Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

The present Question is wont to be proposed otherwise by the Thomists; for since they teach that the divine Word proceeds through intellection, and the Holy Spirit through love, they not undeservedly ask from the knowledge and love of which object each of these two divine Persons proceeds. But we, adhering to the footsteps of the Subtle Doctor, since we assert that those divine processions do presuppose essential knowledge and love, and are acts of speaking and breathing forth distinct from those essential operations, it follows that we should inquire into and resolve from the knowledge and love of which object the divine intellect and the divine will are rendered fruitful, so that the former may produce the Word through the act of speaking, and the latter the Holy Spirit through the act of breathing forth. And so the present difficulty (whatever some may protest) concerns the followers of both Schools, although its proposition is diverse, and the manner of solving it varied.

Note 1. Since the object of divine knowledge and of divine love can be distinguished as fourfold — namely, 1. the divine essence, endowed with all its absolute perfections, namely its attributes, modes, and faculties of understanding and willing; 2. the divine Persons, consisting in their relations, hypostases, and personalities; 3. possible creatures, prescinding from all futurition and existence; 4. finally, all creatures, whether actually existing or at some time future — so also around the resolution of the present Question there is a fourfold, most opposed opinion of the theologians. The first affirms that the Word proceeds from the knowledge, and the Holy Spirit from the love, of all those objects, even of future creatures. Thus Ruiz, Disp. 63, Sect. 1 and 5, etc. Some contend that future creatures should indeed be removed from the number of those objects from whose love and knowledge the divine Persons proceed: but they will that the divine Word proceeds from the knowledge of possible creatures, and also of the three divine Persons and of the divine essence: such is the common opinion of the Thomists. All the Scotists, together with the Subtle Doctor, teach that the divine Word presupposes no knowledge of creatures for its production. Vasquez, Disp. 112, holds that it proceeds indeed from the knowledge of the Father and of itself, but not of the Holy Spirit. There are also those who assert that it proceeds not indeed from the knowledge of creatures and of the divine Persons, but of the divine essence alone, whom the Doctor seems greatly to favor in the places to be adduced below. But all agree that those divine processions are either the knowledge and love of the divine essence, or at least presuppose both, and are posterior to them.

Note 2. That supposition or priority by which the divine Father is said to know His essence, or the divine Persons, or creatures, before He produces the Son or the Holy Spirit, is not a priority of existence and of reality, but only of sign, not indeed in quo, as they speak, but a quo; that is, it does not import an order of duration in which one exists while the other does not exist, since in the adorable Trinity nothing is prior or posterior in duration — all three Persons, namely, are eternal, as St. Athanasius says in the Creed; for what is prior to another in duration cannot be co-eternal with it, since eternity acknowledges nothing prior or posterior. They are therefore only signs a quibus, that is, of the pre-requirement of one to another, whether according to the order of Nature, or of Origin, or of Presupposition. The order of nature is considered not according to causality, by which the cause is prior to its effect, because in divine things there is no true causality, nor any true and properly so-called effect; but only according to the consequence of subsistence, in which manner, says Aristotle, Praedicament., cap. De modis prioris: One is prior to two; for if two exist, one follows in being. But if one exists, it does not necessarily follow that two exist; hence, one being posited, the consequence does not convert, so that two exist. The order of origin is that by which one is from another, namely, in the way in which the produced person emanates from the producer. Finally, the order of pre-requirement is that by which one is preconceived before another and is presupposed to it. The order of nature is among the essential things, both among themselves and compared with the notional, because, the notional things and the divine attributes being understood, it is necessary that the divine essence be understood as their root; but, the essence being understood, it is not necessary that they be conceived. There is therefore among them an order of nature according to the consequence of subsistence. The order of origin is only among the divine Persons, one of whom proceeds from another. Finally, the order of pre-requirement or presupposition is between the Father and the divine essence, because the divine essence is presupposed as the root of Paternity, and also of all the properties, whether absolute or relative, in God.

Note 3. That just as in the same instant of time there can be various instants of nature, says the Doctor in 2. dist. 1. q. 1. n. 13. — for an Angel, v. g., in the first instant of time in which it was created, could produce in itself knowledge and love, which, although they have no order as regards the duration of time, because they were produced in the same instant, nevertheless have several instants of nature, because by nature the Angel was produced before the knowledge, and knowledge before love, since the Angel was produced by God alone, knowledge by God and the angelic intellect, but love by the will presupposing the angelic intellect and the divine concurrence; for by nature the intellective potency must operate before the will; just as, I say, various instants of nature can be distinguished in the same instant of time, so also various instants of origin will be able to be distinguished in the same instant of nature, since in that very instant of nature in which the intellect and the divine will regard their primary object, namely the divine essence, the whole order of origin is found; for nothing is required for the productions of the persons besides those potencies and the primary object. Whence in that very instant of nature three instants of origin can be distinguished: first indeed, that in which the Father has being from Himself; but this origin is only secundum quid; second, that from which the Son has being from the Father; third, that from which the Holy Spirit has being from the Father and the Son; which two latter origins are real and complete.

Indeed, one instant of nature can be subdivided and distinguished into several smaller instants, as may be gathered from the Doctor in 2. dist. 1. quaest. 13., where he assigns only two instants of nature: the first, in which God knows and wills Himself with essential knowledge and volition; and in which, through the fruitful intellect and will, there is within Him a twofold procession of persons and a twofold order of origin, which he asserts to be contained in that first instant of nature; the other, in which God, one and triune, knows and wills creatures; so that in the first instant He comprehends all things which belong to God ad intra; but in the second He embraces those which belong to God ad extra. Whence that first instant of nature can be divided into seven other smaller instants, so that the first instant of nature in divine things is that by which the essence is understood to be under the notion of this essence; the second, by which it is understood to have its intrinsic modes; the third, by which it is understood to have its first attributes; the fourth, by which these attributes are understood to have their first intrinsic modes; the fifth, by which it is understood to have its other attributes founded on the first attributes; the sixth, by which these attributes are understood to have their own intrinsic modes; the seventh, by which the processions of the persons are understood; after which follows the eighth, by which creatures are understood in possible being, etc. These things being thus premised, two things are to be resolved: first, that the divine processions presuppose the knowledge and love not only of the divine nature, but also of the divine persons. Second, that they in no way presuppose the knowledge and love of creatures, whether future or possible.

First conclusion. — The generation of the Word and the spiration of the Holy Spirit do not presuppose the love and knowledge of creatures, whether future or possible, nor do they arise from them as from objects rendering the divine intellect and will fruitful.

This conclusion, as regards both parts, is the Doctor's in 1. dist. 18. quaest. unica n. 1. and 5., and in the second, already cited, as well as in Quodlibet 14.

Proof 1. from the Doctor in 2. dist. 1. q. 1. n. 9.: The divine intellect and the divine will are terminated at the divine essence before they are terminated at creatures under possible or future being: but in that prior instant each of those divine potencies is fruitful for the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit: therefore the Word and the Holy Spirit proceed from the intellect and will terminated at the divine essence, before they extend themselves to the knowledge and love of creatures. The major is evident, for the divine essence is the primary and adequate object of the divine intellect and of the divine will; moreover, it is that which moves each divine faculty to the knowledge and love of creatures; but creatures are only a secondary object: but the intellect and will are first terminated at the primary object, before at the secondary, especially when the primary object per se necessarily moves to the knowledge and love of the secondary: therefore, etc. The minor is also evident: for the intellect and will are rendered fruitful by a perfectly adequate object: but the divine essence is a perfectly adequate object for the divine intellect and will; for it is in every way infinite in the notion of object, just as those faculties are infinite in the notion of productive potency: therefore those potencies are in every way rendered fruitful by the very termination at the divine essence, nor is it necessary for this that they be terminated at secondary objects.

It is confirmed. Then there is no need that the faculty be terminated at the secondary object, so as to draw from it its complete fruitfulness, when all that perfection to be found in the secondary object is in the primary in a more excellent way than in the secondary: but every notion of being and perfection is in the divine essence in a more excellent way than in creatures, whether possible or future: therefore, in order that the divine intellect and the divine will become fruitful for the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit, there is no need that they be terminated at creatures, but it suffices that they be terminated at the divine essence, as at the primary object.

Proof 2. ibidem n. 8. The divine Persons are produced before creatures have possible or future being: therefore the productions of the divine Persons cannot presuppose the knowledge and love of creatures. The consequence is evident: for if in that prior instant creatures have no being, they will in no way be able to be known or loved. The antecedent is proved: the divine Persons are produced earlier if their productive principle is earlier; but in truth the productive principle of the divine Persons is earlier than the productive principle of creatures, especially in the being of futurition; which the Doctor proves thus: the principle of necessary production is prior to the principle of contingent production: but the productive principle of the Persons is necessary; the productive principle of creatures, however, is contingent: therefore the latter must presuppose the former. He proves the major: every production going forth from a supposit presupposes the supposit from which it goes forth: but the production of creatures goes forth from the three divine Persons: therefore it must presuppose them: and hence their necessary productions, and consequently their necessary productive principles.

Proof 3. Quodlibet 14. The motion of the divine essence toward an infinite term is prior to that toward a finite term: but the procession of the Word and

of the Holy Spirit is an infinite term: whereas the being of creatures in known being is a finite term: therefore the productions of the Persons are presupposed before the being of possible creatures. The major is proved, for the infinite simpliciter cannot pre-require the finite, but rather the finite pre-requires the infinite: therefore the knowledge of creatures does not precede the production of the persons. And it is confirmed: for, the prior being removed, the posterior is removed, and not the contrary: therefore, the finite being being taken away, namely the being of possible creatures, the production of the Word is not taken away: therefore the production of the Word is prior to the finite being of creatures.

It is confirmed 1. That, which being removed those divine Persons would nonetheless subsist, does not per se concur to the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit: but if the knowledge and love of creatures, whether future or possible, were absent, those divine Persons would nonetheless be produced and subsist: therefore their production does not presuppose the love and knowledge of creatures. The major is evident. The minor, however, is proved 1. from St. Anselm in Monol. cap. 30., where he says: Whether God be thought of, no other essence existing, or others existing, it is necessary that His Word be co-eternal with Him along with Himself: and cap. 31.: If nothing else ever were, except that supreme spirit, reason nevertheless compels His Word, by which He speaks Himself, to exist from necessity. By which Anselm openly teaches that, even if there were no creatures, whether possible or future, nevertheless the divine Word would subsist wholly unchanged: but if there were no possible or future creatures, there would likewise be no knowledge in God: therefore, the knowledge of creatures being removed, the divine Word would subsist wholly unchanged: the same is to be said of the Holy Spirit. Secondly, it seems ridiculous and absurd to assert that God exists, and the divine Word proceeds, for this reason, because a fly or an ant, v. g., is possible: therefore it is also ridiculous to say that if this or that creature, which is possible, were rendered impossible, the divine Word would not remain intrinsically unchanged. Thirdly, what is more necessary cannot depend on what is less necessary: but the necessity of the procession of the Word is greater than the necessity of the possibility of creatures, since it is the necessity of a being from itself; whereas this is the necessity of a being dependent on another: therefore the Word in its production cannot depend on the possibility of creatures: therefore neither can it proceed from their knowledge.

The Thomists reply. that even if the divine Word proceeds per se from the knowledge of possible creatures, it does not follow from this that it depends on them, or that it needs them, but only that it is necessarily connected with them.

On the contrary. By the very fact that the divine Word is so necessarily connected with the possibility of creatures that it cannot subsist without it, it depends on creatures: for those things depend mutually on one another which mutually imply and remove one another; but, the necessary connection between the production of the divine Word and the possibility of creatures being admitted, they would mutually imply and remove one another: therefore, if the divine Word cannot proceed and subsist without creatures, it follows that it depends on them.

It is confirmed 2. Especially with regard to future creatures: the divine Word is necessary simpliciter: therefore its procession is necessary simpliciter, and so it arises from the divine intellect rendered fruitful by a supremely necessary object: but future creatures are not necessary; indeed, they are altogether contingent, because God can decree or not decree their futurition at will: therefore they cannot be supposed as a pre-required object influencing the generation of the Word. Next, if the divine Word presupposed the knowledge of future creatures, it would follow that free knowledge is in God before the Word is produced: but this is absurd. If free knowledge were in God before the production of the Word, then free decrees would also precede that production of the Word by a priority of nature: for free knowledge presupposes the decree, and so if free knowledge is prior, the decree is also prior. But the decrees are not in God before the Word is generated; both because in God natural things are prior to free things; therefore the generation of the Word, which is natural, is prior to the free decrees; and because if the decrees were in God before generation and spiration, they would necessarily be communicated, like the Word, in the generation itself: but this implies a contradiction, because thus the decree would not be free with respect to the Word to which it is communicated; for that act is not free with respect to the Word, to which the Word does not freely determine itself: but if it receives the decree from the Father in its generation, it does not determine itself to it, and so with respect to it the decree would not be free; and finally because the works of God which concern creatures are the undivided works of the Trinity: but those decrees concerning the futurition of creatures are works of God concerning creatures: therefore they belong indivisibly to the adorable Trinity, and so presuppose it, and consequently the persons to be produced do not presuppose that futurition of creatures, nor therefore are creatures the objects from which the divine intellect and the divine will are rendered fruitful in the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit.

You will object 1. The divine Word is expressive of all those things which are represented in the knowledge of God: therefore it presupposes their knowledge: but all creatures are represented in the essence of God: therefore, etc. The major is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinit. c. 14.

For, he says, He would not have spoken Himself wholly and perfectly, if there were anything less or more in His Word than in Himself; for whatever is in that knowledge from which it is begotten is in Him; but what is not in it is not in Him either. And so God the Father knows all things in Himself, He knows them in the Son; but in Himself, as in Himself; in the Son, however, as in His Word, which is of all things which are in Himself.

And Zeno Veronensis, serm. 1. De aeterni Verbi Generat.: The whole is born of the whole, the perfect of the perfect, having all of the Father, detracting nothing from the Father. The minor also is established from the same St. Augustine, who teaches in many places that creatures are represented and are in the divine essence as in an ocean of entity: whence in De Trinitate cap. 10. he calls it a perfect Word, to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the Almighty, full of all living and changeable reasons, and all are one in it, just as it itself is one of one, with whom it is one; there God knows all things which He has made through it.

I distinguish the major. for that instant in which they are representable, I concede; before, I deny. Because, therefore, creatures are not representable in that same instant, since they are not yet conceived as possible or future in that prior instant of origin in which the Word is produced, but only in some posterior instant, therefore in that prior instant the Word is said neither to represent nor to express creatures. I distinguish the minor similarly: that creatures are represented in the divine Essence, in that prior instant of origin in which the Word is produced, I deny; in the posterior, I concede: or otherwise: that creatures are in the essence of God according to their virtual being, namely insofar as the divine essence is the fount and ocean of any entity whatever, whether uncreated or created, I concede: according to their formal and proper being, I deny: whence, although creatures are supposed for the production of the Word according to that virtual being, they cannot for that reason be said to concur to that production in the notion of object, because that virtual being is nothing other than the divine essence itself.

You will insist. The divine Word is infinite in the notion of Word: therefore it is also infinitely representative and expressive; and consequently it must express and represent absolutely everything representable, for whatever instant in which it is the Word: but in that prior instant of origin the Word is produced under the formal notion of Word, and so it must represent whatever is representable, and consequently, since creatures are representable, it must express them, and so it must presuppose their knowledge, for that instant of its generation.

I distinguish the sequel of the major. that it must represent everything that is representable, for that prior instant in which it is the Word, I concede; that it must represent what is not yet representable for that instant, I deny; therefore, since creatures are not possible or future for every instant in which it is formally the Word, but only in the instant following the divine processions, it must not represent them for that prior instant either, but only in the consequent instant.

You will press. The Word, from the formal notion of Word, cannot represent anything except those things from which it proceeds: therefore either the divine Word in no way represents creatures for any posterior instant, or it proceeds from them: but to assert that the divine Word does not represent creatures is openly against the opinion of Saint Augustine cited above: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. A created word, on account of its limitation, cannot express anything except those things from which it proceeds, because namely all those things of which it is the word concur to its formation, I concede: that the divine Word cannot represent anything except those things from which it proceeds, I deny. For since it has an infinite power of representing, it can express whatever is representable for that instant in which it is representable. Whence it is fittingly said in Speculum Sapientiae 7.: For we know that mirrors can represent even those things which are not, not indeed when they are not, but afterwards when they are: hence the divine Word expresses and represents creatures according to their virtual being in the prior instant of origin; but in the posterior it represents them according to their formal being, namely after the order of the divine processions is complete.

You will object 2. The divine Word proceeds from the comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence and omnipotence, and consequently from the knowledge of all those things without which omnipotence cannot be comprehended: but omnipotence cannot be comprehended if creatures are not known, at least under the notion of possible things: therefore it presupposes their knowledge. The major is evident. The minor, however, is proved: the power of a cause cannot be comprehended unless all the effects arising from such a cause and virtually contained in it are known: but omnipotence is the operative power of God in which all possible creatures are contained: therefore, if they are not known, it cannot be comprehended.

I distinguish the major. that it proceeds from comprehensive knowledge, that is, which is intensively infinite and adequate to the infinite object per se moving and rendering fruitful the divine intellect for the production of the Word, I concede: that it is such as, in that very prior instant of origin in which the Word is produced, must be terminated at all the secondary objects, which have being only in the posterior instant, namely after the order of the divine processions is complete, I deny: for it suffices for the perfect notion of the Word that it proceed from an infinitely perfect object, virtually containing in its omnipotence, as in a root, all the secondary objects; nor is it required that it proceed from those secondary objects formally and actually known. To the major I say that for the comprehension of some power it is not necessarily required that all the effects and all the objects to which it can extend itself be known formally and in act, but it suffices that they be known virtually and habitually, or that the wholly complete power of that potency be known according to all the grades of activity, if it has such grades; it is certain, however, that in that very prior instant of origin, in which the divine Father produces the Son, He also knows His omnipotence to be of infinite power and activity, and so He comprehends it.

You will object 3. Either the eternal Father knows creatures in the instant of the generation of the Son, or He does not know them. If He knows them: therefore, since in that instant the Son proceeds, those creatures are set before the divine intellect; and so the Son proceeds from them. If He does not know them: therefore He learns something in the generation which He did not know in the prior instant.

I answer. that it can be said that in that prior instant of generation the Father is indeed not yet conceived to know creatures, nor are they set before His intellect, but only when the divine processions are wholly complete. Nor does an absurdity follow from this, just as none follows from the fact that in that prior instant of generation He is not yet conceived to produce the Holy Spirit, who is produced only in the posterior sign of origin.

You will insist. whatever the Word has it receives from the Father through eternal generation, according to that saying of Matth. 11. All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and of Ioannis 17.¹ All my things are yours and your things are mine; and this: My doctrine is not mine, but of him who sent me, the Father: but the divine Word has the knowledge of creatures: therefore it received it from the Father through eternal generation and by force of its procession; and so in the instant of the generation of the Son creatures are perceived by the divine intellect, and consequently the Son proceeds from the knowledge of all those things.

I distinguish the major. whatever the divine Word has it receives from the Father formally and by force of its procession; or concomitantly and identically, namely by reason of the divine nature communicated to it together with all its attributes and infinitely operative potencies, I concede: that it receives it only by force of its generation, I deny. Similarly I distinguish the minor: the divine Word has the knowledge of creatures which it receives by force and formal reason of its generation, as if the eternal Father knew creatures in that very instant of generation, I deny: it has that knowledge concomitantly and identically, inasmuch as in its generation it received the divine nature and the divine intellect infinitely cognoscitive; and hence the intellect which can extend itself to everything cognoscible, for that instant in which it will be cognoscible, I concede. Add that although we would concede that the divine Father knew creatures in that prior sign in which the Word generates, it would not however follow in our opinion that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of creatures, since above it was proved that the procession of the Word is not an intellection, but a diction: whence, although creatures were the objects of the divine intellect in that prior sign in which the Word is generated, they do not on that account concur to the production of the Word; for not every object fecundates the divine intellect, so that it be productive of the Word, but only the motive and adequate object does that, such as creatures are not with respect to the divine intellect, but only the divine nature; and therefore the preceding and other similar objections do not directly militate against our assertion.

Second conclusion. — The divine processions presuppose the knowledge and volition not only of the divine essence and of all the attributal perfections, but also of the three divine persons.

This seems to be the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor as to both parts: as to the former indeed there is no difficulty, for all the theologians of both schools, the Angelic and the Subtle, agree that the divine essence together with all its absolute perfections, and so with intellect and will, and with the most perfect knowledge and volition, terminated indeed at the essence itself and its perfections, is prior to the processions and relations, and so is known and loved before the Word and the Holy Spirit are produced.

— But that the Doctor judges that the divine persons likewise are known and loved in that prior sign, I gather from his various sayings. For first, in 1. dist. 6. q. unica n. 5. he says:

The Father in this way generates the Son, willing; because the Father in the first sign of origin understands formally; and then he can also have formally an act of willing. In the second sign of origin he generates the Son, and wills that generation not only with a volition following that generation; but with the volition had in the first sign of origin, by which volition the Father formally wills, some intellection being presupposed, by which the Father understands, but not the generation of the Word.

Thus, therefore, I say that the Father, willing, generates, not only with consequent will, but with antecedent will: as if he would say that the Father, willing, generates the Son with a volition which precedes and is terminated also at the generation itself, before the Son exists with some priority of reason or origin; in which manner Faber, Smising disp. 3. n. 28., Rada controversia 12. on the fourth conclusion explain and defend him; where he says it is more conformable to Scotus to assert that the knowledge and simple complacency of the divine will toward the Son precedes his generation in the Father: and the same reason holds proportionally concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit; so that the knowledge and the simple volition and dilection of the Holy Spirit precede it in the Father and the Son.

2. The Doctor in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 2. n. F. asserts that the divine Father is blessed prior by origin than he generates the Son, because he has no perfection intrinsic to himself from the person produced: but beatitude is an intrinsic perfection of the blessed person, and this beatitude is brought about by the vision of the essence, either absolutely or inasmuch as it is the essence, or, he says, as it is in one person precisely: therefore he judges that the divine essence can be seen, as it is in the person of the Father, prior by origin than the Son is generated: but it cannot be seen in that way without the Son being seen equally: for the essence cannot be seen intuitively as it is in the Father, without the Paternity constituting the Father being seen at the same time: nor can the Paternity be seen without the Filiation being seen, because correlatives are simultaneous in nature and in knowledge: therefore, from the mind of the Doctor, the vision and love of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, precede by the instant of origin their production.

— 3. The Doctor confesses in many places, especially in 2. dist. 1. q. 1. n. 11., that the divine Persons proceed from the intellect and will fecundated by the primary divine object: but there num. 3. he teaches that not only the essence and attributes, but also the divine persons are comprehended under the primary object; for there he distinguishes two instants of nature, in the first of which are contained the divine productions and operations ad intra; in the second indeed the operations of the divine intellect and will concerning creatures, as concerning secondary objects, which, he says, are not objects of themselves, but produced by the intellect and will into the being of object: therefore he judges that the divine processions presuppose the knowledge and love not only of the divine Essence, but also of the divine persons.

Nor does it matter that in 1. dist. 10. quaest. unica it is not known, "It is necessary," he says, "that the divine Essence, whose love is breathed, be foreknown to the Father and the Son, in order that they breathe: but not that the breathed love be foreknown to the Father and the Son:"

for he did not say these things resolutively and assertively; but as if doubtfully and problematically, whence he adds,

Otherwise it could be said that in that first sign of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be breathed, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit intuitively, although not as existing in himself, because they know the divine Essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively whatever intelligible object.

That is, the Holy Spirit can be known by the Father and the Son before he is conceived as produced, namely in the divine Essence itself, in which God knows intuitively even created things before they exist.

— From these things, therefore, it is evident that the Subtle Doctor, in resolving this question, is either altogether problematic, or inclines to our opinion; and hence it can be seen how much certain recent theologians are deceived, who ascribe the opposite opinion to the Doctor, as if he had taught and defended it assertively.

Moreover, the first Conclusion is proved. The divine Father first knows and loves himself than he generates the Son: therefore he also first knows and loves the Son. The antecedent is evident, because in that prior sign of origin the divine Father is adequately constituted in his personality: he was therefore under that notion cognoscible and diligible in that prior sign, for each thing, in the way in which it is, is also cognoscible and diligible. Therefore under that notion he actually knows and loves himself for that sign; for infinite knowledge and dilection, such as the divine is, cannot fail to attain everything cognoscible and diligible, according to the mode of its cognoscibility and diligibility.

The consequence is proved: with the same act by which the Father knows and loves himself under the notion of Father, he also knows and loves the Son under the notion of Son; for since the whole being of the Father, inasmuch as he is Father, is relative, nor can anyone know or will a relative, as such, unless with the same act, at least obliquely, he knows and wills the correlative: hence it comes about that the divine Father in the prior sign of origin in which he knows and loves himself, also knows and loves the Son.

The same reason holds for the Holy Spirit; for if there were any reason on account of which the Holy Spirit could not be known and loved for that sign, it would be chiefly because in that prior sign the Holy Spirit is not yet

understood to exist; but nothing is intelligible and diligible unless while it has being. But in the same way, neither is the Son understood to exist for the first sign, and yet for that sign it is necessary that he be loved and known by the Father, because the Father, inasmuch as Father, cannot be understood without the Son: therefore, etc.

— Next, the Word presupposes comprehensive knowledge of the divine Essence: but the divine Essence cannot be comprehended unless the divine persons are known in it: therefore, etc. The major is evident. The minor is proved: the divine Essence cannot be comprehended, unless whatever is intrinsic to it and in every way identified with it is likewise known: but the divine persons are identified with the essence: therefore it cannot be known without the persons.

— Finally, the divine Essence cannot be comprehended, unless it is likewise known as fecund and communicable to the three Persons: but it cannot be known in that way without the divine Persons themselves being known; therefore, etc. The major is known: for the essence to be communicable to the three Persons is an absolute predicate of that divine Essence: therefore it implies a contradiction for the essence of God to be comprehended, unless it is known as communicable to the three persons. The minor is also evident: for the essence, as communicable to the three persons, is essentially connected with them and really identified with them; but it implies a contradiction for that which is essentially connected and identified with another to be comprehended, the term of the essential connection not being known: just as neither a relation without its term, nor knowledge without an object, can be comprehended: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. In that sign in which the Son and the Holy Spirit are not cognoscible nor diligible, they cannot be known and loved: but in that prior sign they are neither cognoscible nor diligible. Proof: for they are either cognoscible abstractively, or intuitively: but neither can be said. Not indeed abstractively: both because such knowledge would be imperfect and not commensurate to the object, which cannot prescind from existence, because it is a being that necessarily exists: and because the divine persons are pure acts, and that objective abstraction would be a certain potentiality, which is repugnant to pure act. Nor even intuitively, because intuitive knowledge is terminated at an existing or future thing: but the divine persons, in that prior sign, are not conceived as existing; nor can they be said to be future; for futurition is repugnant to pure act and to a supremely necessary being, such as the divine persons are: therefore their knowledge is not presupposed to the divine processions.

I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that the produced persons are known in the same instant in which the producing ones are. For something can be prior to another according to origin, and yet be simultaneous with the other according to knowledge; because the priority of origin is not a priority in which, but only a priority from which; but the simultaneity of knowledge takes place in the instant in which. Although, therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are posterior to the Father in origin, yet because they are with him simultaneous in duration, nature, and consequence of subsisting, hence they are cognoscible together with the Father in the same instant in which. Not therefore as future, or as abstracting from being; but only as present and as a being that necessarily exists, just as the Father himself.

You will insist. intuitive knowledge presupposes its object as existing: but in that prior sign, in which the divine intellection is terminated at the essence, the Word is not presupposed as existing, because it is not yet presupposed as produced: therefore in that prior sign it cannot terminate an intuitive knowledge, and consequently it can be known in that sign neither abstractively nor intuitively; and hence in it it is in no way cognoscible.

I distinguish the major. it presupposes its object as existing in a real instant of nature, or of duration, I concede: of origin and emanation, I deny. I distinguish the minor similarly: in that prior sign of origin the Son is not conceived as produced, I concede; in reality he is not produced, I deny. For the priority of origin says only that the Son is from the Father, not that the Father exists in some instant in which the Son is not; for in that adorable Trinity nothing is prior or posterior.

You will press. if the Word presupposes the knowledge of itself and of the Holy Spirit, it follows that it proceeds from itself and from the Holy Spirit, and also that it is posterior to itself and to the Holy Spirit: but both are absurd: therefore, etc.

I deny the consequence of the major. for, as has been said, that priority of origin does not infer an anteriority of one to the other according to existence, but only according to the termination of knowledge, so that the simple operation of the divine intellect and of the divine will is terminated at the essence and at the divine persons before the diction and spiration are conceived to be terminated at the Word and the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as they are productions; and hence it does not follow that the produced persons are prior or posterior to themselves; but only that they can be conceived and known before they are produced, not with a priority of duration, but of concept.

You will say 2. If the production of the Word presupposed the knowledge of the Holy Spirit, it would be his image: but this cannot be said; for he is the image of the Father alone, as we will say below. The consequence of the major is evident: for he is the image and expression of that knowledge which his production follows.

I deny the consequence of the major. and also its proof; for the Son is only the image of that one by whom he is produced, because as such he claims for himself a double respect of image, namely the respect of the principled to the principle by which he is produced, and the respect of similitude, or of the representing to the represented: whence, since the Holy Spirit is not the productive principle of the Word, but only the term of that divine knowledge which the production of the Word presupposes, hence it cannot be said that he is the image of the Holy Spirit: both because the Holy Spirit is not the motive object for that previous knowledge, but only the divine essence, which the divine Father has from himself, not indeed from the Holy Spirit: and because with respect to the Holy Spirit he does not have the respect of the principled to the principle: therefore, etc.