Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. Evil is customarily distinguished as twofold, namely of nature and of morals. Evil of nature, or natural evil, is that which is out of harmony with nature itself, considered according to its natural principles, and adversely affects it, whether meanwhile it is something privative, such as blindness, deafness, ignorance, death, etc.; or something positive, such as pain, sadness, error, etc. Evil of morals is said to be that which is out of harmony with rational nature, insofar as it is a free agent, or that which is against the rule of right reason; of such a kind are all sins, whether of commission or of omission. Again, each of these two evils, both of nature and of morals, is twofold: for one is pure evil and without any admixture of good; such as any privation of a good owed to nature or to right reason, for example blindness and the omission of a precept; for these, although they are necessarily connected with a good thing, namely the subject, which is good per se, are nevertheless evil per se, because they are pure negations unsuited to such a subject, and have in themselves neither any entity nor, consequently, any entitative goodness. The other is not pure evil, but has in itself entitative goodness and a perfection owed to it according to its species; but it is evil to another, insofar as through that very entitative perfection of its own it is out of harmony with and repugnant to another and adversely affects it; thus pain is said to be the evil of a living being, because it is unsuited to it and grieves it.

Note 2. God is not the efficient cause of moral evil, insofar as it is purely evil: both because this is repugnant to His own divine goodness and infinite holiness, and because moral evil has not an efficient but a deficient and deviating cause; and so it is not an effect but a defect: rather, He is only its permissive cause. But to permit is the same as not to impede, when the power of impeding is nevertheless at hand; whence, for something to be truly said to be permitted, five things are required: first, that it displease the one permitting; second, that it would come to pass unless its cause is impeded; third, that the one permitting know that it would come to pass unless he himself impedes it; fourth, that the power of impeding be present; fifth, that he voluntarily omit to impede, that is, that he not oppose the thing that is to come to pass; for he who opposes himself and strives to impede is not said to permit, even if the thing comes to pass.

Note 3. Every divine permission falls under the eternal decree of God, no less than all of God's positive operations; for just as God does nothing in time, nor impedes any effect of a creature, without having decreed from eternity to do it or to impede it, so too He permits nothing at all without having decreed that permission from eternity: and so no sin is committed in the world without God having determined in particular from eternity to permit it. Moreover, just as every permission of God is good, and God is to be praised and blessed on account of it, so too all His permissions are good, and He Himself is to be celebrated with praises on account of them, although the things He permits are detestable and most wicked: for He has most just and most holy reasons why He permits them: whence St. Augustine in Enchiridio cap. 96. Nothing comes to pass unless the Almighty wills it to come to pass, either by allowing that it be done, or by doing it Himself: nor do we doubt that God does well even in allowing evils to be done, for He does not allow this save by a just judgment.

It has already been said in the preceding Disputation that all evils, both of nature and of morals, are ordered by divine Providence to fitting ends; it therefore remains to be resolved in the present Question only whether this twofold evil is also intended by divine Predestination, as something that occasionally conduces to the salvation of the predestined person himself.

First conclusion. — Truly, the evils of nature are intended by God predestining, so that they occasionally conduce to the salvation of men.

Proof first. from Sacred Scripture, ad Philippenses 2.: To you it is given for Christ, not only that you believe in Him, but also that you suffer for Him. By these words the Apostle affirms that the tribulations of the faithful are not only divinely ordered to their salvation, but are even intended by God as something conducing to the attainment of eternal glory. Whence St. Peter in I. Epist. cap. 2. firmly affirms that Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His footsteps. For if, says St. Paul ad Rom. cap. 8., we suffer with Him, we shall also be glorified with Him. And 2. ad Corinth. 1. As you are partakers of the sufferings, so shall you be also of the consolation. All the Fathers commended in the preceding Disputation on this matter confirm the same thing.

Proof second, by reason. whatever most certainly contributes to the salvation of the predestined person is truly an effect of Predestination: but the natural evils and the punishments of this life contribute to the salvation of the predestined person: therefore, etc. The major is evident from what has been said.

The minor is proved. both because these evils provide the elect with the means and the manner of satisfying divine Justice for their sins: and because they offer the occasion for the exercise of fortitude, patience, and any other virtue; and because they are occasions and incentives for avoiding sins, curbing desires, taming passions, invoking God, and performing the other works of piety of this kind, by which the salvation of man is especially promoted.

You will say. The punishments of Purgatory are not effects of predestination, but are ordered only by supernatural Providence and divine Justice: therefore neither are the punishments of this life. The consequence is evident by the parity of reason; for those punishments are as satisfactory to God as any whatsoever that can be received and borne in this life. But the antecedent is proved: an effect of Predestination must be a benefit granted by God, by which the elect are most certainly saved: but those punishments of Purgatory are not reckoned a divine benefit, since they take their origin not from the goodness and liberality of God, but only from His vindicative justice: therefore, etc.

I deny the consequence. and the reason for the disparity is manifold: First indeed, because the punishment of this life, by reason of the present state, holds the character of a grace and a benefit that can be ordered to the end of Predestination, that is, to the salvation of the Elect; for either they are voluntarily undertaken by the elect, and so can be meritorious; or at least, with them not objecting, they are inflicted by God to pay in this life all that they contracted as a debt through sin, lest they afterwards incur the heavier punishments of Purgatory, which surely has the place of the greatest benefit. But the punishments of Purgatory can neither be meritorious, since the souls given over to those punishments are already at the term, and so can no longer merit, nor can they be means of avoiding other greater punishments. Second, the punishments of this life especially conduce to obtaining the other benefits of God in the order of salvation, namely to obtaining more ample graces and to exercising the virtue of patience, which especially attracts and provokes divine mercy; not so with the punishments of Purgatory; since the souls undergoing them are at the term of merit, grace, and virtue.

Second conclusion. — The permission of sin can be called an occasional effect of Predestination.

Proof. That is said to be an occasional effect of divine Predestination which truly offers the occasion to the Predestined to pursue and accomplish all those things that conduce to salvation: but such is the permission of sin: therefore, etc. The major is evident from what has been said.

The minor is proved. from that passage ad Romanos octavo: To them that love God all things work together unto good. Where the gloss adds: Even sins, insofar as they are the matter for exercising the virtue of humility, etc. With this St. Augustine agrees in lib. De Correctione et Gratia cap. 9., saying: To such an extent, indeed, all things, that if any of those Predestined deviate and go astray, this itself makes them profit unto good, because they return humbler and more cautious. Second, that permission especially conduces to the manifestation and commendation of divine grace and mercy in the Predestined and Elect, for the Apostle says ad Rom. 9. God endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy which He prepared unto glory. Therefore this permission is truly intended by God predestining. Third, finally, for the most part this permission of sin profits the predestined unto salvation. For, says St. Augustine, serm. 33. de verbis Domini, I dare to say: it is expedient for the proud continent to fall, that in that very thing in which they exalt themselves they may be humbled, and with fear and trembling work out their salvation. Thus many of the Saints, on the occasion of their fall, afterwards rise again more cautious, humbler, and more fervent.

You will say 1. An effect of Predestination is a benefit of grace: but the permission of sin is not a gift of grace, nay, it is a subtraction of congruent and efficacious grace: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the minor. it is not a gift of grace in itself, I concede; insofar as it is intended and ordered by God to the salvation of the predestined person himself, namely, that he may become more cautious, humbler, and more fervent, I deny.

You will say 2. Christ merited the effects of Predestination for us: but He did not merit that permission of sin: therefore that is not an effect of Predestination.

I distinguish the minor. He did not merit it precisely insofar as it is the permission of sin, I concede; insofar as it can be ordered to the salvation of the predestined, I deny. For this can be reduced to one of the three direct effects, since it contributes to vocation, insofar as the elect, turning over his sins in his mind, is stirred to consent more promptly and more fervently to God calling, and since this very recollection provokes to greater penance, it also offers the occasion of obtaining new grace and consequently of acquiring a new right to glory.

You will subsume. therefore it will be lawful to ask of God the permission of one's own sin: but this is absurd: therefore etc. The sequel is evident, for it is lawful to ask for all that Christ merited.

I deny the sequel. For since sin cannot be in a man without coming to be by his own will, therefore a man cannot desire the permission of sin without likewise desiring the will and the occasion of committing sins, which is truly evil, although it can conduce to a greater good, as St. Paul teaches ad Rom. 3. Not, he says, as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil, that good may come. Whence to the proof I say: it is lawful to ask for what Christ merited per se, I concede; what He merited only consequentially, I deny. But He merited that permission of sin only consequentially, namely insofar as He offered His merits to the divine Father, that from that permission He might elicit the graces and virtues to be conferred on the predestined.

You will say finally. For this reason the permission of sin would be an occasional effect of Predestination, because from it man rises again humbler and more fervent: but it is not from the permission, but from the consideration of sin, that man so rises: therefore not the divine permission itself, but sin itself will be the effect of predestination, which is absurd.

I deny the minor. since it is precisely from the consideration of the divine permission itself that man rises again more cautious and more fervent through penance; for from it he beholds that the lot of men is so fragile and slippery that, with the divine permission alone posited, he immediately strays from virtue and rushes headlong into sin, according to that saying: Thou hast turned away Thy face from me, and I was troubled.