Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. From the Doctor in 1. distinct. 11. quaest. 2. nu. 2.: Godfrey, Quodlib. 7. quaest. 4., judged this question useless and unworthy of a solution, because it supposes an impossibility, namely, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; but such a supposition does not seem to be admissible on the part of the respondent, because from it he could be refuted and driven to concede contradictories, which would press the respondent exceedingly and lead him into error. But all the other Scholastics made so much of this question that they wove accurate and subtle disputations in its resolution; nor was their labor in vain. For just as other similar questions are usefully debated in the Schools — for example, whether, if God were not immutable, He would be eternal; whether, if man were not risible, he would be distinct from a horse — the first indeed for investigating whether immutability is the formal notion of eternity, the second for knowing the formal principle constituting man and distinguishing him from brutes, although those suppositions are impossible; so likewise, although the supposition made by us is impossible, yet because it conduces exceedingly to perceiving the formal notion distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit, therefore it ought to be judged neither superfluous nor self-contradictory. Add, that St. Augustine, lib. De Trinit. cap. 6., admits a similar impossible hypothesis, teaching that if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him from being called unbegotten; for it is certain that the Father's not begetting the Son is altogether impossible; nevertheless from this impossible supposition St. Augustine rightly concludes that even if a Person in the divine were not generating, that Person would no less be unbegotten.

Note 2. From the same Doctor, ibidem, illative propositions are of two kinds: some are inferred through a first intrinsic predicate, others through an extrinsic locus. Of the former kind are those from which, through an intrinsic locus and an essential consequence, one thing follows from another; as from this, "a man exists," this follows intrinsically: "therefore he is rational," because rational is an intrinsic and essential predicate of man. Of the latter kind are those which are inferred from the other only by a consequence as it were accidental, yet necessary; thus from this, "a man exists," it follows only extrinsically, although necessarily: "therefore he is risible," because risibility is not of the primary intrinsic and essential notion of man, but is something extrinsic to his essential constitution. In the former hypothetical suppositions, it is certain that, the latter being removed, the removal of the former follows through an intrinsic locus; e.g., if Peter were not rational, the intrinsic consequence would follow that he is not a man: in the latter, however, however much the latter is removed, the removal of the former does not follow through an intrinsic locus; e.g., in this hypothesis, if man were not risible, it does not follow through an intrinsic locus that he is not a man, because, risibility being removed, the intrinsic and essential constitutive principles of man still remain, namely, animal and rational. Whence, to the point, this proposition, "the Son is the Spirator," is said to be of the latter kind with respect to the constitution of the Son, and consequently with respect to His distinction from any other, because, active spiration being removed, the adequate constitutive principle of the Son still remains, namely, the essence and filiation.

Note 3. This question gave occasion to the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. quaest. 36. art. 2. For in order to prove against the Greeks that the Holy Spirit truly proceeds from the Son, he used especially this reason, namely, that the Holy Spirit would not be really distinguished from the Son, if He truly did not proceed from Him. Weighing this reason in the cited question, the Doctor shows it to be weak, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit would be really distinguished from the Son no less even if He truly did not proceed from Him: for two relations are to be distinguished in the Son, namely, filiation and active spiration, formally, or at least modally, distinct from each other; by the former of which the Son is constituted not only in the notion of divine Son, but also in the notion of a divine Person altogether complete and perfect: the latter, however, results as it were from the former and supposes it; and so it supposes also the Person of the Son altogether complete and distinct from every other Person. That this may appear more evident, let it be

The single conclusion. — Even if per impossibile the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would nonetheless in reality be really distinguished from Him.

This is the teaching of the Doctor and of all his disciples, and it is gathered first indeed from the holy Fathers, who teach that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, not precisely because He proceeds from Him, but because His emanation is of another notion from the emanation of the Son; thus St. Augustine lib. 5. De Trinitate, cap. 14. bringing forward the reason for which the Holy Spirit is not the Son, says: For He goes forth not as born, but as given; and therefore He is not called the Son, because He was not born as the Only-begotten. Gregory of Nyssa also favors this, praised by Bessarion in the Oration for the union, from lib. 1. on the Gospels, not yet published in Latin; where among other things he has this: The Spirit is conjoined with the Father, and conjoined inasmuch as both are uncreated, and inasmuch as both have their substance from the first principle: He is distinguished by His own property, which is that the Only-begotten was not produced from the Father, and that through Him the Son is made manifest. By which words he assigns an open reason for the distinction of the Father from the Holy Spirit, not from spiration, but from their constitutive property. The same is to be said of the Son: and so the doctrine of those is not true who trace back the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son to active and passive spiration alone.

Anselm openly subscribes, in the Treatise against the Greeks on the procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 2., where he says: Since the Son exists from God by being born, and the Spirit by proceeding, by the very diversity of nativity and procession they are referred to one another as diverse and other from one another. Again, ibidem:

But the Son (to pass over for the present another cause, since it is not yet established that the Holy Spirit is from Him and proceeds from Him) is therefore not the Holy Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son has being from the Father by being born, but the Holy Spirit not by being born, but by proceeding.

This reason he thus urges in c. 3.: They are other from one another through what has been said, as for example because one is born, the other indeed proceeds; and therefore when one is born, he who is thereby other from him, because he is not born in like manner, but proceeds, cannot be born with him; and when one proceeds, he who is thereby other from him, because he does not proceed in like manner, but is born, cannot proceed at the same time. Whence in cap. 4. he concludes: If the Son and the Holy Spirit were not more than one through something else, through this alone they would be diverse, namely, because one exists by being born, the other by proceeding. By which words certainly he approves our opinion most clearly and most subtly: whence Urban the Pontiff, who in the Council of Bari approved the doctrine of St. Anselm with the whole assembly of the Fathers and with applause, does he not seem to have likewise defined the doctrine of Scotus from that time on?

But, which is the chief point, the Angelic Doctor himself approves this very opinion, Quodlib. 4. artic. 3., where he teaches that a thing is distinguished by its form not only from an opposite, but from a disparate; and he gives the example of a sapphire, which he says is distinguished by its form not only from other stones, but from plants: whence he concludes:

Thus, then, it must be said that the Son is distinguished from the Father by His filiation according to the relative opposition of filiation to paternity: but from the Holy Spirit He is distinguished by filiation, through the fact that the Holy Spirit does not have the filiation which the Son has: therefore he truly judges that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, not indeed precisely by active spiration; and so even if, per impossibile, active spiration were removed from the Son, He would no less be really distinguished from Him by filiation.

The Doctor proves the conclusion first: by the same principle by which a thing is constituted, it is also distinguished from any other; because, he says, by the same thing something is a being and one with a unity suitable to such an entity: but what is one in itself is also distinct from anything else; and so the constitutive principle of a thing is also its distinctive principle; whence man is distinguished by animality, by which he is constituted in the being of an animal, from anything not having animality; and by rationality, by which he is constituted in the being of a man, he is distinguished from everything that is not a man: but the divine Son is constituted in personal being by filiation: therefore by filiation He is also distinguished from every Person in which that divine filiation is not. But in the hypothesis in which the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Son, He would not for that reason really include filiation: therefore in that case He would no less be really distinguished from the Son.

The subsumption is proved, in which alone the difficulty seems to lie: the Holy Spirit, from His intrinsic notion, must be produced through the will: but what is produced through the will cannot be the Son; since the divine Son must be produced in the notion of Son through an assimilative faculty from His formal notion, such as the intellect alone is: but what is produced through the intellect cannot be produced through the will, and vice versa: therefore the Holy Spirit, produced through the will, cannot be produced through the intellect; otherwise the same thing would be produced by a double total production, which implies a contradiction; and so in no case can He be the Son, and consequently in every case He is necessarily really distinguished from the Son.

It is confirmed. — Personal distinction is from the form and personal property: but filiation alone is the personal property in the second Person: for the Son is not constituted in personal being by active spiration, because He has it in common with the Father: therefore by filiation alone, not indeed by active spiration, is He personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Next, filiation by its own notion is really incommunicable to the Holy Spirit; otherwise it would not be a personal property: therefore by its own notion it really distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit. Finally, the Son is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that by which He is formally constituted in the being of Son: but He is not constituted in the being and notion of Son by active spiration; otherwise the Father also would have to be called the Son, since the Father also has that active spiration; but He is so constituted by filiation: therefore by it also He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

He proves 2. One and the same thing cannot receive being by two total and adequate productions: but passive generation and passive spiration, if they were from the Father alone, would be made by two total and adequate productions: therefore even in that case they would not be one and the same really; and so they would be really distinct. The major is evident, for otherwise neither of those productions would be adequate, if it admitted the partnership of the other in producing the effect. The minor is proved: production through the intellect in the divine, and production through the will are two adequate productions, for each of those faculties with the divine essence is able to produce an infinite term: but passive generation, or filiation, even in that case would be made through the intellect, and passive spiration through the will: therefore both would be made through an adequate production, and so they cannot be one and the same.

It is confirmed. — Filiation and passive spiration are really distinguished from their intrinsic notion: therefore, although they proceeded from the Father alone, they would no less be really distinct. The antecedent is proved. If they were not so distinguished, they could from their formal notion coincide in the same Person: but this is false. Proof. Because if they coincided in the same Person, it would follow that that Person would have being through two adequate productions, each of which would adequately produce it. Proof. For filiation is produced through the intellect, and passive spiration through the will: but each faculty is infinitely productive, and so productive of an infinite term separately, because each is infinite separately, and not only jointly: but a faculty productive from itself of an infinite term is productive adequately and totally; therefore if filiation and passive spiration coincided in the same Person, it would follow that that Person is produced by two total and adequate productions; since this implies a contradiction, it also implies that one and the same Person would be at once the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore, although the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would not for that reason follow that He is really the same as the Son.

He proves 3. If per impossibile the Father did not spirate, nor produce the Holy Spirit, but the Son alone did, He would nevertheless still be really distinguished from the Son and the Holy Spirit by paternity, which would not be in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit: therefore similarly, if the Son did not spirate, He would still be distinguished from the Holy Spirit by filiation, by which He is constituted in the being of person, and which is not found in the Father nor in the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident by parity of reason.

It is confirmed. — Passive spiration now, and in fact, is not identified with paternity: therefore neither then, in the aforementioned hypothesis, would it be identified with filiation, or passive generation. The antecedent is evident, because paternity and passive spiration constitute two distinct Persons, namely, the Father and the Holy Spirit. The consequence is proved: paternity is therefore not identified now with passive spiration because they are disparate and personal relations: but in the proposed case passive spiration and filiation would also be personal and disparate relations: therefore the same reason which urges that there is not now an identification of the former urges that neither would there then be an identification of the latter. The minor is evident by parity of reason. The major is proved: paternity is not identified now with passive spiration either because it is relatively opposed to it, or because it is a relation disparate from it: not the first, for paternity is relatively opposed to filiation alone, because it is correlative to filiation alone, not indeed to passive spiration: for the first Person is referred through paternity to His Son, not however to the Holy Spirit: therefore paternity is not really identified with passive spiration for no other reason than because it is a relation disparate from it.

Some Thomists reply, that paternity is therefore distinguished from passive spiration, not because it is disparate from it, but because it is identified altogether with active spiration, by which it is correlatively opposed to passive spiration. But the falsity of this reply is openly evident, for if this sufficed, active spiration could not be in the Son; but the consequent is false, and so also is that from which it follows.

Others reply, that paternity is therefore distinguished from passive spiration, because it is in a Person who, by reason of active spiration, or of the spirating Person, is distinguished from passive spiration, or the spirated Person.

Against 1. If this reply stood, it would follow that whatever is in the spirating Father would be really distinguished from the Holy Spirit: but this is false: since the same essence which is in the Father is also in the Holy Spirit. Next, that active spiration is really distinguished from passive brings it about only that the concrete Spirator is also really distinguished from the spirated: but paternity is not formally something of this concrete; for the concrete Spirator says only two things, namely, the essence and the relation of active spiration; but paternity is neither of these: since paternity with the essence makes the generator to be the Father, and refers Him to the Son alone in the notion of generator and Father: therefore paternity contributes nothing to the notion of spirator. Finally, the spirative principle is the same in the Father and the Son; but paternity is not the same in both: therefore paternity is not something of this principle, and so formally contributes nothing to the formal notion of spirator.

1. The Thomists object the authority of the Councils: first indeed of the First Council of Toledo in the Confession of faith: We believe in the Holy Spirit, who is neither the Father nor the Son, because He proceeds from the Father and the Son. But in our case He would not proceed from the Son: therefore in that case He would not be distinguished from the Son. Second, of the Eleventh of Toledo: This alone implies number, that they are toward one another, and in this they lack number, that they are toward themselves: but they are not toward one another except according to relations of origin: therefore where those relations would not be (as they would not be in our case), there would also be no number and distinction of Persons. Third, of the Council of Florence, last session: For those believing that the Holy Spirit in no way proceeds from the Son must needs understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and consequently that He is the Son. It is confirmed by the following words: Those who assert that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, and at the same time proceeds from the Father alone, separate the substance from the hypostasis and imagine a partition of the divine substance. It is urged from sess. 18. where we read: According to all the Doctors, both Greek and Latin, the sole difference of processions, which is said more principally, multiplies the Persons in the divine, to which alone are accommodated he who is from another, and he from whom another is, etc. These words are brought forward by a theologian of the Latins, to prove that, since the Greeks admit that the Holy Spirit is really distinguished from the Son, they must also admit that He proceeds from Him: therefore in the case in which He would not so proceed, He would not be distinguished from Him.

To the first I answer, that the words of the Council are not faithfully cited, since the causal particle eo quod is not found, but it is said absolutely, Who is Himself neither the Father nor the Son, but proceeding from the Father and the Son, which we freely admit.

To the second, I say that the Council wills nothing other than that the divine Persons are truly many by reason of relations, not indeed by reason of essence and of absolutes, in such a way that they are many because they are relative, whether those relations are opposed or only disparate: whence that "toward one another" ought not to be understood determinately and formally of an opposed relation, but of relation as such, and inasmuch as it abstracts from opposed and disparate; for the Council there opposes being toward one another, or relative, to the mode of being from oneself, or absolute: but this division and opposition would not be adequate, if under the former member it comprehended only opposed relations, not indeed also disparate ones; for these cannot be comprehended under the latter member, because they are not toward themselves: therefore this authority does not stand against us.

Regarding the Council of Florence I say that the two earlier texts are cited in bad faith, for in the former the Council does not hold that He is the Son, but rather the contrary, namely that He is not the Son, as is evident in all the exemplars published so far. Nor is it true what some reply, namely that if the particle "not" is placed there, the sentence will have no meaning: for the meaning is clear, namely that the Greeks, saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son but from the Father alone, must nonetheless necessarily admit that He is not the Son, lest they contradict the mystery of the Trinity: whence that word "consequently" does not there have the force of an inference, as if from the fact that the Greeks admit that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, it would follow according to them that the Holy Spirit is not the Son, for this would be a foolish inference; but that particle signifies the same as "consequently" or "furthermore," or "besides." Likewise in the second text that phrase, "to be distinguished from the Son," is not read; but rather: those who maintain that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Person of the Father alone, these without doubt separate the substance of the thing from the hypostasis, etc. These words do not oppose us.

Regarding the later text I say that the Council speaks of what is in fact the case, namely, that now the reason for the distinction of one Person from another is more apparent, because one proceeds and is referred to another: yet from this it is not to be inferred that another reason of distinction would not be at hand, if such a procession of one from another were not present.

They object 2. From Boethius, libro 1. De Trinitate, cap. 22.: Essence contains unity; relation, however, multiplies the Trinity: therefore no Person is distinguished from another except one that is referred to it. Moreover from St. Anselm, libro De Process. Spiritus sancti, cap. 3.: Unity does not lose its consequence where no opposition of some relation stands in the way, whence the common axiom: All things in the divine are the same where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. Finally St. Augustine, libro 2. De Civit., cap. 10.: Therefore God is simple, because what He has, that He is, except that whereby each Person is said relatively to another, as the Father has the Son, and is not the Son. Therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would be the Son, because then He would not be said relatively to Him.

I answer the first, denying the consequence; for it is one thing that a Person is distinguished only from that to which it is referred, and another that no Person is distinguished unless it has a relation through which it is distinguished: in that case, moreover, the Son would also have Filiation, through which He would be constituted and distinguished from the other Persons. Add. that even through Filiation in that case He would be referred to the Holy Spirit, not indeed after the manner of one producing or produced, but after the manner of one really distinct from that from which He is distinguished.

To the second I say that St. Anselm also admits an opposition of relations among disparate relations: for in the same chapter, a little before the words cited in the objection, he says that that opposition of relation is the opposition of Nativity and Procession, which, as is well known, is not relative but disparate: whence he also purposely did not say that all things in the divine are one where a relative opposition does not stand in the way, but an opposition of relation; which opposition, of course, embraces both the relative and the disparate. Add that he himself openly defends our conclusion, as has been said.

To the third the Doctor denies the consequence; for St. Augustine does not will that any Person would be that other to which it had no correlation: but only that it has whatever the other has, except its Personal relation. In our case, however, the Holy Spirit would not have Filiation, nor the Son passive Spiration: therefore there would not be one single Person, but two really distinct from one another.

They object 3. If the relation of Filiation would be a sufficient reason for distinguishing the Son really from the Holy Spirit in the proposed case, it would do this either according to its quiddity and formality, or according to its real and entitative being: not the second, because as such it is the same as the divine Essence: therefore the first. But a relation, insofar as it is a relation, formally regards only its opposite: therefore it distinguishes only insofar as it is a correlation: but in the proposed case there would not be in the Son and the Holy Spirit correlations, or opposed relations: therefore the Son would not be distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

I distinguish the minor. It regards the opposite relatively — I deny; disparately — I concede. To the subsumed proposition: in that case there would not be opposed relations, that is, true correlations — I concede; there would not be opposed relations, that is, really distinct ones — I deny: since indeed passive Spiration and Filiation are disparate relations, and really distinct from one another, as has been said, which disparate reason suffices for that Personal distinction. Thus, just as Paternity would distinguish the Father from the Holy Spirit in that case in which He would not proceed from the Father, although the Holy Spirit would not have a correlation opposed to it relatively, but only disparately; so the Son would be distinguished from Him, because the Holy Spirit has a relation really distinct from Filiation, although that relation in the Holy Spirit would not be the correlation of Filiation, that is, Paternity.

You will insist. A relation distinguishes in that way in which it constitutes: but it constitutes only in order to its term: therefore it distinguishes only from its term. But the term of a relation is that which has the correlation: therefore it distinguishes only from that which has the correlation: but the Holy Spirit in that case would not have the correlation of Filiation, nor would He be its term: therefore the Son through Filiation, insofar as it is a relation, cannot be really distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

I answer 1. By distinguishing the major: it distinguishes in that way in which it constitutes, that is, if it constitutes essentially, it distinguishes essentially; if it constitutes accidentally, it likewise distinguishes in the same way — I concede the major: that is, if it constitutes relatively in order to only one term, it distinguishes only from that one — I deny the major; for although Paternity constitutes the Father formally in order to the Son, nevertheless it also distinguishes Him from the Holy Spirit.

I answer 2. With the major admitted, distinguishing the minor: it constitutes in order to a term which it regards only after the manner of its proper correlative, as the Father has the Son as correlative — I deny: one which it regards after the manner of a term in some way — I concede. Likewise I distinguish the subsumed proposition: in that case the Holy Spirit would not have Filiation as a term which He would regard after the manner of one producing — I concede: one which He would regard after the manner of a Person really distinct from Himself — I deny.

They object 4. If disparate relations, which were not correlations, sufficed for the distinction of the Persons, it would follow that Paternity and active Spiration should constitute two Persons: but this is false according to all: therefore disparate relations do not suffice for the Personal distinction. It is confirmed, because Paternity and passive Spiration should no more constitute two Persons than Paternity and active Spiration: but these do not constitute: therefore neither do those; and consequently in the proposed case the Son would not be really distinguished from the Holy Spirit.

The Doctor denies the sequel of the objection and the antecedent of its confirmation, and says that the reason of these two combinations is disparate, namely, of Generation and active Spiration as compared with Generation and passive Spiration; because two active productions with respect to diverse terms do not conflict in the same supposit; for it can well be understood that someone has several productive actions of several things, as in fact happens not only in the eternal Father, who is productive of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but also in the sun with respect to several effects; but two total passive productions conflict in the same supposit, because it would follow that at one and the same time one thing would be produced twice by a total production, which implies a contradiction: from the fact, however, that Paternity and active Spiration are in the same first Person, nothing else follows than that that Person has two total productions with respect to two diverse terms; but if Filiation and passive Spiration were in one and the same Person, it would follow that there are in it two passive productions, and that it is produced twice, which implies a contradiction; and so if one does not conflict, it does not follow therefrom that the other also does not conflict.

You will insist. Two relations are not of themselves incompossible unless they are opposed to one another: but Filiation and passive Spiration are not opposed: therefore they are not of themselves incompossible.

I distinguish the major: unless they are opposed formally after the manner of two correlations — I deny the major: for two total passive productions of the same effect from the same or a diverse cause are not correlations, and yet they conflict in the same effect, or the same thing: unless they are opposed disparately, so that one requires the exclusion of the other — I concede the major: and likewise, with the minor distinguished, the consequence must be denied.

They object 5. In the divine things no distinction is to be asserted except where either faith establishes it or reason proves it: but in that supposition, neither does faith assert nor does reason prove that there would be a real distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son: therefore it is not to be asserted.

I answer first that in the minor the principle is begged, for this is precisely the question, whether reason proves it or not. Then the argument can be turned back in this way: in the divine things no identity is to be asserted unless either faith teaches it or reason proves it convincingly: but in the posited case, neither faith nor reason evinces that there would be an identity of the Son with the Holy Spirit: therefore neither is that to be asserted.

Finally they object: among the divine relations four disparate oppositions can be conceived: the first indeed between to generate and to spirate; the second between to be generated and to be spirated; the third between to generate and to be spirated; and finally the fourth between to be generated and to spirate: but none of these is a sufficient formal distinctive principle of the Persons; not indeed the first or the second, because then it would follow that the Generated and the Spirated are two Persons, and likewise the Generator and the Spirator two others, which is false. Not even the third or the fourth; for those disparate oppositions would be distinctive of the Persons either insofar as they are such: not the first, for if it belongs to a disparate opposition of relations, insofar as they are disparate, or insofar as it is disparate, to be a formal distinctive principle of the Persons, then already every disparate relative opposition will distinguish, and so to generate and to spirate, just as to be generated and to be spirated, will constitute two Persons: not even the second, because there does not appear to be a stronger reason why these rather than others should be distinctive of persons: therefore, etc.

I answer first that it could be said that they are distinctive of the Persons precisely insofar as they are disparate; nor does it follow therefrom that all disparate relations must thus be distinctive of the Persons: especially since not even all relatively opposed relations are distinctive of the Persons; for active and passive Spiration are correlations and relatively opposed, and yet they do not distinguish personally; for active Spiration in the Father is not Personal, since He is already conceived before it as constituted in the being of Person through Paternity and active generation, which in the instant of origin precedes Spiration. Second I say that not indeed all disparate relations are distinctive of the Persons, but only those which are Personal, or by which the divine Persons are constituted, such as are Paternity, passive Spiration, and Filiation compared with passive Spiration itself.

Corollaries. — From these things it follows first, that although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, nevertheless He could absolutely proceed from a single Person. For the Father and the Son separately have a sufficient productive principle of the Holy Spirit, namely the infinite will made fecund by an infinite object, namely the divine essence: therefore even if in fact He does not proceed from two, nevertheless He could truly proceed from a single Person, equally perfect.

Gather 2. That the Father and the Son are the single principle of the Holy Spirit: both because, as St. Augustine says in lib. 5. De Trinit., cap. 14.: Just as the Father and the Son are one God, and referred as one to the creature, so relatively to the Holy Spirit they are one principle; and because, just as the Father by begetting communicates to the Son the same essence, so also the same spirative power: therefore by reason of that one spirative power, they are to be called one principle of the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident; for just as from this the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are called one God, because they have the one single Divinity; and one Creator, because they have the one single creative power; so also the Father and the Son are to be called one Spirator, or the single principle of the Holy Spirit, because they have the one single spirative power.

Gather 3. That the Father and the Son cannot indeed be called two Spirators, but well two Spirating ones, as the Doctor teaches in 1. dist. 12. q. 1.: because, he says, the plural term "two" joined to the noun "Spirator" would signify that the spirative power in the Father and in the Son is distinct and double, since the word "Spirator" formally designates the power of spirating: but it is otherwise with the participle "Spirating," which signifies the Person having that spirative power; so that just as there are two persons producing the Holy Spirit, so they can be called two spirating ones, that is, two Persons having the spirative power. The reason of the disparity, moreover, is that for the plurality of concrete substantive nouns, the plurality of supposits does not suffice, but a plurality of forms is also required: but for the plurality of adjectives and participles, the plurality of supposits suffices. Hence these propositions are true: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one Creator, one Cause, one Governor, etc.; because they have the one single and same power of creating, causing, etc. Likewise, on account of the plurality of supposits, these too are true: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three Creating, Causing, and Governing ones.