Scotus Academicus, Tomus tertius: De adorando divinae Trinitatis mysterio

Note 1. Revelation is the proposition of an object made through the testimony of some person speaking, whether it takes place in the intellect through God, or in the imaginative faculty through an Angel, or only externally through the teaching of men, or through voices and visions formed by Angels: hence there is a twofold revelation; one created and natural, which is made through the ministry of Angels or men; the other, however, supernatural and divine, which is customarily called the interior light supernaturally infused, efficaciously inclining the will and the intellect to give assent to revealed things; concerning which Matth. 16. Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father. But concerning this revelation we ask in the present, whether through it the human intellect can be so enlightened and strengthened that it may be able to find urgent natural arguments by which it would evidently demonstrate the Trinity, or at least probably recommend it.

Note 2. It is certain that, with supernatural faith presupposed, the human intellect cannot by its innate power of reasoning efficaciously prove the impossibility of the mystery of the Trinity: both because all the natural principles which could suggest this impossibility are taken from finite and limited things, to which, since there is no proportion to divine and infinite things, so neither should there be any comparison, and hence natural reason itself teaches that there is in God something which the created intellect cannot attain by its own powers: and because all the arguments which can assail the Trinity, natural reason illustrated by faith probably solves and dissolves, as will be clear in the course of this Treatise: and finally because natural reason seeks out and supplies certain likenesses and congruities, by which the intellect is led by the hand to assent to this mystery, and the reasons which seemed to suggest its impossibility it so dissolves that they scarcely retain any force: there remains, therefore, only the difficulty concerning the possibility and existence of this mystery, namely whether through natural arguments it can be efficaciously persuaded by a Christian Philosopher to a pagan and an unbeliever.

Note 3. Concerning the resolution of the present Question there are two maximally opposed opinions of Theologians. Richard of St. Victor carried the torch of the first, asserting in lib. 5. De Trinitate cap. 8. that it is proved by manifest reason, indeed convicted by manifold demonstration, that just as the perfection of one person is the cause of another, so the perfection of the two is the cause of the third in the Trinity: whence, speaking of the reasons set down by himself for proving the Trinity of the divine Persons, in cap. 11. he adds: as we have shown above evidently, a manifold reason convinces of the plurality of persons: and in cap. 13.: behold that it stands clearer than light that we find three in three distinctions of properties. With these he contends that the mystery of the divine Trinity can be efficaciously and evidently proved, once the knowledge of it has shone upon us through revelation: for he speaks of the reasons which presuppose faith; for in lib. 1. cap. 1. he weighs that saying of Isaiah c. 7.: Unless you believe, you will not understand. And in cap. 4. he says: Those things which we believe, we can bring forward not only probable but even necessary reasons.

Some Theologians defend the second, entirely opposite opinion, asserting that the mystery of the divine Trinity is so proper to faith that no natural reason can prove it, indeed cannot recommend it in any way at all; with whom St. Thomas seems to agree in I. dist. 33. art. 1. ad. 2., where he says:

in no created thing is there found anything similar to divine simplicity, so that the having is the same as that which is had: for all the likenesses which could be adduced, whether from points or from differences existing in a genus, have more of dissimilitude than of similitude: and they altogether lead away from the truth rather than lead into a true understanding.

But that we may avoid these extremes, we embrace the middle opinion, and we here undertake two things to be resolved: First, that, even with faith and revelation presupposed, no convincing reasons can be brought forth which would evidently persuade one of the Trinity. Second, however, that at least some congruous reasons and likenesses can be brought forth, by which the difficulty of the unbelieving intellect may be softened and it may be disposed to the faith and assent of that mystery.

First conclusion. — The created intellect, however much it may be illustrated even by divine revelation, cannot evidently and certainly demonstrate the mystery of the divine Trinity.

Proof 1. By the authority of the holy Fathers, but especially of Justin in his exposition of the faith concerning the Trinity:

Although, he says, a pure mind is implanted in us, through which we often apprehend by reasoning things higher than ourselves; nevertheless, weighed down by the flesh, it grows dull for the evident perception of greater things. In no way, therefore, since we are men, can we penetrate to that first and blessed essence: what do I say, the divine essence? nay, not even to its mysteries; for nothing divine is manifest to men.

With him agrees St. Augustine lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 1.:

We bring forward, he says, at times a reason, not the one they seek when they inquire about God, because they themselves are not able to take it up, nor perhaps can we either apprehend or set it forth, but one by which it may be shown to them how incapable, and utterly unfit, they are for perceiving what they demand.

St. Hilary agrees, lib. 8. De Trinit., where, affirming that this mystery transcends natural reason, he says:

For this the Church understands by faith, this the Synagogue does not believe, this Philosophy does not know: one from one and the whole from the whole, God and the Son, neither having taken away from the Father by nativity that which He wholly is, nor by being born having failed to keep this same whole with Himself.

It is also proved by reason. Faith, or revelation, cannot bring it about that purely natural and sensible effects have a necessary connection with the Trinity of persons: therefore neither can it bring it about that through the evident knowledge of those effects the divine Trinity be evidently demonstrated. The consequence is clear: for a cause cannot be evidently known through an effect, unless the necessary connection which it has with that effect be likewise made known. Next, faith cannot bring it about that natural reason, leaning only on its own powers, be carried beyond its own sphere: but the mystery of the Trinity is outside the sphere of natural light: therefore it cannot be attained by natural reason itself. Finally, even with the light of faith presupposed, all natural reasonings remain within the sphere of natural light, which cannot show anything divine except by the ministry of creatures: but creatures of themselves lead rather into the assent of the impossibility of this mystery than into the assent of its existence: therefore in truth, although someone through revelation and faith has known the mystery of the Trinity, he nevertheless cannot devise natural reasons which would evidently persuade that mystery to another who does not believe.

Proof 2. From the weakening of all the reasons which could be brought forth for demonstrating this mystery. If any reasons could evidently prove the divine Trinity, the five following above all could: but none of them is demonstrative.

For the first reason could be formed thus from the Doctor in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. n. 3.: whoever has from himself and without imperfection a productive principle sufficient for producing, can produce: but some divine person has from itself and without imperfection a productive principle sufficient with respect to another divine person: therefore it can produce another divine person. The minor is proved. For first it is certain that there is one person, by the same reason by which it is certain that there is God, since Deity must be personated, that it may be able to act and produce: second, that divine person has a fecund memory, that is, an infinite intellect and an infinite object present and applied in the order of the intelligible: moreover it has this memory infinitely fecund from itself, because it is unproduced; and it has it without imperfection, for no imperfection is to be found in God: but that infinitely fecund memory is a productive principle of some infinite perfect thing; not indeed of another God, because the plurality of Gods is repugnant: therefore of another divine person. The minor is proved. A fecund memory from its formal notion is productive of generated knowledge: therefore the fecund memory of the unproduced divine person is productive of knowledge generated and proportioned to itself, and hence infinite: but that infinite knowledge is not an accident, because this would disgrace God: therefore it is something subsistent, and consequently something spiritual living an intellectual life, otherwise it would not be proportioned to the productive principle: and hence it is a divine person: therefore the fecund memory in God produces another divine person; and thus already there are two divine persons, one producing, the other produced.

But that the third can be known in like manner is clear; for that unproduced divine person has a will infinitely perfect from itself; but an infinitely perfect will is productive of an infinite love proportioned to itself: but that produced infinite love must be a divine person, otherwise it would not be proportioned to the producing principle: therefore by natural reason that divine Trinity of persons can be evidently proved.

But although this reason seems to some the most pressing of all, nevertheless a Pagan Philosopher could easily dissolve it. First by denying the minor, and affirming that God does not understand except through an intellection really identified with Himself, not truly distinct from Himself, and therefore His intellection is not a real production of a really distinct term, but only an operation. Second, he could reply that the intellect produces indeed something immanent, but inhering, not truly something subsistent, and hence from this it would not be lawful to infer that the Word produced by God is something subsistent. Third, finally, although he would concede that the divine intellect is productive of a subsistent Word really distinct from the producing principle, he would nevertheless not on that account be bound to admit three persons; indeed he would have a handle for asserting that there are infinite divine persons produced; for since the Word and the Holy Spirit have intellect and will, each of them could produce another Word and another Holy Spirit, and these again others, and so on to infinity.

The second reason can be formed thus; what is supremely and infinitely good is supremely and infinitely communicable: but God is naturally known to be the supreme and infinite good: therefore He must be communicated supremely and infinitely: but outside Himself He cannot be so infinitely and supremely communicated, because a supremely infinite creature cannot be produced: therefore it is necessary that He be infinitely communicated within Himself: but that communication cannot take place except through intellect and will: therefore it is necessary that God communicate Himself through the operation of intellect and will to another within Himself; not indeed to another according to essence, because there cannot be many Gods: therefore according to person; and hence there will be three divine persons, namely one which communicates itself, and two others with whom it is communicated; to one indeed through the intellect, to the other through the will.

But the Philosopher would answer, first, by denying the major, since actual communication brings no perfection into the communicating cause, but only into the produced effect; for actual illumination is not a perfection existing in the Sun, but in the bodies illuminated. He would answer, second, that infinite communication is repugnant to God, since it would seem that it could not take place without a division of the essence and the production of another God, which implies a contradiction. Third, finally, he could distinguish the major: that the infinitely good is infinitely communicable — syncategorematically, so that it can always be communicated more — he will concede: but categorematically, so that it could have at once a communication adequate to itself — he will deny.

The third reason: God is naturally known as most happy: but happiness cannot be that of one solitary being; for it requires companionship: therefore He must have a companion: but creatures, since they are dissimilar and have not existed from eternity, cannot give God true and perfect society: therefore it is necessary that God have a companion who is not a creature: but that one cannot be another God, because many Gods are repugnant; therefore He must have other divine persons. Whence Tertullian Contra Praxeam:

Before all things God was alone, Himself to Himself World and place and all things; alone, however, because there was nothing extrinsic besides Him: otherwise not even then alone: for He had within Himself His own reason, namely His Word, His Son and His Holy Spirit.

But the Philosopher would deny that for the happiness of an infinitely perfect being the companionship of another is required; for God fully suffices to Himself, inasmuch as He is the greatest of all goods and their center.

The fourth reason can be sought from the supreme Charity of God: where there is supreme goodness, there is perfect Charity, which is necessarily toward another, and there is no supreme Charity except toward another supremely good being: but in God there is supreme goodness: therefore there is supreme Charity, which is toward another supremely good being — not indeed toward creatures, which are not supremely good: nor toward another God, because many Gods are repugnant: therefore it must be toward another divine person; and hence several divine persons can be proved by natural reason.

But the Philosopher would deny the minor; for where there is supreme goodness, there perfect Charity, having the notion of friendship, need not necessarily be; for the infinite love which God has toward Himself suffices.

Finally, the fifth reason could be formed thus: we naturally know that no perfection is to be denied to God: but to produce one like oneself in nature is the supreme perfection: therefore it is known not to be denied to God.

But the Philosopher could refute it, first, by distinguishing the minor: namely, that to produce one like oneself is the supreme perfection in corruptible beings, namely that they may be able to preserve their species; but not in beings free from corruption, as is clear in the Angels, who do not procreate other Angels; and hence, since God is free from all corruption, to produce one like Himself would not be a perfection in Him. Second, he would answer that that production is repugnant to God; because in order truly to produce one like Himself He would have to produce another God, which implies a contradiction. Third, if to produce one like oneself is the supreme perfection, since the divine persons which would be produced would be infinitely perfect, they also would have to produce other divine persons; and thus there would have to be an infinite number of divine persons.

It is clear, therefore, that no natural reason can be brought forth which would so evidently persuade the mystery of the Trinity to an unbeliever that he could not deny it his assent. Therefore this mystery can only be probably recommended through those aforesaid reasons; as well as through certain likenesses of natural things, in which the vestige and image of the adorable Trinity is engraved, as will appear.

Second conclusion. — The mystery of the Trinity can be probably recommended and explained from natural things, in which in a certain way its vestiges and images appear and shine forth. This is the constant opinion of the holy Fathers. And they recommend it by various likenesses.

First indeed, in the Sun St. Athanasius q. 1. and Nazianzen Oratione 45. find an expressed image of the Trinity, for the reason that that one heavenly body is one in which nevertheless three distinct things are found, namely the solar orb, the ray and the light. For just as, says Athanasius, the sun consists of three subsistences, so also one God of three persons. For the type of the Father is the solar orb: the type of the Son is the ray: the type of the Holy Spirit is the light of the sun. Accordingly, just as in the Sun the orb, the ray and the light are not called three Suns, but one Sun: so likewise in God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God and not three: whence the compendious exposition of the faith, which is attributed to Cyril of Alexandria, has: The Sun is the Father, the ray is the Son, the fiery splendor is the Holy Spirit.

Second, the holy Fathers draw the same image of the Trinity from the elements; first indeed from fire: for as the above-praised St. Athanasius says, there are three subsistences of one fire, namely the subject of the fire and the burning and the shining: and yet the nature of the fire is one. Thus the Father is the fire, the Son is the burning, the Holy Spirit is the illuminating power. But by subsistence he here calls individual things, although they are accidents. With him agrees Isidore lib. 2. De differentiis Spiritualibus cap. 2. Just as, he says, fire, brightness and heat are three words indeed, but one thing: so in the relation of the persons there is the Trinity, but in the substance of the nature one God.

Third, from the element of air, in which God painted the Rainbow, that in it, as on a triumphal chariot, the holy Trinity might be discerned: for just as in one Rainbow three colors so come together that sight cannot discern in which part one color is terminated and distinguished from another: so in the holy Trinity the divine persons so come together in the Deity that they are the one only God.

Fourth, from the element of Water; for a spring produces a river and a stream, as it were a threefold water and yet a single one: whence Nazianz. Oratione 37. calls the Father the eye of the spring, the Son the spring itself, and the Holy Spirit the river. Tertullian, however, in the book Contra Praxean chapter 8. assimilates the Father to the Spring, the Son to the River, the Holy Spirit to the Stream.

Fifth, from the element of Earth, because in it there are Root, Trunk and Branches, which all form a single tree, as the above-praised Tertullian weighs in the same place, as also St. Augustine lib. De fide et Symbolo cap. 9.

Sixth, St. Augustine collects the same thing from all creatures, 6. De Trinitate last chapter: It is fitting, he says, that we, contemplating with the intellect the Creator through the things which have been made, understand the Trinity, whose vestige appears in the creature in the way that is worthy. Explaining which vestige afterwards he adds: for in that Trinity there is the supreme origin of all things and the most perfect beauty and the most blessed delight. He collects this same thing also in book 4. super Genesim, from the fact that God is said in Sapientiae 11. to have made all things in number, weight and measure; measure, he says, fixes a mode to every thing: number gives to every thing its species, and weight draws it to rest and stability. The Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 13. quaest. 6. num. 6. adds that the vestige of the Trinity which shines in the creature consists chiefly in their unity, species and order, and he collects this from St. Augustine 6. De Trinitate cap. 10. saying: All these things therefore, which have been made by divine art, show in themselves a certain unity and species and order. But the unity found in the creature represents the supreme unity of the first Principle, which is appropriated to the Father; and the species of the creature represents the supreme beauty, which is attributed to the Son; finally the order of the creature represents the most perfect operation of God, which is His blessedness, and is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

Seventh, finally, the holy Trinity painted its own image in man, and deservedly said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: for, as the Doctor teaches in 1. distinct. 3. q. 9. num. 6., just as in the Trinity there is the same divine nature, and the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are three persons really distinct among themselves and identified in the same divine nature: so besides the soul there is found in us a fecund memory, which is the intellect with its object, or the species of it, and this corresponds to the Father. Then in us there is found the intellect informed with actual knowledge, which corresponds to the Son. And finally there is found the will informed by a volition, which corresponds to the Holy Spirit. Moreover, just as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are really distinguished among themselves, and yet are identified with the divine Essence; so the fecund memory and the intellect, as affected by intellection, and the will, as affected by volition, are really distinguished among themselves, and yet are really the same with the soul, inasmuch namely as the intellect and the will are considered in first act, and as they are faculties of the soul itself formally only distinguished from it.

Blessed Augustinus lucidly explains all these things lib. 15. De Trinitate, cap. 20. Whoever (he says) vividly perceives these three, namely memory, intelligence and will in his mind, naturally instituted by God, and how great a thing is in it, whence even the sempiternal and immutable nature can be recalled, beheld, embraced. He remembers through memory, beholds through intelligence, embraces through love: he truly finds the image of that supreme Trinity: to which supreme Trinity, to be remembered, to be seen, to be loved — that he may recall it, contemplate it, delight in it — he ought to refer the whole of that which he lives.