Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. The name of procession is used in creatures chiefly to signify the origin, or emanation, of one thing from another, as from a principle or cause; hence a twofold emanation, or procession, is distinguished, namely immanent and transient. The former is that whose term remains within its principle or cause, such as is the production of a mental word residing in the intellect that produces it: the transient, however, is that whose term goes forth outside its principle or cause, from which it is produced, such as is the procession of heat from fire into water. In divine matters, however, the word Procession signifies a true and real emanation of one person from another, which does not go forth from God into creatures, but remains within the entity of the divine substance and, as it were, subsists eternally in the bosom of the producing person, concerning which is that saying of Ioannis 1.: The Only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father.

Note 2. That although, in order to explain the ineffable mystery of one divine person proceeding from another, Theologians indiscriminately use the names of production, procession, origin, or emanation: nevertheless the word Production properly signifies, as it were, the action of the person producing another: but the others more correctly express the going forth, or emanation, of one person from another: hence they distinguish a twofold procession, just as they do origin itself, namely active and passive. Active procession is the very action of the producing person: passive, however, is the emanation of the produced person. Moreover, it must be noted that although Procession, by the usage of the Church, signifies the emanation of the Holy Spirit, who in the Creed of St. Athanasius is said to be not begotten, but proceeding: nevertheless its signification extends more widely among Theologians; for they are accustomed to use that word to express the origin of each divine Person that emanates.

Note 3. Productive action in creatures is various, but has especially a threefold imperfection attached to it; inasmuch as it produces in the effect dependence, contingency, and diversity of entity from the producing principle. Dependence, I say, because since the effect that is produced passes from non-being to being, it is most certain that before its production it was nothing; and therefore the whole being which it obtains it owes to the producing cause, and consequently depends on it as regards its entity, which it borrows only from the fecundity of the producing cause. Moreover, it imports contingency; for since before its production it was nothing, it is evident that it does not have a necessity of existing, nor therefore is it a necessary being, but only a contingent one. Finally, it has an essence at least numerically different from its principle, because a created being, on account of its finiteness, cannot be communicated without division of itself. Hence if some productive action is granted in which the produced thing is so necessary simpliciter that it cannot be conceived not to exist, and has the same numerically identical essence with the producing principle, it will certainly be established that it is free from these imperfections. Whether, however, in God there is some action of this kind, without any imperfection, productive of the divine persons: or whether the divine Essence is determined from itself to three persons, as to the first without any production, as certain heretics will, who on that account are called Αὐτόθεοι, because they asserted that all divine Persons are from themselves and not from others, this is to be determined in the Question.

First conclusion. — It has been established by faith that there is in divine things a real procession ad intra, according to which one person proceeds and is produced by another.

It is gathered first from various texts of Sacred Scripture, by which the divine Word is said to proceed from the Father; especially, however, from Ioannis 8.: I proceeded from God; and chapter 7: I know him, because I am from him. Although Origen, Euthymius and Theophylact explain these passages of a temporal procession, that is, of the temporal mission of the Son from the Father, that he might come into the world; nevertheless from this too the intended point is proved, because the mission of one person from another does not take place except by reason of the procession from the one by whom it is sent, as will be proved below. — Then Sirach 24: the divine Word, or divine Wisdom, is said to have come forth from the mouth of the Most High, that is, from the intellect of the Father, as the firstborn before every creature. And Sapientiae 7: it is called a certain pure emanation of the brightness of the omnipotent God. And Micah 5: it is said: His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity. — Finally, this very thing is proved by all those oracles by which the Son is said to have received from the Father 1. Life; thus Ioannis 5.: As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. 2. Power, Ioannis 17.: As you gave him power over all flesh. 3. Authority, Matthew 11: All things have been delivered to me by my Father, etc. For since the divine Essence really contains all these divine perfections and is not distinct from them, it follows that the Father gave the essence to which he conferred the aforesaid perfections. — The same sacred Scripture testifies the same thing concerning the Holy Spirit, for Ioannis 15. we read: When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father: and chapter 16: He will glorify me, because he will receive from what is mine and declare it to you. Therefore the Holy Spirit receives knowledge from the Son, and consequently the essence and the other attributes. The word will receive, however, is put in the future, because it indicates the future effect of the same Holy Spirit upon the faithful; nor does this conflict with the procession, which, since it is eternal, embraces all times. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is called in Romans 8 the Spirit of Christ: in Acts 6 the Spirit of Jesus: in Galatians 1 the Spirit of the Son: but one person cannot be called another's, except because it proceeds from it. It is established, therefore, from Sacred Scripture that there are in God from eternity two productive processions of the divine persons.

Secondly: This same truth was defined in various Councils, especially the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, Lateran and Florentine, and is contained in all the creeds of faith approved by the Church, especially the Nicene, where it is said of the Son: God of God, light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made. Of the Holy Spirit, however: Who proceeds from the Father and the Son: and in the Constantinopolitan these are added: We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, proceeding from the Father, and with the Father and the Son to be adored. With these accords St. Athanasius in his Creed, in which it is read: The Son is from the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten: the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. The Council of Toledo 11, celebrated in the year 675, also assents and excellently teaches and embraces all things in its exposition of the faith, in which we read: We confess and believe that the holy and ineffable Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is one God by nature... And we indeed profess the Father to be not begotten, not created, but unbegotten; for he draws his origin from no one, from whom also the Son received nativity, and the Holy Spirit procession, etc.

Thirdly: The holy Fathers prove and confirm this same truth with unanimous assent; and that especially from that passage of Ioannis 5.: As the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son also to have life in himself. This passage St. Ambrose weighs here, lib. 4. De Fide, chapter 5: Who does not notice, he says, that this is to be referred to the unity of life, that the same life is that of the Father and of the Son? For as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself, he gave through unity. With him accords St. Hilary, lib. De Synodis, on Canon 4 of the Orientals, where, explaining the same text, he says: That in both there is life, in both is signified essence... For he does not have anything other than what he gave; and as he has life, so he gave life to be had. With them accords St. Augustine, lib. 15. De Trinitate cap. 26, treating the same passage: As generation from the Father, he says, bestows on the Son essence without beginning of time, without any mutability of nature; so procession from both bestows essence on the Holy Spirit, without beginning of time, without any mutability of nature. They likewise prove from the fact that the divine Essence is communicated by the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit: thus Cyril, book 2 Thesaurus, chapter 1: The divine substance, he says, constituted by a certain ineffable and supreme nature, begot the Son from the hypostasis of the Father: for perfect Deity cannot be, unless it has the Son and brings forth fruit from itself. Hence St. Athanasius, in the 3rd sermon of the Acts of the Council of Nicaea, reproves the Arians, because they said that the paternal nature is sterile and unfruitful. St. Hilary accords, lib. De Synodis, about the middle: A perfect nativity, he says, gave the nature of the Son from the impassible substance not born. We will bring forward abundantly more things similar to these in what follows.

It is proved fourthly by reason, and that a manifold one, by Theologians. Of these the first is gathered from the holy Fathers, who therefore gather that the three persons are not three Gods, but one God, because the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from a single principle, namely the Father, who communicates his same essence to the Son and the Holy Spirit through origin, which, if removed, it would follow that the Son must be of another essence: for thus Nazianzen reasons, Orat. 37: For us, he says, there is one God, since there is one Deity, and those things which are from him are referred to the one: similarly St. Hilary in the same way gathers that there is one unproduced person, but the other two produced: Since therefore (he says, lib. De Synodis, about the middle) there is one God, while they cannot be unbegotten: since for this reason God is one, when the Father is God and the Son is God of God; because innascibility alone rests with the one. St. Fulgentius subscribes, to the fifth objection of the Arians: For indeed, he says, while the unbegotten cannot have one nature, since neither does one find in himself the generation of things from himself; nor does one from one truly recognize in himself the substance of nativity. — The second reason: it is of faith that three persons really distinct from one another are given in the unity of essence: but there cannot be a real distinction of persons in the unity of essence, without a real production and procession of one person from another: therefore it must truly be admitted. The minor is proved: with the procession ceasing, the opposition ceases: but where there is no opposition, there cannot be a distinction of persons: therefore, etc. The minor is evident: since the divine nature, on account of its infinity, identifies with itself all things with which it has no opposition. The major is proved: the divine essence cannot have opposition, except on account of opposite relations; for all things in divine matters are the same, where the opposition of relation does not obstruct: but there is in God no opposition of relation, except on account of procession: which I prove thus: every relation is founded either in measure, or in unity, or in production: but in an infinite being the notion of measure cannot have place; for the infinite is immeasurable, because it is interminable; similarly the relation of unity cannot be found in God, because the supreme unity of the divine nature excludes every distinction of nature whatsoever: therefore only the relation of origin can be found in God. — Thirdly: the Doctor proves this same truth in 1. dist. 2. quaest. 7.: whatever from its formal notion is a sufficient productive principle, in whatever it is from itself, in that it is truly a perfectly productive principle: but the intellect, having an object actually intelligible present to itself and duly proportioned, from its formal notion is a productive principle of begotten knowledge: therefore wherever it will be, it will produce begotten knowledge, and that according to the proportion of its perfection. He subsumes; but in God there is an intellect having an object actually intelligible present to itself and proportioned, namely the divine essence: therefore also in God the intellect is a productive principle of begotten knowledge, not of any kind whatsoever, but of one adequate to itself; for every perfect principle can produce a term adequate to itself; and consequently, since the divine intellect is infinite, it is productive of infinite begotten knowledge. Moreover, since no infinite thing can exist in another; that begotten knowledge will necessarily be subsisting per se. Again, since outside God there is nothing infinite subsisting per se, it follows that the divine intellect must produce a subsisting begotten knowledge, which truly is God. — The same argument can be formed concerning the divine will:

The will, having an object lovable and proportioned to itself, is productive of love proportioned to itself: but the infinite divine will has the divine essence adequately proportioned to itself: therefore it will be able to produce infinite love: but infinite love is a produced divine person: therefore, etc. Although, however, this argument does not suffice to prove that the mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated and known naturally, as we said in Question 3 of the preceding Article, nevertheless it is efficacious, so that, with the light of faith going before, it may be established that real productions ad intra must necessarily be admitted in God — In like manner St. Augustine proves the same truth lib. 9. De Trinitate, cap. 11. In speaking, he says, it must be held that every thing whatsoever which we know generates in us a knowledge of itself: for knowledge is born from both, from the knower and the known. Therefore when the mind knows itself, it alone is the parent of its knowledge; for it itself is both the known and the knower. Hence he concludes: The mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring, and its Word concerning itself, and love as the third, are a certain image of the Trinity; and these three are one, and one substance; nor is the offspring lesser, while the mind knows itself as great as it is: nor is the love lesser, while it loves itself as much as it knows and as great as it is. But so that the aforesaid reason may appear more efficacious from the solution of its attacks, the Doctor attacks it in this way.

He attacks 1. The intellect is productive of generated knowledge only then, when it must understand through that generated knowledge, or must be perfected through it: but the divine intellect cannot be perfected, nor understand through any knowledge really distinct from itself: therefore although it has an object adequately proportioned to itself, it does not follow from that that it is productive of generated knowledge. It is confirmed 1. God through ungenerated knowledge sufficiently understands all intelligible things and is perfected through it: therefore generated knowledge would be entirely futile for this. It is confirmed 2. Ungenerated knowledge is adequate to the divine intellect: therefore it cannot have another generated knowledge. The consequence is clear: for we say that the divine Word is not productive of another Word for this reason, because the divine intellect has an adequate term in the production of only one Word. It is confirmed 3. The intellect, since it is an active potency and not indeed a factive one, cannot produce anything except in itself: but generated knowledge, if there were any, would not be produced in the intellect: therefore it cannot be produced through it: and consequently the intellect is not productive of generated knowledge. — He denies the major. The Doctor denies it, because the notion of the active does not depend per se on the notion of the passive, or of the perfectible; but it is per accidens that the created intellect is productive of the knowledge by which it understands and is perfected: for since it cannot understand through any ungenerated knowledge, it is necessary that it produce generated knowledge, through which it understands and is perfected; and therefore it produces it out of need. Whence a twofold notion is to be distinguished in it: one indeed insofar as it is receptive of generated knowledge; the other insofar as it is productive of the same: the former denotes imperfection, because it involves potentiality and perfectibility; the latter however imports no imperfection, rather it expresses the highest perfection, namely fecundity and activity. Therefore the former is not found in the divine intellect, but only the latter. Whence it follows that the divine intellect can produce intellection, although it cannot receive it, and consequently not only can the fecund memory produce generated knowledge when it can understand and be perfected through it, but also when it neither understands nor is perfected through it. — To the first confirmation he denies the consequence: for it is false that every agent acts for this reason, that it may be perfected through its production: rather there are many agents which operate from the fullness of perfection and fecundity; and therefore by Avicenna, 6. Metaphysicorum, cap. ultimo, they are called agents from liberality. — To the second confirmation he distinguishes the antecedent: ungenerated knowledge is adequate in the notion of ungenerated and as it were produced knowledge, he concedes the antecedent: adequate in the notion of knowledge truly generated and produced, he denies the antecedent and the consequence. Rather, from this he turns the argument back: the divine intellect does not have all the adequate knowledge corresponding to itself without generated knowledge: therefore it has generated knowledge. — To the third confirmation he denies that the active and the factive are accidental differences of potency, since the same potency can be active and factive, as is clear concerning the angelic intellect. But that every created intellect requires a subject in which it acts or brings about intellection, this comes about from the imperfection of created intellection, which since it is an accident, therefore requires a subject in which it inheres, or in which it is received connaturally: whence since in the divine the produced knowledge is per se subsistent, it can truly be understood to be produced, without its being understood to be received in the intellect itself.

Again it can be objected against the aforesaid argument: if this argument concluded anything, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Spirit could also produce generated knowledge and produced love, and so more than three divine persons would be given: but this is repugnant to faith: therefore the aforesaid proof is null. The sequel of the major is proved: for the Son and the Holy Spirit have the divine intellect and will with the divine Essence adequately proportioned, in the notion of the intelligible and the amiable, just as much as the Father: therefore if by this argument the Father can produce generated knowledge and produced love, the Son and the Holy Spirit will be able to do the same. — I deny the sequel and the consequence. For the argument of the proof is not the same concerning the Father as concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit: for the Doctor in his major posited: wherever there is a productive principle sufficient from itself, that is, not from another, it will be able to produce: which argument cannot be applied to the Son and the Holy Spirit; for they do not have a productive principle from themselves; for they have their being from the Father. Add that the argument is not the same concerning the Father as concerning the other persons, because the Father, since he is from himself, does not presuppose generated knowledge adequate to his fecund memory; rather it is presupposed to him, and therefore the production of such knowledge is not repugnant to him: but the Son, since he is the generated knowledge itself, adequate both intensively and extensively to the productive principle, therefore cannot produce another generated knowledge: likewise the Holy Spirit, since he has being from the Father and the Son, presupposes both, and consequently cannot produce generated knowledge.

You will object 1. Against the truth of the conclusion: a being from itself cannot have origin from another: but every divine person is a being from itself, otherwise it would not be God: therefore it cannot have origin. The major is evident, for to have origin is to be from another. — I distinguish the major. A being from itself cannot have origin from another, as from an extrinsic cause and a principle of a diverse nature, I concede: as from a principle of the same nature and excluding all dependence, causality and contingency, I deny: for a being from itself can be taken in two ways: first, as it excludes an extraneous principle and one of another nature; and so truly all divine persons are from themselves: second, as it excludes a real principle which is of the same nature, and so only the divine Father is from himself.

You will insist. What proceeds from another must have a distinct being, and a nature diverse at least in number from him from whom it proceeds: but the divine persons subsist in the same nature in number, and are one God, as we have proved: therefore one cannot proceed from another. — I distinguish the major. What proceeds from another by a finite, corporeal and material procession must have another nature diverse from him, I concede the major: what proceeds by an infinite, intellectual and spiritual procession, I deny the major. For since infinity identifies to itself all things which do not have opposition; and since there is no opposition between the nature which is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, therefore although the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, they ought not on that account to be divine natures distinct in number.

You will object 2. What proceeds from another receives something from him from whom it proceeds; and so it is of a needy and more imperfect nature; needy indeed, for unless it were in need it would not receive: more imperfect indeed, because according to that word of Act. 20., it is more blessed to give than to receive: but among the divine persons, since there is the highest equality, no neediness and inferiority can be found: therefore neither can there be a procession. — I distinguish the major. To be produced by another freely and contingently, not through the communication of a diverse nature, is to be of a needy and inferior nature, I concede: to be produced by another most necessarily and through the communication of the same infinite nature, is to be in need and of an inferior nature, I deny: in the former way, it is more blessed to give than to receive; but not in the latter, as St. Augustine expressly explains, lib. 3. Contra Maximinum, c. 14., after the middle: It is more blessed to give than to receive, he says, but in this life, where there is want, than which abundance is certainly better; for it is better to have than to lack; and it is better to give than to receive; to spend than to beg. But where he who gave gave by living, and he who received received by being born, help was not brought to the needy, but abundance itself was generated. Nor can he who received be unequal to him who gave, because he received even this, that he might be equal.

You will object 3. No product is necessary from itself: but every divine person is a necessary being from itself, since it is God: therefore none is produced. The Doctor proves the major in 1. dist. 2. qu. 7. num. 1.: what is necessary from itself is necessary, all else being set aside: but what is necessary from another is not necessary when that is removed: therefore it cannot be necessary from itself and be from another. He proves secondly: every product can possibly be produced, or has a receptive potency of the very being which it receives, otherwise it could not be produced, nor consequently would it be a product, or it would follow that the impossible would be produced; but what can possibly be produced is not a necessary being: therefore etc. He proves thirdly: through production the divine Essence has a product, which it would not have without production: therefore through production it is truly changed, because from not having a product it becomes having one, and consequently it is not a necessary being. He proves fourthly: production through the intellect would be true generation: therefore if one of the divine persons were produced through the intellect, it would truly be generated: but every generation is essentially a change: therefore there would truly be change in the divine, if production were given: but every change in God implies a contradiction: therefore likewise every production in God implies a contradiction. — The Doctor answers, ibid. n. 9. by denying the major; to the first proof of which he distinguishes the major: nothing can be formally necessary from itself, and at the same time be formally necessary from another, he concedes: nothing can be formally necessary from itself, and at the same time be necessary from another efficiently, or productively, he denies. For in the opinion of the ancient Philosophers, who judged that creatures are produced by God necessarily, it was necessary that they assert those creatures to have an entity by which they were formally necessary, although they received that entity from a cause producing necessarily: whence it is clear that in the opinion of those Philosophers something can at the same time be formally necessary in itself, and at the same time be necessary from another productively. Greater however is the necessity of being, both formally and productively, in the divine Son, e.g. than it would be in creatures if they were produced necessarily; because creatures would receive a diverse essence from the producing cause; but the Son has altogether the same essence with the principle from which he is produced: whence the Doctor concludes: if the Father naturally and necessarily produced a creature, he would produce it formally necessary: yet it would not then be necessary with as great a necessity as the Son is necessary. Or more briefly I distinguish the major: what is necessary from itself, by exclusion of both contingency and production, would be necessary with anything else set aside, I concede: what is necessary from itself only by exclusion of contingency, but not by exclusion of the producing principle, would be necessary with anything else removed, or with that productive principle set aside, especially where it has altogether the same entity with the producing principle itself, as the Son and the Holy Spirit have with the divine Father, I deny. — To the second proof the Doctor distinguishes the major, n. 10.: every product can possibly be produced, either with logical possibility, which says only the non-repugnance that something be produced, so that those terms, possible and to be produced, can be composed with one another without contradiction through the concept of the intellect; or with physical and real possibility, by which is expressed an aptitude, either to receive some accident, or to receive an entity diverse from the productive principle, he concedes the antecedent: that it is only possible to be produced with physical possibility, he denies. He likewise distinguishes the minor; that what is necessary simpliciter does not have physical and real potency to be produced, he concedes; logical and intentional, he denies. Thus a divine Person cannot have physical potency to being, because it would have to be first in potency before it were in act, which is repugnant to a most necessary being. It can however have logical potency, because since in fact it is produced, it is not repugnant that it can be produced. Or more briefly and clearly: what is necessary does not have potency to receive being, I distinguish: if that being which it receives through production is not most necessary and essentially the same with the producing principle, I concede; if it receives being which is most necessary and altogether essentially the same with the producing principle, I deny: but the produced persons in the divine have altogether the same being, essentially and most necessary, with the producing principle; whence although they are from another, they are no less a necessary being. — To the third proof he denies the consequence, because for a change it does not suffice that something so has being through something, that without it it truly would not be; but further it is required that it could have not had that being, and moreover that it could have received it from another than the one from whom it receives it; but the divine Essence never was without production, nor without the Person which it had by means of production, nor could it be without both of them, and consequently it does not become from not having to having, and therefore it is not changed. — To the fourth and final proof he denies the minor; for although generation in creatures imports two things, namely production and change, nevertheless it is essentially production, and only per accidens involves change: whence there can be true generation, where there is true production in the likeness of nature, even if it does not import change, as happens in the divine.

You will object 4. Every production imports the dependence of the product upon the producer: but in the divine there can be no dependence; for all things are most highly equal: therefore neither can there be production. The major is proved: if the product did not depend on the producer, both would have the nature equally, and consequently the product would not require that the producer first have the nature, insofar as it would receive it from him; which is against the formal notion of production: therefore, etc. — He denies the major. The Doctor, ibidem n. 12., denies it and distinguishes its proof: if the produced person did not depend on the producer, both would have the nature equally, that is, would have it without any real dependence of one upon the other, he concedes: both would have it from itself, but not one from the other, he denies: for although one divine Person does not depend on another, nevertheless it requires that the producing person first have the divine nature determined to itself by priority of origin, before it is determined to the produced person: but this pre-requirement is more a presupposition of one person to another than a dependence of one upon another, as we will explain more fully when treating of the consubstantiality and equality of the divine Persons.

You will object 5. Several changes, which do not involve as much imperfection as generation involves, cannot be in the divine: therefore much more can there not be generation in the divine: but if there is no generation in the divine, neither will there be able to be spiration: therefore in the divine there will be no production. The antecedent is proved: neither local motion (latio), or local change, nor alteration, that is, change toward quality, can be in the divine: but these changes do not involve as much imperfection as generation imports, as is clear from the fact that many perfect beings, e.g. the Heavens and the Angels, can be moved locally, which however cannot be generated. — He distinguishes the consequent. The Doctor ibidem: generation cannot be in the divine, insofar as it says imperfection, he concedes: insofar as it says production, he denies: for generation can be considered, as we have already said, either according to the notion of change, by which it connotes the passage from non-being to being, or according to the notion of production, which connotes the produced substance: in the former way it is equally repugnant in the divine, as are the other changes; but not in the latter, because the produced person does not pass from non-being to being, but through its production receives altogether the same being with the producing principle.

Finally you will object with the holy Fathers; first indeed the holy Epiphanius, haeresi 69., who calls the Son Αὐτοθέον, which the heretics Autotheani interpret as having essence from himself. Then St. Augustine, in Ps. 109., and Cyril, lib. 6. De Trin., say that the Father and the Son are one principle, from which it seems to follow that the Son lacks a principle, and accordingly is not from the Father, but from himself. Thirdly, the Son is called Iehoua, just as the Father: but this name signifies him to be the fountain of being: therefore he has essence from himself, and consequently is not produced. — I deny the consequence. And to the first proof I say that St. Epiphanius only intends that the Son of God is truly and properly God; not supposititious, nor fictitious, nor has the Divinity as it were foreign and undue, but proper and due to himself, no less than to the Father, who communicated it; for αυτό, whether in composition or outside, signifies hardly anything else than properly and per se, as Genebrardus notes from Plato and Aristotle, lib. 1. De Trinitate, as Ruiz observes, Disp. 1. Sect. 2. num. 4. — To the second I say that when the holy Fathers call the Son of God a principle, they are to be understood comparatively and respectively, either with regard to the Holy Spirit, or with regard to creatures; so that with the Father he is the one principle of the Holy Spirit ad intra; and with the Father and the Holy Spirit he is the one principle of creatures ad extra. In a similar way the Third objection is solved: for the Son is called the fountain of being, because namely through the fecundity of love he communicates the divine being to the Holy Spirit, and through the fecundity of power he bestows created being upon all beings ad extra.