Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. It is the common opinion of the theologians that four personal relations of origin are to be admitted, namely paternity, filiation, passive spiration, and active spiration. For these alone are the relations which are founded on the divine processions considered in the manner of action and passion: for there are only two real processions, as we proved above, namely the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. These can be considered in two ways, namely actively or passively; generation taken actively is called paternity, but taken passively it is named filiation. Similarly, the procession of the Holy Spirit can be viewed actively or passively: in the former way it is called active spiration, which is in the Father and the Son, and through which they are distinguished from the Holy Spirit; in the latter way, however, it is called passive spiration.

Note 2. Almost all theologians also agree that paternity is truly constitutive of the first divine person, filiation of the second, and passive spiration of the third; but there is no slight difficulty concerning active spiration, namely whether it also constitutes some distinct divine person: for if it is not constitutive of any person, why does it hold a place among the constitutive personal relations? But if it is, then there will be not only three, but truly four divine Persons; and so the mystery of the divine Trinity utterly collapses. To avoid these reefs of error, some theologians judge with Gregory in 1. dist. 26. that active spiration is to be banished from the relations of origin; to whom our Baro partly subscribes in Apologia 3, action 3. The Thomists indeed do not reject it, but contend that it is only virtually distinct from paternity and filiation. Durandus, however, contends that it is really distinguished from paternity and filiation. But the Subtle Doctor, in Quodlibet 5, affirms that spiration is indeed real, yet is diverse from paternity and filiation not really, but only formally and in act.

Note 3. It is most certain that the Father and the Son are really distinguished from the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is likewise distinguished from them: but by what power this distinction is made, not all agree. For some will that this distinction is to be traced back to paternity and filiation, so that for this purpose active spiration is superfluous. On the contrary, others affirm that this real distinction is to be gathered from nothing other than active spiration. Hence two things especially come to be established in the present Question: first, that active spiration is a real relation necessary for the distinction of the persons: second, that it is distinguished from paternity and filiation not really nor only virtually, but formally.

First conclusion. — Active spiration is a real relation, and one necessary for gathering the complete distinction of the divine persons.

Proof of the conclusion: Between a principle and a term really proceeding from the principle, a real relation intervenes, especially when the proceeding term is of the same nature as its principle: but the Father and the Son are one principle, from which the Holy Spirit really proceeds, who is of the same nature as the Father and the Son: therefore the Father and the Son regard the Holy Spirit with a real and mutual relation. I subsume: but they do not so regard him through paternity and filiation: therefore they must regard him through another relation; and so through active spiration.

The major of the syllogism is evident; for there is no stronger reason why a mutual real relation of principle and proceeding term, namely paternity and filiation, should intervene between the first and the second Person, than between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son, from whom he proceeds as a term from a principle.

The inference, moreover, is proved from St. Augustine, Serm. 38. De Tempore, where he says:

The very relation of the Holy Spirit cannot be converted by a reciprocal term in the way that Father and Son can, for the Father is called Father of the Son, and the Son is called Son of the Father, but the Holy Spirit is called uniformly with respect to the Father and the Son, because he is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; for we say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father... But we do not conversely say that the Father is of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as his Son; likewise we say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, but we do not say that the Son is of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood as his Father:

therefore that mutual relation is not by reason of paternity and filiation, and so another relation is to be admitted.

— It is confirmed from the same book 5. De Trinitate, cap. 11., where he proves that between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit there is a mutual relation, not under the notion of Spirit, but under the notion of Gift: for he says:

That relation itself does not appear from this name, namely Holy Spirit, but it appears when it is said gift of God; for it is the Gift of the Father and of the Son, because it proceeds both from the Father, and the Apostle says: he who does not have the Spirit of Christ, this one is not his... Therefore when we say gift of the giver and giver of the gift, we say both relatively to each other:

therefore he judges that between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit there is a mutual relation: but the Father and the Son are not mutually referred to the Holy Spirit through the relation of paternity and filiation, but under the notion of gift, as he himself teaches in cap. 12., where he proves that the relation of the Holy Spirit has as its correlative neither the relation of the Father nor the relation of the Son.

When we say, he says, gift of the Father and of the Son, we cannot indeed say Father of the gift, or Son of the gift; but so that these may answer one another, we say gift of the giver and giver of the gift, because here a customary word could be found, there it could not; we say therefore relatively Father, and the same is said relatively principle, and if perhaps anything else: but the Father is said so with respect to the Son, the principle of things with respect to all things which are from him;

therefore St. Augustine judges that the Father and the Son are truly referred to the Holy Spirit, not through the relation of paternity and filiation, but through the relation of principle: but this relation is called active spiration: therefore this is truly real.

This very point Bessarion lucidly proved from the holy Fathers in the Council of Florence, Oratione pro unione, cap. 6., where, after he had urged that between the Son and the Holy Spirit there is a mutual relation, as of cause to caused and of caused to cause, employing after the Greek manner the name of cause for principle, he proves from this that that relation is not made through filiation: whence he concludes that since the Son as Son is not referred to the Spirit, for he is not called Son of the Spirit, it remains that he be referred to the Spirit as spirating, since the Spirit is also referred to the Son as Spirit; for the Spirit corresponds to the Spirator, and passive spiration corresponds to active spiration; moreover, the Spirit is called both the Spirit of the Son in many places of Sacred Scripture, and his spiration; for this Spirit (as the holy Athanasius says) is the spiration of the Son; since therefore the Spirit is referred to the Son both as spiration and as Spirit, the Son also is referred to the Spirit as spirating. In which he concludes two things: first, that between the Son and the Spirit there is a mutual relation. Second, that this relation on the part of the Son is not filiation, but active spiration, and consequently, that since the Son is really referred to the Holy Spirit, active spiration must necessarily be real.

You will say 1. Nothing is to be asserted in the mystery of the Trinity unless it is supported either by Sacred Scripture or by the oracles of the Councils or of the holy Fathers: but there is no mention of active spiration among the holy Fathers; indeed Albinus Flavius, lib. 1. De Trinit., c. 5., says that the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son is not reciprocal, that is, mutual: therefore this active spiration is not to be asserted.

I deny the minor: for although the holy Fathers did not call the relation between the Father and the Son active spiration, they nevertheless sufficiently designated it by establishing a mutual relation among all the Persons, as we asserted above not only from St. Augustine, but also as is evident from the 11th Council of Toledo, saying: They suggest number by this alone, that they are mutually related; and Nazianz. Orat. 37.: The manifestation, he says, so to speak, and the mutual difference of their relation also produced for them diverse names. There is therefore among those divine Persons a mutual real relation: but this, on the part of the Father and the Son, is not paternity and filiation with respect to the Holy Spirit: therefore the holy Fathers sufficiently affirm that another is to be admitted, namely active spiration, which the Council of Florence tacitly approved, as we said above; indeed the Council of Lyons under Gregory X had also indicated it, in its single chapter De summa Trinitate, saying not only that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by one spiration, but also that they are One principle of the Holy Spirit; and so by the same reason they have a relation to the Holy Spirit by which they are his principle: but according to the Council they are his principle through active spiration, and consequently in the mind of the Council they are referred to him through active spiration.

To Albinus Flavius, I answer that he indeed wills that the Father and the Son are not referred to the Holy Spirit by a mutual relation under the notion of Father and of Son, but only under the notion of principle, as we said above from St. Augustine.

You will say 2. The holy Fathers assign only three personal relations. Moreover, the Lateran Council in the chapter Damnamus excludes a real quaternity in the divine: but if active spiration were real, there would truly be a quaternity of real relations in the divine: therefore etc. Finally, St. John Damascene, lib. 1. De Fide, cap. 10. and 11., discourses copiously on the divine relations: but he makes no mention at all of active spiration: therefore he judges that it is not to be admitted.

I answer 1. The holy Fathers assigned only three personal properties really distinct for this reason, because they were treating only of the relations constitutive of the persons and really distinct; whence, since active spiration constitutes no Person nor is really distinguished from paternity and filiation, therefore there was no discussion of it among them.

To the Lateran Council I say that it excludes a quaternity in the divine only insofar as a quaternity of Persons would be inferred from it: but that is not inferred from the admitted active spiration, for this is not constitutive of a divine Person: therefore the Council does not exclude it. Add that the Council excludes a quaternity of things really distinct, as thing from thing: but active spiration is not so distinguished from paternity and filiation, as we shall immediately prove: therefore it does not fight against us.

To St. Damascene I answer that from a negative authority nothing is certainly gathered, especially when the contrary may be inferred: but S. Damascene supplies in the same cap. 11. a sufficient foundation for asserting the real relation of active spiration, when about the middle he says: God is understood in the properties alone of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession according to cause and the causal: by which he denotes that the reciprocation of the producing principle and the produced term between the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Son is mutual: but this cannot be paternity and filiation: therefore it is active spiration.

You will say 3. The relation of principle in God is not always real, for truly God is the principle of creatures, and yet he does not have a real relation to them: therefore although the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, it does not follow from this that they have a real relation of active spiration.

I distinguish the antecedent: when the producing principle and the produced term are of a diverse order and a diverse nature, I concede: when they are of the same, I deny. But the relation of the Creator to created things is to things of another order and nature, and comes to God only in time: whereas active spiration is toward a term of the same order and nature, and it befits God from eternity, and therefore it is real.

You will say 4. Active spiration presupposes the Father and the Son as constituted: therefore if it is real, it will come to them only by resultance and in the manner of an accident: but this is unbecoming to God: therefore etc.

I deny the minor: for this resultance is not made according to reality, but according to formality, nor does it come from any extrinsic action, as created relations do, but from the intrinsic, and from the fecundity of the divine will: as therefore it is not repugnant that the attributes should result from the essence, distinct from it not really but only formally, so also it is not repugnant that that active spiration should result from the Father and the Son.

Second conclusion. — Active spiration is distinguished from paternity and filiation not really, but formally and in act.

This is the opinion of almost all theologians as to the first part, and Proof 1. From the Lateran Council, cap. Damnamus, where the opinion of Abbot Joachim is proscribed, who said that a quaternity is to be admitted in God, because the essence was really distinct from the Persons really also distinct from one another; and the Council established that it is only a Trinity and not a quaternity for this reason alone, because each of the three Persons is that thing, namely the substance, essence, or nature; from which one may argue thus: the Council established that there is no quaternity of things in the divine: but if active spiration were really distinguished from paternity and filiation, there would be a quaternity of things in the divine; therefore in the mind of the Council it is not so distinguished. It is confirmed, for the Council in the same place especially proscribes a quaternity of Persons: but if spiration were really distinguished, there would be a quaternity of Persons, for that relation would be per se subsistent, and so would be a supposit, and consequently would be a Person, because every supposit of intellectual nature is a person.

Secondly, from the holy Fathers and the very many Councils already often praised by us, but especially from St. Anselm, book De Spiritu sancto: in the divine all things are one, except where the opposition of relation stands in the way, whether it be relative opposition, as the Thomists will, or disparate, as will appear below, in treating of the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son: but between paternity and active spiration there is no relative opposition, because the one is not produced by the other; nor is it between producing principle and produced term; nor is it even disparate, because for this it is required that it be constitutive of a Person, but active spiration does not constitute a Person: therefore it says no opposition with paternity and filiation, and so is not really distinguished from them.

Thirdly and finally, in the divine that which does not proceed from another is not really distinguished from it: but active spiration does not proceed from paternity and filiation: therefore it is not really distinguished from them. The minor is evident, for there are only two divine processions. The major is also evident; for there are only three indications of real distinction, namely those of which one is the producer and the other the produced, those of which one can exist while the other does not exist, and those which can in-exist in subjects really distinct; but the two latter cannot be in the divine: therefore only the first indication of distinction is admitted there: whence rightly John the theologian in the Council of Florence, sess. 18.: Only the relation, he says, which we above named the principal habitude, among all Doctors, both Greek and Latin, multiplies persons by divine procession.

The second part is sufficiently gathered from what has been said, for active spiration is a real relation: but it is not the same formally with paternity and filiation, nor is it really distinguished from them: therefore it is at least formally distinguished. The major is clear from the first Conclusion: the minor also is clear, as to the second part, from what was just said.

Therefore its first part is proved: those relations are distinguished at least formally which have per se distinct terms and are the notions from which the distinction and diversity of the persons is gathered; but such is active spiration with respect to paternity and filiation, since paternity per se regards the Son, and filiation the Father, but active spiration regards the Holy Spirit, and is the reason why the Father and the Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Moreover, it itself effects the mutual relation between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which paternity does not effect, nor filiation, as was proved in the preceding Conclusion: therefore active spiration is at least formally distinguished from paternity and filiation. Moreover, a disparate relation is not the same formally with a directly opposed relation: but paternity and filiation are disparate relations only with respect to passive spiration, whereas active spiration is directly opposed to it: therefore this is at least formally distinguished from paternity and filiation. Finally, if active spiration were formally the same as paternity, it would be as true to say that the Father produces the Son by spirating as by generating; and so the Word could as well be called Spirit as Son: but the consequent is absurd: therefore etc. The sequel is evident; for where there is no distinction in the thing, there cannot be a diversity of the real predicates of the thing itself; and so if paternity and active spiration are in no way distinguished a parte rei, whatever is affirmed of the one can also be affirmed of the other.

You will say 1. Just as there is a disparate opposition between filiation and passive spiration, so likewise there is between filiation and active spiration: but the former opposition suffices to distinguish filiation really from passive spiration: therefore the latter will also suffice to distinguish it from active spiration, and so they will be distinguished not only formally, but also really.

I answer to the major that the Son is not for this reason alone really distinguished from the Holy Spirit under the formal notion of Son, because filiation is a relation opposed disparately to passive spiration, but chiefly because passive spiration is altogether incompossible with filiation in the same supposit; for if filiation and passive spiration were in the same supposit of the Son, it would follow that he would be produced, namely by generation from the intellect and by spiration from the will: but that very thing does not follow from active spiration and filiation; for although the Son spirates and produces the Holy Spirit, he does not on that account cease to be the Son.

You will say 2. As being generated and being spirated stand, so stand generating and spirating: but being generated and being spirated are really distinguished and produce really distinct relations: therefore generating and spirating are also really distinguished, and produce really distinct relations.

I deny the major, for being generated and being spirated are opposed at least through the mediation of active spiration, and constitute diverse Persons; but generating and spirating are not properly opposed; therefore being generated and being spirated are really distinguished, but not so generating and spirating.

You will insist. As generating stands to being generated, so spirating stands to being spirated: therefore by permuted proportion, as generating stands to spirating, so being generated stands to being spirated: but being generated and being spirated are really distinguished: therefore generating and spirating will also be really distinguished. The consequence is clear; because there is no greater reason for distinction in the one pair of extremes than in the other.

I deny the consequence: for although permuted proportion has force of inference in quantity, in other things it nevertheless proves nothing; indeed it appears false by many examples. For instance: as fire stands to heat, so water stands to cold: therefore by permuted proportion, as heat stands to cold, so fire stands to water: but heat and cold can be together in the same subject in remiss degrees; therefore water and fire will also be able to be together in the same matter according to some of their degrees; which consequence is altogether false. The reason, therefore, of the disparity is that the passive being-spirated, that is, the Holy Spirit, really proceeds from the active being-generated, which is the produced Son himself; and therefore it is necessarily distinguished from it, as from a producing principle: but the spirative does not proceed from active generation as from a producing principle, and so they do not keep the same permuted proportion.