Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The cause of Reprobation, just as of Predestination, can be thought to be drawn from a twofold source, namely, either on the part of God, in accordance with His nod and absolute dominion over creatures, whom He willed to predestine or to reprobate, or on the part of the creature, who by his own merits or demerits moves God to Predestination or to Reprobation.

Note 1. This is the most wicked opinion of Calvin, and also of certain of his followers, that God, by reason of His eternal counsel or decree, before He foresaw original sin and the merit or demerit of any man, destined some to life, but others to eternal damnation. Since, however, some Calvinists shamelessly boast that this error is falsely attributed to Calvin, their own Patriarch, it is worthwhile to demonstrate the very thing from his own words: for he writes in book 3. of the Institutionum cap. 21. n. 5.

Predestination, he says, we call the eternal decree of God, by which He had determined within Himself what He willed to be done with each man; for men are not created in equal condition, but for some eternal life, for others eternal damnation is preordained. Therefore, according as each one is created for the one or the other end, we say that he is predestined either to life or to death.

And cap. 22. n. 3.: Wherever, indeed, this good pleasure of God reigns, works do not come into consideration. And cap. 23. n. 1.: I confess plainly that all the sons of Adam fell by the will of God into this misery of condition in which they are now bound. But this is what I said at the beginning, that one must always finally return to the sole arbitrament of the divine will, whose cause is hidden in itself. And n. 7. I confess, he says, that the decree is horrible: yet no one will be able to deny that God foreknew what end man would have, before He created him: and therefore He foreknew it, because by His decree He had so ordained. By these words and others like them, his opinion is clearly enough apparent.

Note 2. To this impious and blasphemous opinion Calvin weaves another no less execrable one, namely, that that eternal and immutable decree of God takes away the freedom of our choice in the business of Predestination and Reprobation, and imposes an inevitable necessity on the Predestined that they be saved, and on the Reprobate that they be damned; and so, according to his most wicked opinion, he draws, impels and compels the Reprobate to sin, and is the Author of all the lusts and crimes to which they are subjected. For thus he writes in lib. 3. of the Institutionum cap. 23. num. 8.

The Catholic Doctors say that the impious perish with God permitting, but not willing it: but why, we shall say, permitting, unless because He so wills? Although not even this is per se probable, that by the sole permission of God, with no ordinance of men, they brought destruction upon themselves. I will not hesitate, therefore, to confess simpliciter with Augustine that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that that will necessarily come to pass which He has willed.

And lib. 2. cap. 3. n. 10. And He moves the will (God), not as it has been handed down and believed for many ages, so that it may afterwards be in our election either to obey or to resist the motion: but by effectively affecting it. Therefore it is necessary to reject that saying so often repeated by Chrysostom: whom He draws, He draws willing. And cap. 2. n. 7. he affirms that God, with the intention of destroying the Reprobate, closes off to them every way of salvation. Some, he says, God devotes to destruction, others He dooms to damnation, and by an incomprehensible judgment He closes to them the entrance to life. And cap. 21. n. 12. Those whom He created for the dishonor of life and the destruction of death, that they might be instruments of His wrath, them, that they may reach their end, He now deprives of the faculty of hearing His word, now He blinds and stupefies them the more through its preaching. And a little later n. 13. Behold, He directs His voice to them, but so that they may become more deaf; He lights a lamp, but so that they may be rendered more blind; He brings forth doctrine, but by which they may be more stupefied; He applies a remedy, but so that they may not be healed. And lib. 1. cap. 18. n. 2. he asserts that the Demon is impelled by God to act wickedly and to destroy men.

I confess, he says, that with the intervention of Satan's work God often acts in the Reprobate; but so that by His impulse Satan himself may play his part and make progress, inasmuch as it is given to him, the same Satan is also said to blind the minds of the faithful; but whence this, unless that from God Himself flows the efficacy of error, so that those who refuse to obey the truth may believe lies? According to the former reason it is said: if any prophet has spoken falsely, I, God, have deceived him. According to the other, indeed, it is said that He Himself gives all men over to a reprobate mind and casts them into foul lusts. Because He is the principal author of His own just vengeance, while Satan is only the minister, etc.

How many and how horrible, and execrable, are the blasphemies of this most impious scoundrel!

Note 3. Regarding the present Question there are three opinions of Catholic Doctors, of which the First contends expressly that each Reprobation, both the positive and the negative defended by them, supposes the foreknowledge of sins, and depends on it as on a motive and demeritorious cause. The Second, indeed, distinguishes between positive and negative Reprobation, and likewise between the will of inflicting punishment and of excluding from glory, as from an unowed benefit. Whence they affirm that the first will supposes the foreknowledge of demerits and is founded on it; but they teach that the second takes its origin from the pure benefit of the divine will; in which they partly agree with Calvin, and partly differ from him. They agree, I say, in this, that they assert that God excludes some from the kingdom, as from an unowed benefit, before foreseen demerits; but they differ in this, that they assert that those thus excluded are not destined to eternal fire except after foreseen demerits. Thus teach many Thomists, whose way Bannes, Zumel and Alvarez prepared, disp. 110. De auxiliis n. 8., where he says: The Reprobation by which God decreed not to give eternal life to some and to permit their sins, is not conditional, but absolute, nor does it presuppose in God the foreknowledge or prevision of the demerits of the Reprobate himself, or of perseverance in sin until the last of life. And in disput. 109. num. 6. conclusion 3. he had earlier said: The positive act by which God from eternity willed not to admit some into His kingdom, was not conditional, but absolute, anteceding in a sign of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice. Finally, the third opinion, which is Granada's, tract. 6. disput. 2., confesses indeed that positive Reprobation is posterior to sins conditionally foreseen, but that nevertheless by one and the same act God decrees the permission of sin and the damnation of the Reprobate, so that simultaneously and in the same sign the sin is permitted to come to be, is foreseen as future, and on account of it the damnation of the man is decreed. Which, however, of these opinions may agree more with Catholic truth and faith, let it be

First conclusion. — God decrees to damn no one to eternal punishment before foreseen demerits. This is of faith.

Proof first. from the Council of Valence cap. 3., where it is said: We confidently confess the Predestination of the Elect to life and the Predestination of the Impious to death: in the Election, however, of those to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit, but in the damnation of those who will perish, evil merit precedes the just judgment of God. By these words this Council established the distinction between Predestination and Reprobation, namely that Reprobation is a work of vindicative justice, which supposes demerits on the part of the one to be reprobated. Predestination, however, is a work of mercy insofar as it supposes the prevenient and cooperating grace of God, by whose help meritorious works are done, which move God to form the decree of Predestination. And consequently the Council judges that God reprobates no one except from the foreseen demerits of that one.

You will say. The Council must be understood of Reprobation according to execution, which truly supposes demerits and final sin, but not according to intention, which is decreed by God's nod and choice.

On the contrary. The Council opposes Reprobation to Predestination in this, that the former is a work of justice, the latter, however, a work of mercy: but in this way they are not opposed according to execution, for both in that way are from justice; the former indeed from vindicative justice, the latter from rewarding justice: therefore that opposition must be understood according to the order of intention, in which Reprobation is a pure work of justice, because it supposes the demerits of men; Predestination, however, is called a work of mercy, because it supposes merits, which have their origin from grace. — It is confirmed. from the 2nd Council of Orange, near the end, where it says: Not only do we not believe that some are Predestined to evil by divine power, but also, if there are those who will to believe so great an evil, we pronounce anathema upon them with all detestation. And from the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 17.: If anyone shall have said that the grace of Justification comes to none but those predestined to life, but that all the rest, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as being by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema.

You will say. The Councils must be understood of the evil of fault, not of the evil of the punishment of loss.

On the contrary. the punishment of loss is the principal terminus and the first object of Reprobation: therefore the statements of the Councils must be understood of it. Add. that the Councils speak of the eternal punishment to be undergone by the Reprobate, and therefore they are not to be understood of the evil of fault alone.

The Conclusion is proved secondly. from the holy Fathers, but especially from Augustine, whose support Calvin falsely and shamelessly boasts. Thus St. Augustine teaches in many places that God damns no one except from that one's foreseen demerits: but especially in Epist. 106., where, when he had said: Although no one is justified by him through preceding merits, let him know that nevertheless no one is hardened except deservedly, he adds: For it is piously and truthfully believed that God, justifying the guilty and the impious, frees them from the punishments they owe; but if God is believed to damn anyone undeserving and subject to no sin, He is not believed to be a stranger to iniquity. Hence in lib. contra Iulianum cap. 18., to prove the necessity of Circumcision and Baptism for wiping out original sin and warding off eternal damnation, he says: God is good, God is just: He can free some without good merits, because He is good; He cannot damn anyone without merits, because He is just. With him Tertullian agrees, lib. 2. contra Marcionem cap. 11.:

God is good from Himself, just from us. Thus the goodness of God is prior according to nature; severity is posterior according to cause: the former inborn, the latter incidental; the former proper, the latter accommodated; the former brought forth, the latter applied; for neither should nature have kept its goodness unexercised, nor should cause have let severity pass by undisguised: God provided the one for Himself, the other for the guilty.

Likewise St. Augustine, lib. 2. contra eumdem Iulianum cap. 10., to prove the truth of original sin, says: But a just God, if He inflicted on infants so many evils, as many as I am not now sufficient to tell, who draw nothing of sin, would appear rather unjust. How much more unjust if He damned them for eternity, without sin? Whence in lib. 4. contra eumdem cap. 8. he pronounces expressly: Let us hold it certain and immovable, he says, that there is no iniquity with God, by which He damns anyone without evil merits. Finally in lib. De Unitate Trinitatis contra Manichaeos cap. 7.: For there is no injustice with God, that He should damn those who have committed no sin at all. From which it plainly appears how far the impious opinion of Calvin wanders from the doctrine of St. Augustine. All these things are confirmed from those which we have said concerning the mind of St. Augustine regarding predestination from foreseen merits.

The same truth is proved by reason. And indeed by the Subtle Doctor in 1. distinction 41. num. 11. in these words: *Damnation does not seem good, except because it is just; for according to Augustine, lib. 11. on Genesis cap. 21., God is not an avenger before someone is a sinner: for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when no fault pre-exists in him; therefore, by a like case, God does not will to punish anyone before He sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will concerning Judas is not to will to damn Judas, as Judas is offered in pure naturals, because He would seem to will to damn him without fault; but it seems that Judas must be offered to the divine will under the notion of a sinner, before He wills him to be damned: therefore since to reprobate is to will to damn, Reprobation will have, on the part of the object, some notion, namely, the foreseen final sin. — Then, punishment as punishment seems to be a certain good from occasion: but an occasioned good, since it is not loved except on the occasion of a presupposed evil, it is necessary that he who decrees that punishment be inflicted first suppose the future occurrence of the sin: and consequently the will of punishing and inflicting punishment supposes in God the prevision of the fault, and depends on it: whence St. Fulgentius, lib. 1. Ad Monimum, weighing those words of Paul to Rom. 9. Esau I have hated, says: I ask you, dearest Monimus, to attend diligently to this place of the Apostle: for it is known that the wrath of God cannot be spoken of, unless where the iniquity of man is believed to have gone before: and below: Because God saw the sins of men by His foreknowledge, He dictated the sentence of Predestination. St. John Damascene agrees, lib. 2. De Fide cap. 26.: God, he says, is moved from Himself to have mercy: to punish, not unless from our presupposed fault. — Finally, to destine someone to punishment is to have him in hatred, and indeed positively: but the positive hatred of God necessarily supposes fault, according to that saying of Wisdom 14. The impious and his impiety are hateful to God: therefore the will by which God destines men to punishment necessarily supposes the prevision of sin. The things which the heretics are wont to object against this truth, it will more rightly dissolve.

Second conclusion. — Before foreseen sins, God positively decrees to exclude no one from eternal glory, as from an unowed benefit. This is against the two latter opinions; and it is proved first by all those texts of Scripture by which it is indicated that God, by an antecedent will, wills all men to be saved; and also by those by which God testifies that the death of the impious is not of His will, and that the perdition of Israel is from Israel itself.

It is also proved. by the authority of the holy Fathers, by whom we have shown above that they openly think that God predestines no one except from foreseen merits; and therefore neither reprobates anyone except from presupposed demerits.

It is confirmed. moreover from Saint Augustine, Epistle 106., where he says:

Since through the free choice of the first man the whole mass flowed into condemnation, without doubt what is made from it into vessels of honor is to be attributed not to his own justice, which no grace preceded, but to the mercy of God; what, however, is made into vessels of dishonor is to be attributed not to the iniquity of God — far be it that there be iniquity with God — but to judgment.

But those who are positively reprobated become vessels of dishonor: therefore, just as those who are predestined become vessels of honor from mercy, which presupposes merits to be conferred through grace by the mercy of God, so those who are reprobated and excluded from the Kingdom become vessels of dishonor from divine vindicative justice, which presupposes fault. St. Prosper agrees with this in Response 7. to the objections of the Gauls, where he says of the reprobate: The grace of God did not abandon them before it was abandoned by them, and because He foresaw that they would defect of their own will, therefore He did not have them in the election of Predestination.

It is proved likewise by reason. If the will of excluding from the Kingdom does not depend on the prevision of future sin, it follows that the reprobate is not in fact excluded from the Kingdom on account of a sin committed: but the consequence is heretical: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: a man cannot be judged to be damned on account of a sin committed, when the damnation itself is truly going to be, even if there were no sin: but the damnation of the reprobate would be going to be, although there were no sin of his; for, given the absolute decree of God about excluding Judas, v.g., from glory, before his malice was foreseen, it is impossible that this exclusion should not follow, although there be no future sin of Judas; for the absolute decree of God is entirely irrevocable and unchangeable. — Then, given that positive exclusion from the Kingdom before foreseen demerits, it follows that God does not sincerely will, with an antecedent will, to save all men: but the consequence openly militates against Sacred Scripture, as we have suggested several times: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: if God sincerely wills, with an antecedent will, to save Judas, He is bound by reason of this will to render salvation possible for Judas: but, given that antecedent decree of excluding Judas from the eternal Kingdom, as an unowed benefit, salvation is no longer in any way possible for Judas, because this divine will cannot be frustrated in its effect: therefore, etc. — Finally, if the decree of excluding the reprobate from the Kingdom does not presuppose their foreseen future sins, it follows that the reprobate, whether they act well or badly, are unchangeably to be damned: but this is repugnant to divine goodness and justice: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: that is unchangeably future which cannot not come to pass: but it is so in the present case, because with an absolute decree of damnation the negation of damnation can in no way be joined; for since the decree of damnation is absolute, it is also unchangeable, before the foreseen sin of the reprobate: therefore, whether he acts well or badly, he will always be damned.

You will say 1. Saint Paul in Rom. 9. speaks expressly of positive reprobation: but there he affirms that it is done independently of the prevision of demerits, and depends on the will of God alone: therefore in reality it is so done. The major is evident: First, because he calls reprobation a hatred; for, speaking of Esau in the person of the other reprobate, he says that God held him in hatred; but hatred is a positive detestation of a thing, and signifies and imports something more than not loving. Second, the same is shown by the example of the potter making one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor; but the potter positively despises that part of the earthen mass out of which he makes a vessel unto dishonor. Third, St. Paul teaches there that the end intended by the reprobating God is the showing of wrath, or of divine justice: but justice indicates a positive act. Fourth, the will to which resistance is opposed is positive: but Paul signifies that such a will is reprobation; for he says: Who resists His will? Therefore in reality he is treating there of positive reprobation. The minor is therefore proved, namely that the Apostle there affirms that positive reprobation depends on the will of God alone, not on merits: First, because it was said of Esau, when he had not yet done anything evil, Esau I have hated; which he proves by adding: Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy: he confirms the same by the example of Pharaoh, because for this very purpose I have raised you up, that I may show in you my power, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth: whence the Apostle concludes: Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens; and soon, objecting to himself: You will say then to me, why does He still find fault? Who resists His will? He answers nothing other than: O man, who are you, who replies to God? As if he were saying that reprobation depends on the will of God alone. Which he confirms again by the example of the potter: Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same mass to make one vessel indeed unto honor, and another unto dishonor? As if he were saying: just as the potter, according to his will and choice, from the same earthen mass fashions one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor, so God, according to His freedom and will, has chosen some for glory, and destines others unto dishonor and everlasting reproach.

I answer 1. We have already plainly satisfied this objection in the Question on Predestination after foreseen merits: to this I only add that the minor is to be denied; and to its proofs I say that Esau is held in hatred before he does anything good or evil, because he is loved less and is reprobated from efficacious grace, which Jacob receives freely and out of the pure mercy of God: nor is the reason of the love of Jacob and the hatred of Esau similar, because Jacob is loved on account of the good works which come from the grace that God bestows out of pure mercy, and therefore, It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs to this grace, but of God alone who shows mercy: Esau, however, is not held in hatred except on account of sin, which is not intended nor brought about by God Himself, but is prohibited and punished. Similarly, when Pharaoh is said to have been raised up, that God may show His power in him, that raising up signifies rather the outcome than the final cause. Moreover, God is compared to the Potter making one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor, to signify that He indeed destines some to glory, but others to eternal reproach, yet after their works are foreseen; for it is not necessary that the comparison fit in all things, but it suffices that it obtain a signification in something. Add that there the Apostle speaks only of election to grace and the Christian faith, which depends on the mere mercy of God, and which neither the natural good works of the Gentiles nor the legal works of the Jews can merit; as is evident there from verse 21. to the end of the chapter: for he says pointedly: What then shall we say, that the Gentiles, who did not follow justice, have laid hold of justice, but the justice which is of faith: but Israel, by following the law of justice, has not arrived at the law of justice?

You will say 2. Saint Augustine asserts in many places that no reason of Predestination or Reprobation can be put forward: for he says in tract. 26. in Ioannem: Why He draws that one and does not draw that one, do not judge, if you do not wish to err; and in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 11.: But why it is given to those rather than to those, who has known the mind of the Lord? etc. And in cap. 12., repeating the same, he says: Why He should free this one rather than that one, again and again we say: O man, who are you, that you answer God? But if sin were the cause of positive reprobation, in truth anyone, without danger of error, would pass judgment on this and would know the mind of the Lord: therefore in reality it is not so.

I answer 1. The argument can rightly be turned back against the adversaries; for if that reprobation depended on the will of God alone, without doubt its cause would not be unknown, but anyone could affirm that Judas was damned for this reason, because God, choosing for glory or destining for punishment whom He wills according to His freedom, had counted Judas among the reprobate.

I answer 2. with the Doctor in 1. dist. 41. n. 15.:

that the Apostle, saying that the judgments of God are inscrutable, refutes the presumptuous who inquire into those things of which they are not capable: not, however, because of a lack of a reason to be rendered, at least in general, although in particular it is not known what evil God foresees in this one, on account of which He reprobates him, and in these special foreseen sins is the height of the riches and the judgments are incomprehensible... For man does not know, nor can he know, into what sin God wills to permit this one to fall, in respect of which there is a not-willing of conferring grace; so that he is thus taken away as finally a sinner in that sin, and thus on account of that foreseen sin he is reprobated.

Third conclusion. — Not only original sin, but any foreseen final sin is the positive cause of Reprobation. This is the Doctor's teaching in the place cited.

The first part is proved. That which is not a cause of damnation is not a cause of positive reprobation: but original sin in many reprobate is not the cause of their damnation: therefore neither is it a cause of positive reprobation. The major is evident: since the only, or at least the principal, effect of positive reprobation is damnation, as will appear below. The minor is proved: a sin once remitted cannot be the motive and cause of damnation: but original sin is remitted in many reprobate, for many receive the remedy of original sin, and sometimes live justly and holily: therefore it is not the cause of their reprobation.

It is confirmed. from the Council of Trent, Sess. 5. Canon 5., where it says:

If anyone denies that, through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that not everything is taken away that has the true and proper character of sin; but says that it is only erased, or not imputed, let him be anathema: for in the regenerate God hates nothing, because there is nothing of damnation in those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism into death, etc.

But if God damned the reprobate who were baptized on account of original sin once contracted, He would certainly hate them on account of something persisting after baptism: therefore the Council in reality judges that they are not reprobated precisely on account of that original sin. Nor does it matter that, even with the guilt of original sin removed, the obligation to some temporal punishments remains; since the regenerate are still subject to the tinder of concupiscence, mortality, and the other calamities of this life. For it is one thing for there to remain in them an obligation to punishments, by which they satisfy divine justice and merit eternal glory; another thing, however, for something of the guilt itself of fault to remain, by which they provoke divine hatred and incur eternal damnation; for the Council openly condemns this, and so no one, without danger of anathema, can teach the opposite.

You will say. Saint Augustine in many places, but especially in Epistle 105., in lib. 1. Ad Simplicianum q. 2., in the Enchir. c. 94., and in lib. De Corrept. et Gratia c. 7., openly teaches that all the reprobate are drawn into damnation from one sin, that is, from original sin, which he calls one, that is, common to all: whence it happened that the Semipelagians ascribed this article to Augustine, that from those who are not Predestined to life the grace received in baptism does not take away original sin, understanding namely that Augustine taught in the cited places that even the baptized are damned on account of original sin, and so that it was not blotted out through the grace of baptism.

I answer. St. Augustine indeed assigned original sin as the cause of Reprobation, not indeed the proximate and formal cause, but the remote and radical cause in adults; for on account of original sin God so permits some to fall into final sin that He would not have permitted it if Adam had not sinned, nor infected his posterity with the original stain, for all would have been finally just and saved, as St. Augustine himself teaches in lib. Retractationum cap. 33. But that permission is not properly a cause of final sin, and so neither of Reprobation, but only an occasion, or a condition without which not, says our Smisingus, disp. 6. n. 716. — That this, however, is the mind of Saint Augustine is confirmed by St. Prosper in the response to the objections of the Gauls, saying that

Who departs from Christ and, a stranger to grace, ends this life, into what does he fall but perdition? But he does not fall back into what was remitted, nor will he be damned for original sin, who nevertheless on account of his last crimes will be visited with that death which was owed to him on account of those which were remitted. Because this neither escaped nor deceived the foreknowledge of God, without doubt He never chose such a one, never predestined him, and never distinguished the one about to perish from eternal damnation.

By which he openly teaches that God reprobates only after a foreseen sin, not indeed original alone, but also final, and so expressly affirms our conclusion.

The second part is clear from that of Eccles. 11.: In whatever place the tree falls, there it will be. By which he signifies that in the damnation of a man the final state is more attended to than the primordial sin. — Then, the motive of Reprobation is sought from sin either original, or intermediate actual, or final: not indeed from original, as has been said; nor even from intermediate actual; therefore it remains that that cause is to be sought from the foreseen final sin, whether finally that be original sin persevering and not blotted out, as happens in infants who die before receiving baptism, or actual, in which the adult closes his life.

You will say. The cause of Reprobation ought to be equal in all: but many are reprobated on account of original sin: therefore all are reprobated on account of it too.

I distinguish the major. the formal cause of Reprobation ought to be the same in all the reprobate, I concede: the material, I deny: but the formal cause of Reprobation is final sin, whether that be original sin persevering, or actual.