Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. The question proceeds concerning the Processions, both of the same notion and of a diverse one; namely, whether in God there are several processions distinct in number and in species. For although according to the Doctor in 1. dist. 17. n. 3. there is not properly genus, nor species, nor specific difference in the divine realities; because these smack of part and composition, and therefore of imperfection; whence properly no specific distinction is to be assigned among the divine realities; nevertheless in God there are some things which, since they are distinguished more than by number and have diverse formal notions, can for that reason be called as it were distinct in species; for they differ more, v. g. generation and active spiration, than two generations and two active spirations would differ, if there were so many. It is to be resolved, therefore, whether the divine Processions are several diverse in species, and several of the same notion distinct by number alone.

Note 2. The individual Processions are distinguished by Theologians into active and passive, whence they can be compared with one another in four ways: First, indeed, the active Processions can be compared among themselves, namely generation with spiration: Second, one passive Procession with another, as being generated with being spirated: Third, the active can be compared with the passive corresponding to it, as to generate with to be generated: Fourth, finally, the active can be compared with the passive disparate from it, as to generate with to be spirated. It is certain, however, that the passive Processions are really distinguished among themselves, for this is necessary for establishing the real distinction and constitution of the divine Persons, as will be evident in the following Disputation. It is equally certain that active spiration is distinguished from the passive corresponding to it; for from this the real distinction between the producing and the produced person is gathered; and likewise from the passive disparate from it, as will be evident when we prove that even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would nonetheless be really distinguished from Him; whence for the present there remains the difficulty to be solved, in what manner the active Processions are distinguished from one another.

Note 3. The distinction of things can be conceived in two ways, namely, either with respect to us, or with respect to themselves. Things are said to differ with respect to us when we conjecture their distinction from certain merely extrinsic notions; since otherwise the intrinsic notion, from which their discrepancy could be derived, lies hidden from us; but they are said to differ with respect to themselves when they are known to differ from their own proper and formal intrinsic notions. And this again in two ways, namely adequately, or first; and inadequately, or not first. In the former way those things are mutually discrepant which differ in their whole selves, as individual differences. In the latter way those things are said to differ which agree in some intrinsic principle, and are discrepant through another thing intrinsic to themselves, as species and individuals, which agree with one another in the generic or specific notion; but they are discrepant through the specific or individual difference.

These things being premised, a threefold difficulty is to be solved; the first, indeed, whether in reality there are two and not more than two processions formally and as it were specifically distinct. The second, whether several processions of the same notion, or in number, is repugnant. The third, from which principles the diversity and distinction of those processions is to be derived. The first resolution will militate against Raymundus Lullius, who, if any faith is to be given to Eymericus, not consistent with himself, affirmed now one only, now several and almost innumerable divine Processions: one only, indeed, for he repeatedly asserted that within God there is only one act of making good, that is, of communicating goodness and the divine essence, because, he says, if there were several acts, each of them would be finite and limited, but this is supremely repugnant to a being infinite in every way. But he likewise admitted several divine processions, for in lib. 1. Sentent. q. 2. he speaks thus: In the divine realities the essence is not idle, but essence and nature nature-fies, goodness makes good, and infinity infinitifies, and eternity eternifies, etc. That, however, in the aforesaid words he did not understand only the formal constitution and denomination of the attributes, but truly also willed there to be various operations ad intra, such as are to understand and to love, is gathered from the same author: As God, he says, naturally has to understand and to love intrinsically, so intrinsically He has naturally to make good, to eternify, to possify and to virtufy; as he speaks in lib. De Centum Dei Nominibus. The second difficulty, however, will have to be solved against the Theologians, who do not agree among themselves in assigning the principles from which the distinction of the divine Processions is to be derived.

First conclusion. — In reality there are two and not more than two processions formally and as it were specifically distinct from one another.

The first part already remains proved more than sufficiently from what has been said thus far, and will appear more evidently from what is to be said in the following Article, in which it will be proved further that the divine intellect and will in God are two distinct principles of the proceeding divine Persons; whence only the following remains to be proved

The second part, which the Doctor thus proves in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. n. 18.: There are as many and no more Processions of diverse notion in the divine realities as there are distinct productive principles: but these are only two, namely fruitful memory and fruitful will, of which one is productive by way of nature; the other, however, by way of freedom, or of will: therefore there are only two Processions of diverse notion. The major is evident; for since the Processions are from productive principles, it follows that their diversity and multiplicity is to be derived from these principles. The minor is proved as to the first part, namely that those two productive principles are distinct: the principle of acting naturally, and the principle of acting freely, have an opposite mode of acting: therefore there cannot be given one principle, to which this diverse mode of acting uniquely belongs; for either, says the Doctor, that productive principle would act from itself determinately, and thus by way of nature, or it would act not from itself determinately, but freely, and thus by way of the voluntary. But since these modes of acting are directly opposed to one another, they cannot be reduced back into one only principle: therefore, etc. Nor can they even be reduced to some third, because it would be necessary that that third principle also have those diverse modes of acting, namely by way of nature and by way of the voluntary: moreover, neither can one of them be reduced to the other: both on account of the same reason, and because since those principles are equally perfectly productive, there would not be a stronger reason why one should be reduced to the other, than why that one to the other: and finally, because nothing is reduced to another, unless the less perfect to the more perfect; in God, however, there is not found an inequality of perfection; therefore if in God there are necessarily two productive principles and not more, there are also only two processions.

You will object 1. Doctor: a diverse mode of principiating can be reduced back into one only principle: therefore although to principiate by way of the will and by way of nature are opposed modes of principiating, from this it is not lawful to infer that there are two distinct principles; nor consequently two processions, nor two proceeding persons. The antecedent is evident; for to principiate necessarily and to principiate contingently are opposed modes of principiating: but these belong to the same principle, namely the divine will, with respect to diverse productions; for with respect to the production ad intra it principiates necessarily; with respect, however, to the production ad extra it principiates contingently: therefore a diverse mode of principiating can be reduced back into one only principle. — The Doctor cited above, n. 23., answers by distinguishing the antecedent; a diverse mode of principiating can be reduced back into one only principle, when those two modes import no imperfection, he denies: when one of them connotes an imperfection, or a lesser perfection, he concedes. For it is necessary that everything imperfect be reduced to the perfect; whence since the mode of principiating contingently connotes an imperfection, because all contingency imports mutability and defectibility; hence it must be reduced to the necessary principle. But the modes of principiating by way of nature, and by way of will have no imperfection mixed in, and so neither of them must be reduced to the other. — Or I distinguish the consequence. From a diverse mode of operating in whatever way it is not lawful to gather the diversity of the principles, I concede; from a diverse mode of operating, such as fruitful memory has, and the divine will, I deny the consequence. For it is evident that the divine intellect does not have the same mode of operating, which the will has; for that one acts naturally, this one, however, voluntarily; it is likewise evident that in God there is no other potency, to which both of these opposed modes of operating could belong: therefore from those diverse modes of operating the diversity of the productive principles in God is rightly gathered; and consequently the diversity and distinction of the divine processions is also duly inferred.

You will object 2. The divine nature, inasmuch as it is nature, is no less a productive principle than the intellect and the will; therefore if from the diversity of principles the diversity of processions is justly gathered, three must necessarily be admitted; since indeed there are three productive principles in the divine realities, namely nature, intellect and will. — The Doctor answers in the same place, distinguishing the antecedent: the divine nature is a productive principle considered apart from the intellect and the will, he denies; joined with each divine faculty, he concedes; for fruitful memory, which is the adequate and total principle of the production of the Son, v. g., includes the intellect and the divine essence, each of which partially concurs to that production. The same is to be said of the will with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit. Whence the divine nature together with the intellect and the will constitutes two integral and adequate principles of the divine productions, of which the Doctor offers the reason, that the adequate principle of intellective knowledge and of love is not the object alone, but the object together with the potency of understanding and willing: whence since the divine nature concurs to the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Spirit as the object to the speaking of the mental Word, and the expression of subsistent love; hence it is that the essence, or divine nature, constitutes only two adequate principles of production, but is not, however, some adequate principle distinct from them.

You will object 3. Doctor: potencies are distinguished by acts: therefore since from the twofold essential potency in God there are two essential acts, namely essential understanding and willing, there cannot be assigned to them two other notional acts, namely generation and spiration; and consequently from those two divine potencies the duality of the divine processions is not rightly inferred. The sequela is evident, since from the same distinctive the distinctions of diverse notions cannot be derived: but the distinction of the notional acts and the distinction of the essential acts are distinctions of diverse notions: therefore that diversity of both cannot be derived from those same two principles. — He denies the sequela. The Doctor ibidem n. 22.; and also the consequence of its proof; for although one potency cannot have several adequate acts of distinct notion, behaving in the same way toward those acts, so that it has each one produced, or each one unproduced; nevertheless it can have several acts of diverse notion, behaving in a diverse way toward them; so that it is related to one by way of an operative, or emanative, principle; to the other, however, it is related by way of a productive principle: thus, however, fruitful memory is related, v. g., to the essential unproduced knowledge and to the generated knowledge, because to the first it is related by way of an operative principle, not, however, a productive one; to the second, however, it is related by way of a productive principle, not an operative one.

You will object 1. Not only is potency the principle of the divine procession, but also the object, namely the divine essence: but although in the divine realities several potencies are given, several objects are not, however, given; for the object of the intellect and of the will is one only, namely the divine essence: therefore although there are two potencies, it does not, however, follow from this that there are two diverse processions and productions. — I distinguish the minor. In the divine realities there are not distinct objects, as it were material ones, I concede: formal ones, I deny. For the same divine essence, since it is intelligible and amiable, has a diverse formality; and so a distinct notion of the formal object, by which it is diversely attained by the intellect in the notion of the intelligible and by the will in the notion of the amiable.

You will object 5. In the divine realities there is only one action: therefore also one only procession. The consequence is evident: for a procession either is active, and thus is synonymous with action; or passive, and thus is correlative to action, and so can only be multiplied according to its multiplication. The antecedent is proved; for active spiration and active generation in the divine Father are really identified, as we shall prove below: therefore they are one only action really. — I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say that indeed spiration and generation are indeed one thing, not, however, one action: for if notwithstanding the real identification of the relations with the divine essence, there are nonetheless several diverse and distinct relations, why not likewise, notwithstanding the real identification of spiration and generation, can there be diverse actions? Add, that if the real identification were an obstacle to the multitude of productions, or processions, the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be several, or distinct, because namely the intellect and the will, from which they proceed, are not really distinguished.

You will insist. In the divine realities nothing is distinct from another, except according to origin and relation, or inasmuch as one proceeds from another: but one procession, or production, does not proceed from another: therefore neither is it distinguished from it. — I distinguish this major. If it does not have principles from elsewhere, by which it is distinguished, other than through the notion of origin from another, from which it is distinguished, I concede: if it has them, I deny. For we shall prove below, that even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would nonetheless be really distinguished from Him; because passive spiration, by which He is constituted, is a distinct constitutive and distinctive principle from filiation, or passive generation, by which the Son is constituted; therefore by parity, although one procession does not arise from another, it is nonetheless no less distinguished from it, from the fact that they are diverse modes of operating, namely to proceed naturally and voluntarily, and they proceed from distinct and diverse principles, namely the intellect and the will, which suffice to distinguish those processions.

You will object 6. The divine Father, in producing the Son, either expends his whole power and fruitfulness and totally, or not; if the first, he cannot produce another person, for beyond the whole there is nothing; if not, it follows that the term produced by it is not infinite: for creatures are not infinite for this reason: although God expends his whole power in their production — for his power has no parts, of which he could occupy one while reserving another, but is wholly indivisible, and therefore he expends it whole when he occupies it — creatures, I say, are not infinite, because God does not totally occupy his power in them. — I answer. God, while he generates the Son, occupies his whole power and totally, namely as much as he can occupy it through one potency, namely through the intellect: for thus the Father expends the fruitfulness of the divine intellect in the production of the Son, so that he cannot produce another Son, as will be evident in the following Conclusion: this, however, does not prevent that he can at the same time go forth into act, also totally through the will, because it is a productive term as it were of another species and through a production as it were specifically distinct from the production, which is made through the intellect. Whence in form: the divine Father expends his whole power and totally in the production of the Son, so that that production adequately matches and as it were exhausts the fruitfulness of every kind of the divine intellect, I concede; for the speech is only about the generation of the Word, or of the intellective term: so that it adequately matches and exhausts the fruitfulness of every kind of the Divinity, so that he cannot through another potency, namely the will, go forth into a productive act of another divine person, I deny.

You will insist. The divine power expended in the production of the Son is in every way infinite: therefore it not only totally matches the fruitfulness of the divine intellect, but also of the Deity itself. The antecedent is evident: for if it were not in every way infinite, it would be limited in some things; and thus it would not produce a term in every way equal to the producing principle. The consequence is likewise evident; for that which is in every way infinite comprehends everything that is of the same genus, and so an infinitely productive power must contain every altogether conceivable productive power. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is in every way infinite in the notion of the divine intellective power and productive of generated knowledge, I concede: in the notion of the divine power simpliciter, I deny. For although for any procession an infinite perfection, or productive power, is required, which in any procession has an adequate act in the notion of the formality of the act, it does not, however, have an extensive adequacy and according to the notion of all the acts, which it can have ad intra: for just as to produce any creature from nothing the infinite power of God is required, as some will have it, and nonetheless not any creation is an adequate act of that power; so in like manner, although for the production of the Son an infinite perfection and fruitfulness of the divine nature is required, that, however, is not exhausted by that procession alone, because it is not in every way adequate to the communicative power of the divine essence, which can be communicated not only through the intellect by way of generation and of knowledge, in the notion of the knowable; but also through the will, by way of spiration and as amiable; whence each one of those productions is adequate to its principle, and therefore cannot be multiplied in number, as will appear

Second conclusion. — It is of faith that there are not in fact several processions of the same kind, distinguished only in number, nor can there be.

It is proved by all those considerations by which we have already shown that there are only three divine persons, and not more. It is moreover evident from all those texts of Sacred Scripture, especially Io. 1. and 3., in which the Son of God is called the only-begotten, from which it is established that God has only one only Son; and so in the divine there are not two generations, much less several. The same is confirmed by all the Creeds, by which we believe in Jesus Christ the only-begotten and only Son of God; whence in the Creed of Saint Athanasius we expressly profess that there is one Son, not three Sons, one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits.

The Doctor proves this truth in q. 2. Quodlib. art. 2. by this theological argument: if in the divine there can be several productions of the same kind, then there could be infinite ones, and consequently there will necessarily be infinite ones; for in a being that is supremely necessary, to be is the same as to be able: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident, for no one has so far so ineptly raved as to assert that the divine Persons are infinite in number: and Saint Bonaventure proves this truth in 1. dist. 2. art. 1. qu. 2. by a fourfold argument; namely, from distinction, order, connection, and completion. First, indeed, from distinction: where there is distinction, he says, there is no confusion: but where there is infinity, there is confusion: therefore, since there is distinction among the divine Persons, there will be no confusion, nor consequently infinity. Second, where there is order, there is termination and mediation: but where there is termination there is no infinity, because infinity knows no term: therefore if there is order in the divine, there is no infinity. Third, where there is connection, it is necessary that all the persons proceed from one; for if one from another, and so on in consequence, then there is an infinite distance between the first and the last: but this is incongruous: therefore all proceed from one. Finally, where there is supreme completion, there is no infinity, for completion takes place in beatitude: but if the persons were infinite, it would be impossible for anyone to be beatified by God: for the knowledge of each person contributes to beatitude: therefore the blessed soul must know all the divine Persons; but it could not know infinite ones, since its power is finite: therefore an infinite number of divine Persons would be absurd. The Doctor proves the major: first, indeed, by the authority of St. Augustine, who argues thus in Contra Maximinum, lib. 3. c. 12. The divine generation would be immoderate, he says, if the begotten Son were to generate a grandson for the Father, because the grandson himself, unless he were to generate a great-grandson for his grandfather, would, according to your wonderful wisdom, be called impotent. He then adds: Nor would the series of generation be filled up, if one were always generated from another, nor would anyone complete it, if a single omnipotent one sufficed. As if he were saying that if one produced person does not suffice to complete the whole production of one action, neither in like manner will another suffice, nor again another, and thus processions and persons of the same kind, infinite in number, would necessarily have to be admitted.

The Doctor proves 2. by this argument: everything multiplicable into several things of the same kind is not determined of itself to a certain plurality, but if it is so determined, it is necessary that it be determined by another: but the divine procession, if it is multiplicable into several processions of the same kind, e.g. into several generations, cannot be determined by another to a certain plurality: therefore if it is multiplicable into several processions of the same kind, it is in no way determined to a certain plurality, but it is necessary that that series of divine processions become infinite. The major is evident by the example of created being, which since it is multiplicable into several created beings of the same kind, it follows that it is not determined of itself to a certain plurality, and unless it were determined to a certain number by an extrinsic agent or by circumstances, its productions could be infinite syncategorematically. The minor is proved: if the divine procession were determined to a certain plurality by another, it would be most of all either by something posterior, or by something prior: but it can be done by neither. Not indeed by something posterior to itself, for no being has its entity from a being posterior to itself; therefore neither can it have its unity from it: nor even by something prior: for this would be either the formal principle of the divine procession, namely the fecund memory and will, or it would be the producing principle, namely the divine person: but by none of these would the divine procession be determined to a certain plurality, if it were multiplicable into several processions of the same kind: for the formal principle of production, namely that by which, and the producing principle, namely that which, if it can have several productions of the same kind, cannot determine itself to a certain number of productions; whence if it were so determined, it would necessarily have to be determined by another: but this cannot be said: both because there is nothing in God besides the fecund memory and will from which this determination could be understood to be made: and because, whatever that may be, about it the same question returns, whether it is prior or posterior; but it could not be posterior, because, as I said, nothing receives its unity, nor its plurality, from what is posterior to itself; nor could it be prior, because that will also be necessary, and so it will not be able to determine the other to a certain number, unless that in turn is determined by another, and so there will be a progress to infinity in those determinations of the divine processions, which since it implies a contradiction, also implies that there are several divine processions of the same kind and distinguished only in number.

He proves 3. also by this argument: a potency which has an adequate act, while it has it, cannot have another: but the divine generative potency has in fact an act adequate to itself in the generation of the Son, or of the Word: therefore it cannot have another at the same time; otherwise that act would both be and not be adequate to it. The minor is proved: for the Son is an infinite term, just as the intellect is; therefore he is truly its adequate term.

You will say. That adequacy is understood either of the act adequate extensively, or of adequacy intensively. If the first, the principle is begged; for this is the same as having an act beyond which another could not be had, whose truth and proof is not evident. If the second, that seems plainly false: for the soul of Christ, e.g., has the created vision of the Word adequate to itself intensively, and yet besides that it still has other visions: likewise the divine intellect has the vision of the divine essence adequate to itself intensively, and nevertheless it also has beyond that the vision of things other than itself. Whence the Doctor in the Reportatis lib. 1. dist. 2. qu. 7., having adduced the same argument, adds that this argument too does not hold; which he proves with the argument just made: therefore etc. — I answer. The aforementioned argument must be understood of adequacy intensively: for the Doctor explains this adequacy through the perfectional infinity of the productive principle and of the produced term; but it is repugnant that an infinite term be multiplied according to the same kind, because the infinite of itself is a being, and therefore it truly is repugnant that there be several sons infinitely perfect. With adequacy thus taken, I answer that the examples put forward in the objection do not press, for neither the intellect of God nor the intellect of the soul of Christ has several visions adequate to itself intensively, but the divine intellect indeed beholds with one vision adequate to itself the divine essence and in it everything visible: but the intellect of the soul of Christ, although it has several visions, nevertheless does not have several visions adequate to its total power of understanding; for it has one vision of the Word and of certain things in the Word adequate to itself, insofar as it is equipped with the light of glory: it also has visions of other things outside the Word, or in their own kind, proportionate and perhaps adequate, insofar as it is equipped and informed by other co-principles of understanding, so that, as our Smising says, Disput. 3. num. 109., neither the created vision of the Word and of the things in the Word, nor the visions outside the Word considered separately, are in Christ adequate to the one total power of understanding which is in him. The objections which could be formed against this solution have already been solved in qu. 3. of the preceding Article.

You will say 2. The aforementioned argument supposes that the divine generative potency is in perpetual use and act of generation: but this seems false, for what forbids God, after his Son was begotten, from having ceased from his generation, so as thus to produce another again? For if anything were an obstacle, it would be most of all because God's actions must be measured by eternity, and must not pass into the past: but this argument seems weak; for, as we read in Genesis 2.: He rested from all the work that he had made: moreover, God no longer produces past days, or those things which passed away with those days: finally, that divine generation itself is said to have passed into the past, for we read in Psal. 2. and 109.: From the womb, before the daystar, I have begotten you: therefore etc. — I deny the minor. For God is in perpetual act of the generation of his Son, and that necessarily and unfailingly: for the divine Father is in perpetual inception or conservation of his own being: but his being is the actual generation, or the notion of Paternity, by which he is constituted, as will be evident below: therefore he always necessarily generates the Son. The same is to be said by parity of the Holy Spirit; for if God is always in actual generation, and it itself does not pass into the past, by the same argument he must be in perpetual spiration. To the confirmations I say that God is in perpetual creation, or conservation, of creatures as long as they exist; whence, since the divine Son always exists, it is necessary that his generation also be necessarily continuous. But to Sacred Scripture I answer that past is indeed truly said of that generation; yet not past in our way of conceiving, that is, that it is purely past; but past in such a way that it involves all times, as is said in Apocalypse 1.: Who is, who was, and who is to come: nay, the very same is gathered from the same words of the second Psalm: This day I have begotten you; for just as I have begotten signifies the past, so this day denotes the present.

Third conclusion. — The divine processions are formally distinguished by themselves. This is the Doctor's teaching in 1. dist. 13. num. 18. For, as he says there, generation is formally by itself generation, and spiration is formally by itself spiration; and from their formal notions it is impossible for generation to be spiration, everything else being excluded per impossibile, so that one need not ask by what they are distinguished, because the whole formal notion of the one is not the same as the whole formal notion of the other.

But he proves first by the authority of St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate, cap. 27. where, after he had declared the supreme difficulty of investigating the difference between the generation of the Word and the spiration of the Holy Spirit, which indeed he says is to be detected only through the beatific vision, he says: Lift up your eyes to that very light, and fix them on it if you can, for thus you will see what distinguishes the nativity of the divine Word from the procession of God, on account of which the only-begotten Son is not of the

Father, otherwise he would be his brother, but the Holy Spirit is said to proceed: and a little below he affirms that the will proceeds from knowledge, yet is not an image of knowledge, saying: Since indeed the will proceeds from knowledge, for no one wills what he does not at all know what or of what kind it is: yet it is not an image of knowledge, and therefore in this matter a certain distance between nativity and procession is understood to be intimated, because to behold something in thought is not the same as to desire it. By which St. Augustine openly confesses that those divine processions are distinguished from one another by their intrinsic principles: since from the distinction of the processions he concludes the distinction of the proceeding Persons. The Doctor confirms this from the same lib. 5. of the De Trinitate, cap. 9. and 11., where St. Augustine, inquiring why the Holy Spirit is not the Son, since nevertheless he goes forth from the Father, solves it by saying: For he goes forth not as born, but as given: by which it is established that St. Augustine intimates that the distinction of the divine Persons is to be traced back to their distinct emanations; and therefore it must be inferred that he teaches that the emanations of the divine Persons are distinct by themselves; for if their distinction were to be traced back from another source, St. Augustine would also affirm that the distinction of the persons is to be traced back from the same source.

He proves 2. Those things differ first per se which differ from one another as wholes formally and adequately: but such are the divine processions: therefore they differ by themselves and are distinguished formally. The major is evident: since the discrepancy of the individual differences (which all philosophers confess to differ of themselves spontaneously) cannot be traced back from elsewhere. The minor is therefore proved: those things differ formally by themselves which differ through a form intrinsic to themselves, and which are the formal notions of the distinction of others: but such are generation and spiration; for from them the difference of the produced divine persons is traced back, while they themselves are distinguished from one another by their own formal notion: therefore etc.

You will say 1. Processions of this kind agree in several predicates, for instance in being, in Divinity, in spirituality, and in the notion of one divine Person proceeding from another: therefore they do not differ as wholes, nor formally by themselves. — Some Scotists answer. This generic and, as it were, transcendental agreement does not stand in the way of those divine processions differing first formally and adequately by themselves: for if by a precision of the intellect they are considered under their own formal notion of generation and of spiration, and insofar as they abstract from the aforementioned predicates as transcendental, it will evidently appear that they are first diverse; because no predicate belonging to generation, as generation is, is included in the definition of spiration, as spiration is; not so is it to be said of those that agree specifically: for man, as man is, e.g., involves in himself a predicate which is common to brute, as brute is, a common predicate, which by proper differences can be contracted to either. — These solutions are indeed the best; nevertheless I add a third, namely that generation and spiration signify an opposed mode of proceeding: for generation signifies the mode of proceeding naturally, but spiration the mode of proceeding freely: but to proceed naturally and to proceed freely are modes of proceeding diverse by themselves: therefore those divine processions are also such.

From these gather 1. The aforesaid processions are indeed gathered by us to be distinct from the diversity of the principles, that is, intellect and will, from which they arise, but not to have their formal distinction from them; for they have their distinction from that from which they have their being formally: but they do not have their being formally from the principles, but only principiatively: therefore neither do they have their formal notion from them, but only their origination.

From these gather 2. That diversity is not to be traced back from the fact that one person is from one principle, another from two, because, as the Doctor says in 1. dist. 13. q. unica, the unity and plurality of supposits does not cause a diversity of notion in forms, or quasi forms, which are in them, or from them, e.g. because whiteness of its notion and of itself is that which changes sight, it does not vary this notion from the fact that it is either in a wall, or in paper, or in other subjects: therefore, by a like argument, generation and spiration do not differ from one another from the fact that they are in diverse supposits, one of which emanates from one principle, namely the Son from the Father; the other from two, namely from the Father and the Son; most of all, since the Holy Spirit from his formal notion does not require a plurality of supposits for his production and spiration, as will be evident below.

From these gather 3. This diversity of the processions is not to be traced back from the fact that one should be prior in origin to another, namely generation prior to spiration, nor from the fact that one originates from another, namely passive spiration from passive generation, or filiation: for when something is prior to another, the reason of such priority and origin is rightly sought; whence things are not precisely distinguished first by the notion of such priority or posteriority which is to be found between them: therefore neither are those divine emanations first distinguished through this notion of prior and posterior. Moreover, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not on that account be less really distinguished from him, as we will teach below: therefore, although he would not originate from passive generation, he would not the less be really distinguished from it, and so their diversity is not to be traced back by reason of the origination of one from the other. It is consequently the case, therefore, that that very diversity of the divine processions is traced back from their formal notion.