in an admixture of darkness; just as neither the slowing of motion consists in rest, nor dullness of sight in blindness — from which examples the second applies most of all to the matter at hand: since the heavenly orbs are not all revolved with equal swiftness, but the highest among them, which is called the primum mobile, is stirred with a swifter motion, and the rest thereafter, each according as it is nearer or farther, are moved more quickly or more slowly. But if that lesser swiftness consisted in any part of rest, there would nowhere be true and simple motion; since even beyond that supreme and swiftest revolution, a swifter one could either be feigned by us, or created by God: wherefore one motion is slower than another without any admixture of contrary rest; likewise one light more splendid than another, tempered by no part of gloom. After that manner, therefore, an angel is said to be purified when he receives some new light of knowledge which he lacked before: and that very thing which was wanting is like a kind of privation, which the incoming knowledge drives away; whence the name of purification has been given to it.

You will ask first. Do individual angels have proper names?

I answer. It seems more probable that proper names were assigned by God to individual angels severally; not indeed so that they might be known by them among the other Blessed, as St. Gregory teaches, Homily on the hundred sheep, but so that the Blessed may use them when conversing with them, for after the day of judgment the various Blessed will speak of one another, and of the angels; therefore it is necessary that they make use of their names, and now both blessed souls and angels, whenever they speak of anyone, need names for that same reason. And what we say of the good angels must be judged the same of the evil ones, otherwise Christ would have questioned a certain demon in vain as to what his name was.

But there are only seven holy angels whose names are recalled by Catholic writers, and they are Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, Uriel, Salathiel, or Sealtiel, Iehudiel, and Barachiel, as Serarius proves in chapter 12 of Tobias, and Salmeron tom. 3. They are designated by Sacred Scripture under several mystical appellations; for Apocal. 4. they are called seven lamps before the throne of God; because they shine with the highest brightness, and illumine with a certain remarkable splendor those to whom they are sent, a symbol of which thing the angel exhibited who stood beside Peter, A light shone in the dwelling, Act. 12. And in the same Apocalypse St. John says: I saw the lamb standing as though slain, having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven Spirits of God, sent into all the earth. They are called horns, because they are most mighty for routing demons, for protecting the Church, for working miracles, for defending the just, and for the punishment of the impious: they are likewise called eyes, because they are most perspicacious and most vigilant for knowing and fulfilling the will of God, for procuring the salvation of the Church and of men; whence of these it is said in Zach. 4. These seven eyes are the Lord's, which run to and fro through the whole earth: of these also we have it in the same Apocalypse c. 8. And I saw seven angels standing in the sight of God. And elsewhere in the same book seven angels are mentioned as having, as it were, care of the whole earth.

Hence in Tobiae 12.¹ Raphael said of himself that he was one of those seven: I am, he says, Raphael the angel, one of the seven, who stand before the Lord. They are said to stand before the Lord, or in the sight of God, metaphorically, after the manner in which ministers are present to a Prince, and ready to receive and carry out his commands; and this also indicates how familiar they are with God, for to stand seems to signify a certain familiarity, for of the familiars of Solomon the Queen of Sheba says in lib. Reg. 3. cap. 10.: Happy are thy servants, because they stand always before thee; for it is the property of familiars and attendants to stand before a Prince, while Princes sit.

All these things Clement of Alexandria confirms, lib. 6. Strom. toward the end. There are seven, he says, who hold the greatest power, the firstborn Princes of the angels, bearing with them, because of their offices, the name of God.

The peculiar meaning of their names is drawn out thus: Michael is interpreted, Who is like God? which name was given him after he conquered Lucifer with a generous spirit, and drove him out of the empyrean heaven with his wicked followers, and fights against him daily on behalf of men, and because he also defends and guards the honor of God and his greatest glory, nor permits anything whatsoever concerning it, however small, to be detracted.

Some others add that he presides over the prayers and oblations of the faithful, and for that reason is called Michael, that is, Who is like God? as if to say: to God alone belongs the hearing of the prayers of penitents, and being propitious to their sins, and also their justification and salvation.

— Gabriel, that is, the strength of God, because he announced the mighty deeds and wars of God to Daniel, to the blessed Virgin, etc. Again Gabriel is said in Hebrew Geberel, that is, man-God, as if to say: God will become incarnate, and will be man as to nature and progress of age and body: yet he will remain vir (man), because from the first instant of conception his soul will be full of all knowledge, grace, fortitude, etc., according to that saying of Jeremiah 31. A woman shall compass a man.

— Raphael, that is, Physician, or medicine of God, because he presides over the health of bodies. Whence he cured the blindness of Tobias, and can obtain for us spiritual and bodily remedy.

— Uriel, that is, light, or fire of God, because he illumines men with the knowledge of God and inflames them with love.

— Salathiel, or Sealtiel, that is, prayer of God, because he prays for men and stirs them up to adoration.

— Iehudiel, that is, Confession, or praise of God, because he exhorts men to confession and the praise of God.

— Barachiel, that is, blessing of God, because he procures the benefits of God for us and urges us toward the blessing of God and thanksgiving.

— The three last are noted by no tradition, but have come down to us from the Hebrew. There is mention of Uriel in Esdras lib. 4., but this book is not reckoned among the Canonical books; Salathiel, Iehudiel, and Barachiel are celebrated by Antonio Duca, a distinguished man who flourished in the time of Paul III Supreme Pontiff, in the Hymn on the seven assisting Angels. But whether they are to be addressed by those names or by others, it is most certainly certain that they are the seven chief angels of the celestial court, who stand in the sight of God, and to whom the care of the whole earth is entrusted.

Furthermore, these holy angels stir us up to embrace the seven virtues opposed to the seven capital sins in equal number, which are: humility, patience, liberality, chastity, temperance, diligence, and charity; and since those seven pre-eminent angels are of the order of Seraphim, as we shall say presently; therefore their special task and office is to restrain the seven chief demons fallen from heaven, who by continual suggestions induce us to commit those seven capital sins, and alas! often make us succumb to them.

But who are those chief evil angels deputed by Lucifer to suggest so many evils? St. Bernard, in sermon 13. on the Psalm qui habitat, enumerates them:

The first, he says, is Leviathan, the Prince of pride: the second Beerith, the Prince of anger: the third Mammon, the Prince of avarice: the fourth Beelzebuth, the Prince of envy: the fifth Asmodaeus, the Prince of lust: the sixth Beelphegor, the Prince of gluttony, and the seventh Astaroth, the Prince of sloth, or laziness.

Since, therefore, these things are so, God, who by his kindness and ineffable goodness wills the salvation of us all, willed to choose and appoint just as many Princes from among the good angels, that they might blunt the impious assaults of these seven demons against us.

To these add, that beyond the four first angels out of the seven named above, venerable Bede in his Collectanea makes mention of two others, namely Rumiel and Phaniel, and commends himself to them in these words: Gabriel be unto me logic; Michael be unto me a girdle; Raphael be unto me a shield; Uriel be unto me protector; Rumiel be unto me defender, Phaniel be unto me security. Besides these names, moreover, some add Nuriel, Zamael, Zadkiel, and Caphziel. There are also some of the aforementioned, as well as other names, in the second book of the Sybilline verses, which are related in the second tome of the Bibliotheca Sanctorum Patrum:

Then Eromiel, Uriel, Samiel, and Azael, Knowing beforehand what evil each of men has wrought, Shall bring all souls from the lands before the shadowy gloom To judgment, before the dreadful throne of the immortal Great Father.

But since these names are neither inferred from the Scriptures, nor reported by the Holy Fathers, therefore they are neither to be used nor invoked; especially since the holy Apostle has proscribed novelties of words, and the Roman Council held in the year of our Lord 745., under Pope Zachary, condemned the prayer of a certain Aldebert, in which, invoking eight names of angels, he said: I pray you, and conjure you, and supplicate myself to you, Angel Uriel, Angel Raguel, Angel Tabuel, Angel Michael, Angel Adimis, Angel Tubuas, Angel Subaoth, Angel Limihel. When this prayer had been read, Pope Zachary said:

these names, besides Michael's, are all names of demons. What else should be done but that all that has been read be committed to the fire? And all the Bishops agreed, saying, we acknowledge the names of no more than three angels, that is, Gabriel, Michael, Raphael.

So we read in the Acts of the Council. And hence Baronius infers clearly understands that the fourth book of Esdras published under that name, in which mention of the angel Uriel frequently occurs, has been proscribed by the Roman Church and rejected utterly.

To a similar kind of flour must be reckoned those things which Rabbi Benidior relates in the preface which he prefixed to his commentary on the book Ietsira, i. e. On creation, where he sets forth the names of those angels whom the Thalmudists fable to have been the masters and teachers of the Patriarchs. For they say that the angel Raziel was the teacher and preceptor of Adam, Iophiel of Shem, Zaclekiel of Abraham, Raphael of Isaac, Peliel of Jacob, Gabriel of Joseph, Metraton of Moses, Malathiel of Elias. The same author adds that each of these teachers and doctors taught his disciple the Cabbala, or tradition, by voice or in writing, from whom it was propagated among the people of God. Thus, e.g., the angel Raziel, Adam's tutor, consigned to him on behalf of God a book in which the secrets of loftier and more hidden wisdom were contained, mention of which marvelous book is found in the Zohar on Genesis. But all these things are rabbinical trifles, to which no credence is due.

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Monitum I: Monitum editoris

Praefatio I: In secundum librum Sententiarum praefatio

Tractatus I: De Angelorum natura, operationibus, et praecellentiis

Disputatio I: De Angelorum existentia, natura, et ordine

Articulus I: De Angelorum existentia

Quaestio I: An revera constet Angelos existere

Quaestio II: An, et quo tempore, et loco creati fuerint Angeli

Articulus II: De natura, et substantia Angelica

Quaestio I: An Angeli sint omnino incorporei, et prorsus immateriales

Quaestio II: An, et quomodo Angeli sint incorruptibiles, et immortales

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo Angeli ab anima rationali distinguantur

Articulus III: De numero, et ordine Angelorum

Quaestio I: An certo cognosci possit multiplex Angelorum numerus

Quaestio II: An inter Angelos plures sint specie, et solo numero distincti

Quaestio III: Quid, et quot sint Angelorum hierarchiae, et ordines

Disputatio II: De facultatibus, et operationibus Angelorum

Articulus I: De intellectu, et cognitione Angelorum

Quaestio I: Quis, et qualis sit intellectus Angelicus

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angeli res intelligant per earum species

Quaestio III: Quodnam sit obiectum cognitionis Angelicae

Quaestio IV: An, et quomodo Angeli sibi invicem loquantur

Quaestio V: An, et qualiter unus Angelus alterum illuminare possit

Articulus II: De voluntate Angelica

Quaestio I: An Angelica voluntas revera sit libera, et mutabilis

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angelus Deum, seipsum, et alia diligat

Articulus III: De potentia motrice, et executiva Angelorum

§ I: De loco Angelorum

Quaestio I: An, et per quid Angeli constituantur in loco

Quaestio II: Qualiter Angeli existant in loco

§ II: De motu Angelorum

Quaestio I: An, et per quid Angeli localiter moveri dicantur

Quaestio II: Qualis, et quotuplex distingui possit motus Angelicus

Quaestio III: An Angelus possit transire de uno loco ad alium, non transeundo per spatium intermedium

Quaestio IV: An, et quae sit Angelorum durationis mensura

§ III: De activitate Angelorum erga corpora

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Angeli soleant in assumptis corporibus apparere

Quaestio II: An, et quas Angeli operationes vitae edere possint in corporibus assumptis

Disputatio III: De Angelorum gratia, merito, et demerito

Articulus I: De gratia Angelis concessa

Quaestio I: An, et in qua beatitudine creati fuerint Angeli

Quaestio II: An, et qualem gratiam habuerint Angeli

Quaestio III: An, et quomodo Angeli gratiam sanctificantem, et suam beatitudinem ex propria operatione, et merito fuerint assecuti

Articulus II: De officiis sanctorum Angelorum erga homines, et obsequiis hominum erga Angelos

Quaestio I: An omnes omnino Angeli ad hominum obsequia interdum deputentur

Quaestio II: An, et qualiter Angeli sancti ad hominum custodiam deputentur

Quaestio III: Quaenam beneficia per suam custodiam nobis impendant Angeli, quaeve ob eam eis rependat Deus, nosque eis rependere debeamus

Articulus III: De Angelorum peccatis, et poenis

Quaestio I: An, et qualiter Angeli peccare potuerint

Quaestio II: Quodnam, et quale fuerit primarium, et capitale diaboli peccatum

Quaestio III: An voluntas daemonum ita sit in malo obfirmata, ut nec possit aliquatenus resipiscere, nec bonum aliquod operari

Quaestio IV: An, et quali poena daemones crucientur

Appendix I: Appendix. De infestatione, et cruenta daemonum in humanum genus saevitia