Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. From the Doctor, q. 5 of the Quodlibet, the relations of origin can be considered in two ways, namely either really and identically, insofar as they are really the same as the divine essence, and also with the Persons whom they constitute together with that essence: or formally, and according to their own proper relative entity, that is, insofar as they are formally distinguished from the divine essence, and are like hypostatic forms determining it to the constitution of the divine Persons. In the former way it is certain that they are really infinitely perfect, for thus they are one and the same thing with the Divinity itself, whose infinite perfection they imbibe in themselves: but the difficulty is whether these same relations, considered in the latter way, import some perfection and infinity; so that just as the Attributes add to the divine essence some absolute perfection formally distinct from the perfection of the essence itself, so likewise the relations of origin, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they really include, add to it some relative perfection also formally distinct from its essential perfection.

Note 2. From the same, ibid., num. 27., real being, as such, is first divided into quantified being and non-quantified being. Then quantified being into finite and infinite being: afterwards finite being into the ten Categories. By quantified being he understands a perfect being, that is, one measured by the quantity of perfection: by non-quantified being, on the other hand, he understands a being not having this perfection. Moreover, it must be noted that a threefold perfection can be distinguished: the first is moral, which in God is absolute and unique, namely divine Holiness, of which there is no question here. The second is transcendental, or entitative, which is the integrity of a thing consisting of all the things that are required for its constitution in the notion of such a being; and this belongs to absolutely every being. The third is the perfection of virtue, or qualifying, which is the gradual perfection of each nature, according to which a nature is said to be more, or less, or equally perfect. All agree that the divine relations are perfect with that transcendental perfection, since they have whatever can be desired for the completion of the divine hypostatic relation: but they do not so agree that they are perfect with a qualifying perfection, by which they could be said to perfect the divine essence relatively, just as the attributes perfect it absolutely.

Note 3. From the same, ibid., the infinite is twofold, namely intensive and extensive. The extensive infinite is that which extends to more things in number to infinity, such as is the infinite number of possible creatures. The intensive infinite is described by the same in two ways: first indeed absolutely, so that the infinite is that to which nothing of entity and perfection is lacking, in the way in which it is possible for it to have these in some one thing, namely either formally, or really and identically, or eminently, in which way infinity can be described: The most simple and most eminent complex of all entity and of every perfection that can be thought of: comparatively, however, the infinite can be described: That which exceeds any finite being beyond every determinate or determinable proportion of being: thus, says the Doctor, the infinite is distinguished from any finite being however perfect; for there is no finite being that is not exceeded by another; for whiteness, v. g., is exceeded by knowledge threefold, knowledge by the intellective soul tenfold, this by the Angels a hundredfold; but God, who is infinite, exceeds every finite thing beyond every assignable proportion of entity and perfection. By the former description infinity requires that any lack of entity and perfection whatsoever be removed from the infinite being; since a being thus infinite must lack no perfection at all: by the latter there is removed from the infinite whatever higher thing by which it could be exceeded. These things having been thus premised, it must be resolved whether the divine relations, constitutive and distinctive of the Persons, are formally infinite perfections.

The single conclusion. — The relations of origin formally import no perfection, and they are neither finite nor infinite.

Thus the Subtle Doctor says in many places, but especially in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. n. 16., Whatever is said commonly of God and of the creature is indifferent to the finite and the infinite, speaking of essential things; or at least to the finite and the not-finite, speaking of anything whatsoever; because the divine relation is neither finite nor infinite. He has the same in q. 4. n. 23., where he says that if Paternity and Deity are conceived in the abstract, this predication: Deity is Paternity, cannot be true, Because, he says, one of them is not formally infinite, but only Deity is formally infinite. But he expressly embraces and proves this conclusion in q. 5 of the Quodlibet:

"Concerning the second Article," he says, "I hold this conclusion: Paternity is not formally infinite, and there are three reasons for this: the first reason is taken from the unity of infinite being: the second from its communicability: the third from its simplicity and incompossibility, since intensive infinite being is unique, incapable of being multiplied, and not restricted, but communicable, and incompossible with anything whatsoever."

He forms the first reason thus: There cannot be several really distinct things formally intensively infinite: but there are several relations of origin really distinct: therefore they are not formally intensively infinite. The minor is evident from what has been said: the major he proves by three means, namely from the comparison of those infinite things among themselves: secondly from the comparison between the finite and the infinite: thirdly from the comparison of those several infinite things to the intellect and the will. First indeed the intensive infinite really claims for itself every perfection simpliciter; but it does not really claim for itself that perfection which another being has, from which it is really distinguished: therefore there cannot be two infinities simpliciter really distinct from one another. From the second means he proves the major thus: among essentially subordinated beings one finally arrives at some being which sufficiently terminates the dependence of all finite beings, and which must necessarily be infinite and unique; infinite indeed, because it must have every perfection from itself, otherwise it would again depend on another, nor would the series of subordinated beings rest in it. Unique indeed, because there cannot be several total causes of the same order for the same effect. Finally, from the third means he proves the same major thus: infinite being is the adequate object of an infinite intellect and an infinite will: but there cannot be several adequate objects of the same intellect and will: therefore there cannot be several infinite beings really distinct.

He forms the second reason thus: Every perfection simpliciter is communicable: but everything intensively infinite is a perfection simpliciter: therefore every intensive infinite is communicable. He subsumes: but no Personal property is communicable, because it is the formal reason of existing incommunicably: therefore no Personal property is a perfection simpliciter; and so the relation of origin, which is a Personal property in the divine, is not a perfection simpliciter. The major of the first syllogism he proves from the description of perfection simpliciter, Which, according to St. Anselm, is in anything better itself than not-itself, that is, as the Doctor explains, which in anything, insofar as it is the supposit of being, is better itself than another incompossible with it in the same: but what is formally incommunicable is formally incompossible with another in the same supposit of being: therefore what is formally incommunicable is not a perfection simpliciter: but every perfection simpliciter in the divine is communicable: therefore the relations of origin, since they are incommunicable, are not perfections simpliciter.

From which I gather with the Doctor ibid. that no simpliciter simplex perfection is incompossible with another simpliciter simplex perfection; for if, v. g., A were incompossible with B, and they are simpliciter simplex perfections: therefore A is better than B, which is not-itself; and B, since it is also a perfection, will be better than A, which is not-itself, and consequently A would be more perfect and less perfect with respect to B, which is impossible.

Finally, the third reason of the Doctor is thus formed: A perfection simpliciter and infinite must be so really identified with every perfection compossible with it in the same supposit that one of them can be predicated of the other in the abstract: but the relation of origin is not so really identified with everything compossible with it in the same supposit: therefore the relation of origin is not a perfection simpliciter and infinite. The minor is evident: for although active spiration, v. g., is really identified with generation, as was proved above, nevertheless this proposition is not true, active generation is active spiration; otherwise it would be true that the divine Father would produce the Son equally by spirating as by generating; and thus the Son would proceed as much through the will as through the intellect, which is plainly false. The major he proves as to its first part, namely that a perfection simpliciter and infinite must be really identified with everything compossible with it in the same subject: both because nothing is essential in the divine that is not really the same as the divine Essence and as every essential thing, which comes from no other source than that every essential thing is a simpliciter simplex perfection: and because the infinite cannot be composed with another, otherwise it would be a part of it and would be exceeded by the whole; but excess is repugnant to the infinite; but if something compossible with it in the same supposit were not entirely really the same as it, they could not constitute one thing except through some composition: therefore every perfection simpliciter and infinite must be really the same as everything compossible with it in the same supposit. From these the second part is inferred, for those things which are really the same are truly predicated and affirmed of one another by reason of the identity of the predicate with the subject; for however much abstraction is made from the subject, since the identity of the predicate with the subject always remains, the affirmation of one of the other is also always true.

The Conclusion is confirmed from the absurdities which follow from the opposite opinion. First indeed, if the divine relations import some perfection, it follows that one person will contain some perfection which another does not contain; because each contains the personal relation proper to itself, not belonging to the other; for Filiation does not belong to the Father, nor Paternity to the Son, nor Paternity and Filiation to the Holy Spirit; and consequently the divine Persons will not be infinite, because each lacks some perfection: but to the infinitely perfect one no simpliciter simplex perfection should be lacking. Moreover, since in the Father and the Son there are two relations, namely in the Father Paternity and active Spiration, and likewise in the Son Filiation together with the same active Spiration; but in the Holy Spirit there is only one, namely passive Spiration; the consequence is that if the relations are simpliciter simplex perfections, the Father and the Son will be more perfect than the Holy Spirit, since they have one simpliciter simplex perfection to which the Holy Spirit has no corresponding one: but this is most absurd: therefore also that from which it follows.

The Doctor ibid. objects four difficulties against his doctrine set forth above. First, that which is not comprehensible by a created and finite intellect is infinite: but the relation of divine origin is not comprehensible by a finite intellect, according to that saying of Isaiac 18. Who shall declare his generation? Therefore it is formally infinite; for everything finite is comprehensible. Second, every action adequate to an infinite principle and term is formally infinite: but divine generation is an action adequate to an infinite formal principle, namely the infinite fecund memory, and to an infinite term which, namely the Son, and to a term by which, namely the communicated essence, both of which terms are infinite: therefore divine generation is formally infinite. Third, the reason of subsisting per se is the most perfect mode of being: but the relations of origin are reasons of subsisting per se: therefore they are most perfect. Fourth, that which is the same as the infinite essence cannot not be infinite; but the relations of origin are identified with the divine Essence: therefore they cannot not be infinite.

The Doctor answers the first by denying the major, for to the notion of the incomprehensibility of anything, its identification with the infinite suffices; for something cannot be comprehended unless its being is perfectly known; nor can this be so known unless all its modes and all its perfections are apprehended; but infinite perfections cannot be comprehended by a finite intellect; and so, for something to be incomprehensible, it suffices that it be identified with the infinite: but the relations of origin are identified with the infinite essence: therefore, although of themselves they are not formally infinite, they are not on that account comprehensible by a created and finite intellect.

To the second he answers that there is a twofold adequation, namely proportional and quantitative: and the proportional again twofold, namely intensive and extensive. Whence in form he distinguishes the minor: that divine generation is adequate to its principle and term with an extensive proportional adequation, which only requires that the origin, or action, be so from such a principle and to such a term that it cannot be from another and to another; nor can such a principle extend itself to eliciting another action, nor can such a term be produced by another action, he concedes: that it is adequate with a quantitative or intensive proportional adequation, namely one requiring the same perfection in the origin and the term as there is in the principle, he denies; for not even a created origin is thus adequate to its principle, which is always more perfect than its action and the produced term, because it depends less. From extensive proportional adequation, however, it does not follow that if the one is formally infinite, the other must likewise be infinite, because formal intensive infinity regards the quantity and the intensity of grades, not extension.

To the third he answers that to subsist per se is equivocal, and is taken in two ways: first indeed for a mode of existing per se and independently of anything else; and thus it is something absolute in the divine; and so it is a simpliciter simplex perfection, and is the absolute existence spoken of above. Second, for a mode of existing incommunicably to another, as to a supposit, and thus it is neither a simpliciter simplex perfection, nor secundum quid; but it is only in this latter way that the divine relations are called reasons of subsisting per se, and so they are neither perfect nor imperfect.

To the fourth he distinguishes the major: whatever is identified with the infinite is infinite, if it is capable of infinity, he concedes; otherwise he denies: but the relations of origin are not capable of infinity by reason of their incommunicability, and because of the reasons already assigned, and so the consequence is to be denied.

You will object 2. The divine relations are called perfections both by the Councils and by the Fathers: therefore they truly are such. The antecedent is proved from the Council of Constantinople, the Epistle to Damasus, We believe, it says, equal honor and dignity, and coeternal empire in three most perfect subsistences, or three perfect persons: likewise Justin, in the exposition of the faith on the Trinity, We preferred, he says, to set forth the knowledge of one Deity in three perfect subsistences. Likewise Cyril of Alexandria, in book 1 of the Thesaurus, c. 6.: He is perfect, he says, not only because He is God, but also because He is Father. Damascene subscribes, 1. Fidei c. 11., saying: In the properties of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, we understand the difference according to cause and caused (or causal) and Personal perfection, that is, the mode of existing: the same, in lib. De Decretis primae institutionis: The hypostases, he says, and persons are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for each of them is a perfect hypostasis and a perfect person. Therefore truly the personal relations are perfections, and perfect.

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that the holy Fathers and the Councils, in the cited texts and other similar ones, take the divine hypostasis and person, not in the abstract for the formal subsistence and personality, insofar as it is formally distinguished from the divine essence and concurs with it to constitute the divine person; but in the concrete for the divine Person itself, insofar as it simultaneously imports the essence and the personality, in which way truly the divine Persons are most perfect. That the sayings of the holy Fathers are not otherwise to be taken is sufficiently gathered from their cited words. To St. Damascene especially I answer that he does not will the personal properties to be formally perfections: for he teaches the contrary in c. 9., saying: All things which the Father has are the Son's, with this one exception, that He is not unbegotten; which word indeed indicates neither a difference of nature, nor dignity and authority, but a mode of existence. Therefore he names those properties perfections only as taken in the concrete, and for the persons.

You will object 3. The mystery of the Trinity, insofar as it is the Trinity, is supremely adorable, and therefore infinitely perfect: but the Trinity, insofar as it is the Trinity, connotes and imports the divine relations: therefore it is true that the relations import supreme and infinite perfection.

I distinguish the major: the mystery of the Trinity imports a supreme perfection holding from the part of the divine nature, which is communicated to the three Persons together with its attributes and perfections, I concede: a supreme perfection proceeding from the divine relations, which are the terms of the divine communication and fecundity, I deny: for the whole perfection which shines forth in adoring the mystery of the Trinity is to be traced back to the part of the divine nature, which supremely and infinitely constitutes and perfects the divine Persons; not however to the part of the relations, which are pure terms of divine fecundity and nature, adding no perfection to it, but only giving it a mode of subsisting incommunicably.

You will object 4. The subsistence of the divine Word, insofar as it is formally distinct from the essence, terminates the assumed human nature, and confers on it and also on its actions supreme perfection and dignity: therefore it itself has that perfection formally. The consequence is evident: for what the personality of the divine Word bestows on the human nature, it confers not in the notion of an efficient cause, but of a formal one; and so by itself as a form it signifies the actions and perfects the nature of the assumed man, and consequently it itself either is a perfection, or formally contains the supreme perfection. The antecedent is proved: for the assumed man, by reason of the personality communicated to him, is adorable, and that with the adoration of latria: therefore he contains a good, not of any kind, but infinite and supreme, because he merits supreme worship.

I deny the antecedent as to the second part, namely that the subsistence of the Word, insofar as it is formally distinguished from the divine Essence, confers supreme perfection on the humanity of Christ; and its proof I distinguish: the assumed man is adorable and supremely perfect by reason of the personality of the Word alone, I deny: by reason of the Deity hypostatically united to him, I concede: for Christ is therefore said to be supremely perfect and worthy of supreme worship, not precisely only because He subsists by the subsistence of the Word, but because by reason of this subsistence He is hypostatically united to the Deity, and is the Man-God.