Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. The definition of person is varied, but especially twofold. The first is handed down by Boethius, praised above, saying: A person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Although the Doctor does not disapprove of this definition, in 1. dist. 23. n. 4. he nonetheless judges that it is to be expounded by the definition handed down by Richard in lib. 4. De Trinit. cap. 22., saying that a person is the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature. For according to the definition of Boethius it would follow that the rational soul, and even the Deity itself, insofar as it prescinds from the divine supposits, would be a person, because both the Divinity and the rational soul are an individual substance of a rational nature; yet no one will call the Deity so considered a person; otherwise there would be four divine Persons; likewise no one should assert that the rational soul is a person, since it is not ultimately complete, nor incommunicable, for it always has an order to the body, either that which it informs, or that which it can inform. It does not escape me, however, that many oppose this opinion as regards the rational soul; but concerning these things let the Physicists and Metaphysicians see.

Note 2. From the same author, in the same place, nature is distinguished from person in this, that nature is communicable, whereas person is incommunicable, both ut quo and ut quod. To be communicated ut quod is to be communicated as a universal to its inferiors, with which it is the same; thus human nature is communicable ut quod to Peter and Paul, each of whom is truly a man; to be communicated ut quo is to be communicated either as a singular nature to its supposit, or as a form to the subject which is denominated from it. Thus, v. gr., human nature in Christ, although it is singular, is nevertheless communicable ut quo, because it is unible to the supposit of the Word; so likewise whiteness, which is in a wall, is communicable ut quo, because it is united to it as to a subject which it informs; the notion of person and of supposit excludes both of these communicabilities, since a personated nature is not communicable to another after the manner of a superior and common nature, because it is singular and individual: nor even ut quo, because it cannot be communicated to another, neither as to a supposit, nor as to a subject. For it does not have the notion of a part, but of a whole in every way complete and terminated.

Note 3. That although the divine nature, considered precisely in itself, and insofar as it prescinds from the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is perfect in the being of a divine and infinite nature; because as such it consists of all the essential predicates, intrinsic modes, and attributes constituting it on every side in the being of an infinite nature; nevertheless, as such, it is not complete in hypostatic being, nor is it ultimately terminated according to existence. For it is communicated to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, subsisting in themselves, and ultimately terminating the divine nature. Hence it comes about that, although the divine nature so considered has existence and subsistence, as will be established in the following Question three; yet as such it does not have the notion of supposit, nor of person; but it is constituted in the notion of person by the relative properties, which determine the divine nature to the supposit of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

These things being noted, three points are to be resolved in the present Question. First, that the notion of person properly belongs to God. Second, that this notion is not something positive, but negative. Third, that it belongs univocally to the three persons.

First conclusion. — The name and notion of person truly and properly belongs to God.

This is the common opinion, and of faith, as is evident from all those oracles both of Sacred Scripture and of the Councils, by which three divine Persons, distinct from one another, are affirmed in God.

It is also proved by reason. Person, from what has been said, is the incommunicable existence of a rational nature: but it is most evident that these three things placed in the definition of person, namely a rational nature, existence, and an incommunicable mode of existing, perfectly belong to God; a rational nature indeed, since God holds the primary and most excellent grade among spiritual natures, and is endowed with infinite power and wisdom, not indeed of reasoning, but of understanding; likewise existence, for to Him first and most of all does it belong to be a necessarily existing being; finally, that incommunicable existence belongs to Him, natural reason itself demonstrates, because to the first and greatest being there necessarily belongs a mode of existing independently of another, and consequently a mode of subsisting per se, which is the same as existing incommunicably: therefore, etc.

Secondly: if He existed in another as a form in a subject, or as a nature in a supposit, He would not exist per se precisely, but only by reason of another, by whom He would be sustained: but this is unbecoming to God, the first being wholly independent: therefore, etc.

Finally: the notion of person will be truer and more perfect in God the more perfectly subsisting per se and existing wholly incommunicably belongs to Him: but the mode of subsisting per se belongs most perfectly to God, since He depends on nothing either in being or in being conserved: the notion of existing most perfectly independently of another likewise belongs to Him, as from a subject and an extraneous supposit, one that is not divine and really the same as the Deity: therefore the notion of person likewise belongs to Him most perfectly.

You will say 1. The name of person is not attributed to God in the sacred Letters. Moreover, it was unusual and unknown to the first Christians, as Coccius relates in lib. 1. De Trinit. articulo 4. Finally, properly speaking there is nothing in God which that name signifies, and the Theologians use the name of person, not to express something, but lest they seem to be silent, as St. Augustine says in 5. De Trinit. cap. 9.: When it is asked, he says, what three? human speech labors under a truly great poverty. Yet three persons has been said, not that that might be said, but lest it be passed over in silence. Therefore it must be admitted that the name of person does not truly belong to God, or at least that the Theologians have nothing certain on this matter. — I deny the consequence, and to the first I say: although the name of person is nowhere found in the sacred Letters said of God, nor do we anywhere read of the person of God; nevertheless, what the name of person signifies is found affirmed of God in many ways in sacred Scripture, namely, that He is a Spirit endowed with infinite wisdom, and hence that He is of a rational nature: likewise, that He has an incommunicable existence, both ut quo and ut quod, since on account of His singularity He cannot be communicated as a common nature, and on account of His independence He cannot be communicated either as a form to a subject, or as an individual nature to a supposit: therefore, since the notion of person belongs most perfectly to God, the name of person is also fittingly attributed to Him. — To the second I say, that indeed the name of person was not first taken up by the faithful and attributed to God; but nevertheless it came about, says Richard in lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 5., that those who first transferred this name of person to divine things did this very thing out of necessity, that they might have something to answer those asking what those three in the Trinity were, since they could not answer that they were three Gods. He adds: Let us no longer ask from what necessity it was afterwards transferred to divine things, but in what truth, through the Spirit of truth, it was inspired to those who transferred it, and universally used by the Latin Church. It is certain, therefore, from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and the common usage of the Church, that the name of person properly belongs to God. — To the third I say, that indeed the name of person does not perfectly declare the quiddity and the peculiar properties by which the three supposits of the Divinity are distinguished from one another; nevertheless, that name was wisely taken up by Catholics, that in one word they could answer the Sabellians asking what those three were. Nor did St. Augustine intend anything else in the cited place: to which that which he adds in lib. 7. cap. 4. corresponds: When therefore it is asked, what three, or what three things, we betake ourselves to finding some special or general name by which we may comprehend these three; nor does it occur to the mind, because the superemi- nence of the Divinity exceeds the faculty of ordinary speech: for God is more truly thought than said, and is more truly than He is thought

You will say 2. The notion of person renders the nature, the same in number, incommunicable to another supposit; for human nature, v. gr., which is personated in Peter, cannot be communicated to another: but the divine nature, which is communicated to the Father, is also communicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore in the Father it is not incommunicable, and hence not personated. — I answer 1, distinguishing the major: the personated nature is incommunicable precisely insofar as it is a singular nature, I deny: for the human nature of Christ is truly and properly singular and individual, and yet it is communicated and united to the Word: it is incommunicable reduplicatively, as personated, that is, insofar as it signifies precisely the nature determined by personality, or the person in concreto, I concede. And with the minor likewise distinguished, I deny the consequence: thus the divine nature is indeed in the Father communicable to another, insofar as it is divine nature: not, however, insofar as it is the personality of the Father; for as such it signifies nothing other than the supposit consisting of divine nature and Paternity; and hence it signifies nothing other than the Father. It is certain, however, that the divine Father is not communicable to the Son, so as to be one and the same with Him; indeed He is really distinguished from Him. — I answer 2. that this is peculiar to the divine nature, that one and the same wholly indivisible nature can be communicated to three supposits, because neither does its infinity suffer several numerically distinct divine natures, nor does its supreme unity and simplicity sustain any multiplication and division; but it is otherwise with created natures, which, since they are finite and multipliable, hence it comes about that the same numerically one nature cannot be in several supposits.

You will say 3. The divine nature, insofar as it prescinds from the divine Persons, is in every way complete and incommunicable to another nature; since it is individual and singular: therefore it has no need of any supervening notion of person and of supposit, by which it might be completed and rendered incommunicable. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is in every way complete in the notion of divine nature, namely, because it consists of the essential predicates, intrinsic modes, and attributes perfecting and constituting it in the notion of an infinitely perfect being, I concede: it is complete in hypostatic being, and in ultimate incommunicability, I deny. For the divine nature taken precisely, whole and entire, is in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Whence of itself it does not have the notion of supposit nor of person; since it is not ultimately terminated according to existence; but it is constituted in the being of person by those relative properties, which are the ultimate term of the existence of the divine nature, and together with it constitute the three subsistents, further incommunicable to others, as terminating.

Second conclusion. — It is probable that the divine personalities are some positive mode terminating the divine nature, and as it were completing it in incommunicable being.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Doctor in 3. dist. 1. quaestione 1. n. 10., where, after he had said that a created nature can be said to be communicable in three ways, namely, either actually, as the soul is communicated to the body which it actually informs; or aptitudinally, as the separated soul, which has an inclination to inform the body; or obedientially; such as is the obediential potency in the rational soul to inform its body, he adds:

The divine Person has not only the negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but also has a repugnance to communication ut quod and ut quo. But such repugnance cannot exist except through a positive entity, and therefore it follows that this person is never without such an entity; but the created person too, because it is not repugnant to it to be communicated, since it is in obediential potency, is not thus incommunicable, and therefore it is not necessary to attribute such a positive personal entity to it, but the double negation of actual and aptitudinal communication suffices for it.

It is moreover proved. The divine personality obtains a twofold office; for it completes the divine nature and ultimately terminates it, and constitutes and distinguishes the divine persons: but the divine nature cannot be completed through a simple negation, nor can the divine Persons be constituted and really distinguished from one another through something purely negative: therefore the notion of person in divine realities must be something positive. — Then, from St. Augustine, lib. De Doctrina Christiana: The things to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Moreover, from the same author, 7. De Trinit. cap. 5.: It is not one thing to be God and another to be a person: but the thing and the Deity are something positive: therefore divine personality, for its formal element, is likewise something positive. — Finally, the divine Person is a real positive being: therefore its formal constituent must also be real and positive.

You will say. Created personality formally consists in a twofold incommunicability, ut quo and ut quod, and imports nothing positive beyond the notion of individual; therefore the same must be said of divine personality. — I deny the consequence. And the reason for the disparity is, first, because, as the Doctor said above, divine personality implies a repugnance to communication in every way, such as created person does not imply; but a negation founded in repugnance, since it is in every way inseparable from the subject, therefore requires something in the subject by reason of which it cannot be separated from it: whence it comes about that every repugnance is the repugnance of something, that is, of something not having a potency to something: but the simple negation, which created personality implies, is not thus inseparable from the subject, because in fact it is separated in the human nature assumed by the divine Word. Add, that even with created personality set aside, the notion of individual still remains, which sufficiently distinguishes the singular nature from another; but with divine personality set aside, nothing would remain by which the divine persons would be constituted and distinguished from one another.

Third conclusion. — Some common concept can be abstracted for the divine persons, which is univocal to them in the notion of person. Thus the Doctor in 1. dist. 25. n. 1., and

Proof. because each of the three divine persons is called a person; and truly the three agree in the notion of person, as such, not however as Peter and Paul agree in this man, for this man is said only equivocally of Peter and Paul: for this pronoun signifies what it demonstrates: whence when this man is said of Peter, that singular thing is demonstrated which is Peter, and which is wholly different from another singular thing which is Paul: whence it comes about that this man is not said of them univocally: but divine Person is truly said of the three according to its own proper notion; since each of them truly is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature; therefore it belongs to them univocally. — It is confirmed: if the name of person did not belong to them univocally, they would not be called three persons; for nothing is numbered except what is univocal: whence the heavenly and the earthly dog are not rightly called two dogs, because the name Dog is not univocal to the heavenly and the earthly: but truly three divine persons are said: therefore the name and notion of person belongs to them univocally.

You will say. Three created individuals and singulars are said as truly and properly as three divine Persons: but according to the Doctor created singulars do not agree in a common univocal notion; for this man does not agree univocally with Peter and Paul: therefore although three divine Persons are said, it is not rightly inferred that the name and notion of person belong to them univocally. — I answer to the major, that three individuals are said to be three only insofar as it is true that the created nature is numbered in them, which belongs to them univocally; whence, since the divine nature cannot be numbered in this way in the divine persons, because it is the same in number in the three; therefore something else univocal to them must be numbered in them; but this other cannot be anything but that which person formally says: therefore the notion of person must be univocal to them.

You will insist. Not only three created individuals, but also three individual differences and singularities are properly said: but three individual differences do not agree in a common univocal notion: therefore although three divine persons are said, it does not follow from this that they agree univocally. — I answer. Indeed three singularities are rightly said to be three, not on account of the commonness of a univocal concept of nature, but on account of the proportion of office, because they equally distinguish ultimately, and render the nature incommunicable to several inferiors. But the divine persons agree thus not only on account of the proportion of office, but also on account of the definition and notion of the divine Person, which belongs to them; for each of them truly is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature, ut quo and ut quod. Whence there is no parity.