Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. By the name of relation we understand that form, as it were, by which one thing regards another and is compared with it. Hence it comes about that in any relation a twofold being is distinguished, namely being in, and being toward. For since a relation is a habitude of one thing to another, it is necessarily in a subject, which relates, and toward a term, which it regards. But whether a relation is real according to that twofold being, the Authors do not agree; for some, with William of Paris, praised by the Carthusian in 1. dist. 26. q. 2., affirm that both in God and in all creatures relations are not real entities, but only beings of reason; or at least only extrinsic denominations, as Ockham taught in 1. dist. 30. q. 4. Some contend that relations are not real insofar as they are toward something, but only insofar as they are in something; so most Thomists with St. Thomas in De potentia, quaest. 4. art. 5. and in dist. 26. quaest. art. 2. ad 3. Finally, the rest agree with the Subtle Doctor that the divine relations ad intra are real according to that twofold being, namely in something, and toward something.

Note 2. From the Doctor, Quodlibet. 6. n. 33., three things are especially required for the reality of a relation: First, a real foundation, which is in the thing, and from the nature of the thing. Second, real extremes, really distinct. Third, that it itself inhere in the extremes from the nature of the thing, namely without any consideration of the intellect, or without the operation of an extrinsic power. It must moreover be noted that of real relations, especially of those which are called mutual, there are three properties, of which the First is that they are simultaneous by nature: the Second, that they are simultaneous in knowledge, or definition: the Third, that they are said convertibly; all of which, from Aristotle, St. Cyril thus weighs in lib. 2. Thesauri c. 3.: Things which are relative, he says, are simultaneous both by nature and by reason, and one is inferred from the other. It is consequent, therefore, that those relations are to be called real to which the three aforesaid conditions and the three designated properties belong: but whether all these fit the divine relations ad intra, will have to be determined here.

Note 3. The divine relations differ from created ones especially in three things; for first, a created relation is of almost no entity and existence, of no activity and efficacy, and finally of no solidity and permanence; indeed, by the defect of its own fragility and thinness, it vanishes at almost the same moment in which it is born: but the divine relation is of such and so sublime an entity that it institutes the most august Trinity and constitutes the divine Persons in personal being. Second, the relations of creatures are accidental, and therefore need a subject both to exist and to be conserved: but the divine relations are substantial, and subsisting per se, and although they flow from the divine Essence, as from a sea of all entity and perfection, and determine it to the constitution of the Persons, nevertheless they are not in the divine essence itself as in a subject, but are really identified with it. Third, the relations coming intrinsically in creatures suppose their extremes, that is, the foundation and the term, really existing and distinct, because they arise only from the position of the foundation and of the term: but the divine relations do not suppose, but constitute the divine Persons, and make them really distinct.

These things having been premised, three remain to be established: First, whether the divine personal and proper relations are truly real: second, whether they are real both according to being toward something and according to being in something: Third, whether the common relations of identity, equality, and likeness are also truly real.

First conclusion. — The relations proper to the divine Persons are simpliciter real. This sufficiently appears from those things which we said in proving that the divine Persons are constituted through the relations, reduplicatively as they are relations.

It is proved moreover. By the authority of the Councils, especially of the Council of Toledo 11, cap. 1., saying: In the relative names of the persons the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both. Which, since the three persons are said relatively, nevertheless one nature is believed through substance. The same is evident from the Council of Florence, session 18, where John the Theologian, from the common opinion of the Greek and Latin Fathers, says: Only relation, among all the Greek and Latin Doctors, multiplies the persons by divine procession, so that one person differs from another on no other account than by force of relation. From which I argue thus: the divine Persons are really constituted and distinguished: therefore through something real, constitutive and distinctive: but that, from the Councils, is nothing other than relation: therefore that is truly real.

Proof 2. Those relations are truly to be called real to which the three properties required for a real relation belong; but they belong to the notional relations: therefore these are real. The major is evident: for property follows entity; and so if that is real, this likewise will be real. The minor is proved: the three conditions are that the mutual relations are simultaneous by nature, simultaneous in knowledge, and in reciprocal inference, as was said in the second Note: but they fit indeed the relations constitutive of the divine Persons; the Father and the divine Son, for example, are simultaneous by nature, and from the existence of one the existence of the other is inferred, as St. Cyril expressly proves in Dialogo De Trinit. lib. 1.: If the Son existing as begotten were not, he says, neither would the Father be according to the reason of nature; for the Father is because he begot: therefore it is true both that they subsist together and that both are taken away together. They are also simultaneous in knowledge; for Basil says, lib. 2. Contra Eunomium: From the fact that the Father is, the Son also is; and immediately, when one takes up the thought of the Father, that of the Son also occurs to him; for the Father is evidently the Father of the Son. With this agrees Cyril of Jerusalem in Catechesi 7.: The name of the Father, he says, together with the appellation of that very name, presents the Son also to be understood; just as likewise one naming the Son also understands the Father; for, as Gregory of Nyssa subjoins in Epist. Contra Apollinarem: When one has named the Father, it is certain that he has brought in the signification of some Son; for how will he be called Father unless the Son is also understood? St. Hilary favors this in book 7. De Trinitate: The name of the Father, he says, has in itself the name of the Son; for he is the Father only through the Son; and the signification of the Son is the demonstration of the Father, because the Son is only from the Father. Therefore if the property of a real relation belongs to the personal relations, those will truly have to be called real.

Proof 3. Those relations are truly to be called real to which the three conditions required for a real relation belong, namely that its foundation is real, that it is between real extremes, and that it inheres in the foundation from the nature of the thing, and apart from consideration of the intellect: but these three conditions belong to the personal relations: the first indeed, because the active and passive origin in which the relations of the producer and the produced are founded is truly a real foundation: second, those relations are between really distinct extremes, for the producer and the produced are really distinguished from each other: finally, those relations and the habitudes of one Person to another belong to them apart from any operation of the intellect; for even if no created intellect had ever existed, the divine Father would no less really be the Father of the Son, and the Son the Son of the Father: therefore they would have had relation to each other no less really.

You will say 1. A real relation requires really distinct extremes: but the divine relations do not have really distinct extremes. Proof: for those relations are between the Essence, which is communicated by one Person to another: but the divine Essence in the Person communicating it is not distinguished from itself insofar as it is in the Person to whom it is communicated; indeed it is altogether the same: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that the divine essence itself is not the extreme, or the proximate foundation, of the relation which intervenes between the divine Persons; but the divine Persons themselves are the very extremes of the relations; for it is not the Essence, but the divine Persons themselves that are really referred to each other; and so, since the Persons are really distinct, their relations too are between really distinct extremes.

You will insist. Not only does a relation require, but it also prerequires the reality and distinction of the extremes: but the divine relations do not suppose real and really distinct extremes: therefore they are not real.

I distinguish the major. A created relation prerequires the reality and real distinction of the extremes, because it does not arise except from the foundation and term being posited, I concede: an uncreated and divine relation so requires really distinct extremes, I deny. For since this relation is constitutive and distinctive of the divine Person, because it is terminative of the communication of the divine Essence, therefore it does not suppose, but effects the distinction of the extremes.

You will say 2. Real relations are affirmed to be in God for this reason, because the divine Persons are denominated by relative names: but from that it is not lawful to gather that there are in them some real relations: therefore, etc. The major is evident from the proofs of the Conclusion; the minor is proved: for God is no less truly really called Lord, Creator, etc. than the first person is called Father: but from the fact that God is called by the relative name of Lord, it does not follow that there is in him a real relation, such as intervenes between lord and servant among creatures: therefore from the fact that the first person is called Father, it is not lawful to conclude that it is the same relation which is between Father and Son among creatures.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I distinguish the major: God is said to be Lord as really as the first person is said to be Father, with the reality of termination, because namely the relation of Lordship is terminated at creatures really existing, just as, proportion being kept, the relation of Paternity is terminated at the Son really existing, I concede: as really intrinsically, or through an intrinsic relative form, I deny. For the relation of Lord arises only from the extrinsic, and belongs to God already constituted on every side in his being both essential and personal: therefore it is said to be a relation coming to him from the extrinsic, namely from the production of the creature; but the relation of Paternity belongs to him from the intrinsic, not only because it flows from the essence with which it is really the same, and from which it is distinguished only formally, but also because together with the divine Essence it concurs to the intrinsic constitution of the divine person in his personal being.

You will say 3. Boethius, book 1. De Trinit., about the middle, having enumerated all the categories, says: These, when anyone turns the predication to the divine, all things that can be predicated are changed: but being toward something cannot be predicated at all. Therefore from that it follows that relation, which is the category toward another, does not really belong to God, as substance does, and those things which beyond substance are signified by way of quantity, or quality, or action, etc.

I answer. Boethius means that relations are not predicated of the Divinity in the same way as the other categories are enunciated, but in an altogether different way: for when in the next following book he had inquired whether the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are substantially predicated of the Divinity: after the middle of the book he concludes thus:

From these things therefore we understand that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not said substantially of the Divinity itself, but in a certain other way: For if it were substantially predicated of each one, it would also be said singularly of all: But now it is manifest that it is said toward something; for the Father too is the Father of someone.

Boethius therefore confesses that relations are predicated and said of God as toward something; which is a certain other mode of predication distinct from the predication of substance, and of the other categories, which are verified of the individual persons. For the individual persons are said to exist per se, to be equal, similar, etc., but the individual persons are not said to be Father, etc.

Second conclusion. — The relations of origin constitutive of the divine Persons are truly real according to being toward something. It is proved from all those things by which it has already been intimated that the divine relations are constitutive of the persons, insofar as they are relations; for the relations of origin are constitutive of the divine persons insofar as they are real, and according to the proper notion by which they are relations: but they are proper relations according to being toward another: therefore they are also relations, and constitutive, according to their being toward something. The major is evident from what has been said. The minor is proved: with being toward something set aside from a relation, nothing further remains through which one thing is understood to be referred to another: but with the notion of referring one thing to another removed from a relation, the relation no longer remains: therefore, with being toward something set aside, there will no longer be a true relation.

It is confirmed. The divine relations constitute the persons in the same way in which they distinguish them: but they distinguish them only according to being toward. Proof: they do not distinguish except insofar as they are opposed to each other only according to being toward; not indeed according to being in, which is common to them with the absolute forms: therefore, etc.

Second: Paternity according to the most formal notion of Paternity is a relation to the Son: therefore relation according to the most formal notion of relation, or according to being toward another, is a real entity. The major is clear: for if Paternity according to its most formal notion were not a real entity, God would not be truly and properly Father, but only through a certain comparison of the human intellect; and therefore he would be less properly Father and Son than a man generating and begotten, who really are Father and Son. The minor is evident from what has been said, by which we proved with very many authorities of the holy Fathers that the proper notion of Paternity is wholly toward the Son, just as the whole notion of the Son is toward the Father. And it is proved moreover from the Council of Worms in the profession of faith, where, repeating the words of the Council of Toledo 11 saying: In the relative names of the persons the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both, etc.; it subjoins: That which the Father is, he is not to himself but to the Son; and that which the Son is, he is not to himself but to the Father. With this agrees St. Bernard in Epist. 192. ad Innocentium, where he says: Not that which he is to himself, but that which he is to the Son, is designated by the name of Father. Therefore the true notion of relation is toward another.

Third, finally: if relation according to being toward another were not of itself properly real, but only from the fact that the substance of God is real, or his love and intellection; it would follow that the eternal divine relations are not real in a more perfect and truer way than the relations are real which belong to God from time, by which he is really denominated Lord and Creator; for these are likewise founded in the operations of the divine intellect and will; for God in time is really and properly called Lord from the real subjection of creatures, the foundation of the volition and command being supposed, by which God from eternity pre-defined to produce and govern creatures: but this consequent is absurd; otherwise the relations of origin would be only extrinsic denominations; and so they would not be real and intrinsic constitutive principles of the divine Persons: therefore, etc.

You will object. Being toward something formally regards only the term: but formally regarding the term is not some real notion: therefore being toward something is not real. The major is clear. The minor is proved: that is not per se real which is common to real being and being of reason: but regarding the term is something common to a real relation and a relation of reason: for each refers the foundation to the term: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I deny the minor: for a relation of reason truly does not regard the term, but is conceived after the manner of those relations which regard the term, just as any being of reason is not a being, but is conceived after the manner of a being. Then, just as being in something is said of a real relation and of a relation of reason, so too is being toward another; for relations of reason are conceived as much after the manner of accidents inhering in subjects as they are conceived to be toward another: therefore if from the fact that being toward a term is said of a real relation and of a relation of reason it would follow that the relation is not real insofar as it is toward something, it would also not have to be called real insofar as it is in something, and so the relation would be real according to no notion of itself; which is absurd.

You will say 2. The whole reality of any being is in it itself: therefore it can really be real only according to being in, not indeed according to another being opposed to this, such as is being toward.

I distinguish the major. That the whole reality of an absolute being is to be in itself, and toward itself, I concede: of a relative being, I deny. Indeed, from the definition of relatives their whole being is toward another; for Aristotle says in defining relation: Things are relative to something for which this very being is to be related to something, that is, to have a habitude toward another. The rest that could be objected is drawn from Philosophy, and we have already solved it in our Academical Philosophy by proving that relations are real beings; therefore let it be

Third conclusion. — Truly in God there are relations of identity, equality, and likeness: and they are real. This conclusion has two parts. Of these the first is proved: In God there are relations of identity, equality, and likeness, in which there is perfect identity, equality, and likeness: but that most perfectly obtains among the divine Persons. — For first, among them there is the highest essential Identity: both because the same essence is numerically one in the three persons: and because the divine Essence, by reason of its infinity, identifies with itself the constitutive relations of the divine Persons, whence it comes about that although there are three persons, nevertheless there is one only God; therefore among them there is the highest and perfect identity. Second, there is also an all-around Equality among the divine Persons, as is gathered from that passage ad Philippens. 2, where Paul says of the divine Word: He did not think it robbery to be equal to God, that is, he did not tyrannically, nor by robbery, usurp the equality of God, but it was connatural to him. This divine equality, moreover, is attended to chiefly in three things, namely, in the infinite magnitude of the perfections, in the eternal immutability of existence, and in the inexhaustible fecundity of power, as St. Fulgentius sets out in the book De Fide ad Petrum, chap. 1, saying:

That none of these, namely of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is outside any one of them, because no one of them either precedes in eternity, or exceeds in magnitude, or surpasses in power: because neither to the Son, nor to the Holy Spirit is the Father anterior or greater, nor can the Son's eternity and immensity, as it were anterior or greater, naturally precede or exceed the immensity and eternity of the Holy Spirit.

The Council of Toledo 6 likewise agrees, in the profession of faith before the middle: In this Trinity, he says, there is such unity of substance that it lacks plurality, and holds equality, nor does it remain less in each one than in all: nor greater in all than in each person. It is likewise confirmed from the Creed of St. Athanasius saying: In this Trinity nothing is earlier or later, nothing greater or less, but all three persons are coeternal with one another, and coequal. — Third, finally, this same thing is evident regarding Likeness: for among the divine Persons there is a perfect assimilation, by reason of the attributes and divine perfections, in which those divine Persons are said to be altogether alike: whence Athanasius in the Creed: As the Father is, such is the Son, such is the Holy Spirit: hence in the first oration Contra Arianos he says: The Son inasmuch as He is the Word, and Wisdom of the Father, has all things that are the Father's, eternity, immutability, and in all things and in all respects the same likeness. The Holy Spirit also has this same likeness, not indeed by the most formal force of His procession as the Son does, but by reason of the divine nature communicated to Himself; wherefore some Fathers went so far as to call the Holy Spirit the form, and image, and Word of the Son, as will appear in the following Disputation. — St. Hilary proves this divine likeness in book 3 De Trinit. from that passage of Genesis let us make man, etc. He who says, he remarks, let us make man to our image, and likeness, shows that they are mutually like themselves in this, that he speaks of our likeness.

Richard of St. Victor proves it, however, in book 3 De Trinitate chap. 7, from the perfect charity that is among the divine Persons:

The fullness of Charity requires, he says, that each be supremely loved by the other, and consequently, according to the aforesaid norm of discernment, each be supremely lovable. But where each is equally to be loved, it is necessary that each be equally perfect: it is necessary, therefore, that each be equally powerful, equally wise, equally good, equally blessed, etc.

Whatever could be objected against this truth has already been resolved from what has been said about the consubstantiality and equality of the divine Persons.

Thus the second part is proved. Namely, that those relations of identity, equality, and likeness are truly real, as the Doctor affirms in 1. dist. 31. and elsewhere.

Proof 1. A real relation is one that belongs to its extremes, setting aside the work of the intellect: but such are the aforesaid relations: therefore they are real. The major is evident. The minor is proved from the holy Fathers and Councils, especially Nicaea, Toledo 1., Constantinople 1., in which the divine Son is said to be of the same essence with the Father, and equal to Him in all things, and perfectly like Him.

It is confirmed. On the side of the thing the divine Son has all things required on the part of the foundation for the relations of identity, equality, and likeness with the Father: therefore truly also on the side of the thing He has those notions. The consequence is evident; for in these intrinsically adventitious relations, once a sufficient foundation and term are posited, the relation necessarily results. The antecedent is proved, for from Aristotle book 5 Metaphysicorum chap. 5: Those things are the same whose substance is one; like, however, those whose quality is one; equal, moreover, those whose quantity is one; but on the side of the thing in the Father and the Son there is one substance, namely the divine nature; likewise one quality, namely the attributal and modal perfections; finally one quantity, not of bulk, but of worth, namely the Divinity, Majesty, and Sublimity: therefore likewise in them there are on the side of the thing the relations of identity, equality, and likeness.

Second, equality and likeness are real relations in creatures: therefore much more so in God. The antecedent is evident: the consequence is proved: Equality and likeness are much more perfectly in divine things than in creatures: therefore it will stand much more strongly that they are real in God. The antecedent is of St. Augustine himself lib. 3. De Trinitate, cap. 4. and 5., where he proves the supreme equality of the persons from their supreme simplicity, and in chapter 10, speaking of the Son insofar as He is the image, he says: To whom there is already such congruence, and first equality, and first likeness, disagreeing in nothing, and in no way unequal, and in no part dissimilar, but corresponding identically to him whose image He is.

Third, the cited Doctor proves in number 2.: Those relations are real to which all the conditions desired for a real relation belong, namely: first, that the extremes be real: second, that they be really distinguished: third, that the relation result from the nature of the thing, or of the extremes, and so without any comparison of the intellect: but those three conditions truly fit the aforesaid relations. For first, the essence and divine perfections, which are the foundations of the identity, equality, and likeness of the Persons, are truly real: second, the Persons themselves, between whom those relations obtain, are really existing, really distinct from one another: third, finally, no comparison of the intellect is needed for those divine Persons to be the same, equal, and like: therefore truly those three conditions necessary for a real relation belong to the aforesaid relations.

The Thomists reply: Besides the three assigned conditions, a fourth is required, namely that there be a foundation by which it is really distinguished in each extreme: this, however, does not occur in divine things; for the essence is the same, and the perfections are the same in number in the three adorable Persons; and so on account of the lack of this condition the aforesaid relations cannot be real in God.

On the contrary 1. Paternity and Filiation in creatures are real relations: but the foundation of Paternity is not really distinguished from the foundation of Filiation; for the foundation of Paternity is active generation, and the foundation of Filiation is passive generation: but action and passion are not really distinguished according to the Philosopher, 3. Physic., as the Thomists themselves freely admit: therefore the foundation of created Paternity is not really distinguished from the foundation of Filiation; and so, for relations to be real, a real distinction of the foundations is not necessary. Second, if the same numerically one quantity or quality were constituted in diverse subjects, there would obtain between those subjects the relation of equality and likeness: but in such a case the foundation would not be really distinct in those extremes; therefore the unity and identity of the essence and divine perfections in the divine Persons does not hinder there being in them real identity, equality, and likeness.

They reply 2. That in that case equality and likeness would not arise between those subjects, because, they say, a form placed in two subjects does not render those two such; for to have a duality the forms must be multiplied. — But the reply is shown to be false by two instances: for first, in the eternal Father and in the Son there is one only active spiration, and yet the Father and the Son are two spirators: likewise in the three Persons of the same most holy Trinity there is one only eternity, and yet St. Athanasius teaches in the Creed that those three are coeternal: therefore whiteness, e.g., placed in two subjects will truly make two white things, and so two like things, although the form is one in number; and consequently for the reality of the relation a real distinction of the foundation in the extremes is not necessary, but it is enough that the extremes themselves be really distinct.

They reply 3. If the foundation were not multiplied, it would follow that the same thing would be related to itself: for the foundation is that which is related.

I deny the consequence. For the foundation is indeed the reason of relating, but not that which is related; for the extremes are the things which are related, and these are the divine persons really distinct from one another.

The aforesaid reasons are confirmed: the aforesaid relations are founded in unity: therefore the greater the unity of essence, perfection, and magnitude, the more excellent will be the identity, equality, and likeness, and consequently if the relation of identity arises between two substances distinct in number or in species, much more will it arise between extremes in which there will be one substance in number. Moreover

You will say 1. If equality and the other relations were real in divine things, it would follow that there are given in God more real relations than four: but the consequence seems false, and against the common opinion of the theologians: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is evident, for the relations of identity, equality, and likeness are formally distinguished from the relations of origin: therefore truly there would be in God more relations than four. Indeed the Doctor himself constitutes two relations of likeness, two of equality, and two of identity in each divine Person, of which one is referred to one, and the other to the other Person; from which result 18. real relations, to which if you add the four relations of origin, there will be in God twenty-two real relations. Again, since all divine perfections are distinguished from the nature of the thing, and are all infinite intensively, the consequence will be that there are as many relations of equality and likeness as there are attributes, which certainly would produce an immense number of relations in divine things. — The Doctor denies the minor ibid. n. 7. It can be conceded, he says, that as many perfections as there are in God simpliciter, so many habitudes there are also, and so many equalities: yet just as all those are simpliciter one thing, so too the equalities according to being are simpliciter one thing. Therefore it does not imply a contradiction that in God there be many relative formalities, just as there are many absolute ones.

You will say 2. Formalities and entities in divine things are not to be multiplied without any urgent necessity: but there seems to be no necessity of multiplying so many relative entities; for the divine Persons can be said by themselves to be mutually equal, the same, and like; for by this nothing else can be said to be signified than that they have the same essence and perfection, or that one does not have another essence, nor a greater or lesser perfection than the other: therefore for this those positive entities are superfluous.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that since divine equality, identity, and likeness are positive, those denominations also must be made through something positive; and so through some positive formality: but to have the same essence and perfection, or not to have another essence and perfection, is not formally something positive, but purely negative; and therefore this does not suffice for that denomination of identity, equality, and likeness; but for this there is required some entity, or relative formality, distinguished from the essence and attributes, and from the relations of origin themselves, formally or at least modally.

You will say 3. Equality is a relation simpliciter simplex: but a relation in divine things is not such: therefore equality is not a relation.

He distinguishes the major. The Doctor in 1. dist. 19. qu. 1. n. 8.: Equality taken fundamentally is a perfection simpliciter simplex, because it presupposes the perfect and in every way infinite nature in the Persons, I concede: equality taken formally, insofar as namely it is a relative formality by which the divine Persons are referred to one another, is a perfection simpliciter, I deny; or, as the Doctor speaks ibid.:

I say that a perfection simpliciter, that is, which formally could be infinite, elicits nothing but something that can be essential in divine things, and toward itself, and such is in some way pre-understood to the relations of origin, such as wisdom, goodness, etc.; equality, however, is not pre-understood to the relations of origin, nor can it be toward itself: for the Father is not equal to Himself, but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not say a perfection simpliciter; it says, however, a perfection which in every nature, compared to something of the same nature, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity says imperfection, for there is no inequality in the same nature unless one individual has that nature imperfectly. Nor does it hinder that in dist. 26. he affirms that equality formally says perfection, for he does not say this from his own opinion, but according to the mind of others, who from the fact that the persons were said to be constituted by something absolute inferred that it followed that there was some perfection in one person which was not in another; which inference the Doctor shows to be null, saying that they would conclude better that the relation did not constitute the person. For it seems more probable, he says, that a relation can be a perfection, than that it is a hypostatic property, etc., supply, in the opinion of the one arguing.