Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Just as theologians, says St. Dionysius 1. De Divinis Nominibus, praise the Deity invoked under many names, as when they again present Her as saying, I am who is, life, light, God, truth: so, when the same theologians praise the cause and author of all things with many names drawn from all their effects, as good, as beautiful, as wise, as intelligent, as God of Gods, as Lord of Lords, as Holy of Holies, etc., thus says St. Thomas 1. p. q. 15. art. 2. ad 3.: To express the diverse perfections of the Son of God, diverse names are attributed to Him: for, that He may be shown connatural to the Father, He is called Son; that He may be shown coeternal, He is called brightness; that He may be shown wholly similar, He is called Image; that He may be shown immaterially begotten, He is called Word, etc.

All the names, however, which Sacred Scripture attributes to the Son of God, St. Ambrose embraces in a twelvefold enumeration, lib. 2. De Trinit.:

For He is called Son of God, Word, Image, Idea, Principle, Wisdom, Light, Brightness of eternal light, Figure of Substance, Character, Mirror, Truth. These are (says Ambrose in the same place) those precious stones, sardius, iaspis, smaragdus, chrysolitus, and others, with which the vestment of holy Aaron, who bore the figure of Christ, is woven: this is the true vesture of the Priest, this the wedding garment, this the precious breastplate... He is called Son of God because He is born of God the Father: Word, because He comes forth from the mouth of the Most High with perfect knowledge of Him: Image, brightness of glory, and mirror, because nothing is lacking to Him whereby He might perfectly express the Father: Vapor of the power of God, because He is of the same nature as the Father: Brightness of eternal light, because He is coeternal with Him: Character, because He is distinguished from the Father by personal difference, not by essential perfection.

But of all these names, some are common to the three Persons and are only appropriated to the Son, such as Light, Power, Idea, etc. Others, however, are notional and proper, such as Son, Word, Image, Character, Figure of Substance. That the name Son is proper to the second divine Person is sufficiently clear from what was said in Quaest. 5. of the first Disputation and Quaest. 3. of the second. It remains, therefore, that we examine the other names, proper and appropriated to the three, in the following Questions.

Note 1. Many heretics have been deceived concerning the Word of God. For first, Valentinus dreamed that the Word was not the Son of God, nor had it proceeded immediately from God, but that a mind had been brought forth by the ineffable union of the Father, as it were, and of silence, as it were, as Mother, which together with the only-begotten Son brought forth truth; and that afterwards, after many ages, the Word proceeded from mind together with truth, as Irenaeus relates, lib. 1. cap. 1. Secondly, Paul of Samosata asserted that the divine Word is not subsistent, but prolate and transitory, as Epiphanius narrates, heresy 65. He says: Some of the disciples of the Samosatan, says Athanasius, Orat. 5. Contra Arianos, dividing the Word from the Son, say that the Son indeed is Christ, but the Word is another. Their reasoning we shall set forth and solve below. Thirdly, the Alogians, that is, those without the Word, rejected the appellation of Word, because, they said, the Son of God is pronounced neither by mouth nor by mind; wherefore they rejected all the writings of St. John, because in them mention was made of the divine Word. So Augustine, heresy 30. Arius and Eunomius seem to have asserted this very thing, thinking that every word is a prolation of the voice, as St. Athanasius narrates in the book De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi. But certain Arian disciples, not agreeing further, said that the Word always was, but the Son had not always been: some wanted the man assumed by the Word to be the Son; the rest, along with Arius varying his opinion, distinguished two Words: one existing in God, which is His Wisdom, undistinguished from the very Person of the Father; another foreign to the substance of the Father, about which, said Arius, St. John spoke when he said: in the beginning was the Word. Finally Michael Servetus, in the year 1540, calling up from the underworld the errors that had long since been buried, asserted that the Word of God is nothing other than a disposition by which it pleased Him to reveal to us the secret of His will. All of which errors, that we may thrust back into the underworld whence they emerged

Note 2. From St. Augustine, book De Fide, et symbolo cap. 3.: the Son of God is said to be the Word of the Father for this reason, because through Him the Father becomes known.

Just as, therefore, we do this with our words when we speak the truth, so that our mind becomes known to the hearer, and whatever secret we carry in our heart is brought forth through signs of this kind to the knowledge of another: so Wisdom, which God the Father begot, since through it the most hidden mind of the Father becomes known, is most fittingly named His Word.

Hence Richard of St. Victor, book 6. De Trinit., cap. 12., gathers that only the Son is the Word, and not in like manner the Holy Spirit: Because, he says, the Word is born of the heart alone, and by it the intention of the one uttering is made known: rightly, therefore, is the sole offspring of the sole Father named the Word, through which He Himself, who is the principal Wisdom, is manifested. He adds nevertheless another, and indeed genuine, reason why the Son is called the Word, namely that He is produced by utterance; for, as he observes in the same place, the Word is the same thing that is conceived in the heart and that is brought forth by the voice: For what, he says, is the voice, except the vehicle of the word, or, if it pleases better, the garment of the word? Is there one man when clothed, and another when stripped? Whence he infers, that if someone had an ear for the intention of the heart, just as he has for the intention of the mouth, he would have no need at all for exterior speech to be made to him. It is therefore ratified, and established that the Son of God is rightly called the Word, either because He represents and manifests the Father, or because He is produced by utterance.

Note 3. That although St. Athanasius, Orat. 3. Contra Arianos, said that the Word of God is not to be sought as being of such a kind as ours is, because God is not such as we are, nevertheless the uncreated Word, and the created word agree most of all in three things. For first, both are spiritual, and a permanent, not transitory, offspring of the mind: for, as whoever is the Author of the book De cognitione verae vitae speaks, in Augustine, tom. 9.: The supreme Father begot His Word by thinking Himself, which subsists at once coessential in the essence of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit. Secondly, both are immanent within the very one who utters them: for the divine Word so goes forth from the Father that it never goes out beyond His bosom: It proceeded from the Father, says St. Peter Chrysologus, but from the Father it did not wholly depart; or, as Tertullian says in the book Contra Praxeam, God brought forth His speech just as the root brings forth the shoot, the fountain the stream, and the Sun the ray... Nor yet is the shoot discerned from the root, nor the stream from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun, for, as John says, the Word was with God. Whence Zeno of Verona, serm. 3. De aeterna Verbi generat., calls the Son of God the noble inhabitant of the Father's heart. Thirdly, both represent, and express the object at the intuition of which they are formed: For whatever thing, says Anselm in Monol. cap. 31., the mind, whether through the imagination of the body or through reason, desires veraciously to think, its likeness, as much as it is able, it strives to express in its very thought.

The created word, and the uncreated Word likewise differ most of all in three things: 1. because the former is an accident; the latter a substance: 2. the former is a form constituting the one understanding in second act, whence it is produced from the need of the one understanding, namely that he may become one who understands; the latter, however, is produced from fecundity, not from any need, because the Father is essentially understanding before He utters the Word: 3. the former is not of the same nature with the one uttering; the latter, however, is entirely of the same nature with the Father, by whom it is uttered and produced.

The single conclusion. — The notion, and appellation of Word properly belongs to the divine Son alone.

This is the opinion of nearly all theologians against Durandus, in 1. dist. 27. q. 2., where he teaches that the Word, properly taken, is an essential predicate, and common to the three Persons. It is proved first from all the texts of Sacred Scripture in which the Son is signally called the Word, most of all from the 1. cap. of John, where the name of Word is expressed many times: That this name, says Cyril, lib. 7. Thesauri cap. 1., seems to have been chosen as something proper to the Son, in the beginning, he says, was the Word, and the Word was, etc. You see how this name signifies the very being of the Son according to nature; and below: In vain do we marvel at the Evangelist, and, as if he had thundered something great and proper, call him the Son of thunder, unless he had proclaimed the Word as something proper, marvelous, and unheard of.

The other Fathers prove this same truth by their testimonies; above all St. Augustine, book 7. De Trinit., cap. 2.:

Therefore, he says, the Father and the Son are together one essence, and one magnitude, and one truth, and one wisdom; but the Father and the Son are not together both one Word, because they are not together both one Son: for just as the Son is referred to the Father, and is not said with reference to Himself, so too the Word is referred to Him whose Word it is, when it is called Word. For by that same thing He is the Son by which He is the Word, and the Word by which He is the Son.

Therefore the notion of Word is not a distinct property, but formally the same as Filiation; whence he concludes: Since therefore the Father, and the Son are not together one Son, it follows that the Father, and the Son are not together both one Word. But the notion of Word, insofar as it is proper to the Son, is distinguished from Wisdom, which is only appropriated; whence he adds:

And therefore He is not the Word by that by which He is Wisdom, because the Word is not said with reference to itself, but only relatively to him whose Word it is, just as the Son is referred to the Father; but He is Wisdom by that by which He is Essence, and therefore because there is one Essence, there is one Wisdom. Since moreover the Word is also Wisdom, but He is not the Word by that by which He is Wisdom: for the Word is understood relatively, Wisdom however essentially; let us take that which is said when He is called Word to be said as if born wisdom were spoken, so that He is the Son, and the image.

Proof 3. By theological reason: That appellation ought to be judged proper to the Son of God which Sacred Scripture ordinarily uses to designate the second Person in the Deity: but Scripture employs the name of Word for this purpose, as is evident both from what has been said, and from the first epistle of John, cap. 5.: There are three who give testimony in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit: for by that word three, the number, and distinction of the Persons is signified; wherefore it was fitting to give to each a proper name by which each person is distinguished from another: therefore, just as the name of Father is not metaphorical, but proper, so too must the name of Word be such. — Then, the formal notion of Word consists in this, that it is a term produced by utterance representing the object: but the Son of God, as has been proved in disp. 2., is a term produced by utterance, and represents His object most perfectly: therefore only the Son is properly, and truly the Word.

You will say 1. Where the Vulgate at Ioan. 1. renders Word, many of the holy Fathers, especially Cyprian, Jerome, etc. read Speech, and Reason: but speech, and reason is not a property of the divine Son: therefore neither is Word.

St. Augustine answers in lib. 83. Quaestionum q. 63.:

That which in Greek is called λόγος signifies in Latin both reason, and word; but in this place of Ioannis 1. we interpret it better as Word, so that not only the respect to the Father is signified, but also those things which were made through the Word by operative power. Reason, however, even if nothing is made through it, is rightly called reason; for although the Son would be the Word from eternity, even if nothing were to be made in time, nevertheless that power, and quidditative property, that whatever things are to be made are made through the Word, is more aptly signified by the name of Word, than by the name of Reason, or of Speech.

You will say 2. The Word in divine things is common to the three Persons: therefore it is not a property of the Son alone. The antecedent is proved: first indeed from St. Irenaeus, lib. 2. cap. 48.: God, he says, existing wholly as mind, and wholly existing as λόγος, that is, Word; similarly St. Ambrose, in the single book De Filii divinitate cap. 5.: Whether, he says, you say light of light, or Word of Word, or Spirit of Spirit, or Lord of Lord, whatever you will have said of Him, you will nevertheless believe the Father, and the Son to be of one essence. Moreover St. Athanasius, Adversus eos, qui dicunt passus est Deus, sermo carne, says: he who calls God λόγον signifies the simple essence. St. Dionysius professes this very thing in the book De Divinis Nominibus cap. 1., where, recounting the names suitable to God, he commemorates among them these, namely that He be called Giver of life, Wisdom, Mind, Word, etc. Therefore in truth he judges the name of Word to be a predicate not notional, but essential.

I deny the antecedent. For that was not the mind of the holy Fathers; for first, Irenaeus in the same place affirms that the Word is emitted from thought, and sense; and so he judges that only that is to be called Word which is produced by utterance, whether internal, or external: but only the Son, as is evident, is produced in this way, and consequently He alone is to be called Word. But if he says that the whole God is λόγον, he means to signify nothing other than that the Word is not a part of God, but is moreover the whole God. To Ambrose I say that he does not there assert from his own mind that the Son is Word of Word; and if anyone said these things, he would not on that account detract from the faith of consubstantiality. To Athanasius I reply that he does not there deny that a Person is signified by Speech, or Word, but he denies that two natures are signified in one Person, just as they are signified by the name of Christ: whence he adds: But he who says Christ, he declares the conjunction of two natures. Finally, to St. Dionysius I say that he there embraces together all the names, whether personal, or essential, which are attributed to God by theologians, and so he lists the name of Word along with the other personal names.

You will say 3. The name of Word is attributed to God only metaphorically: therefore it does not designate a peculiar property of the Son. The antecedent is proved from Theophylact on that text of Ioannis 1.: This was in the beginning with God, where he says: Nor will anyone have found any other proper name worthy of God: the Word itself is not substantially and properly the name of the Only-begotten, but only manifests, without affection, the Son born of the Father, etc. Similarly Chrysostom, Homil. 1. on John, says: The principal reason why John called the Son Word, was that He was about to announce the Father to us; for all things, he says, whatsoever I have heard from the Father, I have made known to you.

I answer. That the aforementioned Fathers mean nothing other than that no proper name can be devised by us that is worthy of God, and truly significative, and expressive of Him: whence Chrysostom a little above had said: No one can either say, or understand God according to His greatness, and since it cannot be said how great the substance of God is, He manifests it to us from His works: whence the name of Word is attributed to God to signify that He proceeds from the divine intellect as the expressive term of His object, for which no more apt name is in use by us to express the same thing.

You will say 4. The name, and notion of Word also belongs to the Holy Spirit: therefore it is not a peculiar property of the divine Son. The antecedent is proved from St. Basil, lib. 5. Contra Eunomium cap. 11., saying: The Word of God indeed is the Son: but the Word of the Son is the Spirit, which he proves from that text of Hebrews 1.: Carrying all things by the word of His power; he adds, and since the Word of the Son is through God, the same Apostle says, Ephes. 6.: The sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. That it is attributed properly, and from the nature of the thing, I deny; figuratively, and metaphorically, I concede: the metaphor, however, consists in this, that just as it is proper to the Word to proceed from some Person, and to be emitted to express His sense, and will, for which reason Christ proves that He is the Word of the eternal Father, saying: My doctrine is not mine, but His who sent me, the Father: so the Holy Spirit can be called the Word of the Son, because He is emitted by the Son, to intimate His senses, and will to the faithful, according to that text of Ioan. 16.: He will glorify me, because He will receive of mine, and will announce it to you. Add that He can also be called the Word of the Son from the effect which He works in the hearts of those evangelizing the truths proclaimed by Christ: For you are not, says Christ addressing the Apostles, Matth. 10., the ones who speak, but the Spirit of your Father, who speaks in you. To St. Paul I say first that the divine Son carries all things by the word of His power: that is, He conserves all things by His most powerful command with the same ease with which He produces them, according to that text of Psalmi 148.: He Himself said, and they were made, etc. So St. Chrysostom explains it, Homil. 2. Or that He contains, and preserves all things by Himself, who is the omnipotent Word, just as in Ioan. 12. He says: The word which I have spoken, that one will judge him; that is, I myself, who am the word of the Father, as St. Augustine interprets it, lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 12. To the second I reply, that by the Sword of the Spirit is to be understood not the Holy Spirit as being the Word of the Son, but the spiritual sword, which is the divine doctrine itself, with which we must fight everywhere against all the adversaries of salvation, both visible and invisible.

You will say 5. The divine Word is distinguished from the Son of God: therefore the notion of Word is not a property of the divine Son. The Samosatians used to prove the antecedent from that text of Act. 10.: God sent the Word to the children of Israel, announcing peace through Jesus Christ, etc.

I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say, first, that there the Word is not taken for the divine Person, but for the message, which is spoken outside God, and announced to men. Second, I say that by these words the divine Son can also be understood, whom God the Father sent into the world, to preach the gospel of peace in the assumed humanity; nor indeed is it new in the Scriptures for the same Person to be repeated in the same sentence, without His name or a relative pronoun being employed, as is evident from that text of 1. ad Corinth. 1.: Waiting for the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ, who will also confirm you even to the end without crime in the day of the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. So St. Athanasius answers, in oration 5. Contra Arianos, near the end.

You will say lastly. Of one, and the same Person there are not two hypostatic properties, but a single one: but the notion of Word is distinguished from Filiation: therefore it is not a property of the divine Son.

I answer 1. By denying the major: for in the Father, and the Son there is active Spiration formally distinct from Paternity, and Filiation, from which their real distinction from the Person of the Holy Spirit is also argued; and so to one, and the same Person two formalities, or relations, or hypostatic properties are not repugnant.

I answer 2. That the notion of Word is not formally distinct from the notion of Son, nor are there two relations, but a single one conceived in different ways; as is evident both from St. Augustine cited above, and from St. Athanasius, Oration 2. Contra Arianos, saying: By that very thing by which the Word of His Father is the Son, He is the Word of the Father, etc. The Nazianzen agrees with him, Orat. 35. near the end: The Son, he says, seems to me to be so called, who is the same in essence with the Father, and also because He is from Him. The Word moreover, because it is related to the Father as speech to the mind, etc. Whence the notion of Word, and of Son is one, and the same, but only considered in different ways; and so the minor is to be denied.

Note 1. Image is a likeness of something proceeding from it, so that two things necessarily concur to the notion of an image, namely, likeness, and Procession. Likeness, I say, either in species, that is, in the specific nature, or at least in a sign of the species, that is, in something specially representative of the specific nature, just as a painted image stands with respect to its prototype; for, as St. Augustine speaks in De Genesi ad litteram c. 16.: Every image is like that of which it is the image. Second, for the proper notion of an image there is required its procession from him of whom it is called an image: For, says St. Augustine, an image is such when it is expressed from something. By the lack of this procession the Father is not an image of the Son, although perfectly like to him, nor is a painting deemed an image of the object of which the painter did not make use as an exemplar, although otherwise the painting is like to that object; nor finally among men, although two are most like to each other, if however one does not proceed from the other, he is not called his image. Those two things, therefore, are necessary for an image, namely, Likeness, and Procession.

Note 2. That just as a threefold likeness expressed from another can be found — namely, either in an artificial thing, or in an intentional one, or in a natural one — so a threefold image can be given, namely, the Artificial, as a statue, or a tablet formed for the expression of someone; the Intentional, as the species impressed, and expressed by the object; and the Natural, as the Son with respect to the Father, whose specific likeness he bears. Hence it follows that an image is so much the more perfect, the greater is the likeness of that which proceeds from another: hence the artificial image is the most imperfect of all, because it only bears a likeness in a quality, namely, in the figure of that thing which the image represents: the intentional image is more perfect, because it imports a likeness not only in a sign of the species, but also in the species itself, or nature, under a mode of being, not indeed natural, but intelligible, or intentional: but the most excellent of all is the natural image, because it imports a likeness in the species, or nature, under a natural, and entitative mode of being.

Note 3. From St. Augustine, lib. 83. quaest. 74., that image, equality, and likeness are mutually distinguished:

Because, he says, where there is an image there is at once a likeness, not at once an equality: where there is an equality there is at once a likeness, not at once an image: where there is a likeness there is not at once an image, nor at once an equality: as in a mirror there is an image of a man, because it was expressed from him: there is also necessarily a likeness, yet not an equality, because many things are lacking to the image, which nevertheless are in that thing from which it was expressed. Where there is an equality there is at once a likeness, not at once an image, as in two equal eggs, because there is an equality in them, there is a likeness — for whatever things are present in one, are present also in the other — an image, however, there is not, because neither was expressed from the other. Where there is a likeness there is not at once an image, nor at once an equality: for indeed every egg is like to every egg, inasmuch as it is an egg; but the egg of a partridge, although inasmuch as it is an egg it is like to the egg of a hen, is yet neither its image, because it was not expressed from it, nor equal, because it is smaller, and of another kind of living creatures. Where, therefore, in something representing another there is not only a likeness, but also a perfect equality of the representing to the represented, then in like manner in it the notion of an image exists most perfectly.

These things being premised, two points are to be resolved: First, whether the true and perfect notion of an image belongs to the Son. Second, whether it befits him alone. Which two, that they may be defined together, let there be

The single conclusion. — The notion of an image belongs perfectly, and properly to the Son alone in divine things.

The truth of this Conclusion is evident from what has been said concerning the generation of the Son, and

it is gathered moreover from various texts of Sacred Scripture, by which the divine Son is called the Image of the Father; thus ad Colos. 1.: Who is the image of the invisible God: ad Hebraeos 1.: Who, being the Splendor of glory, and the Figure of his substance, or as St. Chrysostom renders it in the same place, homil. 3.: the Character of his substance, inasmuch as, he says, Just as the Father himself subsists in himself, needing nothing, so also the Son.

It is proved also by the holy Fathers: for first, Athanasius in the Epistola de decretis Nicaenae Synodi says: But if you call him an image, by that very fact you will have indicated that he is the Son; for what is like to God, except his own offspring? Nazianz. subscribes, Orat. 4. De Theologia: Brief, and compendious, and easy is the declaration of the Paternal nature, the Son: for everything that is begotten defines its begetter by a certain silent voice. Gregory of Nyssa agrees, in the book De Differentia essentiae, et hypostaseos: The hypostasis of the Son, he says, is as it were the form, and face by which the Father is known, and the hypostasis of the Father is known in the form of the Son, while that property which is considered in these remains for the distinction of the Persons.

It is proved moreover by theological reason: To the divine Son alone belong the two aforesaid conditions desired for the notion of an image, namely, likeness, and procession from him whose likeness he bears: therefore the Son alone is the image. The antecedent is evident from those things which we said to establish that the procession of the Word is a true generation, because it proceeds as like to the producing principle.

It is confirmed. Moreover, from the holy Fathers, who from this twofold condition gather that the Son is the image of the Father; thus St. Cyril of Alexandria, lib. 3. Thesauri cap. 1.: On this account, he says, the Son is the Word, and Image of God, because he was truly, and properly begotten from the Father himself. And Athanasius, Orat. 4. Contra Arianos:

Although, he says, he alone is the true image, and genuine offspring of his Father, no obstacle thence arises from the fact that we too are recounted as having been created to the image of God, and that we have been named the glory, and image of God; since that comes to pass not from our own nature, but on account of the image of God, and his true glory dwelling in us, which indeed is itself the reason, or Word of God, which afterwards for our sake was made flesh.

It is confirmed again. That the Son is the true image of the Father, from the other names, which differ from image only in the mode of signifying, but in the thing signified express altogether the same thing as image; the first of which is the name face, which is sometimes used by Sacred Scripture to signify the divine Son; thus Ps. 138.: Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, and whither shall I flee from thy Face? For, says the praised Gregory of Nyssa: The hypostasis of the Son is as it were the form, and face by which the Father is known: whence the ancient Patriarchs, beseeching the incarnation of the divine Word, said, Ps. 79.: Show us thy Face, and we shall be saved. To which name the appellation Countenance also befits. Whence Cyril, lib. 3. in Ioan. cap. 29.: In this way, he says, we understand even that: the light of thy Countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us: for he calls the Son the Countenance of God the Father, that is, the Character of the Father. — The second name is Form: whence Christ himself, Ioan. 5.: The Father bears testimony of Me, and you have never heard his voice, nor seen his Form, and you do not have his Word abiding in you, because you do not believe him whom he has sent: which Athanasius weighing, in the praised Oration 4., says: Beautifully did he thus join the Word to the form, so as to make plain that he is the Word of God, and the Image, Character, and Form of his Father. Hence it is said in Danielis cap. 3. that the Form of the fourth was like to the Son of God: from which the same St. Athanasius in the sermon Contra omnes haereses infers, that the Arians are worse than Nabuchodonosor, because they will that the Son be neither like, nor consubstantial to God. — Thirdly, he is called Seal, and Character: and it is gathered from the words of Ioan. 6.: Him hath God the Father sealed. Which words Basil so weighs, in his single book De Spiritu sancto cap. 6., saying: Christ is the splendor of glory: him hath God the Father sealed, and expressed his whole self in him. With which the above-praised Gregory Nazianzen agrees, where he teaches that the Son is called the Character, as the pure, and by no means lying seal of the Father: of which St. Ambrose gives this reason in the book In Prooemio lib. 2. De fide: The Son of God, he says, is called image, and splendor, and character, because these have revealed the incomprehensible, and unsearchable majesty of the Paternal Divinity in the Son, and his expressed likeness. The other appellations of this kind you will be able to read in Ruiz, disp. 64. sect. 8.

You will say 1. Man is said to have been made to the image, and likeness of the divine Trinity, according to that of Genes. 1.: Let us make man to our image, and likeness: whence Chrysostom in the sermon De Trinitate: Signifying, he says, that Scripture is one image of the Holy Trinity, it said: and God made man, to the image of God he made him: and Hilary, lib. 5. De Trinitate: To the image, he says, of the Father and of the Son man is formed; the name does not differ, the nature does not differ, for one is the species of the image to which man was created: and Fulgentius in the book De Fide ad Petrum: One is, he says, the Divinity, and image of the holy Trinity, to which man was made: therefore the notion of an image does not belong to the divine Word personally, but also to the Divinity itself, nay even to the Trinity.

I answer. The name of Image is taken in two ways, namely, either for the exemplar, and prototype to whose likeness something is formed, or for the likeness produced to the imitation of another. In the former way the name of image is taken both by Sacred Scripture, and by the Fathers cited in the objection; for the Divinity is indeed the exemplar, to the imitation of which man was made, not, however, the image properly so called.

You will say 2. The Holy Spirit is in reality also called an image: therefore this notion does not belong to the Son alone. The antecedent is proved from that ad Romanos 8.: Whom he foreknew, and predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son: whence Cyril in the Dialogue De Trinit. lib. 7.: But that the Spirit is the likeness of the Father, he says, he hears the blessed Paul writing, because those whom he foreknew, these he predefined conformable to the image of his Son: whence Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide cap. 18., says: The image of the Father is the Son, and of the Son the Holy Spirit, through whom Christ dwelling in man gives him, according to what he is, the image: therefore, etc.

I answer. With our De Bassoli, in 1. dist. 27. q. 3. art. 3., the aforesaid Fathers used the name of image improperly, and extended it with so great a latitude, as to comprehend any perfect likeness in nature of the proceeding Person with the principle from which he proceeds; although he does not proceed from it as from an exemplar; nor consequently proceeds as like formally by force of the procession: which they did for this reason, that they might more evidently prove the Holy Spirit to be consubstantial with the Father no less, than the Son; since the Holy Spirit in reality is not less like, and equal to the Father, nor can less lead into the knowledge of the Father, than the Son himself.

You will insist. The Holy Spirit is infinitely more like to the Father, and the Son, than creatures are to God: but spiritual creatures, namely men, and Angels, are truly perfect images of God: therefore much more is the Holy Spirit a perfect image of the Father, and of the Son.

I answer first. By denying the minor: for creatures are not images of God except very imperfect ones, because they do not have the same species, or the numerically same nature, nor any perfect sign of the divine nature; although they have some imperfect likeness with it, namely, according to the spirituality of the substance, and the operation of the intellect, and of the will.

I answer second. That although those creatures are imperfect images of God, nevertheless the notion of the divine image belongs more properly to them, than to the Holy Spirit, because they have that imperfect likeness with God formally by force of their production: since they are formed by him as artifacts by the artisan; and thus, just as the artisan forms the work to the likeness of the idea which he preconceived in his mind, so God founded creatures by looking to himself, as to their exemplar: but the Holy Spirit has not a likeness with the producing principle formally by force of his procession; but only identically, and by reason of infinity; and therefore the notion of image does not equally properly belong to him, as to creatures¹.

Gather from these. That the divine Son is the image of the Father in two ways: first, the Natural, inasmuch as he proceeds from him really into an all-round likeness of the divine nature. Second, the Intentional, inasmuch as by force of his production he proceeds as Word, and knowledge; and so proceeds as intentionally expressing the Father: and thus he is his image, not only inasmuch as he is of the same nature, and substance with him; but also inasmuch as he is the produced knowledge of the Father himself; which latter notion of image is most proper to the divine Son; for he alone proceeds as Word, and as knowledge perfectly expressing his principle.

The third genus of names by which the Son of God is designated in the sacred Scriptures is Wisdom. For this word is for the most part used to stand for the Person of the Word, as will be established below. Wherefore three things especially are to be resolved here. 1. Whether the name of Wisdom truly so befits the Word that it can stand for His Person. 2. In what manner this appellation squares with the divine Word, namely whether properly, or appropriately. 3. Whether the divine Father is wise with that wisdom which is the Word. Wherefore

Note 1. That there is this distinction among essential, proper, and appropriated things in the divine: that the essential are those predicates — whether quidditative, or modificative, or attributive — common to the three divine Persons, such as are the divine nature, immensity, goodness, etc. But the proper are those properties, or relative formalities, by which each Person is constituted, and distinguished from another. But the appropriated are those essential and absolute predicates which, though truly common to the three Persons, are nevertheless accommodated to one Person rather than to another on account of some singular reason and affinity: thus, to extinguish the heresy of those who would say that the divine Father is powerless on account of old age, Omnipotence is attributed to Him, which nevertheless belongs to the three divine Persons inseparably: so likewise, because the divine Word proceeds through the intellect, whose office it is to know and to be wise, and because the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, which is the sanctuary of love, goodness, and holiness, therefore knowledge, wisdom, etc. are appropriated to the Son, while holiness, goodness, and love are specially attributed to the Spirit.

Note 2. That it was fitting that some essential attributes, and some operations ad extra, should be specially appropriated to one Person or another, although these were truly common to the three divine Persons; the truth of this assertion is gathered not only from Sacred Scripture, in which we behold many such appropriations, but also from the holy Fathers, who accommodated various appropriated perfections to one divine Person rather than to another; so that through the property of the word, or of the work, the truth of the Trinity is suggested to us, and let not the intellect divide what the hearing distinguishes, says St. Leo, serm. 2. De Pentecoste cap. 2. For never, as he adds, is the Trinity understood, if it were always said inseparably. Reason also favors this, for it was fitting that darker and more difficult things be manifested through those which are more easily perceived: but the attributes and operations of God ad extra are understood by us more clearly than the properties and distinctions; since by evident demonstration from known creatures we can rise to the knowledge of the divine attributes; not so to the cognition of the personal properties; and therefore it was fitting to accommodate to one divine Person some special attribute naturally known, by which the distinction of that Person from another might more easily become known. Whence Richard of St. Victor, in the little work De tribus appropriatis cap. 2., speaking of the divine Power, Wisdom and Goodness, says: In these three the form and image of the supreme Trinity is expressed, so that the invisible things of God may be seen, being understood through the things that are made. Those things, therefore, which are in that Trinity are three to three, like to like, proper to proper, etc.

Note 3. That two things are required for a perfect appropriation: First, that there be a knowledge, and a certain affinity of the attribute with the property of the Person, as was just said, since the Son proceeds through intellection, Wisdom is appropriated to Him, so that, hearing this name, the hearers may be moved to apprehend something peculiar in the second Person, which is not common to the rest, namely the notion of the Word, of the Image, etc. Second, that through the appropriated perfection there be removed the imperfection which the less instructed could suspect in a divine Person; thus Alensis says, 1. p. qu. 67. membro 3. art. 1., Power is attributed to the Father, lest He be believed weaker on account of old age; Wisdom to the Son, lest He be thought more feeble on account of youth; and Goodness to the Spirit, lest He be heard of as cruel: whence it comes about that St. Thomas calls appropriation the Way of likeness, and of unlikeness: Albert, 1. p. qu. 48., the Approach, and withdrawal: Henry, 2. p. art. 72. q. 1., the Correspondence according to likeness: but the above-cited Alexander of Hales explains both these conditions of appropriation best of all from the end, namely, That truth may be taught, and error be met. These things being thus premised, it remains to prove the three things already mentioned, and so let it be

First conclusion. — Wisdom is truly attributed to the Son, and sometimes stands for His name.

It is proved from Sacred Scripture. First indeed, because Wisdom is for the most part called begotten: but no essential attribute, as such, can be said to be begotten: therefore then the name of wisdom stands for the Person of the Word. The minor is evident: because the essence neither generates, nor is generated. The major is proved, for in Proverb. 8. that divine Wisdom says: The abysses were not yet, and I was already conceived: and again: Before all the hills I was brought forth: and Eccl. 24.: I came forth out of the mouth of the most High, the firstborn before every creature. Hence St. Paul, 1. ad Corinth. 1., calls Christ the Lord the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Whence St. Basil, lib. 1. Contra Eunomium, rightly gathers that, If Christ is the power of God, and the wisdom of God, these, however, are uncreated and coeternal with God (for He was not at some time without wisdom, or without power), then Christ is uncreated and coeternal with God.

It is confirmed from the holy Fathers, who in a similar way prove that the Son of God is eternal, and therefore coeval with, and consubstantial to, the Father: thus St. Ambrose, in the book De symbolo cap. 11., refutes the Arians saying: There was a time when He was not; and before He was born He was not; in this way: Could there have been a time when the Father was without life, without Wisdom, without Virtue, without the Word, which Christ is? St. Augustine agrees with him, in the Oration Contra haeres. cap. 6.: You see therefore, that He always was, of whom you dare to say that He was not. Or if you say that God was at some time without the Word, or without reason, you will be an adversary not only of the Son, but also of the Father. Whence in lib. 7. De Trinit. cap. 1. he says: It is impious to say that God is not the Father of His Wisdom. Hence Theophylact on 1. Ioannis: It is impossible, he says, for God to be without speech, and wisdom, and virtue: therefore, because the Son exists as the Word, Wisdom, and Virtue of the Father, we believe that He is always with God, that is, with the Father.

That Eusebius, whoever he is, the Author of the first homily de Symbolo, explains all these things lucidly:

As, he says, the sun cannot exist without splendor, nor fire without heat, nor immortality without eternity, nor eternity without immortality, nor power without strength; as, I say, reason cannot exist without wisdom, nor truth without justice, nor goodness without mercy; so the Father could never exist without the Son: for all powers are contained in the Son.

From all of which it is evident that Wisdom truly stands for the Son, not only in Sacred Scripture, but also among the holy Fathers.

Second conclusion. — Wisdom is attributed to the divine Son not properly, but appropriately.

This is the common teaching, and St. Augustine proves it, lib. 7. De Trinit. cap. 1., where, having said: Because in that simplicity to be wise is nothing other than to be, there wisdom is the same as essence; he concludes: The Father therefore, and the Son are together one essence, and one magnitude, and one truth, and one wisdom; but the Father and the Son are not together both one Word, because they are not together both one Son: the reason for which he gives in the same place, that the Son, as Image and Word, is said not with reference to Himself, but to the Father, and relatively. From this he infers that the Son is not the Word in the respect in which He is Wisdom, because He is Wisdom in the respect in which He is essence: Therefore, he says, He is not the Word in the respect in which He is wisdom, because the Word is not said with reference to itself, but only relatively with respect to him whose Word it is, just as the Son with reference to the Father; but Wisdom in the respect in which He is essence: and therefore, because there is one Essence, there is one Wisdom. From which it clearly appears that Wisdom is an essential attribute, and therefore common to the three divine Persons, not however proper to the Son alone. Hence St. Augustine in the same place infers, that when the name of Wisdom stands for the Person of the Son, it should not be called Wisdom simpliciter, but Wisdom born, or begotten:

Since, however, he says, the Word is also Wisdom, but it is not the Word in the respect in which it is Wisdom: for the Word is understood relatively, but Wisdom essentially: let this be understood when the Word is said, so that born Wisdom is not said, so that He may be the Son, and the Image: and when these two are said, that is, born Wisdom, in one of them, because it was born, both the Word, and the Image, and the Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not understood, because they are said relatively.

From these things it clearly appears that the name of Wisdom is not simpliciter proper to the Son, but only with an addition, namely when born, or begotten Wisdom is said; for in this way it befits the Son alone not only appropriately, but also properly, and expresses nothing other than what the name of Word and of Son expresses.

Third conclusion. — The divine Father is not wise with the begotten Wisdom.

This is the common teaching, and the Doctor proves it thus in 1. dist. 32. q. 1. n. 9.: If the divine Father were wise with the begotten Wisdom, then either the begotten Wisdom would be the form by which the Father would be made formally wise, just as He is Father by Paternity: or the begotten Wisdom would be the principle of the Wisdom which is in the Father, in which sense the Master of the Sentences concedes that the Son is wise with the unbegotten Wisdom principiatively, namely because the unbegotten Wisdom of the Father is the principle of the begotten Wisdom, which is the Son: or finally the sense would be, that the Son would be the sub-authoritative principle with respect to the act of being wise, which is in the Father, just as the Word is the sub-authoritative principle with respect to the act of creating; for the Father is said to create by the Word: but neither of these can be said licitly, and truly. Not indeed the first, nor the second, otherwise the divine Father would receive Wisdom from the Son, which is absurd:

For if, says St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinit. cap. 7., the Son alone understood for Himself, so that the understanding might be for Himself, and for the Father, and for the Holy Spirit, we return to that absurdity, that the Father is not wise from Himself, but from the Son, nor did Wisdom beget Wisdom, but the Father is said to be wise by that Wisdom which He begot... And if for God to be is the same as to be wise, and that is His essence by which He is Wisdom, then not the Son from the Father, which is true; but rather the Father has essence from the Son, which is most absurd, and most false.

Nor even the third, because a sub-authoritative principle has a true action with respect to that of which it is said to be such a principle; for the Son, e.g., truly influences the creatures which the Father produces through Him, and with Him: but the begotten Wisdom has no influence with respect to the act of being wise in the Father. Whence St. Augustine concludes in the same place: God the Father is therefore wise with that Wisdom by which He Himself is His own Wisdom, and the Son is the wisdom of the Father from the wisdom which is the Father, from whom the Son was begotten. Whence he rightly revoked, in the first book of Retractationum cap. 26., what he had taught in lib. 83. Quaestionum q. 23., that God is said to be wise, because He Himself begot that Wisdom by which He is said to be wise. Which opinion he certainly retracted, and in the same place asserts that he examined it more carefully in the books De Trinit.

You will say 1. The divine Father speaks by the Word, according to St. Augustine, 7. De Trinit. cap. 1.: but from St. Anselm in Monologio, cap. 63. To speak is nothing other for the supreme Spirit than to behold, as it were, by thinking*: therefore the Father beholds by the Word, and hence also is wise by the Word.

He distinguishes the minor. The Doctor, n. 10.: If to speak is taken essentially, inasmuch as it signifies the same as to understand, as St. Anselm takes it, he concedes: if it is taken notionally, and inasmuch as it imports the same as to produce the Word, he denies the minor, and likewise the consequence, since in this way speech is distinguished from essential intellection. And so the Father speaks by the Word only in so far as He is the principle of the Word, which by its own notion is formally declarative, and expressive of everything declarable, and manifestable; and thus the Father is only the active cause, not indeed the formal cause, of that representation, and expression: not otherwise than if Peter were to make a mirror, in which all the species, and images of things would be received; that mirror would indeed be the formal cause of that representation, but Peter only the efficient cause. Hence it is, that although the Father speaks by the Word in this way, He cannot nevertheless be said to be wise by the Word, because to be wise is taken essentially, not indeed notionally.

You will say 2. The Doctor admits in the same place, q. 1. n. 7., that the divine Father is rightly said to love Himself by the Holy Spirit: therefore by parity it is also not incongruously said, that He is wise with the begotten Wisdom. The consequence is proved: the Father is said to love Himself by the Holy Spirit because He produces the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father by appropriation: but He also produces the Word, which is appropriately called the Wisdom of the Father: therefore etc.

I deny the consequence, and to its proof I say that there is this distinction between loving, and being wise in the divine: that to love can be taken notionally, inasmuch as it signifies the production of the Holy Spirit, who is called produced love, by which reasoning to love is nothing other than to breathe forth the produced love: but to be wise is not ordered to signifying the production of Wisdom, but only the attainment, and perception of the object, whence it comes about, that it is taken only essentially for the whole intellection, not however notionally for the productive speech of the divine Word; and therefore between the two there is no parity.