Scotus Academicus, Tomus quartus: De Angelis

Note 1. We are not here inquiring whether the angels excel men; for it is certain, and more certain than certainty, that by their natural endowments the angels are far more excellent than men, seeing that St. Paul affirms that even Christ the Lord Himself, inasmuch as He is man, was made a little lower than the angels, Hebrews 1. Hence St. Peter, chapter 2, teaches that the angels are greater in power and might, namely than men; for, as St. Jerome says in expounding that text, So great is the dignity of the angels that all human nature compared to them is called childhood. Hence St. Augustine, book 9 De Civitate c. 13: Man is a kind of mean between the beasts and the angels, inferior to the angels, superior to the beasts, having mortality in common with the beasts, and reason with the angels. To these oracles theological reason itself also bears witness: both because the angels have a greater affinity with the divine essence — for they have no commerce with matter, and are wholly simple, excluding, in the manner of God, all composition and physical composibility; not so man, who consists at once of an earthly and a heavenly part, namely an immortal soul and a corruptible body. Moreover, as was proved in the preceding Question, an angel demands incorruption and everlasting duration: but man, as Job says, comes forth like a flower and is crushed, and flees like a shadow, and nowhere remains in the same state. Finally, the angels had from their very origin knowledge of all natural things, and there is nothing so abstruse and impenetrable to us (excepting future things and the secrets of hearts) that they do not see most profoundly; hence they will effectively, choose immovably, and move with such swiftness that in an instant they possess heaven and earth. But man is utterly unwarlike, dull, and rude, always unlike himself while he lives, nor is he the same in the evening that he was in the morning. Great, therefore, is the dignity and excellence of the angelic nature above the human.

If, however, we consider the divine benefits of the supernatural order granted gratuitously by God both to angels and to men, it is beyond doubt that human nature is superior to the angelic in many gratuitous and supernatural gifts. For that nature was raised to hypostatic union and assumed by the divine Word, which, as the Apostle says, Hebrews 2, nowhere took hold of angels, but of the seed of Abraham. Hence with reason the angel of John the Evangelist's Rector and Teacher, Apocal. 19, refused to be adored by him. See, he said, that you do it not, for I am your fellow servant: which St. Ambrose expounding says: The angel trembles to be adored by a man, when above himself he adored the man God. Moreover, God bestowed the priestly dignity not on angels, but on men, by which they hold authority over the triple body of Christ, namely the Moral, the Mystical, and the Natural. Priests, I say, have authority over the moral body of Christ, namely souls, which they can bind and loose from sins by censures. Second, they obtain jurisdiction over the mystical body of Christ, namely the Church, which they illuminate, perfect, and as it were deify: wherefore by St. Dionysius in the books De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia priests are called theurgists, that is, makers of gods. Third and finally, the priest holds dominion over the true and natural body of Christ. For he makes it present sacramentally, and at his words the very Word of God, by whom all things were made, presents Himself to another, God obeying the voice of a man, as is said in Josue 10. Hence St. Ephrem calls the priesthood the most excellent of all ornaments, the summit of all the goods that are in men, something divine; and as it were the final goal of all things that are sought among men.

These things being premised, there remains here only to be discussed whether and by what reason the angels are distinguished from the rational soul according to the proper characters of each nature and their own entity, which, that it may be settled more evidently,

Note 2. All the theologians (excepting a few of lesser note) agree among themselves that rational souls are specifically distinguished from angels; and the Doctor proves this in 2, dist. 1, q. 5, num. 2, by this argument: Forms of the same character have the same character of perfecting or not perfecting: but the soul is naturally the perfective of a body as its form; an angel, however, is naturally not the perfection of any matter: therefore etc. The things that can be objected against that assertion are of less weight and will be easily dissolved from what is to be said. But since this specific distinction must precisely be sought, the controversy among the very princes of Theology is grave.

For the Seraphic Doctor in 2, dist. 1, part 2, artic. 3, q. 2 derives that distinction from the fact that the soul is unitable to a body, whereas an angel is not so unitable.

St. Thomas in 2, dist. 3, q. 1, artic. 6, ad. 2, and often elsewhere, following in the footsteps of Henry of Ghent, places this difference in a diverse intellectuality, or in degrees of intellection, or in the power of understanding; namely that the angels are endowed with a stronger power of understanding and understand more fully and more excellently than the soul: since, he says, the angels apprehend most perfectly all the objects that are offered to them without any inquiry and discursus; but the soul knows definite things only with discursus; and therefore it is called rational, because it reasons about things.

But our Alexander of Hales in 1. 2, collation on substance, q. 2, derives the specific distinction between the angels and the rational soul from the greater or lesser degree of understanding, which namely is greater in an angel and lesser in the soul. For if, he says, a diverse degree of sensing, greater or lesser, in brutes suffices for their specific distinction; why should not the same diversity in the intellectual power also produce a diverse species? Yet he hunts out another cause of this distinction, which we shall set forth below.

The Subtle Doctor refutes these opinions excellently, and himself established the fourth, far more probable, which, that it may appear more evidently,

Note 3. A species can be regarded in two ways: First properly, for a thing that is placed per se and directly under a genus, and which is predicated in quid of many things differing in number, e. g. man, who is constituted under the genus animal and is said in quid of individual men. Second, it is taken less properly, for a thing that is not placed per se under a genus, but in predicating has the manner of a species; thus matter and form, considered in themselves, are placed under no genus, since they are only parts of the composite; but they have only the manner of species in predication, for matter considered universally is said of this and that matter; and material form of this and that form; and so they are called species merely predicable, and not subjects. Nevertheless, those species regarded according to their metaphysical entity, and inasmuch as they consist of genus and difference, since they have the true character of some metaphysical whole of being, can also, thus considered, be called predicable: for the rational soul, e. g., although physically it is a part concurring with the human body toward the constitution of man; nevertheless metaphysically it is a certain whole consisting of a genus, namely the degree of spiritual substance, in which it agrees with the angel; and of its differential character, by which it differs essentially from the angel: and so, thus regarded, it is predicated specifically of this and that soul, and has the true character and denomination of a predicable species.

It must further be observed. from the Doctor praised above, num. 5, that the diversity of species is to be derived from the last essential difference contracting the genus, with which there can stand other superior differential degrees, which are conceived as common to the genus before it is conceived to be contracted and determined to a species by this last difference; as appears from the example of man and horse, for although they are two distinct species mutually opposed through rational and irrational, nevertheless the sensitive faculties, namely nutritive, visual, etc. are in both of the same species, because they tend to the same object. For faculties and powers are distinguished by operations, and operations by objects, at least extrinsically on the part of the specifying terminus; for those sensitive powers do not emanate proximately and immediately from the last difference contracting the genus, namely the degree of sensibility, or animal, and constituting the species proximately of man and horse; but from the remote difference contracting the superior genus, namely a living body to a corporeal animated sensitive substance, and constituting it in sentient being. These things having been lightly touched, the proposed question must now be resolved.

First conclusion. — The specific difference distinguishing the angelic nature from the human is not to be sought from the fact that the rational soul is unitable to a body, whereas the angel is not so unitable. This is the opinion of the Subtle Doctor in the place praised above, num. 2, and he proves it thus: the specifically distinctive difference must be sought from the first constitutive and distinctive degree of the species: but unitability is not the first constitutive degree of the rational soul a priori; for that unitability denotes an aptitude, which presupposes the essence of a thing, and therefore cannot be the primary reason of specific distinction, although a posteriori it denotes it, as the properties of things usually indicate specific differences.

He confirms that argument from the fact that the soul (let the same judgment be made about the other substantial things) is first constituted in itself essentially before it may be said to have an order to another to which it be united; and consequently has in itself the difference by which it is distinguished from other things. Nay, the Doctor's argument seems best if the speech is about formal unitability, and inasmuch as it is an aptitudinal respect resulting from the nature of the soul; but otherwise if the speech were about radical unitability, because that radical unitability is the very essential difference of the soul, from which follows the aptitude to union; just as conversely the non-unitability of the angel consists in some essential predicate of the angel, to which follows the negation of unitability, both radical and formal.

St. Bonaventure, however, seems to have spoken of radical unitability, when he assigned it as the primary reason of the specific distinction of the soul from the angel, for he says:

that which is for the soul to be united to a human body, or to vivify a human body, does not signify an accidental act, nor does it signify an ignoble act. Not accidental, because by reason of it the soul is a substantial form: not ignoble, because by reason of it the soul is the most noble form of all, and in it stands the appetite of the whole nature: for the human body, of the most noble complexion and organization that there is in nature, is organized and complexioned, and therefore is not completed, nor is it born to be completed, except by the most noble form or nature: that therefore by which the soul is unitable to such a body signifies something essential, which is the most noble in the soul: and so by it is rightly taken the specific difference according to which the soul differs from the angelic nature.

In which words the Seraphic Doctor seems to speak of radical unitability, since he calls it most noble and essential; but such is not formal unitability, and therefore he is not to be understood of it, and thus his argument is valid and efficacious, and coincides with the argument of the Doctor in the third conclusion to be brought forward.

Second conclusion. — The specific distinction of the angels from the rational soul does not arise from their having a diverse manner and distinct power of understanding. This is against the authors of the second and third opinions, but especially against the Thomists, who confirm their assertion with the Angelic Doctor by this argument above all: Intellectual forms, which are so disposed that one in understanding discurses and the other does not discursus, are not of the same species: but the soul in understanding discurses, the angel by no means: therefore they are not of the same species. It is confirmed by a similar case, because the sensitive soul in brutes does not seem to be distinguished except by diverse degrees of sensing, and yet there is a specific difference there: therefore the specific difference between angel and man ought to be gathered by diverse modes and degrees of understanding, namely that the soul in understanding discurses, but not the angel.

The Doctor attacks this argument: both because it is not a priori, for the diverse degrees and modes of understanding in the soul and the angel are something posterior to their essences: but the specific distinction of beings must be sought from their natures. Moreover, things are first distinguished according to their faculties and first acts before they are distinguished in order to second acts: but to understand with discursus, and not to understand with discursus, are only second acts, which presuppose in the angel and the soul a diverse faculty and intellectual power: therefore their specific distinction is not primarily to be derived from them. Then also because that argument does not conclude a posteriori. For, says the Doctor, if to discursus and not to discursus argue diverse intellectual natures, since the soul discurses about conclusions, which it infers from principles per se known, but does not discursus about those same principles, it would follow that the soul is specifically distinguished from itself. Moreover, the blessed soul does not discursus about the beatific object: but it does discursus about the object naturally known: therefore if the specific distinction of the soul from the angel were to be gathered from the power of discoursing or not discoursing, it would follow that the blessed soul is specifically distinguished from itself, since it discourses about one object, but not so about another. Nor does the alleged example in confirmation help at all; for brutes are not distinguished by various degrees of sensing more or less; but by formal and specific differences, which, since they are for the most part unknown to us, we are compelled to expound through their various properties and diverse modes of sensing. Here, however, we do not inquire into the properties peculiar to the angels as opposed to souls, but into the essential differences by which they differ from each other specifically, which we contend are in no way to be inferred from the power of discoursing or not discoursing.

Third conclusion. — The specific distinction of the angels from the rational soul is not to be sought from their greater or lesser inclination and propensity to the good. This is against Alexander of Hales, who in quest. 20, memb. 5 derives the difference of both the angelic and the human nature from the fact that the angel is a free substance vertible immutably, but the soul is vertible mutably.

For God (he says) is a free essence invertible into good and evil: but the angel and the rational soul is a free essence vertible into either: but in this they differ essentially, because the angelic understanding, where it is turned to good or evil, is determined to it by its nature, and therefore the evil angel is not capable of penitence, because he is not avertible from evil: but the rational soul, vertible into good and evil, after its conversion to either always remains free, and therefore is convertible and capable of penitence.

But to this argument, however excellent, Alexander himself does not trust, for he adds: This is said without prejudice to the more probable opinion: for if anyone in the theological order could find a more convenient difference, one must rest: since things of this kind are of the highest speculation. Therefore this reason does not better indicate the specific difference of the angel from the rational soul than the preceding ones; since that vertibility or invertibility, or mutable or immutable and unvaried adherence of the will to some object or purpose, follows only upon the operation of the intellect and will of the angel and the soul; and therefore it presupposes their faculties and essences as diverse: therefore another reason must be sought a priori for the specific distinction of the angel from the soul, which will be opened up by

Fourth conclusion. — The angel and the rational soul differ specifically from their own natures, namely because the angel is of a complete nature and the soul of an incomplete nature. So the Doctor in the place cited number 4, where he says:

I say that because the angel is such a nature to itself, and the soul such a nature to itself, therefore they are first distinguished in > species: not indeed as two species, but as species and part of a species; and yet it itself is the first reason for distinguishing its own species (of which it is a part) from the angel; and therefore the first reason of specific distinction on the part of its own species is itself.

As if he should say that that which has a species in itself cannot be of the same species as that which has not a species in itself, but is a part of a species: but the angel has a species by himself, whereas the soul is only a part of the human species, and is the reason or formal cause why man is specifically distinguished from the angel: for the human body is indeed the material cause of this distinction; but the soul is its formal cause and the more principal one; since it is the more excellent constitutive part of man, it is likewise the most principal distinctive part of him.

Therefore it is impossible that the soul should be of the same species as the angel; but it differs from him as a part of a species from a species.

And so the primary reason of their distinction is to be sought from the fact that the soul is an incomplete nature and the angel a complete nature. — Then, the specific distinction of the angels from the rational soul is to be sought precisely from this, that, this being posited, even though the other things are not understood, they are truly perceived to be of diverse species: but with the character of a complete nature posited in the angels, and of an incomplete nature in souls, they are sufficiently understood to differ specifically, even if unitability or non-unitability etc. is not perceived: therefore the primary reason of their specific distinction is to be sought from the concept of a complete or incomplete nature. The major is evident. The minor is proved: for whether the angel and the soul are conceived intuitively or abstractively, it is certain that he who perceives the angels to be complete natures, saying no order of them to another with which they constitute some whole, truly perceives them to differ specifically from the soul, which by its nature is incomplete, and says that it has a habitude to the body with which it constitutes man; even if he does not apprehend them to be discursive or non-discursive etc. Therefore the primary reason of their distinction is derived from the concept of a complete or incomplete nature.

Which is certainly confirmed by the example of the angels themselves, who, as the Princes of Theology agree, are distinguished among themselves specifically, and consequently have faculties and powers specifically distinct; for they cannot be distinguished specifically unless they have distinct properties proceeding from diverse specific differences. But those properties cannot be assigned which could belong to one and not to the other, unless their intellect and mode of understanding be specifically distinct. For what other faculties can be thought in an angel than intellect and will? Therefore even if angelic intellects are occupied about the same object, nevertheless they are truly specifically distinct; much more are they specifically distinguished from the human, for the agreement of the intellect of one angel with the human is less than with the intellect of another angel.

— Finally, that must be said the primary reason of either distinction, from which arise properties specifically distinct: but the diverse properties of the angels and of souls arise from the fact that the soul is an incomplete nature, but the angels a complete nature; for from that it follows that the soul is unitable to a body, whereas the angel is not unitable to it: therefore etc.

— And so spiritual substance taken generically is immediately divided into a spiritual substance complete in the manner of a substantial and spiritual act existing per se integrally and subsisting, and into a spiritual substance incomplete in the manner of a form ordered to the other part, that is, to the human body, and consequently not existing integrally nor subsisting. The first species is the angel; the second is the soul. The first is called a complete spirit in the manner of act: the second an incomplete spirit in the manner of potency; for to be a form, since it demands matter, is as it were something potential: whence the angel can be called act in act, but the soul act in potency.

Which the Doctor most clearly signifies in the words praised above, when he says num. 5:

The angel is such a nature to itself, and the soul such a nature to itself, that is, such a spiritual substance, therefore they are first distinguished in species, not indeed as two species, but as species and part of a species: because the soul is not properly a species, but a part of a species: as if he should say: the angelic nature constitutes an integral species, because it is a complete act.

You will say 1. If these things are so, it follows from this that the opinion of the Subtle Doctor in this matter coincides with the opinion of St. Bonaventure, which he himself impugns. For what else is the unitability of the soul with the body than that character of an incomplete spiritual substance? And what else is that non-unitability in the angel than the character of a complete being? For that reason indeed the soul is said to be unitable to a body, because it is an incomplete substance and a form orderable to matter; and conversely it is an incomplete substance because it is unitable with the body.

I answer. by denying this inference: for it is one thing to be an incomplete substance, and another to be unitable to a body: since the character of an incomplete substance is precisely something absolute, and is attended to in the order to itself; but the character of unitability is something relative, and is attended to by the order to another to which it is unitable. Then the character of unitable follows the character of incomplete, for it presupposes the unitable thing already constituted in its being, and consequently distinct in its being; for a form is first conceived to have entitative being and in itself, before it is conceived to be ordered to another. Finally, since the character of non-unitable is a negation, it cannot be constitutive and distinctive of the angelic nature. Therefore neither can unitability be the constitutive and distinctive character of the soul. Since, then, the angel and the soul are distinct species of spiritual substance, they ought to have opposite differences and mutually diametrically opposed. It is added that unitability is either the non-repugnance that the soul be united to another, and thus it is something negative; or an inclination to union, and thus it presupposes a thing constituted. But the soul does not constitute an integral species, although it is the first reason of specific distinction in man, whom it constitutes with the human body. — Therefore, according to the mind of the Doctor, the primary reason of the specific distinction between the angelic and human nature is that one is a complete spiritual substance, the other an incomplete one. To which degree of spiritual substance, then, belong the intellective and volitive character, or intellect and will, which are the faculties and powers of that spiritual substance itself, and as it were properties proceeding from that substance and predicable of it in quale. For if it be asked of what kind that spiritual substance is, it is fittingly answered that it is a substantial spiritual act, intellective and volitive.

You will say 2. The angel and the soul are equals in nature: therefore they are of the same species. The consequence is evident; for things that differ specifically have a diverse nature, and therefore are not equals in nature. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine, book 3 De Libero Arbitrio, where he says that rational souls are unequal in office to the superior powers, but equal in nature: therefore etc.

I deny the antecedent. and to its proof I say that St. Augustine said the angel and the soul are equals in nature, not by respect to the predicates by which they are constituted, but by order to the beatitude to which they are ordered: both because one has more of beatitude from his nature than another: then because although they are not of the same natural perfection, they can nevertheless have equal beatitude: finally because they have the same beatific object in which alone they can rest and be satiated; and therefore by their nature they are equally ordered to seeing and loving God.

You will say 3. The operations and powers of the angel and of the rational soul are of the same species: therefore likewise the angel and the soul do not differ in species. The sequence is evident, for the powers and operations follow the natures of the things of which they are: for operating follows being, not only according to the order of existence, but also according to the character of essence and the dignity of entity.

The Doctor answers num. 6. in two ways: first indeed that if the angel and the soul are considered absolutely and according to their own natures, they truly differ in species; nevertheless the intellect and intellection of the angel ought not on that account to be specifically distinguished from the intellect and intellection of the soul; for it does not involve (he says) that things may differ in some species according to nature, but not according to power and operation; since the soul of an ox and of an eagle differ specifically from each other, nevertheless the visual power and vision of the ox does not differ in species from the vision and visual power of the eagle while they are occupied about the Sun, e. g., because they are about the same object. Hence it is possible that containers differ in some way, although the contents do not differ from each other; for the animal in man and brute is the same, although brute and man differ specifically.

He answers, second, that the intellectual power of the angel and of the soul differ in species on the part of the foundation, but not on the part of the object while they are occupied about the same object, and thus acts can be diverse when they proceed from diverse natures and foundations of the powers; although they are of the same species inasmuch as they depend on the objects about which they are occupied; and therefore the intellection of the angel and of man can be said to be of the same species on the part of the object, but diverse on the part of the foundation. But since the diversity on the part of the foundation is a diversity simpliciter; whereas the identity on the part of the object is not an identity simpliciter, but secundum quid; for whatever difference suffices to distinguish, but not whatever identity suffices for the perfect identity of things: hence it must be said that the intellection of the angel and of man, even about the same object, and likewise their intellectual powers, differ specifically.

You will say 4. If the angel and the soul were of diverse species, it would follow that every angel is more perfect than any soul, and consequently that the capacity of any angel with respect to beatitude would be greater than the capacity of any soul: but beatitude satiates the whole capacity of nature: therefore greater beatitude ought to be given to the greater capacity: and consequently the beatitude of any angel would be greater than the beatitude of any man; which yet the Theologians, and indeed the holy Fathers, affirm to be false.

The Doctor answers. by conceding both consequences and denying the subsumption; for beatitude (he says) is not given with proportion to nature chiefly, but to merits; and consequently it does not satiate the whole natural capacity of the soul or the angel, because they could have greater beatitude, if namely they had ampler merits, although they obtained an equal natural capacity. The second consequence could also be denied; for the angel could have a greater natural perfection, although he did not have a greater capacity for beatitude.