Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. The name of reprobation signifies the same as the exclusion, or repudiation, of some unsuitable thing; for it is formed from the particle re and the noun probatio. The particle re, moreover, sometimes signifies and conveys the contrary of its simple words (as Calepinus observes). Hence the name of reprobation is used in a threefold manner in Sacred Scripture. First, more broadly, to designate the repudiation of any vile and useless thing; thus in Hebrews 7 the dismissal of the old law is called the abrogation of the former commandment because of its weakness and uselessness. Second, more strictly, for the rejection of any evil and harmful thing, whether in the order of being or in the order of morals; thus Ecclesiasticus 9: many who have admired the appearance of a strange woman have become reprobates. Third and finally, for the divine decree by which some, on account of their demerits, are excluded from the heavenly kingdom and appointed to punishment. For reprobation is opposed to election: therefore, just as election is the efficacious will of crowning the elect and beloved of God, so reprobation is the absolute will of casting His enemies into eternal fire and of excluding them from the kingdom of Heaven. St. Paul likewise appears to have used the word of reprobation in this way, 1. ad Corint. 9.: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a reprobate. Hence the reprobate have various names in the sacred Scriptures, for they are called vessels of wrath, vessels of fury, vessels for dishonor; likewise the cast-off, the expelled, the despised, those delivered over to oblivion, etc.

Note 2. In reprobation three acts of the intellect are found and as many of the will, as has already been said concerning predestination. For in the divine intellect there is the act of knowledge of simple intelligence, by which God knows the possibility of fault and of punishment. Moreover, the act of conditional knowledge, by which He knows the future fault and punishment, if efficacious help should be denied. Finally, the act of knowledge of vision, by which He absolutely and intuitively discerns the future fault and punishment. Likewise in the will the first act is the decree of permitting sin and perseverance in it, even unto death. The second is the will of excluding from glory, on account of foreseen unworthiness. The third is the will of punishing with the eternal punishment of sense, on account of the offended divine majesty.

Note 3. A twofold reprobation is commonly distinguished: one from grace, the other from glory. The former is called reprobation only secundum quid, because even efficacious grace is sometimes denied to the predestined, who nevertheless are not on that account called reprobates. The latter, however, is called reprobation simpliciter, because it imports and signifies every exclusion whatsoever, both from grace and from glory. Again, this is further distinguished by some as twofold, namely negative and positive. The negative, they say, is the will by which God, in electing some from eternity before their foreseen works, neglects others, without any prevision of demerits as yet. Hence arises the will of denying efficacious graces for avoiding sin. The positive is the will, or eternal decree, by which God, having foreseen the final sin of certain men, keeps them from the kingdom of Heaven and destines them to eternal punishment. Whether, however, these things agree with the truth will be resolved below.

First conclusion. — There must be admitted in God an efficacious and immutable decree, by which He willed from eternity to exclude some men and angels from glory and to destine them to eternal punishment. This is evident first from the Council of Valence, canon 3., where it is said: We confidently confess the predestination of the elect to life and the predestination of the wicked to death. Second, the same is evident from all those texts of Scripture in which the damned are said to be rejected by God, to depart, to be cast out and sent into eternal fire; and likewise from all those parables in which those to be damned are made like the goats to be set at the left hand and thence to be cast into the flames, like the tares growing until the harvest, but afterwards to be gathered into bundles to be burned, and likewise the bad fish to be cast out, Matth. 13. For, as Chrysologus says, serm. 18., *this likeness reveals why Christ chose fishermen for the apostleship and made fishers of men captors of fish, so that the type of the divine judgment might be shown by the art of fishing. The catch gathers fishes confused together, but the sorting places the chosen into the vessels. So the Christian calling gathers the just and the unjust, the bad and the good; but the divine election separates the good from the bad.

Proof of the same by reason. First, indeed, God executes nothing at all in time that He has not decreed to do from eternity: but in fact He really keeps many from glory and adjudges them to eternal punishments: therefore He proposed this from eternity: but such a proposal is called reprobation: therefore it must be admitted. — Second, it belongs to the notion of a general provider to permit some secondary causes, which are by their nature defectible, sometimes to fail of the attainment of their end; for it pertains to the notion of a universal provider to allow particular causes to act according to the mode of their nature: but by the very fact that they act according to the mode of their nature, they fail of the end; because on account of that defectible inclination of nature they commit many sins: therefore it pertains to the notion of providence to suffer certain rational creatures to fall away from glory: but this case is reprobation: therefore it exists. — Finally, if reprobation were to be kept away from God, it would be chiefly because it imports and argues some defect: but it is not so; rather it conduces greatly to making known and magnifying God's justice, power, goodness and patience, which shine forth no less in reprobation than in election; for both show God's wonderful power, patience, and justice punishing and rewarding: whence the Apostle, ad Rom. 9.: God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction. For it is of infinite power, patience and goodness that whatever things are done against His will serve His will; that He long tolerates the wicked in great patience, so as to provoke them to repentance; but those who resist and abuse this patience He at length punishes. Therefore, etc.

You will say 1. The damnation of men happens apart from the will of God; for He wills all men to be saved: likewise: I do not will the death of the wicked, but that the wicked be converted from his way: Ezechiel. 11: therefore it does not come about through an absolute and efficacious decree of reprobation.

I distinguish the antecedent. It happens apart from the antecedent, inefficacious and primary will, by which God, from His infinite goodness, creates all men and destines them to glory, as to their ultimate end, before their merits and demerits are foreseen, I concede: apart from the efficacious will, absolute and subsequent to the prevision of demerits, by which out of vindicative justice He must avenge sins, I deny.

You will say 2. The eternal damnation of men disgraces the infinite goodness of God; for how would He be infinitely good, who would be the author of the eternal misery of men? Therefore that damnation does not proceed from His efficacious decree.

I deny the antecedent. for, as Tertullian says, lib. 1. Adversus Marcionem cap. 25.,

God is not to be judged from His goodness alone; for if, as he subjoins in c. 26., He neither emulates, nor is angry, nor condemns, nor vexes, inasmuch as He does not even act the judge; I do not find how the account of discipline can stand with Him, and indeed a fuller one; for what sort of thing is it, that He should establish by precept what He will not execute; that He should forbid offenses which He will not punish, He who is not about to judge; being, of course, a stranger to all the feelings of severity and animadversion?

Whence he concludes: Most stupid, therefore, is he who is not offended at a deed which he does not love to be done, when the offense is the companion of a frustrated will; or if he is offended, he ought to be angry; if he is angry, he ought to avenge; for vengeance, too, is the fruit of anger, and anger is the debt of the offense, and the offense, as I have said, is the companion of a frustrated will.

You will insist. For manifesting that divine justice it suffices that God prohibit evil, or, as Tertullian says ibid. cap. 21., that He judges evil by not willing it, and condemns it by prohibiting it; but admits it by not avenging it, and absolves it by not punishing it.

I deny the antecedent. for this manner of justice shows God to be inert and weak: whence Tertullian rightly exclaims in the same place:

O God, a prevaricator of truth, a circumscriber of His own sentence! He fears to damn what He damns; He fears to hate what He does not love; He permits the deed which He does not permit to be done: He wishes as much to show what He does not will as to approve. This will be imaginary goodness, a phantom of discipline, and the precepts themselves perfunctory, offenses secure, etc.

You will say 3. Perfect providence ought to bring it about that the things subject to it attain their prescribed end; but divine providence is most perfect: therefore it ought to bring it about that men subject to it infallibly obtain the eternal beatitude to which, as to their ultimate end, they are ordered; and so with it there should be no reprobation.

I distinguish the major. that a most perfect particular providence ought so to conduct itself, let it pass: a common and general providence, I deny. For although it pertains to a particular provider to exclude any defect whatsoever from those who are subject to his ordering, it is otherwise with the universal Provider. For since He regards the common good, which can be impeded and diminished by the goods of particulars, it comes about that He must permit some defect in particulars, for the sake of preserving the common good of the whole; since therefore God is the most universal Provider, He must permit the defects of individuals, lest the good of the whole universe be impeded; for if all evils were prohibited and restrained, many goods would be lacking to the universe; for if there were no consumption of plants and animals, neither the brutes nor men would live; if there were no persecution of tyrants, the patience of the martyrs would be lacking. Finally, if there were no permission of sin, there would likewise be no manifestation of divine justice, of the defectibility of free choice, and of the necessity of grace. Add. that, as we have said, it belongs to the notion of the most perfect providence that it order the things subject to it to their end according to the mode of their nature, and so that it sometimes suffer defectible things to fail of the end, so that the defectibility of nature may appear from this.

You will say 4. No wise person, making something for the sake of an end, ought, as far as in him lies, to keep it from attaining that end: but God made all men for the sake of beatitude: therefore He ought not to exclude them from it, nor consequently to reprobate them.

I distinguish the major. if He orders that thing necessarily and indefectibly to such an end, I concede; if contingently and defectibly, I deny; for so He can permit that some individuals fail of the attainment of the end, both to preserve their freedom, and to lay open their defectibility and manifest His justice.

Second conclusion. — Reprobation is rightly described: the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will, and the judgment of the divine intellect concerning the eternal punishment to be inflicted on a rational creature, and his exclusion from beatitude, on account of the foreseen abuse of grace and final sin.

The truth of this description is evident from the explanation of its individual parts. For first it is called an efficacious decree of the will, in which it agrees with predestination, which is also God's efficacious will of leading just men to an end befitting them. "Absolute" is added, so that that negative reprobation may be excluded, which some authors maintain, and which we shall presently impugn. The judgment of the divine intellect is added, since for reprobation three acts of the intellect are required, as was said in the second Note; whence reprobation is at once called foreknowledge and purpose. Foreknowledge, indeed, inasmuch as it is an act of the intellect, either apprehensive or judicative; apprehensive, I say, of demerits, and judicative of the unworthiness of those who on account of demerits are judged unworthy. Likewise it is a purpose of the will at once detesting and approving; detesting, I say, the iniquity of those dying finally in sin, and approving their exclusion from eternal beatitude, their damnation to punishments. Reprobation, says Alexander of Hales, 1. p. qu. 29. membr. 2., is knowledge with approval of the punishment and with detestation of the iniquity, or, as the Master of the Sentences says, dist. 1., from St. Augustine, reprobation is the foreknowledge of the iniquity of some and the preparation of the damnation of the same. Finally, "on account of the foreseen abuse of grace and final sin" is added; for reprobation is not made except from foreseen demerits, as we shall prove against Calvin in the following Question. Hence no negative reprobation is to be admitted on the part of God, proceeding from His pure liberty and before the foreseen demerits of men, as will appear.

Third conclusion. — Negative reprobation is not to be admitted. This follows from what has been said; for God does not predestine except from foreseen merits: therefore neither does He desert any except those whom He foresees will not have merits, and so He deserts none without a foreseen cause on their part; which is proved, 1., from Scripture, Tobia 3.: You do not delight in our perdition. And 2. Petri c. 3.: God deals patiently for your sake, not willing anyone to perish. Therefore God reprobates no one without a cause on the part of the creature; for if out of pure liberality He chose some, but despised and deserted others, without any cause on their part, He would without doubt will those forsaken to perish, since He would not will to save them, and would delight in their perdition, because that perdition would come about according to the good pleasure of His will. — Then from 1. ad Timotheum cap. 2.¹ God wills all men to be saved, not indeed with the consequent will, because He truly wills those who are foreseen to die in final sin to be damned: therefore with the will antecedent to the prevision, both of merits and of demerits, and so before that prevision He has no negative will with respect to the salvation of some who are not chosen; for how would He will all to be saved, if He had no will of saving any of them all?

It is confirmed. from St. John Damascene, lib. 2. De Fide Orthodoxa cap. 29., where he says: It must be known that God antecedently wills all to be saved and to obtain His kingdom; for He did not form us for punishment, but, as good, for the communication of His goodness. But He wills to punish sinners as Just. St. Prosper proves the same in the third response to the objections of the Gauls, where, speaking of the reprobate, he says: That men of this sort, therefore, having fallen into these evils, perished without the correction of repentance, did not have the necessity of perishing from the fact that they were not predestined; but for this reason they were not predestined, because they were foreknown as being about to be such from voluntary prevarication. By which words he plainly denies predestination and reprobation antecedent to the prevision of works, and so also excludes that negative reprobation. Which he again confirms in cap. 7., where likewise speaking of those to be damned he says: To ascribe the fall of these to God is the mark of no slight perversity, as if on that account He were the impeller and author of their ruin, because He foreknew that they would fall by their own will, and on this account did not distinguish them from the children of perdition by any predestination.

It is also proved by reason. With that negative reprobation admitted, it necessarily follows that the non-elect can in no way be saved, and that whatever they have done they will infallibly be damned: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is proved: for no one is saved unless he is predestined; for this is a certain law of God, otherwise God would do in time what He did not decree to do from eternity. — Then, since the number of the predestined is so certain and determinate that it can neither be increased nor diminished, as has been proved; it follows that he who is not thus elected can in no way be saved, and so salvation will be altogether impossible for him. But this is absurd; otherwise those who are damned would not be blameworthy for not having worked out their salvation; for no one can justly be blamed for not having done what was altogether impossible for him. For what king, unless stupid and altogether cruel and most unjust, would condemn some man to death because he had not fulfilled a command to draw the stars from Heaven, or to drink up the whole sea? Add. that thence every perverse person can frame that most annoying dilemma, so as the more willingly to indulge in pleasures, and to be little solicitous about salvation: either, he will say, I am thus gratuitously elected from eternity, or I am not so elected. If I am elected, certainly whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved, since God's decree is altogether invariable. If I am not elected, all my efforts toward salvation are in vain, because I shall indefectibly be damned, since it is certain that no one will be saved unless he is in the number of those who are gratuitously elected; which dilemma certainly loosens and slackens all the reins to impiety. — Finally, from that negative reprobation admitted, as the Adversaries explain it, it follows that those to be damned were excluded, not only negatively, but also positively, at least implicitly and equivalently, from eternal glory, before their demerits and their final state of injustice were foreseen: but this savors of the blasphemy of Calvin, as will appear in the following Question: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: he who wills absolutely and efficaciously some whole consisting of many parts known individually, after the manner of a perfect aggregate and with the proportion of the parts to one another, in number, grades and other circumstances signifying a particular determination, by this very fact excludes all the other parts not elected, even possible ones, so that, if that election of certain parts and that determination is infallible and efficacious, the other parts not elected are also infallibly and efficaciously excluded from the constitution of that whole. But God, according to the Adversaries, so conducts Himself that He intends the heavenly kingdom efficaciously and absolutely by that election antecedent to the prevision of merits, as a certain whole determined as to persons in number, quality, grade of glory and other circumstances, or (as they themselves speak) He conducts Himself after the manner of an Architect, who should think of building a palace of determinate magnitude out of so many stones destined individually, in quantity and quality, or as a host, who should wish to arrange a banquet of a certain number of persons designated individually. Therefore, just as the Architect truly reprobates all the stones which He does not include under that determinate number, and just as the host excludes from his banquet all those whom he does not invite, so also God, by force of the eternal decree by which some are elected while the rest are neglected, is held to exclude the neglected. The consequence is evident, and the preceding reason is confirmed; because any certain and determinate number no less excludes all those units of which it does not consist, than it includes all those of which it consists and is formed. Then, if that decree did not have the force of exclusion, God could not certainly and infallibly know from it that no one other than those thus elected is to be saved. Finally, from that determinate election it comes about that God prepares efficacious graces for the elect, by which they infallibly attain salvation, but does not prepare such graces for the others: but this denial of grace argues a positive exclusion, just as the preparation of grace supposes a positive election: therefore truly, from negative reprobation it follows that the non-elect are positively excluded from glory, before their demerits are foreseen; which altogether savors of Calvinism. The things that can be objected against this conclusion have already been sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, resolved from those things which we have said in proving that predestination is made only from foreseen merits, and so that all reprobation is made only after foreseen demerits.