Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

By the name of notion the theologians intend nothing other than the proper manner of knowing one person. This manner is taken either for the formal concept, by which we specially know that divine Person, and discern him from another, concerning which St. Augustine lib. 5. De Trinit. c. 6. One notion is that by which the begetter is understood, another that by which the unbegotten is understood; or for the objective concept, that is, some special mark, and as it were a character holding from the side of the same person, by reason of which we know him as distinct from another, concerning which St. Basil lib. 2. Contra Eunomium: The properties, he says, αἱ δὲ ἡμέτεραι, as certain characters, as it were, and forms inspected in the substance, distinguish. Concerning the notions according to this latter acceptation, two things come to be resolved. 1. Whether some characters are to be admitted in the divine Persons, by which they appear distinct from one another. 2. That those characters are customarily numbered as five. Since, however, the principal difficulties which regard this matter have been resolved above from those things which we said concerning the properties and the personal relations; therefore it will involve and resolve the three aforesaid investigations

Note 1. Although one and the same real formality is at once a property, a relation, and a notion, nevertheless these differ from one another according to their various respects; for paternity, e.g., is called a Relation insofar as it regards its term and refers the generating Person to the one generated; it is called a Property insofar as it belongs only to the first divine supposit and affects the first Person; it is named a Notion in comparison with the intellect, since it is for it the reason for knowing the first Person as distinct from the others. Although all these things signify one and the same formality, they nevertheless keep this order, that that formality is first called a relation, then a property, and finally a notion; for nothing can be the reason for manifesting something else unless it is proper to it, nor can it be proper unless it is distinguished from the others. Moreover, the distinction of the divine Persons is sought from their constitutive principle, which is the personal relation itself.

Note 2. Three conditions above all are required for a notion. The first, that it be a property of one person, or of some persons, yet not common to all three, for which reason neither the divine essence nor anything essential has the character of a notion. The second, that it be signified and expressed in the abstract; for notions are, as it were, forms by which the divine Persons are known; hence it comes about that the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit neither are nor can be called notions, because they directly signify the persons themselves in the concrete, and do not per se denote those forms by which the persons can become known, such as Paternity, etc. The third, that it signify that form not as in fieri, but as in facto esse, for want of which to generate and to be generated, likewise to spirate and to be spirated, cannot be called notions, because they are signified as in fieri. Some Scotists also add a fourth, namely that the notion signifies and imports the dignity of the Person: but this is repugnant to the Doctor and to the truth: since, as we said above, the personal relations connote no formal perfection.

Note 3. The notion is described by the theologians in this way: A notion is the proper reason or mark for knowing a divine person as distinct from another. This is abundantly clear from what has just been said; for it is called a reason or mark because it is like a character or seal by which one person is designated and marked as distinct from another; whence Justin, in the exposition of the faith on the Trinity: When we hear the word "begotten," he says, as it were a certain mark, we immediately think of the Son, just as also by the mark of the one proceeding we call the Spirit a proper person. Secondly, it is added, the proper reason for knowing the person; for, says St. Basil, book 2 Contra Eunomium, since there is one Deity, it is impossible to grasp the proper notion of the Father or of the Son, unless our thought is strengthened by the reception of the properties.

Finally it is added, as distinct from another:

For neither, says St. Basil in his single book De Spiritu sancto, cap. 5, explaining that text of the Apostle to the Ephesians 4, "One God, and Father, etc.," are the notions employed for this, that they might introduce a diversity of natures, but that he might approve the unmixed notion of the Father and of the Son: thus the Apostle employed them.

First conclusion. — Notions are to be admitted, as certain characters by which the divine Persons become known to us more easily.

This is common among the theologians, and not only among them but also among the Holy Fathers. This truth is evident from the 3rd Note, and it is moreover proved especially from St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ep. 43.

It is necessary, he says, that through certain proper notions an unconfused comparison be had in the Trinity: and further on, of the Holy Spirit: It has the essence engrafted from the cause of the Father; whence it also proceeds, and it has this notion and knowable sign of the property which is according to hypostasis, by which together with the Son it also makes itself known: and after a few words he says of the Son: It has absolutely no communication of notions according to its own property, neither with the Father nor with the Holy Spirit, but from the signs already mentioned it alone is recognized. Finally he adds of the Father: But the Father, who is God above all things, alone has the peculiar notion of his hypostasis, that he is the Father, and that he subsists from absolutely no cause, and by this indication again he himself is known properly and separately.

In which words he openly confesses that the divine Persons are recognized as distinct from one another by their marks and characters, where although he uses the word notion in the concrete, which indeed most of the Fathers also do, it is nevertheless clear that it is more correctly taken in the abstract: since to those asking how the three divine Persons agree and differ among themselves, it would be answered more easily and more correctly by saying that the Father is distinguished from the Son by Paternity, than if, using the concrete name of the Father, one said that the Father therefore differs from the Son because he generates him; for this is a circumlocution, not a formal reason.

It is confirmed from other Holy Fathers, who use the notions in the abstract; first indeed from St. Basil, book 2 Contra Eunomium, saying: Properties and marks, as certain characters and forms beheld in the substance, distinguish what is common by the appropriated characters. Tertullian agrees, book De Fide, cap. 2, where he teaches that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, not in substance but in form, nor in power but in kind: and he gives the reason for this, because there is one God from whom also those grades and forms and species are assigned to the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. As if he would say that the three divine Persons are recognized as distinct from one another, not by their concrete names, but by the relations and, as it were, their constitutive and distinctive forms; which for this reason St. John of Damascus, book 3 De Fide, cap. 6, calls characteristic and signal properties: whence in cap. 7 he says: The characteristic and discretive property of the filiation of the Word of God, according to which it is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit.

The same Conclusion is proved by reason: that is to be admitted in the divine matters which most conduces to the easier perceiving and explaining of the distinction of the divine Persons: but the divine notions contribute wonderfully to this: therefore they are to be admitted. The major is evident, since the theologians must employ those very words which contribute most to the explanation and disclosure of so abstruse and so ineffable a Mystery. The minor is proved: the property and distinction of the divine Persons can become known and be expressed in two ways, namely through concrete and abstract names: but the abstract words are more fitting for signifying not only the simplicity but also the distinction of the Persons than the concrete ones, because abstracts are conceived as most simple forms, and on that account are more apt for conceiving and signifying divine simplicity: whence Nazianzen, Oration 39: The Holy Spirit, he says, proceeding from the Father, not however in the manner of Filiation, as neither of generation, but of procession: For let it be permitted, for the sake of perspicuity, to coin names. He judges therefore that abstract names confer perspicuity and clarity upon the distinction of the persons: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed: three notions belong to the Father, two to the Son, and one alone to the Holy Spirit: for Innascibility, Paternity, and active Spiration belong to the Father; Filiation and active Spiration belong to the Son; but to the Holy Spirit only Procession, or passive Spiration, befits: therefore through the proper concrete name of each Person it is not understood to be sufficiently distinguished from another; and so it was fitting that the notions be signified in the abstract through the peculiar properties of each Person, by which all the modes by which one Person is distinguished from another would become known more easily. The consequence is evident, for easily through these abstract names we explain that the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit, not by Paternity and Filiation, but by active Spiration; by which however they agree with each other mutually, but differ by Paternity and Filiation: therefore, etc.

You will object 1. Things which are simple are known and distinguished by themselves, nor do they need forms or marks by which they appear distinct: but the divine Persons are most simple: therefore they do not need notions in order to be known as distinct.

I distinguish the major: things which are simple both formally and really do not need marks and characters, I concede: things which are simple only really, but not formally, I deny. I distinguish the minor in like manner: the divine Persons are most simple really, that is, they are not constituted out of really distinct parts, I concede; they are most simple formally, I deny; for they comprise several entities formally distinct from one another; for they consist of the divine essence and also of the relations by which they are constituted in the character of person; whence just as real simples are better known through some form signified in the abstract than through the concrete name itself, so also the divine Persons become known more easily through the divine notions than through the concrete names Father, Son, etc.

You will insist. Nothing is signified by the name Father which is not likewise signified by the name Paternity, for Paternity denotes generation just as much as the name Father: therefore either neither suffices, or one of the two is superfluous.

I distinguish the antecedent: the same thing is signified really, and in a different mode, I concede; formally, and in the same mode, I deny. For the word Father not only imports the form of Paternity, but moreover connotes the Deity, either in recto or at least in obliquo; but Paternity neither in recto nor in obliquo formally signifies the Deity, but in recto says the property, and in obliquo connotes the person of the Father, whose property it is; although the Divinity is indeed included and contained really in Paternity, this inclusion nevertheless proceeds only from the thing signified, not from the mode of signifying of the word.

Second conclusion. — The theologians rightly number, as is customary, five notions by which the divine Persons become known to us, namely Innascibility, Paternity, Filiation, active and passive Spiration.

Proof: as many notions are to be admitted as there are modes by which the divine Persons can be known as distinct from one another: but that mode is fivefold: therefore, etc. The major is evident; for notions are admitted only for the easier detecting and perceiving of the distinction of the Persons. St. Bonaventure proves the minor in 1, distinct. 26, art. unico, q. 4.

The reason for distinguishing, he says, is taken from the side of origin: either therefore positively, or privatively: if privatively, it either deprives origin in the manner of a producer, and this does not express nobility, namely, not to produce, therefore it is not a notion. Or it deprives origin in the manner of a product, and this either specially or generally: if specially, it does not express nobility: if generally, thus it expresses nobility, and therefore the privative notion is one alone, namely Innascibility. But if it be taken from the side of origin positively, since origin is twofold, and to each there necessarily corresponds a twofold relation, of necessity there will be four, active and passive generation, and active and passive Spiration, and in all five.

In almost the same way St. Thomas proves it in the first part, q. 32, art. 3: Since the notion pertains to the order of origin, as many notions must be admitted as there are orders of origins: but these are five: therefore the divine notions are just as many. The minor is proved: in the divine reality there are only two processions, each of which imports a twofold positive order of origin, namely that from which another is, and that which is from another: for first, the procession through the intellect imports the order of him from whom another is, which order is called Paternity and is the notion of the Father: likewise it imports the order of him who is from another, and it is called Filiation, which is the notion of the Son. Likewise the procession through the will also imports this twofold order, namely that of him from whom another is, which order is active Spiration, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, and this notion distinguishes the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit; and that of him who is from another, and this order is called passive Spiration, which is the notion of the Holy Spirit. Besides those positive orders of origin, there is still another that regards origin negatively, namely the order of him from whom another is, and who is not from another, and thus is Innascibility, which is another notion of the Father. Besides these five, however, no other mode of origin appears. Therefore there are only five notions.

You will say. There must be as many notions, and no more, as there are properties constituting and distinguishing the divine persons: for notions are established in order to the knowledge of the Persons, as they are constituted and distinguished in themselves: but those properties are only four, namely Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration, both active and passive: therefore the notions are just as many; and so since Innascibility does not constitute a person, it also cannot have the character of a notion.

I distinguish the major: there must be as many positive notions as there are properties, I concede: there must be as many both positive and negative, I deny. For those four properties can found more than four positive or negative concepts: for the divine persons can be known by us either positively, according to the relation and relative opposition which they have to themselves, or negatively, according to the exclusion of an external or internal principle: hence it comes about that although the Person of the Father becomes sufficiently known as positively distinct from the other persons through Paternity and active Spiration, nevertheless since a place for doubting would remain, whether the Father is produced by another or not, in order that he be understood as a person entirely unproduced, it is necessary that Innascibility be attributed to him, which is the negation of generation and of production from another.

You will say 2. Active Spiration is common to the Father and the Son: therefore it is not the proper notion of any divine Person. The antecedent is evident from what has been said, and will appear more fully from what is to be said: the consequence also becomes certain from the conditions required for notions which we have assigned.

I answer, that the properties are of two kinds: for some are singular and belong to one Person alone, as Paternity, Filiation, and passive Spiration: but the other is not singular, nor yet common to all, but proper to only two persons, namely active Spiration, which belongs to the Father and the Son, but not to the Holy Spirit. Whence it comes about that under that respect in which it does not belong to the Holy Spirit, it sufficiently distinguishes him from the Father and the Son, and since it is proper to the Father and the Son, it must also be called the notion of the Father and of the Son.

You will say 3. Innascibility in the Father is taken either for the material element or for the formal: if the first, it is not something distinct from Paternity, for thus taken it formally signifies Paternity: if the second, it cannot be called a notion, since it is a pure negation of a productive principle, and consequently does not express the dignity which seems to be required for the character of a notion.

St. Thomas answers that Innascibility taken formally says a negation, and nevertheless entails dignity: for a negation, he says, imports dignity when the affirmation opposed to it expresses imperfection; for in a King, e.g., it is a dignity that he is not an artisan or a merchant: but innascibility negates procession from another, which although in the Son and the Holy Spirit it does not express imperfection but perfection, nevertheless in the Father it would import imperfection, for it would signify that he is not the first principle, the font, and the origin of the whole Trinity.

The Doctor answers in 1. d. 28. q. 2. n. 7. That the unbegotten under its proper notion, as it signifies not having a begetter, is a property of the Father, and sufficiently imports dignity, that is, non-indignity; for this suffices for a personal property, that it be not an indignity, just as the personal properties in the divine reality are not said to be imperfections: yet not perfections simpliciter, that is, universally such that in anyone it is better to have it than not to have it. Then, to the mind of St. Thomas, he replies that the unbegotten, insofar as it denies having a begetter, expresses the personal dignity of the first person in the divine reality, because just as it is a dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a dignity in the first person not to have one, and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some positive proper thing connoted by this, that he is unbegotten. Whence a negation can be said to be of dignity in someone, insofar as it would be of indignity if the opposed affirmation were placed in him, just as it is a dignity in a King not to be slothful and shameless.

You will say 4. By the same reason that Innascibility is established as a notion proper to the Father, by the same Inspirability will have to be attributed to the Son, as well as Ingenerativity, or the negation of the generative power of another Son: likewise to the Holy Spirit there will have to be attributed Ingenerability, as well as Inspirativity, or the negation of the power of spirating and generating; for the Son too can be understood to generate another Son, for if he is at once Son and Spirator, why will he not be at once begotten and begetting? The Spirated one also can be understood as generative, for in created things love can apply the intellect to conceiving a word, and so it can be the principle of the word, if not elicitive, at least imperative. Therefore in order that it appear that these do not belong to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that the aforesaid notions be attributed to them, and so far more than five notions can exist.

The Doctor answers in 1. dist. 28. q. 1. n. 9. That it is not unbecoming that more notions than five be admitted; for just as in the time of St. Ambrose the notion of Innascibility and of the Unbegotten was unknown, rejected by St. Ambrose himself and by the other Fathers, but afterwards was accepted by St. Augustine and the other Fathers, or, as the Doctor himself adds,

If from the beginning there were known only three notional properties, namely Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration, this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, and of John in his Canonical Epistle, cap. 1., nevertheless afterwards by investigation other notions and properties became known, which were in themselves before, although not known before; and so just as the later Fathers granted more notions than the earlier ones, yet the earlier ones did not deny them, although they did not express them: so it does not seem unbecoming for the later ones, with respect to those Doctors, to posit such notions, provided they can conclude them from the words of the earlier ones.

The Doctor therefore judges that in truth more notions than five can be admitted: nevertheless, that we may comply with the more common opinion of the theologians, I answer, secondly, that the aforesaid notions are either reduced to the earlier ones or excluded by the others: for since active Spiration is attributed to the Son, through it it is sufficiently understood that he himself cannot be produced through Spiration, otherwise he would produce himself. Add that active and passive spiration are relatively opposed, and so require really distinct terms, and thus cannot be in the same Person, and consequently by the position of active Spiration in the Son it is sufficiently understood that the character of passive Spiration is excluded from him, and so he does not need another reason, namely Inspirability, to signify that exclusion. Likewise, since, as was proved above, there cannot be several processions, nor several Persons of the same kind in God, nor can one Person proceeding through the intellect proceed through the will, and vice versa; consequently, since there is one Son in the divine reality proceeding through the intellect, and one Holy Spirit proceeding through the will, it is sufficiently known that another Son or another Holy Spirit cannot be produced: and so to signify this there is no need of the notions of Inspirativity in the Holy Spirit, or of Ingenerativity in

the Son and the Holy Spirit: this negation of the generative or spirative power is sufficiently known from elsewhere to be excluded.

You will say 5. The character of Word and of image is proper to the Son, just as the character of love and of gift is proper to the Holy Spirit: but each character signifies those divine Persons as distinct: therefore each has the force of a notion; and so there are more notions than five.

I answer, that these names signify not so much properties as appropriations; for they signify the mode of procession of the Son through the intellect and of the Holy Spirit through the will, which modes of proceeding appear sufficiently and more than sufficiently diverse through the origins and constitutive relations of the divine Persons, and so to express this there is no need of a multiplication of the divine notions beyond the number five. Add that even if an open reason did not support this truth, it would nevertheless not be fitting on that account to depart from the common opinion of the theologians; for one must think and speak as the many do, especially concerning this abstruse mystery of the Trinity.