Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Claude Frassen

Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Claude Frassen (1620–1711)


Tractatus I: De Deo essentialiter operante

Disputatio I: De intellectu divino et scientia divina

Articulus I: De intellectu divino quatenus est potentia operativa

Quaestio I: An et quid sit intellectus divinus, seu potentia Dei intellectiva

Quaestio II: Quodnam sit objectum primarium divini intellectus

Quaestio III: Quodnam sit objectum secundarium divini intellectus

Articulus II: De scientia Dei

§ I: De scientia simplicis intelligentiae

Quaestio I: An res possibiles ex se prius sint intelligibiles, quam ab intellectu divino cognoscantur

Quaestio II: An et quomodo Deus cognoscat creaturas possibiles

§ II: De scientia visionis

Quaestio I: An futura contingentia Deus certo noverit

Quaestio II: Quomodo et in quo medio prius cognito Deus noverit futura contingentia

Quaestio III: Quomodo conciliari possit certitudo divinae scientiae cum rerum contingentia et libertate humana

§ III: De contingentibus conditionate futuris

Quaestio I: An Deus certo noverit contingentia conditionate futura

Quaestio II: An dentur in Deo decreta conditionata

Quaestio III: An detur scientia media, qua Deus cognoscat futura conditionata ante decretum

Articulus III: De divino intellectu practico

Quaestio I: An, quid et quot sint ideae divinae

Disputatio II: De voluntate divina

Articulus I: De divina voluntate generatim

Quaestio I: An, quid et quotuplex sit divina voluntas

Quaestio II: Quodnam sit objectum primarium divinae voluntatis

Quaestio III: An et quomodo Deus amet creaturas

Quaestio IV: Quot et quinam sint actus, seu effectus divinae voluntatis

Articulus II: De libertate Dei

Quaestio I: An et quotuplex sit divina libertas

Quaestio II: In quo formaliter consistat divina libertas

Quaestio III: An et qualis sit distinctio et ordo inter libera decreta divinae voluntatis

Articulus III: De divinae voluntatis virtutibus, ac praecellentiis

Quaestio I: Quid et qualis sit divina sanctitas

Quaestio II: An et qualis justitia sit in Deo

Quaestio III: An et quotuplex misericordia sit in Deo

Disputatio III: De providentia divina, ejusque mirandis effectibus

Articulus I: De divinae providentiae existentia, natura, affectibus et effectibus

Quaestio I: An revera sit in Deo rerum omnium creatarum providentia et cura

Quaestio II: Quid et quae sit divina providentia

Quaestio III: An et quomodo defectus tam naturae, quam morum divinae providentiae subsint

Quaestio IV: An et quomodo Deus rebus creatis immediate provideat

Articulus II: De praedestinatione sanctorum

§ I: De praedestinatione generatim

Quaestio I: An revera aliqui homines a Deo necessario praedestinentur

Quaestio II: Quid sit praedestinatio

Quaestio III: Qualis sit actus divinae praedestinationis

Quaestio IV: Quodnam sit objectum divinae praedestinationis

Quaestio V: An et quae sit praedestinationis certitudo

Quaestio VI: An et quomodo conciliari queat humana libertas cum invariabili praedestinationis certitudine

§ II: De causis praedestinationis

Quaestio I: Quot et qui fuerint haereticorum errores de causis divinae praedestinationis

Quaestio II: An praedestinatio ad gratiam fiat ex praevisis meritis

Quaestio III: An electio efficax praedestinatorum ad gloriam merita praevisa antecedat, vel supponat

§ III: De effectibus praedestinationis

Quaestio I: Quot et qui sint principes et directi praedestinationis effectus

Quaestio II: Utrum bona naturalia sint subsidiarii praedestinationis effectus

Quaestio III: Utrum defectus et mala tam naturae, quam morum, sint occasionales praedestinationis effectus

Articulus III: De reprobatione

Quaestio I: An, quid et quotuplex sit reprobatio

Quaestio II: An et quae sit causa reprobationis

Quaestio III: Quot et qui sint reprobationis effectus

Although according to our view, eternal damnation alone, as regards the punishment of sense and of loss, is the one and proper effect of Reprobation according to intention, since it alone follows the foreseen final sin, which we said above to be the demeritorious and motive cause of Reprobation: nevertheless, because according to execution every reprobate man rushes headlong into that eternal damnation by three steps, as it were; namely, by the subtraction and expulsion of graces, by Blinding and by Hardening: hence it is worthwhile to taste something of each of these in the present place.

Note 1. From St. Bonaventure in the Compendio Theologico 1. 2. cap. 31., that the hardening of spirits is said translatively and by metaphor, according to a certain proportion, from the hardness of corporeal things. Now the hardness of bodies (he says) is followed by a threefold property. The first is an inability to receive an impression. The second is a stability of remaining in itself. The third is a strength for resisting. Hence the heart is said to be hardened in three ways: in one way, through an inability to receive grace; in a second way, through a firm adherence to sin; in a third way, through rebellion against the divine inspirations and commandments of God. The first arises from the faculties of the soul vitiated and depraved by sin: the second from the continual habit of sinning, by which it happens that the sinner, when he has come into the depths, despises. The third, indeed, from the inveterate and obstinate malice and pride of the sinner himself, by which he scorns God, and is neither terrified by his threats, nor attracted by his promises, nor moved any longer by his graces.

Note 2. That blinding, the subtraction and withdrawal of grace, and hardening happen in three ways, namely affectively, dispositively, and effectively, or causatively: First, indeed, the sinner, because of his continual habit of sinning, is so affected toward sin that he resists God, calling and inviting him through his graces to conversion, for a long time and obstinately; he does not attend to the divine commandments and threats, and, like an anvil, resists the blows and grows harder; such was the sin of Pharaoh, who did not yield to so many scourges and to the miracles of God so frequently repeated. Second, the sinner has certain habitual dispositions, as it were, through which, on account of his long-standing sins, he is rendered for the future incapable of obeying the divine inspirations, so that he scarcely perceives them, and scarcely attends to the supernatural truths that are proposed. For hardening, which embraces the two other effects, seems to be contained in these three things, namely, not to think of, not to penetrate, not to feel the divine benefits provoking to penance: according to that saying of Isaias: Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, etc. For just as grace includes the illumination of the intellect and the impulse of the will, according to that saying: Thy lightnings enlightened the world: the earth saw and trembled: so hardening denotes a certain blindness in the intellect, and an inadvertence to those things which God speaks interiorly: it includes also in the will an obstinacy, by which it neither feels the divine motions nor is touched by them, so as to repent efficaciously: according to that saying: They made their faces harder than a rock, and refused to return. Third and finally, these three effects are taken causatively and effectively, namely on the part of the cause from which this disposition and the sin of hardening draw their origin per accidens; that cause, however, is none other than the divine decree of denying to the Reprobate, on account of his preceding sins, the suitable graces by which his heart would in fact be softened. Hence it follows, according to this threefold acceptance, that hardening, blinding, and the subtraction of grace are at once a sin, and a cause of sin, and a punishment of sin, to be attributed to the Reprobate himself rather than to God.

Note 3. From St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 40. art. 4. q. 1., that punishment can be distinguished as threefold: For there is, he says, a certain inflicted punishment, a certain contracted punishment, and a certain enacted punishment: an inflicted punishment is simpliciter a passion which does not conflict with grace, such as are hunger, thirst, and sickness. A contracted punishment is the fomes and concupiscence, and this indeed is a passion and therefore a punishment, but nevertheless it inclines to an evil action: and therefore it conflicts with grace, not as to substance, but as to inclination. An enacted punishment is like hardening and the expulsion of grace, and this indeed is a punishment, because it is a passion: but because it is from an evil action, or from sin, and accompanies it inseparably, therefore it is opposed to grace, and so it is clear that although it comes about through one's own action, nevertheless it is a punishment, as is clear in the man with scabies, who delights in scratching himself, but afterwards feels a burning in his flesh.

These things having been thus premised, it is asked whether the expulsion and withdrawal of grace, blinding, and hardening happen rather on the part of God, or on the part of the sinful Reprobate.

Only conclusion. — The withdrawal of grace and the blinding or hardening of the human heart take their origin from the part of the sinner before they do from the part of God. This is the common opinion of the holy Fathers and Doctors; and it is established, indeed, 1. concerning the withdrawal of grace, from the Council of Trent Sess. 6. cap. 11., where it has these words: God does not forsake those once justified by his grace, unless he is first forsaken by them. This is confirmed from St. Augustine lib. De Natura et Gratia c. 16., where he says: When he has led to perfect health, that is, to perfect life and justice, he does not forsake, if he is not forsaken, so that one may live always justly. St. Prosper agrees with him, respons. 7. to the Obiectiones Vincentianas, where, speaking of Christians who, abandoning the piety of the Christian way of life and of faith, have passed irrevocably into profane errors or damnable morals, he says:

By no means is it to be believed that men of this kind have fallen into this desperation from the will of God, since the Lord rather lifts up all who fall, and raises up all who are cast down; for no one is raised up except by his grace, no one is established except by his grace. It is therefore the will of God that one remain in a good will, he who neither deserts anyone before being deserted, and often converts many deserters.

The same is clear concerning the blinding of the heart, which St. Augustine pronounces to be at once a punishment of sin and a cause of sin, and also a sin, in lib. 3. Contra Iulianum c. 3., in these words: Blindness of heart, which only God the enlightener removes, is both a sin, by which one does not believe in God, and a punishment of sin, by which the proud heart is punished with worthy chastisement, and a cause of sin, when something evil is committed through the error of the blind of heart. This truth he lucidly expounds in lib. De Natura et Gratia chapter 22., where, explaining that saying of the Apostle to the Romans, speaking of the philosophers who When they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, he says:

To be sure, that obscuration was already a vengeance and a punishment, and yet through this punishment, that is, through the blindness of heart, which happens when the light of wisdom departs, they collapsed into more and graver sins, saying they were wise, they became fools: Grave is this punishment, if anyone understands, and from this punishment see where they went: and they changed, he says, the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents.

So they did from the punishment of sin, by which their foolish heart was darkened, and yet on account of these things, because although they are penal, they are also themselves sins, he adds and says: therefore God delivered them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness. See also from this punishment what they do, so that, he says, they disgrace their own bodies among themselves. And because this punishment is one of iniquity, while it is also iniquity, he commends it more clearly, saying: who exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. On account of this, he says, God delivered them up to shameful passions: Behold how often God punishes, and from the same punishment more and graver sins arise, etc.

Finally, the same thing is clear concerning the hardening of the heart; for as St. Aug. himself says in lib. De Gratia et libero arbitrio, explaining that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 9., He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens;

in him, he says, whom he permits to be seduced or hardened, believe his evil merits; but in him on whom he has mercy, faithfully and without doubt acknowledge the grace of God, who does not render evil for evil, but good for evil. Nor on that account take away from Pharaoh his free choice, because in many places God says: I have hardened Pharaoh, or I will harden the heart of Pharaoh; for it is not on that account that Pharaoh himself did not harden his own heart; for this too is read of him, when the dog-fly was taken away from the Egyptians, Scripture saying: and Pharaoh hardened his own heart, and at that time, and refused to let the people go: and thus both God hardened through a just judgment, and Pharaoh himself through free choice.

Hence St. Aug. excellently concludes, exhorting the faithful to constant progress:

Be certain, therefore; because your labor will not be in vain: if, advancing in a good purpose, you persevere to the end. For God, who now did not render to those men anything according to their works, will then render to each one according to his works. God will render all things indeed: evil for evil, since he is just and mild; and good for evil, since he is good; and good for good, since he is good and just: only he will not render evil for good, since he is not unjust. He will render, therefore, evil for evil, punishment for injustice; and he will render good for evil, grace for injustice; and he will render good for good, grace for grace.

The African bishops exiled in Sardinia agree with them in the Epistola Synodica around the middle:

God, they say, is said to harden, not because he compels to iniquity, but because he does not snatch from iniquity: which, because he is just, he does justly. Therefore, when God has mercy, a man is saved without his own merits; but when he hardens, he justly receives what he deserves: for the Lord saves by the gift of goodness, and hardens by the judgment of severity.

St. Isidore also adds, in lib. De Summo bono cap. 5. near the end:

Just as, he says, God is said to take away from a man some gift which the man did not have, that is, which he did not merit to receive, so too God is said to harden a man, not by making his hardness, but by not taking away that hardness which he himself nourished for himself. In no other way is God said to blind certain men, not that he himself causes that same blindness in them, but that on account of their useless merits he himself does not take their blindness away from them.

How much, however, this hardness of heart is to be lamented, St. Bernard openly reveals in lib. 1. De Consideratione cap. 2., where, addressing Pope Eugene and entreating him to withdraw from temporal affairs and return to his heart, lest perhaps little by little he be drawn to a hard heart, he says:

Do not go on asking what that is: if you have not shuddered, this is yours. The hard heart alone is that which does not dread itself, because it does not feel. Why do you ask me? Ask Pharaoh, no one of hard heart ever attained salvation, unless perhaps God, having mercy, took away from him, according to the Prophet, the stony heart and gave a heart of flesh. Then he excellently depicts the hardness of heart: What, then, is a hard heart? he says: It is that which is neither split by compunction, nor softened by piety, nor moved by prayers, does not yield to threats, is hardened by scourges. It is ungrateful for benefits, unfaithful to counsels, cruel to those who trust it; shameless toward base things, fearless toward dangers, inhuman toward human things, rash toward divine things: forgetful of past things, negligent of present things, not providing for future things. It is that to which, of past things, nothing at all does not pass away except injuries alone; of present things nothing does not perish; of future things there is no regard, or preparation, except perhaps for avenging. And to embrace in brief all the evils of this horrible evil, it is that which neither fears God nor reveres man. Behold where these cursed occupations will drag you, if you nevertheless go on, as you have begun, to give yourself wholly to them, leaving nothing of yourself to yourself; you waste time: and if it is now permitted to show myself to you as another Jethro, you too will be consumed in these things with foolish labor, which are nothing but affliction of spirit, evisceration of the mind, evacuation of grace. For what is the fruit of these things but spiders' webs?

Appendix I: De libro vitae

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