Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. All natural goods are reduced to five principal heads: namely, first, to natural being, under which are comprehended the substance, the faculties, and the natural potencies of the predestined person himself. To the second belong a keen intellect, a temperament balanced toward virtue, a good disposition, and other natural seeds of virtue of this kind. To the third, in turn, are reduced the various circumstances regarding the life of the predestined person himself, v. g., that he is born at such a time, in such a place, of such parents, that he dies sooner or lives longer. Under the fourth are comprehended all moral goods performed for the sole honesty of virtue. To the fifth, finally, are reduced all resources and riches.

Note 2. Those same natural goods can be conceived in three ways as effects of Predestination: namely, either insofar as they would be meritorious or dispositive causes with respect to grace and glory, in the way in which the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians affirmed them to be effects of predestination; which was condemned by the holy Fathers, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the Councils: or insofar as they are the subject in which the other effects of Predestination are received: or insofar as they are the matter and the occasions of virtues by which the predestined person more easily accomplishes those things that pertain to salvation.

Note 3. Natural goods can be conceived as being granted to men by God in two ways: namely, either by reason of general Providence, which bestows on each and every one the means by which they may attain the appointed end; whether meanwhile that end is natural and to be obtained through merely natural means, or supernatural and to be obtained through supernatural means. Secondly, that they are conferred from the intention and decree of Predestination, so that God would not bestow them unless He foresaw that they would be aids to the predestined person, whereby he might more easily work out his salvation and obtain eternal glory. In the former way they are said to be ordered to Predestination only per accidens. In the latter way, however, they pertain to it per se and can be called its direct and subsidiary effects.

Only conclusion. — The natural goods of the first order are presupposed to Predestination, but the rest can be called its subsidiary effects. This is the teaching of the Doctor with respect to both parts; of which the first is proved, and that by the authority of the Doctor saying in 1. dist. 41. quaest. unica, that in the first instant Peter and Judas, equally willed by God in esse existentiae, are offered to God, and then God so wills glory for Peter that He wills nothing for Judas, but there is only there a negation of the volition of glory. He therefore holds that positive Predestination, just as negative reprobation, presupposes a man already foreseen according to the being of existence; and so existing being is not an effect of Predestination, but is presupposed to it.

It is confirmed. from the same Doctor in 3. dist. 39., where he says that this was the order in divine prevision: in the first instant God understood Himself under the notion of the highest good; in the second He understood creatures; and in the third He predestined these to glory, etc.

It is also proved by reason. An accidental form presupposes the being of the subject in which it is received; and consequently the volition of that same form presupposes the volition of the subject: but by the decree of Predestination God wills to confer glory on man as an accident superadded to him, perfecting him not substantially but only accidentally: therefore the decree of Predestination presupposes the decree of the production of that subject, which subject is indeed the very nature and substantial being of the predestined man. Secondly, that will by which God wills all men to be saved is prior to predestination, since it extends to absolutely all men, and comprehends both those who are afterwards ordered to beatitude from their foreseen merits, and those who are reprobated from their foreseen demerits: but that antecedent will presupposes, or at least is simultaneous with, the substantial being of men: therefore the decree of Predestination presupposes the decree of production, and so this is not its effect. Finally, if the natural being of the predestined man could be called an effect of that Predestination, it could also be called grace, and it would depend on the merits of Christ: but St. Augustine forbids saying both of these in Epist. 105. ad Sixtum, where, after having attacked at length the error of Pelagius affirming that creation is grace, because God gratuitously and out of pure liberality gives us being, not however from our merits, he finally concludes:

Let this fallacy be cast out from the hearts of Christians: for the Apostle does not at all commend that grace by which we were created, that we might be men: but that by which we were justified, that we might be just men: for this is the grace through Jesus Christ our Lord: for Christ did not die for any, that men might be created, but for the impious, that they might be justified.

By these words he openly indicates that natural being is in no way to be counted among the effects of Predestination, except remotely and fundamentally, that is, insofar as it is the subject of Predestination.

The second part is also proved. namely, that the other natural goods can be called subsidiary effects of Predestination: Whatever serves the predestined man for obtaining glory more easily is a subsidiary effect of Predestination: but so it is with the aforesaid goods: therefore etc. The minor is proved concerning the goods of the second order: that which helps a man, and serves him so that he becomes more prompt to embrace the faith, and so that he more easily pursues virtue, is truly an effect of Predestination: but so it is with the goods pertaining to the second head, as St. Augustine teaches in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 14. It appears, he says, that some have in their very talent a divine gift of intelligence naturally, by which they are moved to faith, if they either hear words congruent to their minds, or see signs. By these words Augustine holds that that gift of intelligence, which is per se natural, is an effect of Predestination in the elect. — It is clear also concerning the goods of the third head; since Christ Himself says in Math. 24. that, If those days had not been shortened (of the persecution of Antichrist) not all flesh would have been saved, but for the Elect, whom He chose, the days will be shortened: therefore that shortening of the days is intended by God predestinating, and is an extrinsic cause or a sine qua non condition of the salvation of the predestined. The same is confirmed from Wisdom 4., where of the just elect it is said: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding. Which text St. Aug. in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 14. interprets thus: It was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew this, that it would be, not that it would not be, that is, that He would have granted him an untimely death, so that he might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptations; and in the same place he praises St. Cyprian in lib. De mortalitate saying that death is found to be not only not useless to the faithful, but even useful, since it withdraws a man from the dangers of sinning, and places him in the security of not sinning. — The same concerning the other circumstances of times, places, temptations, etc. is affirmed by Aug. himself in lib. 50. homil. 23. around the middle, where he says: Were you not an adulterer? this your God says to you: I was governing you for Myself, I was keeping you for Myself, that you would not commit adultery; and explaining how He kept him, partly by the grace of paternal protection removing the occasions of sinning, partly by the grace of internal motion, he adds: The tempter was lacking, and that the tempter should be lacking I brought about: place and time were lacking, and that they should be lacking I brought about; the tempter was present, place was not lacking, time was not lacking: that you would not consent, I frightened you. Acknowledge therefore the grace of Him to whom you owe even that you did not commit. It is established therefore that the circumstances of places and times, in which the elect are born, live, and die, as well as the conditions of the parents from whom they are born, and of the men by whom they are educated, or with whom they associate, are effects of Predestination. — The same truth is clear concerning the goods of the fourth order: for moral works, which are done by the predestined without any concurrence of grace, are for them a help toward obtaining beatitude: both because they conduce to the accidental joy, which the predestined will perceive in the state of beatitude on their account: and because they contribute to avoiding sin, if the work which is elicited is commanded and ordered by the law: and because those good works, set before the mind, supply the predestined person with an occasion of praise and thanksgiving: and finally, because temporal goods, insofar as they can be and in fact will be instruments of virtue, are truly numbered among the effects of Predestination, and can fall under merit, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae quaest. 114. art. ultimo: therefore much more are good moral acts elicited for the sole honesty, for they pave the way to meritorious works to be elicited with grace, and lay down certain seeds of virtues. — Finally, the same is established concerning the goods of the fifth head; for resources and riches confer no small usefulness on the predestined person, so that he may more easily work out his salvation, for they are instruments of the virtues of liberality, mercy, almsgiving, by which sins are redeemed, graces are acquired, Christ saying: with what measure you have measured it will be measured back to you, and also; give alms; and behold all things are clean for you, etc. Moreover, they also afford him an occasion of serving God more willingly and easily, and also of frequenting works of piety and devotion; for since the rich are free from the occupations by which their life is sustained, they have the time to hear sacred things, to attend sermons, and to exercise other things of that kind most conducive to salvation. Finally, those same goods contribute to meritorious works and sometimes fall under merit, as St. Thomas, just cited, affirms: therefore they also contribute to salvation. Whence also in the Lord's Prayer and in other prayers we ask temporal goods from God in the name of the Savior: therefore those temporal goods can be effects of Predestination, for they are reduced to the order of grace, or they are salutary, and are contained under the object of infused Hope, as St. Thomas affirms in 2. 2. q. 17. art. 2.

You will object 1. Against the first part: whatever contributes efficaciously and influences the effects of Predestination and is intended in predestination itself is its effect: but the substance and natural being of the predestined person influences efficaciously the effects of Predestination, for it is the efficient cause of the acts by which a man is justified and merits glory; it is also the efficient cause of glory itself and of the beatific vision, which it produces through the intellect elevated by the light of glory; moreover, it can be a motive in the manner of an object, by which, namely, the predestined person may be stimulated to render thanks to God for the benefit of creation and conservation: therefore the substance of the predestined person conduces to predestination, and so is intended by it.

I deny the major. for not everything that concurs efficiently toward the effect of some Providence is an effect of such Providence, as is clear by example: for when someone provides a friend with a horse for riding, the friend himself is not deemed an effect of such Providence, although he efficaciously concurs toward the riding by mounting the horse, and by driving and urging it on.

Or I distinguish. whatever contributes efficaciously to predestination, in the manner of a means conducing to an end, is its effect, I concede: in the manner of a subject for receiving an accidental form, I deny: but the substance and the natural faculties of the predestined person are not ordered to glory as to an end; but only as a subject for an accidental form, which it receives and by which it is perfected, and so they cannot be effects of Predestination.

You will object 2. A good disposition and keenness of intellect are effects of Predestination, as has been said: but all these are identical with the substance and the natural faculties of the predestined person himself: therefore if these are not effects of Predestination, neither will those be able to be.

I answer 1. That when we said that a good disposition and other things of this kind are effects of Predestination, we abstracted from that philosophical question about the real or formal distinction of the faculties and rational potencies from the substance of the soul, of which they are the potencies. Whence, supposing the opinion about the real identity of the intellectual potencies with the intellectual substance, I distinguish the minor: a good disposition and keenness of mind is not an effect of Predestination, insofar as they are considered entitatively, I concede: operatively, that is, insofar as they are attended to with respect to operation and exercise, I deny: for taken in this way, since they depend on corporeal organs, they are not identified with the substance of the soul, and so they can be means toward glory

You will object 3. To be born at such or such a time, of such or such Parents, is an effect of Predestination, as has been said: therefore likewise to be born simpliciter, and to have natural being, ought to be counted among the effects of Predestination. The consequence is clear: because to have been born of such parents involves and signifies that the nature already is and has been born: therefore whatever is affirmed of the first cannot be denied of the second, and so if the first is an effect of Predestination, the second must also be.

I deny the sequel. for this does not follow any more than if you were to say: man's being involves matter and man's soul being: therefore just as man's being is an effect of generation, so man's matter and soul being is an effect of generation; which consequence is erroneous and sophistical; for man's soul is not generable. I say therefore that the sequel is rightly denied, because whenever in some whole there are several parts, something can rightly be the cause of one part, without being the cause of another; or be the cause of the whole, without being the cause of the parts separately; for in truth a man generating concurs in the production of the body and of the generated man, but not in the production of the soul: hence, in order that what is affirmed of one can also be affirmed of the other, it is necessary that the attribute which is affirmed belong to both. Whence, although to have been born of such parents is ordered as a means to glory, and so is an effect of Predestination, it does not however follow that to have been born simpliciter must likewise be an effect, since it cannot have the notion of a means, but only of a subject, with respect to the glory to be obtained.

You will object 4. One man's birth can be an effect of the Predestination of another; so, v. g., the Nativity of the Most Blessed Virgin was an effect of the Predestination of Christ. Therefore by parity a man's birth can be an effect of the Predestination of the same man.

I deny the consequence. and the reason for the disparity is that one man's birth can be a means to the salvation of another man, and so it can become an effect of the other's Predestination: but it is otherwise concerning the birth of some man with respect to himself; for this, since it cannot be a means to his own salvation, but pertains only to constituting the subject, which must be promoted to salvation through certain means, from this it comes about that it cannot be called an effect of Predestination.

You will object against the second part. natural goods have no proportion with grace and glory; and consequently they contribute in no way to their attainment: therefore they are not effects of Predestination.

I deny the consequence. for from this it only follows that they are not dispositions and meritorious causes with respect to grace and glory, which we readily admit; but it does not follow that those goods cannot serve to obtain these dispositions, and to have grace received and exercised more promptly and more easily.

You will object 2. Predestination is the preparation of the gifts of grace: but those goods are of nature, not indeed of grace: therefore they are not effects of Predestination.

I distinguish the antecedent. such goods are not from God, as the author of grace, productively and elicitively, I concede: imperatively and ordinatively, I deny: they are produced therefore by God as the author of nature, but they are ordered by Him as the author of grace, to beatitude.

Or I distinguish otherwise. they are goods of nature and natural according to substance, I concede: according to mode and supernatural operation, I deny: but taken in this way they can be effects of Predestination, just as external preaching and miracles, which, although they are natural with respect to substance, and only supernatural with respect to mode, are nevertheless said by St. Augustine in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 14. to be effects of Predestination.

You will object 3. The effects of Predestination are so related that the earlier ones are like causes with respect to the later ones, for so calling conduces to justification, and this to glorification: but those natural goods do not conduce to the other effects of Predestination, namely to grace and glory, otherwise they would be dispositions in consideration of which God would bestow grace, which is the error of the Semi-Pelagians: therefore, etc.

I answer. the major is true of direct and per se effects; not indeed of indirect and per accidens effects, such as natural goods are. Secondly I say that it is not necessary that there be that connection among all the effects of Predestination, that the second is given on account of the first, as on account of merit, or on account of a proper end; but those two effects can be two means to one third. For just as light, v. g., and the species are given for causing vision; but among themselves they have only proportion and connection for completing the principle of vision: so by parity predestination presupposes nature, and is accommodated to it in the manner of a subject, or of a foundation, to which from the liberality of God supernatural help is added, by which it is elevated and constituted as it were an integral principle of a meritorious work, or of one dispositive to the other effects of Predestination.