Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Having examined and, as far as was permitted, explained the mystery of divine Predestination, we now venture to set forth the awful hidden mystery of Reprobation, its kindred mystery, in a fitting order indeed, since both are an ordered species of divine Providence by which the rational creature is ordered and led to its eternal end, one fitting and due to it. Wherefore, concerning Reprobation we may discuss three things. First, what its existence, nature, and parts are. Second, what causes it has. Third, what its effects are.

Note 1. The name of reprobation signifies the same as the exclusion, or repudiation, of some unsuitable thing; for it is formed from the particle re and the noun probatio. The particle re, moreover, sometimes signifies and conveys the contrary of its simple words (as Calepinus observes). Hence the name of reprobation is used in a threefold manner in Sacred Scripture. First, more broadly, to designate the repudiation of any vile and useless thing; thus in Hebrews 7 the dismissal of the old law is called the abrogation of the former commandment because of its weakness and uselessness. Second, more strictly, for the rejection of any evil and harmful thing, whether in the order of being or in the order of morals; thus Ecclesiasticus 9: many who have admired the appearance of a strange woman have become reprobates. Third and finally, for the divine decree by which some, on account of their demerits, are excluded from the heavenly kingdom and appointed to punishment. For reprobation is opposed to election: therefore, just as election is the efficacious will of crowning the elect and beloved of God, so reprobation is the absolute will of casting His enemies into eternal fire and of excluding them from the kingdom of Heaven. St. Paul likewise appears to have used the word of reprobation in this way, 1. ad Corint. 9.: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a reprobate. Hence the reprobate have various names in the sacred Scriptures, for they are called vessels of wrath, vessels of fury, vessels for dishonor; likewise the cast-off, the expelled, the despised, those delivered over to oblivion, etc.

Note 2. In reprobation three acts of the intellect are found and as many of the will, as has already been said concerning predestination. For in the divine intellect there is the act of knowledge of simple intelligence, by which God knows the possibility of fault and of punishment. Moreover, the act of conditional knowledge, by which He knows the future fault and punishment, if efficacious help should be denied. Finally, the act of knowledge of vision, by which He absolutely and intuitively discerns the future fault and punishment. Likewise in the will the first act is the decree of permitting sin and perseverance in it, even unto death. The second is the will of excluding from glory, on account of foreseen unworthiness. The third is the will of punishing with the eternal punishment of sense, on account of the offended divine majesty.

Note 3. A twofold reprobation is commonly distinguished: one from grace, the other from glory. The former is called reprobation only secundum quid, because even efficacious grace is sometimes denied to the predestined, who nevertheless are not on that account called reprobates. The latter, however, is called reprobation simpliciter, because it imports and signifies every exclusion whatsoever, both from grace and from glory. Again, this is further distinguished by some as twofold, namely negative and positive. The negative, they say, is the will by which God, in electing some from eternity before their foreseen works, neglects others, without any prevision of demerits as yet. Hence arises the will of denying efficacious graces for avoiding sin. The positive is the will, or eternal decree, by which God, having foreseen the final sin of certain men, keeps them from the kingdom of Heaven and destines them to eternal punishment. Whether, however, these things agree with the truth will be resolved below.

First conclusion. — There must be admitted in God an efficacious and immutable decree, by which He willed from eternity to exclude some men and angels from glory and to destine them to eternal punishment. This is evident first from the Council of Valence, canon 3., where it is said: We confidently confess the predestination of the elect to life and the predestination of the wicked to death. Second, the same is evident from all those texts of Scripture in which the damned are said to be rejected by God, to depart, to be cast out and sent into eternal fire; and likewise from all those parables in which those to be damned are made like the goats to be set at the left hand and thence to be cast into the flames, like the tares growing until the harvest, but afterwards to be gathered into bundles to be burned, and likewise the bad fish to be cast out, Matth. 13. For, as Chrysologus says, serm. 18., *this likeness reveals why Christ chose fishermen for the apostleship and made fishers of men captors of fish, so that the type of the divine judgment might be shown by the art of fishing. The catch gathers fishes confused together, but the sorting places the chosen into the vessels. So the Christian calling gathers the just and the unjust, the bad and the good; but the divine election separates the good from the bad.

Proof of the same by reason. First, indeed, God executes nothing at all in time that He has not decreed to do from eternity: but in fact He really keeps many from glory and adjudges them to eternal punishments: therefore He proposed this from eternity: but such a proposal is called reprobation: therefore it must be admitted. — Second, it belongs to the notion of a general provider to permit some secondary causes, which are by their nature defectible, sometimes to fail of the attainment of their end; for it pertains to the notion of a universal provider to allow particular causes to act according to the mode of their nature: but by the very fact that they act according to the mode of their nature, they fail of the end; because on account of that defectible inclination of nature they commit many sins: therefore it pertains to the notion of providence to suffer certain rational creatures to fall away from glory: but this case is reprobation: therefore it exists. — Finally, if reprobation were to be kept away from God, it would be chiefly because it imports and argues some defect: but it is not so; rather it conduces greatly to making known and magnifying God's justice, power, goodness and patience, which shine forth no less in reprobation than in election; for both show God's wonderful power, patience, and justice punishing and rewarding: whence the Apostle, ad Rom. 9.: God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction. For it is of infinite power, patience and goodness that whatever things are done against His will serve His will; that He long tolerates the wicked in great patience, so as to provoke them to repentance; but those who resist and abuse this patience He at length punishes. Therefore, etc.

You will say 1. The damnation of men happens apart from the will of God; for He wills all men to be saved: likewise: I do not will the death of the wicked, but that the wicked be converted from his way: Ezechiel. 11: therefore it does not come about through an absolute and efficacious decree of reprobation.

I distinguish the antecedent. It happens apart from the antecedent, inefficacious and primary will, by which God, from His infinite goodness, creates all men and destines them to glory, as to their ultimate end, before their merits and demerits are foreseen, I concede: apart from the efficacious will, absolute and subsequent to the prevision of demerits, by which out of vindicative justice He must avenge sins, I deny.

You will say 2. The eternal damnation of men disgraces the infinite goodness of God; for how would He be infinitely good, who would be the author of the eternal misery of men? Therefore that damnation does not proceed from His efficacious decree.

I deny the antecedent. for, as Tertullian says, lib. 1. Adversus Marcionem cap. 25.,

God is not to be judged from His goodness alone; for if, as he subjoins in c. 26., He neither emulates, nor is angry, nor condemns, nor vexes, inasmuch as He does not even act the judge; I do not find how the account of discipline can stand with Him, and indeed a fuller one; for what sort of thing is it, that He should establish by precept what He will not execute; that He should forbid offenses which He will not punish, He who is not about to judge; being, of course, a stranger to all the feelings of severity and animadversion?

Whence he concludes: Most stupid, therefore, is he who is not offended at a deed which he does not love to be done, when the offense is the companion of a frustrated will; or if he is offended, he ought to be angry; if he is angry, he ought to avenge; for vengeance, too, is the fruit of anger, and anger is the debt of the offense, and the offense, as I have said, is the companion of a frustrated will.

You will insist. For manifesting that divine justice it suffices that God prohibit evil, or, as Tertullian says ibid. cap. 21., that He judges evil by not willing it, and condemns it by prohibiting it; but admits it by not avenging it, and absolves it by not punishing it.

I deny the antecedent. for this manner of justice shows God to be inert and weak: whence Tertullian rightly exclaims in the same place:

O God, a prevaricator of truth, a circumscriber of His own sentence! He fears to damn what He damns; He fears to hate what He does not love; He permits the deed which He does not permit to be done: He wishes as much to show what He does not will as to approve. This will be imaginary goodness, a phantom of discipline, and the precepts themselves perfunctory, offenses secure, etc.

You will say 3. Perfect providence ought to bring it about that the things subject to it attain their prescribed end; but divine providence is most perfect: therefore it ought to bring it about that men subject to it infallibly obtain the eternal beatitude to which, as to their ultimate end, they are ordered; and so with it there should be no reprobation.

I distinguish the major. that a most perfect particular providence ought so to conduct itself, let it pass: a common and general providence, I deny. For although it pertains to a particular provider to exclude any defect whatsoever from those who are subject to his ordering, it is otherwise with the universal Provider. For since He regards the common good, which can be impeded and diminished by the goods of particulars, it comes about that He must permit some defect in particulars, for the sake of preserving the common good of the whole; since therefore God is the most universal Provider, He must permit the defects of individuals, lest the good of the whole universe be impeded; for if all evils were prohibited and restrained, many goods would be lacking to the universe; for if there were no consumption of plants and animals, neither the brutes nor men would live; if there were no persecution of tyrants, the patience of the martyrs would be lacking. Finally, if there were no permission of sin, there would likewise be no manifestation of divine justice, of the defectibility of free choice, and of the necessity of grace. Add. that, as we have said, it belongs to the notion of the most perfect providence that it order the things subject to it to their end according to the mode of their nature, and so that it sometimes suffer defectible things to fail of the end, so that the defectibility of nature may appear from this.

You will say 4. No wise person, making something for the sake of an end, ought, as far as in him lies, to keep it from attaining that end: but God made all men for the sake of beatitude: therefore He ought not to exclude them from it, nor consequently to reprobate them.

I distinguish the major. if He orders that thing necessarily and indefectibly to such an end, I concede; if contingently and defectibly, I deny; for so He can permit that some individuals fail of the attainment of the end, both to preserve their freedom, and to lay open their defectibility and manifest His justice.

Second conclusion. — Reprobation is rightly described: the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will, and the judgment of the divine intellect concerning the eternal punishment to be inflicted on a rational creature, and his exclusion from beatitude, on account of the foreseen abuse of grace and final sin.

The truth of this description is evident from the explanation of its individual parts. For first it is called an efficacious decree of the will, in which it agrees with predestination, which is also God's efficacious will of leading just men to an end befitting them. "Absolute" is added, so that that negative reprobation may be excluded, which some authors maintain, and which we shall presently impugn. The judgment of the divine intellect is added, since for reprobation three acts of the intellect are required, as was said in the second Note; whence reprobation is at once called foreknowledge and purpose. Foreknowledge, indeed, inasmuch as it is an act of the intellect, either apprehensive or judicative; apprehensive, I say, of demerits, and judicative of the unworthiness of those who on account of demerits are judged unworthy. Likewise it is a purpose of the will at once detesting and approving; detesting, I say, the iniquity of those dying finally in sin, and approving their exclusion from eternal beatitude, their damnation to punishments. Reprobation, says Alexander of Hales, 1. p. qu. 29. membr. 2., is knowledge with approval of the punishment and with detestation of the iniquity, or, as the Master of the Sentences says, dist. 1., from St. Augustine, reprobation is the foreknowledge of the iniquity of some and the preparation of the damnation of the same. Finally, "on account of the foreseen abuse of grace and final sin" is added; for reprobation is not made except from foreseen demerits, as we shall prove against Calvin in the following Question. Hence no negative reprobation is to be admitted on the part of God, proceeding from His pure liberty and before the foreseen demerits of men, as will appear.

Third conclusion. — Negative reprobation is not to be admitted. This follows from what has been said; for God does not predestine except from foreseen merits: therefore neither does He desert any except those whom He foresees will not have merits, and so He deserts none without a foreseen cause on their part; which is proved, 1., from Scripture, Tobia 3.: You do not delight in our perdition. And 2. Petri c. 3.: God deals patiently for your sake, not willing anyone to perish. Therefore God reprobates no one without a cause on the part of the creature; for if out of pure liberality He chose some, but despised and deserted others, without any cause on their part, He would without doubt will those forsaken to perish, since He would not will to save them, and would delight in their perdition, because that perdition would come about according to the good pleasure of His will. — Then from 1. ad Timotheum cap. 2.¹ God wills all men to be saved, not indeed with the consequent will, because He truly wills those who are foreseen to die in final sin to be damned: therefore with the will antecedent to the prevision, both of merits and of demerits, and so before that prevision He has no negative will with respect to the salvation of some who are not chosen; for how would He will all to be saved, if He had no will of saving any of them all?

It is confirmed. from St. John Damascene, lib. 2. De Fide Orthodoxa cap. 29., where he says: It must be known that God antecedently wills all to be saved and to obtain His kingdom; for He did not form us for punishment, but, as good, for the communication of His goodness. But He wills to punish sinners as Just. St. Prosper proves the same in the third response to the objections of the Gauls, where, speaking of the reprobate, he says: That men of this sort, therefore, having fallen into these evils, perished without the correction of repentance, did not have the necessity of perishing from the fact that they were not predestined; but for this reason they were not predestined, because they were foreknown as being about to be such from voluntary prevarication. By which words he plainly denies predestination and reprobation antecedent to the prevision of works, and so also excludes that negative reprobation. Which he again confirms in cap. 7., where likewise speaking of those to be damned he says: To ascribe the fall of these to God is the mark of no slight perversity, as if on that account He were the impeller and author of their ruin, because He foreknew that they would fall by their own will, and on this account did not distinguish them from the children of perdition by any predestination.

It is also proved by reason. With that negative reprobation admitted, it necessarily follows that the non-elect can in no way be saved, and that whatever they have done they will infallibly be damned: but the consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is proved: for no one is saved unless he is predestined; for this is a certain law of God, otherwise God would do in time what He did not decree to do from eternity. — Then, since the number of the predestined is so certain and determinate that it can neither be increased nor diminished, as has been proved; it follows that he who is not thus elected can in no way be saved, and so salvation will be altogether impossible for him. But this is absurd; otherwise those who are damned would not be blameworthy for not having worked out their salvation; for no one can justly be blamed for not having done what was altogether impossible for him. For what king, unless stupid and altogether cruel and most unjust, would condemn some man to death because he had not fulfilled a command to draw the stars from Heaven, or to drink up the whole sea? Add. that thence every perverse person can frame that most annoying dilemma, so as the more willingly to indulge in pleasures, and to be little solicitous about salvation: either, he will say, I am thus gratuitously elected from eternity, or I am not so elected. If I am elected, certainly whatever I do, I shall infallibly be saved, since God's decree is altogether invariable. If I am not elected, all my efforts toward salvation are in vain, because I shall indefectibly be damned, since it is certain that no one will be saved unless he is in the number of those who are gratuitously elected; which dilemma certainly loosens and slackens all the reins to impiety. — Finally, from that negative reprobation admitted, as the Adversaries explain it, it follows that those to be damned were excluded, not only negatively, but also positively, at least implicitly and equivalently, from eternal glory, before their demerits and their final state of injustice were foreseen: but this savors of the blasphemy of Calvin, as will appear in the following Question: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: he who wills absolutely and efficaciously some whole consisting of many parts known individually, after the manner of a perfect aggregate and with the proportion of the parts to one another, in number, grades and other circumstances signifying a particular determination, by this very fact excludes all the other parts not elected, even possible ones, so that, if that election of certain parts and that determination is infallible and efficacious, the other parts not elected are also infallibly and efficaciously excluded from the constitution of that whole. But God, according to the Adversaries, so conducts Himself that He intends the heavenly kingdom efficaciously and absolutely by that election antecedent to the prevision of merits, as a certain whole determined as to persons in number, quality, grade of glory and other circumstances, or (as they themselves speak) He conducts Himself after the manner of an Architect, who should think of building a palace of determinate magnitude out of so many stones destined individually, in quantity and quality, or as a host, who should wish to arrange a banquet of a certain number of persons designated individually. Therefore, just as the Architect truly reprobates all the stones which He does not include under that determinate number, and just as the host excludes from his banquet all those whom he does not invite, so also God, by force of the eternal decree by which some are elected while the rest are neglected, is held to exclude the neglected. The consequence is evident, and the preceding reason is confirmed; because any certain and determinate number no less excludes all those units of which it does not consist, than it includes all those of which it consists and is formed. Then, if that decree did not have the force of exclusion, God could not certainly and infallibly know from it that no one other than those thus elected is to be saved. Finally, from that determinate election it comes about that God prepares efficacious graces for the elect, by which they infallibly attain salvation, but does not prepare such graces for the others: but this denial of grace argues a positive exclusion, just as the preparation of grace supposes a positive election: therefore truly, from negative reprobation it follows that the non-elect are positively excluded from glory, before their demerits are foreseen; which altogether savors of Calvinism. The things that can be objected against this conclusion have already been sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, resolved from those things which we have said in proving that predestination is made only from foreseen merits, and so that all reprobation is made only after foreseen demerits.

The cause of Reprobation, just as of Predestination, can be thought to be drawn from a twofold source, namely, either on the part of God, in accordance with His nod and absolute dominion over creatures, whom He willed to predestine or to reprobate, or on the part of the creature, who by his own merits or demerits moves God to Predestination or to Reprobation.

Note 1. This is the most wicked opinion of Calvin, and also of certain of his followers, that God, by reason of His eternal counsel or decree, before He foresaw original sin and the merit or demerit of any man, destined some to life, but others to eternal damnation. Since, however, some Calvinists shamelessly boast that this error is falsely attributed to Calvin, their own Patriarch, it is worthwhile to demonstrate the very thing from his own words: for he writes in book 3. of the Institutionum cap. 21. n. 5.

Predestination, he says, we call the eternal decree of God, by which He had determined within Himself what He willed to be done with each man; for men are not created in equal condition, but for some eternal life, for others eternal damnation is preordained. Therefore, according as each one is created for the one or the other end, we say that he is predestined either to life or to death.

And cap. 22. n. 3.: Wherever, indeed, this good pleasure of God reigns, works do not come into consideration. And cap. 23. n. 1.: I confess plainly that all the sons of Adam fell by the will of God into this misery of condition in which they are now bound. But this is what I said at the beginning, that one must always finally return to the sole arbitrament of the divine will, whose cause is hidden in itself. And n. 7. I confess, he says, that the decree is horrible: yet no one will be able to deny that God foreknew what end man would have, before He created him: and therefore He foreknew it, because by His decree He had so ordained. By these words and others like them, his opinion is clearly enough apparent.

Note 2. To this impious and blasphemous opinion Calvin weaves another no less execrable one, namely, that that eternal and immutable decree of God takes away the freedom of our choice in the business of Predestination and Reprobation, and imposes an inevitable necessity on the Predestined that they be saved, and on the Reprobate that they be damned; and so, according to his most wicked opinion, he draws, impels and compels the Reprobate to sin, and is the Author of all the lusts and crimes to which they are subjected. For thus he writes in lib. 3. of the Institutionum cap. 23. num. 8.

The Catholic Doctors say that the impious perish with God permitting, but not willing it: but why, we shall say, permitting, unless because He so wills? Although not even this is per se probable, that by the sole permission of God, with no ordinance of men, they brought destruction upon themselves. I will not hesitate, therefore, to confess simpliciter with Augustine that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that that will necessarily come to pass which He has willed.

And lib. 2. cap. 3. n. 10. And He moves the will (God), not as it has been handed down and believed for many ages, so that it may afterwards be in our election either to obey or to resist the motion: but by effectively affecting it. Therefore it is necessary to reject that saying so often repeated by Chrysostom: whom He draws, He draws willing. And cap. 2. n. 7. he affirms that God, with the intention of destroying the Reprobate, closes off to them every way of salvation. Some, he says, God devotes to destruction, others He dooms to damnation, and by an incomprehensible judgment He closes to them the entrance to life. And cap. 21. n. 12. Those whom He created for the dishonor of life and the destruction of death, that they might be instruments of His wrath, them, that they may reach their end, He now deprives of the faculty of hearing His word, now He blinds and stupefies them the more through its preaching. And a little later n. 13. Behold, He directs His voice to them, but so that they may become more deaf; He lights a lamp, but so that they may be rendered more blind; He brings forth doctrine, but by which they may be more stupefied; He applies a remedy, but so that they may not be healed. And lib. 1. cap. 18. n. 2. he asserts that the Demon is impelled by God to act wickedly and to destroy men.

I confess, he says, that with the intervention of Satan's work God often acts in the Reprobate; but so that by His impulse Satan himself may play his part and make progress, inasmuch as it is given to him, the same Satan is also said to blind the minds of the faithful; but whence this, unless that from God Himself flows the efficacy of error, so that those who refuse to obey the truth may believe lies? According to the former reason it is said: if any prophet has spoken falsely, I, God, have deceived him. According to the other, indeed, it is said that He Himself gives all men over to a reprobate mind and casts them into foul lusts. Because He is the principal author of His own just vengeance, while Satan is only the minister, etc.

How many and how horrible, and execrable, are the blasphemies of this most impious scoundrel!

Note 3. Regarding the present Question there are three opinions of Catholic Doctors, of which the First contends expressly that each Reprobation, both the positive and the negative defended by them, supposes the foreknowledge of sins, and depends on it as on a motive and demeritorious cause. The Second, indeed, distinguishes between positive and negative Reprobation, and likewise between the will of inflicting punishment and of excluding from glory, as from an unowed benefit. Whence they affirm that the first will supposes the foreknowledge of demerits and is founded on it; but they teach that the second takes its origin from the pure benefit of the divine will; in which they partly agree with Calvin, and partly differ from him. They agree, I say, in this, that they assert that God excludes some from the kingdom, as from an unowed benefit, before foreseen demerits; but they differ in this, that they assert that those thus excluded are not destined to eternal fire except after foreseen demerits. Thus teach many Thomists, whose way Bannes, Zumel and Alvarez prepared, disp. 110. De auxiliis n. 8., where he says: The Reprobation by which God decreed not to give eternal life to some and to permit their sins, is not conditional, but absolute, nor does it presuppose in God the foreknowledge or prevision of the demerits of the Reprobate himself, or of perseverance in sin until the last of life. And in disput. 109. num. 6. conclusion 3. he had earlier said: The positive act by which God from eternity willed not to admit some into His kingdom, was not conditional, but absolute, anteceding in a sign of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice. Finally, the third opinion, which is Granada's, tract. 6. disput. 2., confesses indeed that positive Reprobation is posterior to sins conditionally foreseen, but that nevertheless by one and the same act God decrees the permission of sin and the damnation of the Reprobate, so that simultaneously and in the same sign the sin is permitted to come to be, is foreseen as future, and on account of it the damnation of the man is decreed. Which, however, of these opinions may agree more with Catholic truth and faith, let it be

First conclusion. — God decrees to damn no one to eternal punishment before foreseen demerits. This is of faith.

Proof first. from the Council of Valence cap. 3., where it is said: We confidently confess the Predestination of the Elect to life and the Predestination of the Impious to death: in the Election, however, of those to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit, but in the damnation of those who will perish, evil merit precedes the just judgment of God. By these words this Council established the distinction between Predestination and Reprobation, namely that Reprobation is a work of vindicative justice, which supposes demerits on the part of the one to be reprobated. Predestination, however, is a work of mercy insofar as it supposes the prevenient and cooperating grace of God, by whose help meritorious works are done, which move God to form the decree of Predestination. And consequently the Council judges that God reprobates no one except from the foreseen demerits of that one.

You will say. The Council must be understood of Reprobation according to execution, which truly supposes demerits and final sin, but not according to intention, which is decreed by God's nod and choice.

On the contrary. The Council opposes Reprobation to Predestination in this, that the former is a work of justice, the latter, however, a work of mercy: but in this way they are not opposed according to execution, for both in that way are from justice; the former indeed from vindicative justice, the latter from rewarding justice: therefore that opposition must be understood according to the order of intention, in which Reprobation is a pure work of justice, because it supposes the demerits of men; Predestination, however, is called a work of mercy, because it supposes merits, which have their origin from grace. — It is confirmed. from the 2nd Council of Orange, near the end, where it says: Not only do we not believe that some are Predestined to evil by divine power, but also, if there are those who will to believe so great an evil, we pronounce anathema upon them with all detestation. And from the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 17.: If anyone shall have said that the grace of Justification comes to none but those predestined to life, but that all the rest, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as being by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema.

You will say. The Councils must be understood of the evil of fault, not of the evil of the punishment of loss.

On the contrary. the punishment of loss is the principal terminus and the first object of Reprobation: therefore the statements of the Councils must be understood of it. Add. that the Councils speak of the eternal punishment to be undergone by the Reprobate, and therefore they are not to be understood of the evil of fault alone.

The Conclusion is proved secondly. from the holy Fathers, but especially from Augustine, whose support Calvin falsely and shamelessly boasts. Thus St. Augustine teaches in many places that God damns no one except from that one's foreseen demerits: but especially in Epist. 106., where, when he had said: Although no one is justified by him through preceding merits, let him know that nevertheless no one is hardened except deservedly, he adds: For it is piously and truthfully believed that God, justifying the guilty and the impious, frees them from the punishments they owe; but if God is believed to damn anyone undeserving and subject to no sin, He is not believed to be a stranger to iniquity. Hence in lib. contra Iulianum cap. 18., to prove the necessity of Circumcision and Baptism for wiping out original sin and warding off eternal damnation, he says: God is good, God is just: He can free some without good merits, because He is good; He cannot damn anyone without merits, because He is just. With him Tertullian agrees, lib. 2. contra Marcionem cap. 11.:

God is good from Himself, just from us. Thus the goodness of God is prior according to nature; severity is posterior according to cause: the former inborn, the latter incidental; the former proper, the latter accommodated; the former brought forth, the latter applied; for neither should nature have kept its goodness unexercised, nor should cause have let severity pass by undisguised: God provided the one for Himself, the other for the guilty.

Likewise St. Augustine, lib. 2. contra eumdem Iulianum cap. 10., to prove the truth of original sin, says: But a just God, if He inflicted on infants so many evils, as many as I am not now sufficient to tell, who draw nothing of sin, would appear rather unjust. How much more unjust if He damned them for eternity, without sin? Whence in lib. 4. contra eumdem cap. 8. he pronounces expressly: Let us hold it certain and immovable, he says, that there is no iniquity with God, by which He damns anyone without evil merits. Finally in lib. De Unitate Trinitatis contra Manichaeos cap. 7.: For there is no injustice with God, that He should damn those who have committed no sin at all. From which it plainly appears how far the impious opinion of Calvin wanders from the doctrine of St. Augustine. All these things are confirmed from those which we have said concerning the mind of St. Augustine regarding predestination from foreseen merits.

The same truth is proved by reason. And indeed by the Subtle Doctor in 1. distinction 41. num. 11. in these words: *Damnation does not seem good, except because it is just; for according to Augustine, lib. 11. on Genesis cap. 21., God is not an avenger before someone is a sinner: for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when no fault pre-exists in him; therefore, by a like case, God does not will to punish anyone before He sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will concerning Judas is not to will to damn Judas, as Judas is offered in pure naturals, because He would seem to will to damn him without fault; but it seems that Judas must be offered to the divine will under the notion of a sinner, before He wills him to be damned: therefore since to reprobate is to will to damn, Reprobation will have, on the part of the object, some notion, namely, the foreseen final sin. — Then, punishment as punishment seems to be a certain good from occasion: but an occasioned good, since it is not loved except on the occasion of a presupposed evil, it is necessary that he who decrees that punishment be inflicted first suppose the future occurrence of the sin: and consequently the will of punishing and inflicting punishment supposes in God the prevision of the fault, and depends on it: whence St. Fulgentius, lib. 1. Ad Monimum, weighing those words of Paul to Rom. 9. Esau I have hated, says: I ask you, dearest Monimus, to attend diligently to this place of the Apostle: for it is known that the wrath of God cannot be spoken of, unless where the iniquity of man is believed to have gone before: and below: Because God saw the sins of men by His foreknowledge, He dictated the sentence of Predestination. St. John Damascene agrees, lib. 2. De Fide cap. 26.: God, he says, is moved from Himself to have mercy: to punish, not unless from our presupposed fault. — Finally, to destine someone to punishment is to have him in hatred, and indeed positively: but the positive hatred of God necessarily supposes fault, according to that saying of Wisdom 14. The impious and his impiety are hateful to God: therefore the will by which God destines men to punishment necessarily supposes the prevision of sin. The things which the heretics are wont to object against this truth, it will more rightly dissolve.

Second conclusion. — Before foreseen sins, God positively decrees to exclude no one from eternal glory, as from an unowed benefit. This is against the two latter opinions; and it is proved first by all those texts of Scripture by which it is indicated that God, by an antecedent will, wills all men to be saved; and also by those by which God testifies that the death of the impious is not of His will, and that the perdition of Israel is from Israel itself.

It is also proved. by the authority of the holy Fathers, by whom we have shown above that they openly think that God predestines no one except from foreseen merits; and therefore neither reprobates anyone except from presupposed demerits.

It is confirmed. moreover from Saint Augustine, Epistle 106., where he says:

Since through the free choice of the first man the whole mass flowed into condemnation, without doubt what is made from it into vessels of honor is to be attributed not to his own justice, which no grace preceded, but to the mercy of God; what, however, is made into vessels of dishonor is to be attributed not to the iniquity of God — far be it that there be iniquity with God — but to judgment.

But those who are positively reprobated become vessels of dishonor: therefore, just as those who are predestined become vessels of honor from mercy, which presupposes merits to be conferred through grace by the mercy of God, so those who are reprobated and excluded from the Kingdom become vessels of dishonor from divine vindicative justice, which presupposes fault. St. Prosper agrees with this in Response 7. to the objections of the Gauls, where he says of the reprobate: The grace of God did not abandon them before it was abandoned by them, and because He foresaw that they would defect of their own will, therefore He did not have them in the election of Predestination.

It is proved likewise by reason. If the will of excluding from the Kingdom does not depend on the prevision of future sin, it follows that the reprobate is not in fact excluded from the Kingdom on account of a sin committed: but the consequence is heretical: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: a man cannot be judged to be damned on account of a sin committed, when the damnation itself is truly going to be, even if there were no sin: but the damnation of the reprobate would be going to be, although there were no sin of his; for, given the absolute decree of God about excluding Judas, v.g., from glory, before his malice was foreseen, it is impossible that this exclusion should not follow, although there be no future sin of Judas; for the absolute decree of God is entirely irrevocable and unchangeable. — Then, given that positive exclusion from the Kingdom before foreseen demerits, it follows that God does not sincerely will, with an antecedent will, to save all men: but the consequence openly militates against Sacred Scripture, as we have suggested several times: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: if God sincerely wills, with an antecedent will, to save Judas, He is bound by reason of this will to render salvation possible for Judas: but, given that antecedent decree of excluding Judas from the eternal Kingdom, as an unowed benefit, salvation is no longer in any way possible for Judas, because this divine will cannot be frustrated in its effect: therefore, etc. — Finally, if the decree of excluding the reprobate from the Kingdom does not presuppose their foreseen future sins, it follows that the reprobate, whether they act well or badly, are unchangeably to be damned: but this is repugnant to divine goodness and justice: therefore, etc. The consequence of the major is proved: that is unchangeably future which cannot not come to pass: but it is so in the present case, because with an absolute decree of damnation the negation of damnation can in no way be joined; for since the decree of damnation is absolute, it is also unchangeable, before the foreseen sin of the reprobate: therefore, whether he acts well or badly, he will always be damned.

You will say 1. Saint Paul in Rom. 9. speaks expressly of positive reprobation: but there he affirms that it is done independently of the prevision of demerits, and depends on the will of God alone: therefore in reality it is so done. The major is evident: First, because he calls reprobation a hatred; for, speaking of Esau in the person of the other reprobate, he says that God held him in hatred; but hatred is a positive detestation of a thing, and signifies and imports something more than not loving. Second, the same is shown by the example of the potter making one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor; but the potter positively despises that part of the earthen mass out of which he makes a vessel unto dishonor. Third, St. Paul teaches there that the end intended by the reprobating God is the showing of wrath, or of divine justice: but justice indicates a positive act. Fourth, the will to which resistance is opposed is positive: but Paul signifies that such a will is reprobation; for he says: Who resists His will? Therefore in reality he is treating there of positive reprobation. The minor is therefore proved, namely that the Apostle there affirms that positive reprobation depends on the will of God alone, not on merits: First, because it was said of Esau, when he had not yet done anything evil, Esau I have hated; which he proves by adding: Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy: he confirms the same by the example of Pharaoh, because for this very purpose I have raised you up, that I may show in you my power, and that my name may be proclaimed in all the earth: whence the Apostle concludes: Therefore He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens; and soon, objecting to himself: You will say then to me, why does He still find fault? Who resists His will? He answers nothing other than: O man, who are you, who replies to God? As if he were saying that reprobation depends on the will of God alone. Which he confirms again by the example of the potter: Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same mass to make one vessel indeed unto honor, and another unto dishonor? As if he were saying: just as the potter, according to his will and choice, from the same earthen mass fashions one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor, so God, according to His freedom and will, has chosen some for glory, and destines others unto dishonor and everlasting reproach.

I answer 1. We have already plainly satisfied this objection in the Question on Predestination after foreseen merits: to this I only add that the minor is to be denied; and to its proofs I say that Esau is held in hatred before he does anything good or evil, because he is loved less and is reprobated from efficacious grace, which Jacob receives freely and out of the pure mercy of God: nor is the reason of the love of Jacob and the hatred of Esau similar, because Jacob is loved on account of the good works which come from the grace that God bestows out of pure mercy, and therefore, It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs to this grace, but of God alone who shows mercy: Esau, however, is not held in hatred except on account of sin, which is not intended nor brought about by God Himself, but is prohibited and punished. Similarly, when Pharaoh is said to have been raised up, that God may show His power in him, that raising up signifies rather the outcome than the final cause. Moreover, God is compared to the Potter making one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor, to signify that He indeed destines some to glory, but others to eternal reproach, yet after their works are foreseen; for it is not necessary that the comparison fit in all things, but it suffices that it obtain a signification in something. Add that there the Apostle speaks only of election to grace and the Christian faith, which depends on the mere mercy of God, and which neither the natural good works of the Gentiles nor the legal works of the Jews can merit; as is evident there from verse 21. to the end of the chapter: for he says pointedly: What then shall we say, that the Gentiles, who did not follow justice, have laid hold of justice, but the justice which is of faith: but Israel, by following the law of justice, has not arrived at the law of justice?

You will say 2. Saint Augustine asserts in many places that no reason of Predestination or Reprobation can be put forward: for he says in tract. 26. in Ioannem: Why He draws that one and does not draw that one, do not judge, if you do not wish to err; and in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 11.: But why it is given to those rather than to those, who has known the mind of the Lord? etc. And in cap. 12., repeating the same, he says: Why He should free this one rather than that one, again and again we say: O man, who are you, that you answer God? But if sin were the cause of positive reprobation, in truth anyone, without danger of error, would pass judgment on this and would know the mind of the Lord: therefore in reality it is not so.

I answer 1. The argument can rightly be turned back against the adversaries; for if that reprobation depended on the will of God alone, without doubt its cause would not be unknown, but anyone could affirm that Judas was damned for this reason, because God, choosing for glory or destining for punishment whom He wills according to His freedom, had counted Judas among the reprobate.

I answer 2. with the Doctor in 1. dist. 41. n. 15.:

that the Apostle, saying that the judgments of God are inscrutable, refutes the presumptuous who inquire into those things of which they are not capable: not, however, because of a lack of a reason to be rendered, at least in general, although in particular it is not known what evil God foresees in this one, on account of which He reprobates him, and in these special foreseen sins is the height of the riches and the judgments are incomprehensible... For man does not know, nor can he know, into what sin God wills to permit this one to fall, in respect of which there is a not-willing of conferring grace; so that he is thus taken away as finally a sinner in that sin, and thus on account of that foreseen sin he is reprobated.

Third conclusion. — Not only original sin, but any foreseen final sin is the positive cause of Reprobation. This is the Doctor's teaching in the place cited.

The first part is proved. That which is not a cause of damnation is not a cause of positive reprobation: but original sin in many reprobate is not the cause of their damnation: therefore neither is it a cause of positive reprobation. The major is evident: since the only, or at least the principal, effect of positive reprobation is damnation, as will appear below. The minor is proved: a sin once remitted cannot be the motive and cause of damnation: but original sin is remitted in many reprobate, for many receive the remedy of original sin, and sometimes live justly and holily: therefore it is not the cause of their reprobation.

It is confirmed. from the Council of Trent, Sess. 5. Canon 5., where it says:

If anyone denies that, through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that not everything is taken away that has the true and proper character of sin; but says that it is only erased, or not imputed, let him be anathema: for in the regenerate God hates nothing, because there is nothing of damnation in those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism into death, etc.

But if God damned the reprobate who were baptized on account of original sin once contracted, He would certainly hate them on account of something persisting after baptism: therefore the Council in reality judges that they are not reprobated precisely on account of that original sin. Nor does it matter that, even with the guilt of original sin removed, the obligation to some temporal punishments remains; since the regenerate are still subject to the tinder of concupiscence, mortality, and the other calamities of this life. For it is one thing for there to remain in them an obligation to punishments, by which they satisfy divine justice and merit eternal glory; another thing, however, for something of the guilt itself of fault to remain, by which they provoke divine hatred and incur eternal damnation; for the Council openly condemns this, and so no one, without danger of anathema, can teach the opposite.

You will say. Saint Augustine in many places, but especially in Epistle 105., in lib. 1. Ad Simplicianum q. 2., in the Enchir. c. 94., and in lib. De Corrept. et Gratia c. 7., openly teaches that all the reprobate are drawn into damnation from one sin, that is, from original sin, which he calls one, that is, common to all: whence it happened that the Semipelagians ascribed this article to Augustine, that from those who are not Predestined to life the grace received in baptism does not take away original sin, understanding namely that Augustine taught in the cited places that even the baptized are damned on account of original sin, and so that it was not blotted out through the grace of baptism.

I answer. St. Augustine indeed assigned original sin as the cause of Reprobation, not indeed the proximate and formal cause, but the remote and radical cause in adults; for on account of original sin God so permits some to fall into final sin that He would not have permitted it if Adam had not sinned, nor infected his posterity with the original stain, for all would have been finally just and saved, as St. Augustine himself teaches in lib. Retractationum cap. 33. But that permission is not properly a cause of final sin, and so neither of Reprobation, but only an occasion, or a condition without which not, says our Smisingus, disp. 6. n. 716. — That this, however, is the mind of Saint Augustine is confirmed by St. Prosper in the response to the objections of the Gauls, saying that

Who departs from Christ and, a stranger to grace, ends this life, into what does he fall but perdition? But he does not fall back into what was remitted, nor will he be damned for original sin, who nevertheless on account of his last crimes will be visited with that death which was owed to him on account of those which were remitted. Because this neither escaped nor deceived the foreknowledge of God, without doubt He never chose such a one, never predestined him, and never distinguished the one about to perish from eternal damnation.

By which he openly teaches that God reprobates only after a foreseen sin, not indeed original alone, but also final, and so expressly affirms our conclusion.

The second part is clear from that of Eccles. 11.: In whatever place the tree falls, there it will be. By which he signifies that in the damnation of a man the final state is more attended to than the primordial sin. — Then, the motive of Reprobation is sought from sin either original, or intermediate actual, or final: not indeed from original, as has been said; nor even from intermediate actual; therefore it remains that that cause is to be sought from the foreseen final sin, whether finally that be original sin persevering and not blotted out, as happens in infants who die before receiving baptism, or actual, in which the adult closes his life.

You will say. The cause of Reprobation ought to be equal in all: but many are reprobated on account of original sin: therefore all are reprobated on account of it too.

I distinguish the major. the formal cause of Reprobation ought to be the same in all the reprobate, I concede: the material, I deny: but the formal cause of Reprobation is final sin, whether that be original sin persevering, or actual.

Although according to our view, eternal damnation alone, as regards the punishment of sense and of loss, is the one and proper effect of Reprobation according to intention, since it alone follows the foreseen final sin, which we said above to be the demeritorious and motive cause of Reprobation: nevertheless, because according to execution every reprobate man rushes headlong into that eternal damnation by three steps, as it were; namely, by the subtraction and expulsion of graces, by Blinding and by Hardening: hence it is worthwhile to taste something of each of these in the present place.

Note 1. From St. Bonaventure in the Compendio Theologico 1. 2. cap. 31., that the hardening of spirits is said translatively and by metaphor, according to a certain proportion, from the hardness of corporeal things. Now the hardness of bodies (he says) is followed by a threefold property. The first is an inability to receive an impression. The second is a stability of remaining in itself. The third is a strength for resisting. Hence the heart is said to be hardened in three ways: in one way, through an inability to receive grace; in a second way, through a firm adherence to sin; in a third way, through rebellion against the divine inspirations and commandments of God. The first arises from the faculties of the soul vitiated and depraved by sin: the second from the continual habit of sinning, by which it happens that the sinner, when he has come into the depths, despises. The third, indeed, from the inveterate and obstinate malice and pride of the sinner himself, by which he scorns God, and is neither terrified by his threats, nor attracted by his promises, nor moved any longer by his graces.

Note 2. That blinding, the subtraction and withdrawal of grace, and hardening happen in three ways, namely affectively, dispositively, and effectively, or causatively: First, indeed, the sinner, because of his continual habit of sinning, is so affected toward sin that he resists God, calling and inviting him through his graces to conversion, for a long time and obstinately; he does not attend to the divine commandments and threats, and, like an anvil, resists the blows and grows harder; such was the sin of Pharaoh, who did not yield to so many scourges and to the miracles of God so frequently repeated. Second, the sinner has certain habitual dispositions, as it were, through which, on account of his long-standing sins, he is rendered for the future incapable of obeying the divine inspirations, so that he scarcely perceives them, and scarcely attends to the supernatural truths that are proposed. For hardening, which embraces the two other effects, seems to be contained in these three things, namely, not to think of, not to penetrate, not to feel the divine benefits provoking to penance: according to that saying of Isaias: Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes, lest they see with their eyes, etc. For just as grace includes the illumination of the intellect and the impulse of the will, according to that saying: Thy lightnings enlightened the world: the earth saw and trembled: so hardening denotes a certain blindness in the intellect, and an inadvertence to those things which God speaks interiorly: it includes also in the will an obstinacy, by which it neither feels the divine motions nor is touched by them, so as to repent efficaciously: according to that saying: They made their faces harder than a rock, and refused to return. Third and finally, these three effects are taken causatively and effectively, namely on the part of the cause from which this disposition and the sin of hardening draw their origin per accidens; that cause, however, is none other than the divine decree of denying to the Reprobate, on account of his preceding sins, the suitable graces by which his heart would in fact be softened. Hence it follows, according to this threefold acceptance, that hardening, blinding, and the subtraction of grace are at once a sin, and a cause of sin, and a punishment of sin, to be attributed to the Reprobate himself rather than to God.

Note 3. From St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 40. art. 4. q. 1., that punishment can be distinguished as threefold: For there is, he says, a certain inflicted punishment, a certain contracted punishment, and a certain enacted punishment: an inflicted punishment is simpliciter a passion which does not conflict with grace, such as are hunger, thirst, and sickness. A contracted punishment is the fomes and concupiscence, and this indeed is a passion and therefore a punishment, but nevertheless it inclines to an evil action: and therefore it conflicts with grace, not as to substance, but as to inclination. An enacted punishment is like hardening and the expulsion of grace, and this indeed is a punishment, because it is a passion: but because it is from an evil action, or from sin, and accompanies it inseparably, therefore it is opposed to grace, and so it is clear that although it comes about through one's own action, nevertheless it is a punishment, as is clear in the man with scabies, who delights in scratching himself, but afterwards feels a burning in his flesh.

These things having been thus premised, it is asked whether the expulsion and withdrawal of grace, blinding, and hardening happen rather on the part of God, or on the part of the sinful Reprobate.

Only conclusion. — The withdrawal of grace and the blinding or hardening of the human heart take their origin from the part of the sinner before they do from the part of God. This is the common opinion of the holy Fathers and Doctors; and it is established, indeed, 1. concerning the withdrawal of grace, from the Council of Trent Sess. 6. cap. 11., where it has these words: God does not forsake those once justified by his grace, unless he is first forsaken by them. This is confirmed from St. Augustine lib. De Natura et Gratia c. 16., where he says: When he has led to perfect health, that is, to perfect life and justice, he does not forsake, if he is not forsaken, so that one may live always justly. St. Prosper agrees with him, respons. 7. to the Obiectiones Vincentianas, where, speaking of Christians who, abandoning the piety of the Christian way of life and of faith, have passed irrevocably into profane errors or damnable morals, he says:

By no means is it to be believed that men of this kind have fallen into this desperation from the will of God, since the Lord rather lifts up all who fall, and raises up all who are cast down; for no one is raised up except by his grace, no one is established except by his grace. It is therefore the will of God that one remain in a good will, he who neither deserts anyone before being deserted, and often converts many deserters.

The same is clear concerning the blinding of the heart, which St. Augustine pronounces to be at once a punishment of sin and a cause of sin, and also a sin, in lib. 3. Contra Iulianum c. 3., in these words: Blindness of heart, which only God the enlightener removes, is both a sin, by which one does not believe in God, and a punishment of sin, by which the proud heart is punished with worthy chastisement, and a cause of sin, when something evil is committed through the error of the blind of heart. This truth he lucidly expounds in lib. De Natura et Gratia chapter 22., where, explaining that saying of the Apostle to the Romans, speaking of the philosophers who When they had known God, they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, he says:

To be sure, that obscuration was already a vengeance and a punishment, and yet through this punishment, that is, through the blindness of heart, which happens when the light of wisdom departs, they collapsed into more and graver sins, saying they were wise, they became fools: Grave is this punishment, if anyone understands, and from this punishment see where they went: and they changed, he says, the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents.

So they did from the punishment of sin, by which their foolish heart was darkened, and yet on account of these things, because although they are penal, they are also themselves sins, he adds and says: therefore God delivered them up to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness. See also from this punishment what they do, so that, he says, they disgrace their own bodies among themselves. And because this punishment is one of iniquity, while it is also iniquity, he commends it more clearly, saying: who exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. On account of this, he says, God delivered them up to shameful passions: Behold how often God punishes, and from the same punishment more and graver sins arise, etc.

Finally, the same thing is clear concerning the hardening of the heart; for as St. Aug. himself says in lib. De Gratia et libero arbitrio, explaining that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 9., He has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens;

in him, he says, whom he permits to be seduced or hardened, believe his evil merits; but in him on whom he has mercy, faithfully and without doubt acknowledge the grace of God, who does not render evil for evil, but good for evil. Nor on that account take away from Pharaoh his free choice, because in many places God says: I have hardened Pharaoh, or I will harden the heart of Pharaoh; for it is not on that account that Pharaoh himself did not harden his own heart; for this too is read of him, when the dog-fly was taken away from the Egyptians, Scripture saying: and Pharaoh hardened his own heart, and at that time, and refused to let the people go: and thus both God hardened through a just judgment, and Pharaoh himself through free choice.

Hence St. Aug. excellently concludes, exhorting the faithful to constant progress:

Be certain, therefore; because your labor will not be in vain: if, advancing in a good purpose, you persevere to the end. For God, who now did not render to those men anything according to their works, will then render to each one according to his works. God will render all things indeed: evil for evil, since he is just and mild; and good for evil, since he is good; and good for good, since he is good and just: only he will not render evil for good, since he is not unjust. He will render, therefore, evil for evil, punishment for injustice; and he will render good for evil, grace for injustice; and he will render good for good, grace for grace.

The African bishops exiled in Sardinia agree with them in the Epistola Synodica around the middle:

God, they say, is said to harden, not because he compels to iniquity, but because he does not snatch from iniquity: which, because he is just, he does justly. Therefore, when God has mercy, a man is saved without his own merits; but when he hardens, he justly receives what he deserves: for the Lord saves by the gift of goodness, and hardens by the judgment of severity.

St. Isidore also adds, in lib. De Summo bono cap. 5. near the end:

Just as, he says, God is said to take away from a man some gift which the man did not have, that is, which he did not merit to receive, so too God is said to harden a man, not by making his hardness, but by not taking away that hardness which he himself nourished for himself. In no other way is God said to blind certain men, not that he himself causes that same blindness in them, but that on account of their useless merits he himself does not take their blindness away from them.

How much, however, this hardness of heart is to be lamented, St. Bernard openly reveals in lib. 1. De Consideratione cap. 2., where, addressing Pope Eugene and entreating him to withdraw from temporal affairs and return to his heart, lest perhaps little by little he be drawn to a hard heart, he says:

Do not go on asking what that is: if you have not shuddered, this is yours. The hard heart alone is that which does not dread itself, because it does not feel. Why do you ask me? Ask Pharaoh, no one of hard heart ever attained salvation, unless perhaps God, having mercy, took away from him, according to the Prophet, the stony heart and gave a heart of flesh. Then he excellently depicts the hardness of heart: What, then, is a hard heart? he says: It is that which is neither split by compunction, nor softened by piety, nor moved by prayers, does not yield to threats, is hardened by scourges. It is ungrateful for benefits, unfaithful to counsels, cruel to those who trust it; shameless toward base things, fearless toward dangers, inhuman toward human things, rash toward divine things: forgetful of past things, negligent of present things, not providing for future things. It is that to which, of past things, nothing at all does not pass away except injuries alone; of present things nothing does not perish; of future things there is no regard, or preparation, except perhaps for avenging. And to embrace in brief all the evils of this horrible evil, it is that which neither fears God nor reveres man. Behold where these cursed occupations will drag you, if you nevertheless go on, as you have begun, to give yourself wholly to them, leaving nothing of yourself to yourself; you waste time: and if it is now permitted to show myself to you as another Jethro, you too will be consumed in these things with foolish labor, which are nothing but affliction of spirit, evisceration of the mind, evacuation of grace. For what is the fruit of these things but spiders' webs?