Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. The name subsistence is here used to signify the mode of existing per se. It is, however, taken in two ways: first, as it is opposed to existing in another through inhesion, in which manner every substance is called a being subsisting per se, whether it be complete or incomplete: thus any part of a physical body, whether integral or essential, although existing in the whole, is called a being subsisting per se, no less than the physical body itself. Second, it is taken for existing per se, insofar as it signifies a most perfect existence, independent of another as of something perfective or sustaining, in which manner any nature wholly complete, and standing firm in its essential predicates, as well as in its attributes and properties, prior in nature to being in its own supposit or another's, is called a being subsisting per se: thus humanity, prior in nature to being assumed by the Person of the Word, is said to exist per se, or to subsist; for by the name of subsistence is signified not only a person or hypostasis, but also any thing whatsoever existing per se and in itself, as Rusticus clearly teaches in his book De Incarnatione contra Acephalos: Therefore, he says, the name of subsistence very clearly signifies sometimes a person, but sometimes a nature.

Note 2. The mode of existing per se completely is again twofold, namely communicable and incommunicable. The former belongs to any common substantial nature, which, insofar as it prescinds from those things to which it is communicated, just as it is called a truly complete and real nature, so likewise is to be called existing per se, or subsisting; the latter, however, belongs to a singular nature, not only complete in the notion of a singular nature, but also in the notion of a person, or supposit. Hence a twofold difficulty arises concerning the present Question: first, whether the divine nature, insofar as it prescinds from the divine persons and the relations constitutive of the persons, can be said to subsist per se, and to have an absolute existence and a subsistence distinct from the relative subsistences: second, whether on the hypothesis that this absolute subsistence is given, three others are to be admitted as relative, really distinct from one another, and formally from the absolute existence.

Note 3. Concerning the two aforesaid difficulties there is a twofold opposed opinion of the Authors: for first Vazquez, Disp. 125., affirms that the divine nature subsists in the divine persons only through their own relative subsistences; and hence denies that there is given in the divine any absolute subsistence common to the three persons and proper to the divine nature. Durandus, however, in 1. dist. 13. quaest. 2., judges that the three divine Persons draw the whole notion of subsisting from the absolute subsistence of the divine essence included in them; but that they have incommunicability from their constitutive relations; and hence that three relative subsistences are altogether superfluous for constituting the divine persons. Between these extreme opinions the disciples of the Subtle Doctor walk by a middle and safer way, and the weightier Thomists follow them, affirming that one absolute subsistence and three relative ones are to be admitted.

First conclusion. — Truly there are three relative subsistences in the divine persons. This Conclusion sufficiently stands firm from the Holy Fathers praised at the beginning of the present Article in the explanation of the name of subsistence, and is moreover proved: there are several subsistences in the divine: but there are not several absolute subsistences: therefore there are several relative ones. The major is evident, both from what has been said, and especially from the Sixth General

Synod, action 11., where it is said that the Most Holy Trinity was made numerable by personal subsistences. Likewise from the holy Fathers, especially Cyril of Alexandria in the Dialogo De Trinit., lib. 3., where he says: Every discourse of our faith tends to this, that we see one nature of the Deity, which properly subsists in three subsistences. So likewise Athanasius, in the Sermone De Deipara, says: We proclaim one God in three subsistences, in which there is one substance. Finally, St. Ambrose in the Symbolum Apostolorum, cap. 2., says: It is Catholic, that we confess both one God according to the unity of substance, and that we acknowledge the Father and the Son in each one's own subsistence.

Some reply: That while the Councils and holy Fathers proclaim several subsistences in God, they take subsistence for personality.

On the contrary. That acceptance is either a proper or an improper locution: if the first, the proposition is had, namely that subsistence in some proper acceptance of itself is manifold in God: if the second, surely it is unbecoming, without any urgent necessity, to twist the words of the Councils and Fathers to an imperfect sense.

Add. That if the Fathers and Councils have used subsistence for personality, the proposition is truly concluded; for just as there are several relative personalities in the divine, so also there will be several relative subsistences.

Others reply: That the Councils and holy Fathers take subsistence, not for personality in the abstract, but for the persons and the subsisting thing in the concrete; and so when they affirm that several subsistences are to be admitted in God, it is the same as if they said that there are several persons and subsisting things by the same essential subsistence.

On the contrary. The holy Fathers and Councils speak of subsistences as of forms by which the divine Persons are constituted, distinguished, and numbered: but this is to use subsistence in the abstract, and not in the concrete: therefore, etc. Then, even if they use subsistence in the concrete, it is always lawful to infer that the relative subsistences are distinct: for to the multiplication of a concrete substantive it is necessary that the forms be multiplied: whence the three Persons cannot be called three Gods, because the name God is a substantive; and there is only one form signified by that name, namely the Deity: therefore if only one absolute subsistence is given, it will not be able to be multiplied in the persons, just as the Deity itself is not multiplied. And consequently, since the Councils and holy Fathers affirm that subsistences are multiplied, it is necessary that they distinguish the relative subsistences from the absolute one.

The Conclusion is moreover proved by theological reason. Whatever belongs to the divine Persons by reason of the relations by which they are constituted in personal being is multiplied in them: but subsistences belong to them in this way: therefore they are multiplied. The major stands firm, for with the formal notion multiplied it is necessary that that also which is formally the same with it be multiplied; but subsistences are formally the same with the constitutive relations of the divine Persons: for subsistence, as it expresses a mode of subsisting incommunicably, is the very constitutive notion of the person in personal being: for the divine Persons, insofar as they are Persons, subsist per se independently and incommunicably, therefore they truly have incommunicable subsistences. — Then; where there are diverse productive principles quod, there must be diverse subsistences: for just as to operate follows being, so the productive principle quod presupposes complete being, and hence subsisting per se: but in God there are diverse productive principles quod of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; for the Father is the principle quod of the Son, and the Father and the Son are the principle quod of the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore the Father and the Son must have distinct subsistences. — Finally, the humanity of Christ was assumed and terminated only by the subsistence of the Word, not by the subsistence of the Father or of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the subsistence of the Word is distinguished from the subsistence of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, and hence they do not subsist by a single absolute subsistence.

You will say 1. To subsist is a perfection simpliciter simplex: but a relation in the divine expresses no perfection, as will be established in the following Article: therefore likewise no relation is a subsistence.

I distinguish the major. To subsist per se communicably and absolutely expresses perfection, I concede: to subsist per se incommunicably and relatively expresses perfection, I deny.

You will object 2. The notion of subsistence is something absolute: therefore no relative subsistence is given in the divine. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine, 7. De Trinit., cap. 1., saying: Every thing subsists to itself; how much more God? But that which is to itself, and not to another, is absolute. Therefore the notion of subsisting is something absolute.

I deny the antecedent, and to its proof I say that St. Augustine there speaks of subsistence as it expresses a per-se-ity independent of another sustaining it, such as is the absolute subsistence belonging to the divine Persons by reason of the essence communicated to them, not by reason of the relations. Or I say that he wills only this, that subsistence, or the subsistent, be not to another, so as to be the subsistence or the subsistent of another thing, as the Father, e.g., is the Father of the Son: this, however, does not prevent subsistence from being relative, just as a person, which although it cannot be called the person of another person, is nonetheless no less relative.

You will say 3. The divine nature, as we will soon prove, subsists by an absolute subsistence; therefore it does not subsist by relative subsistences. The consequence is evident; for subsistence is the ultimate term in the line of subsisting. Therefore it cannot be terminated by another, and consequently besides the absolute one a relative one ought not to be admitted.

I distinguish the antecedent. It subsists by a communicable subsistence, I concede; by an incommunicable one, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the consequence: other communicable and absolute subsistences ought not to be admitted, I concede: incommunicable and relative ones, I deny.

I likewise distinguish the proof. A personal and incommunicable subsistence is the ultimate term in the notion of subsisting, I concede: a non-personal and communicable one, I deny. For an absolute and essential subsistence, just as it is not incommunicable, so neither does it have the notion of an ultimate term, but only of a term constituting the nature wholly complete in the notion of the divine nature, and rendering it capable of being communicated to the three divine Persons.

Second conclusion. — Subsistence taken for the mode of existing per se, and excluding dependence on another extrinsic thing in existing, belongs to the divine nature, insofar as it prescinds from the personalities. This is the teaching of the Doctor in 2. dist. 7. quaest. 1. and in 3. dist. 1. quaest. 1. n. 6., where, speaking of the divine nature insofar as it prescinds from the personal relations, he affirms that it could have been the term of the hypostatic union, because, he says, it has no being from a person, but is naturally prior to being in a person, and gives being to the person; for it is a nature of itself this, and subsisting per se, although not incommunicably.

The Conclusion is proved. First indeed by the authority of the holy Fathers: for first of all Pope Agatho in the decretal Epistle, which is found in the sixth Synod, art. 4., says: We confess God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, not three Gods, but one God: not the subsistence of three names, but one subsistence of three subsistences. Likewise St. Augustine, 7. De Trinit., cap. 1.: Every thing, he says, subsists to itself; how much more God? And cap. 5., near the end: For God to be is the same as to subsist: and therefore if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one subsistence. St. Jerome agrees with him, Epistola 57. ad Damasum: One, he says, is the nature of God, and alone, which truly is; for that which subsists does not have it from elsewhere, but it is its own. St. Hilary urges the same thing in his book De Trinit.: It is not, he says, the condition of corporeal natures, that they be in one another: that they have perfect unity of nature in subsistences; with a few words interposed: but to be in, not one thing in another, as a body in a body, but so to be and subsist, as to be in a subsistent; and to be in in such a way, that these things subsist, belongs to God alone. St. Anselm also subscribes in the Monologion, cap. 13., where he says: The Father, by begetting, gave to the Son, that he might subsist, be wise, and live, not through an extraneous, but through his own essence, wisdom, and life, etc. Finally Boethius concludes in his book de duabus naturis, about the middle: God, he says, is a hypostasis, that is, a subsistence; for he subsists needing nothing; whence we say that there is one usia, or usiosis, that is, one essence, or subsistence, of the Deity.

The Conclusion is proved by reason. To the divine essence, insofar as it prescinds from the divine Persons, belongs every perfection simpliciter simplex: but to subsist per se is a perfection simpliciter: therefore it is to be attributed to it. The major is evident: for the divine essence, the relations being cut off, is infinitely perfect in the genus of being, and is true God, and hence a complete being in the notion of the Deity. Therefore all compossible perfections are to be attributed to it. The minor also stands firm: since it far surpasses to subsist per se than to exist either in another, or dependently on another. Therefore it is a perfection simpliciter simplex to be attributed to the divine essence; not indeed through the personal relations, which express no perfection. Therefore it subsists per se and immediately. — Second, the divine essence, insofar as it prescinds from the persons, exists per se completely, and independently of any extrinsic thing, as well as of the persons. Therefore it truly subsists. The consequence is evident: since by absolute subsistence we understand nothing other than a complete substance existing per se, and incommunicable to any extrinsic complement really distinct from itself. The antecedent, however, is proved; the divine essence receives no perfection from the Persons, but bestows on them very many perfections, indeed all, since all the perfections of the divine Persons flow from the essence. Therefore it subsists independently of them: much more independently of every extrinsic thing really distinct, and hence it subsists per se. — Third, that which is a sufficiently active principle per se is also subsisting per se: but God, as He is pre-understood to the persons, is a sufficiently active and productive principle: therefore He is subsisting per se. The major stands firm: for since subsistence is the complement of nature, and since nature ought first to be complete in being before operating, because being is prior to operating; therefore it ought first to subsist before it acts. The minor also stands firm: both because the works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided, namely by reason of the undivided Deity, for whatever belongs to all the persons entirely, that belongs to them by reason of the essence common to them; but to create, e.g., belongs to them undividedly: therefore by reason of the common essence, or the Deity. Therefore producing belongs to God prior to the persons; and producing cannot belong to the essence unless it is subsisting, since actions belong to subsistents; and consequently God, insofar as He prescinds from the persons, is subsisting.

It is confirmed. By the authority of the holy Fathers, who affirm that creatures are produced by God subsisting. Thus St. Dionysius, cap. 1. De Divinis nominibus, says: The subsistence of Goodness, through its own being, is the cause of all subsisting things; and Gregory of Nyssa in the book De Vita Moysis: Nothing, he says, besides the supreme essence, which is the cause of all things, and on which all things depend, truly subsists.

You will say 1. If the divine Essence subsisted insofar as it prescinds from the persons, it would be a person: but this is absurd; otherwise there would be given in God a quaternity of persons, which was condemned in the Lateran Council: therefore God, insofar as He prescinds from the persons, does not subsist. The sequel of the major is proved: a person expresses nothing other than the subsistence of an intellectual nature: but the divine Essence, insofar as it prescinds from the persons, is an intellectual nature; therefore if it subsists per se, it will truly be a person. It is confirmed, for according to the holy Fathers praised at the beginning of this Article, Subsistence signifies the same as Hypostasis: but hypostasis in God is the same as person: therefore if the divine Essence subsists, it will truly be a person.

I distinguish the major. If it subsists by a personal subsistence, incommunicable to another as to a supposit, it will be a person, I concede: if it subsists by an absolute subsistence, incommunicable indeed to another extrinsic thing really distinct from the subsisting essence itself, but communicable to the divine supposits really indistinct from the essence itself, it will be a person, I deny: for it is of the notion of a person that the subsistent be an intellectual nature incommunicable to another, whether extrinsic or a supposit. To the confirmation I distinguish the major: subsistence in Latin signifies the same as hypostasis in Greek, according to some acceptance of it, and that the more frequent, I concede: according to every acceptance of it, I deny. For, as we have observed, the name of subsistence is taken in two ways by the Fathers: first indeed for a per-se-ity excluding dependence on a sustainer: second, for a per-se-ity excluding communicability to a supposit. In the former way it does not signify the same as hypostasis; but only in the latter; according to the former acceptance, we say that there is a single absolute subsistence in God; according to the latter, truly there are three relative subsistences.

You will say 2. Subsistence is the ultimate term of the nature which it affects: but the divine Essence antecedently to the personalities has nothing which is its ultimate term. Therefore it does not have subsistence. The minor is proved: the ultimate term excludes a posterior term; but the divine essence does not exclude a posterior term; since it is still terminated by the relative subsistences: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. A personal subsistence, incommunicable to another supposit, is the ultimate term of the nature, which acknowledges no posterior one, I concede; an absolute and natural subsistence, by which it makes the nature existing per se, and nonetheless communicable to another as to a supposit, ought to be its ultimate term, I deny: for thus the divine nature, since it is infinitely fruitful, by its own notion demands to be communicated to the divine Persons, and to be finally terminated by them, and further to be made incommunicable.

You will say 3. To subsist is to exist per se, not only independently of another, but also with a repugnance to being in another; just as to inhere is to be in another with a repugnance to existing per se: but the divine nature, insofar as it prescinds from the Persons, does not enjoy this mode of existing per se; rather it demands to exist in the Persons: therefore as such it does not truly subsist.

I distinguish the major. It is to exist per se, and not in another, as in a sustainer, I concede; as in an ultimate terminator, I deny. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence. For the divine nature, although it demands to be in the Persons, as in the terms of its fruitfulness; is not, however, in them as in a sustainer completing it; for the divine Essence receives no perfection from the Persons, indeed every perfection of the Persons flows from it; nor is it completed by them in the notion of the divine nature, but only in them is its infinite fruitfulness derived, and by them terminated.