Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. Four conditions are required for something to be a direct effect of predestination. First, that it be caused immediately by God: for since predestination taken actively is the very divine will

of God choosing creatures for beatitude, it is necessary that it be done immediately by him; for which reason sins and any defects of the predestined cannot be reckoned effects of predestination, although they sometimes contribute to establishing it; since indeed they cannot arise from God himself, the ocean of holiness and the spring of grace. Second, that it be caused by the efficacious intention of conferring and bestowing glory; for this intention is the root and cause, and the motive of election, as well as of the conferral and application of all the means which concur to the work of predestination. Third, that in fact those effects lead per se to the attainment of glory itself; for since all the other effects of predestination are intended from the efficacious intention of giving glory to the predestined, it follows that those effects themselves must truly contribute per se to that attainment; for the efficacious will of God cannot be futile and void. Fourth and finally, that those effects of predestination depend on the merits of Christ: For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.

Note 2. Three direct effects of predestination are commonly numbered by theologians, namely the grace of calling, of justification, and of glorification; that is, beginning, continuing, and completing the work of predestination. These St. Paul enumerates in Romans 8 in these words: Whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified: nevertheless, in establishing this truth, not all agree: for Durandus in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. holds only grace: Ockham, however, on the contrary contends there for only glory: St. Bonaventure, however, holds it to be glory and the first justifying grace: the other theologians, however, judge that not only glory itself, nor justification alone, but also all graces that call, cooperate, and dispose to justification and perseverance, are to be counted among the direct effects of predestination.

Note 3. Calling and justification can be distinguished as twofold. For one calling is efficacious, which has joined to it the consent of free choice, obtains the cooperation of the human will, and gains the end to which it is ordered, concerning which Job says: You will call me, and I will answer you. The other, however, is called inefficacious calling, which through the malice, stubbornness, or negligence of the one called is frustrated in its effect and end, and suffers rejection: for a threefold kind of men spurns grace, namely those devoted to business, those entangled in pleasures, and those blinded by malice, all of whom are expressed in the parable of the one inviting to the wedding; for one went off to his farm to refresh his mind: another to his business: while the rest seized the servants and killed them. Concerning these God complains: I called them, and you refused. Again, efficacious calling is in turn twofold; for some calling has only a temporal effect, as happens in the reprobate, who sometimes obey God as he calls and live piously; but since they finally fall away from grace, all those good works which they performed do not profit for obtaining eternal beatitude. Another, however, has effect unto eternal life; and that either proximately, as happens in those who persevere finally; or remotely, as happens in those who, having fallen from grace, rise again through penance. Likewise justification is twofold; for one has only a temporal effect, as happens in the reprobate, who sometimes frequent the Sacraments and are justified, but again given over headlong to sin, perish forever, and the preceding justification profits them nothing: another, however, has effect unto eternal life; and that either immediately, such as is justification persevering finally, or mediately, namely when the predestined, deviating from justice but rising again through penance more cautious and more fervent, have their mortified works likewise revive and again claim for themselves the right to glory previously acquired, which had been lost through sin. It is asked, therefore, whether all these species of calling and justification are to be counted among the direct effects of predestination.

First conclusion. — Every grace of calling of the predestined, insofar as it has effect unto eternal life, is truly a direct effect of predestination.

It is proved first. From that passage of John 16: Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me: which all the holy Fathers and sacred Interpreters understand of the grace of calling: but no one comes to Christ, nor remains with him, unless he is predestined: therefore since the one called comes to him and abides with him, it follows that the grace of calling is intended by God who predestines and is numbered among the effects of predestination. The same is confirmed from that passage of Rom. 8: Whom he predestinated, them he also called. This text St. Augustine expounds excellently in this way in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 17.

For whom he predestinated, them he also called; that is to say, with that calling according to purpose. Not others, therefore, but those whom he predestinated, them he called: nor others, but those whom he so called, them he also glorified; nor others, but those whom he predestinated, called, justified, them he also glorified: with that end, of course, which has no end.

St. Fulgentius agrees with him in lib. 1. Ad Monimum cap. 11., where he expressly affirms that all the graces of calling, justification, and glorification pertain to predestination; for when he had weighed this passage of Psalm. 22. Thy mercy will follow me: and had said:

He precedes, therefore, the impious, that he may become just; he follows the just, that he may not become impious; he precedes the blind, that he may give the light which he did not find; he follows the seeing, that he may keep the light which he conferred; he precedes the one cast down, that he may rise; he follows the one lifted up, that he may not fall: he precedes, giving man a good will, he follows the well-willing, working in him the faculty of good work:

finally he concludes:

This mercy of God, therefore, follows in man that which, going before, it itself bestows; and so it not only recalls the erring to the way by justifying him, but also guards and helps the one walking well, that it may lead him to the gift of eternal glorification. All these things, however, that is, both the beginnings of our calling and the increases of justification and the rewards of glorification, God always had in predestination, because he foreknew the future works of his grace both in the calling and in the justification and in the glorification of the Saints.

It is also proved by reason. First, whatever is conferred on the predestined by reason of the decree of predestination, is its effect: but all efficacious callings, and all the helps preparing for justification, are conferred by reason of the decree of predestination: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for nothing has the effect of predestination, except by reason of that decree by which predestination is established and which is intended by the one predestining as a means leading to the end. The minor, however, is proved from that passage of the Apostle 2. ad Timoth. 1.: Who hath called us with his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace: where he expressly affirms that the grace of calling is from the purpose and decree of predestination. The same is confirmed from that passage of Rom. 8.: To them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints: where he says the predestined are called according to the purpose and decree, to signify that the grace of calling is conferred by reason and force of the decree. Add that, if from this sentence of St. Paul some infer that temporal goods are to be counted among the effects of predestination, much more ought all divine helps, such as the graces of calling, to be reckoned among the direct effects. — Then, according to St. Augustine, predestination is the preparation of the means by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated; but calling is one of those means, and indeed simpliciter necessary; for it is the beginning without which man cannot believe nor be justified: therefore it is truly an effect of predestination. — Finally, predestination according to the Doctor is the ordination of the intellectual creature unto eternal life, and so requires consent on the part of the creature, just as it also requires help on the part of God: but that consent and that help are not supplied except through the grace of calling, by which God calls the intellectual creature and orders it to that end: therefore that grace of calling is intended by God who predestines and is conferred by reason of the decree of predestination.

You will say 1. The effects of predestination cannot be common to the predestined and the reprobate: but the graces of calling, even of efficacious calling, are common to both, for many times they are granted to these just as to those; hence many are called, but few are elect: therefore they cannot be effects of predestination.

I deny the minor. For although calling and justification can be found in the reprobate, not however in the same way as in the predestined; because in these they are found with an efficacious ordination and perseverance up to the attainment of glory; in the reprobate, however, without it; hence they are not disposed in the same way.

You will insist. Not all the predestined have the grace of calling: therefore it is not to be judged a direct effect of predestination. The consequence is evident: for a direct effect necessarily follows upon the position of the cause, since from it the existence of the cause is argued, just as fire is perceived from heat and from illumination. The antecedent is proved by the example of infants dying after having received baptism; for since they are not in possession of reason and freedom, they are also incapable of consent and cooperation; and so also of the grace of calling.

I distinguish the antecedent. Not all the predestined have the grace of calling immediately, I concede: at least mediately, I deny: for although infants are not called per se and immediately to Baptism; they are nevertheless called through those who have care of them and bring them to Baptism. Add that it is not of the nature of an effect of predestination that it belong to all and only the predestined, but it suffices that, when it is conferred, it be granted only by force and reason of the decree of the one predestining.

You will say 2. There are many callings which do not contribute to predestination: therefore they are not its effects. The antecedent is evident in all those callings which are made void by subsequent sin.

I deny the antecedent. For although those callings are mortified through sin, nevertheless through the subsequent grace of justification they revive and are ordered to, and contribute to, obtaining glory.

You will ask. Whether even inefficacious calling in the predestined is to be counted among the effects of predestination?

I answer. Indeed, it is an effect of predestination, at least remotely and mediately: both because, as has been said, To them that love God, that is, to the predestined, as St. Augustine explains in lib. 1. contra duas Epistolas Pelagii, all things work together unto good: therefore also inefficacious callings, which dispose to conversion at least remotely, by bringing it about that the predestined, at length turning over in his mind his negligence and hardness, promptly answers God as he calls: and because those callings are an incentive and motive to humility, gratitude, and penance; for the predestined, called once, again, and a third time, at length recalling these callings to memory, grieves from his heart that he did not consent to them; and that grief leads to performing penance more earnestly, as well as to greater care and vigilance for salvation; and so it also contributes to obtaining glory.

You will say. These callings do not contribute to glory except occasionally: therefore they are not to be counted among the direct effects of predestination. The antecedent is evident from the reasons adduced; the consequence is also evident; otherwise even sin, since it is an occasion of humility and an incentive to greater penance, would also be called a direct effect of predestination.

I deny the antecedent. For at least remotely and mediately they lead to obtaining glory, as has been said; not otherwise than the first drops contribute to hollowing out and wearing away a stone. To the consequence I say that sin and the inefficacious calling grace do not have the same nature; because sin is not intended by God who predestines, as the calling itself is, which on the part of God is always efficacious, although on the part of the one called it becomes inefficacious, because of the refused consent.

Second conclusion. — Justification, both persevering and interrupted, which has effect unto eternal life, is truly an effect of predestination.

The first part is clear, and no one calls it into doubt; since the Apostle has said, Whom he justified, them he also glorified: whence St. Augustine in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 11. constantly affirms that grace is an effect of predestination; which indeed has been said of the grace justifying perseveringly, since it abides unto eternal life. — Add, that to this very persevering justification that definition of predestination by its effect, praised there by St. Augustine, fits most aptly: The predestination of the Saints, he says, is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated. For it is certain that through persevering justification itself the predestined are most certainly liberated from any temporal or spiritual captivity, since it transmits them into eternal liberty. — Finally, efficacious calling, although in itself it does not persevere unto eternal life, is nevertheless truly an effect of predestination: therefore much more so is justification itself, which is the happy close of the present life and the auspicious beginning of eternity.

The second part is proved. First indeed, from that oracle of St. Paul: Whom he predestinated, them he also justified, which indeed the holy Fathers and Interpreters take indefinitely of any justification which has effect unto eternal life; so that that word "justification" indifferently comprehends every justification, whether received in baptism, or repaired in penance, or persevering in the predestined even unto death. — Then, justification interrupted by sin finally leads the elect efficaciously to eternal life: therefore it is truly an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident: for predestination, as was just said, is the cause and preparation of all the benefits of God by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated. The antecedent is proved from the three principal utilities which justification itself, lost and repaired, confers toward obtaining eternal life. First indeed, that justifying grace was without doubt the principle of some good work meritorious of eternal life; for since it is the seed of good works, it cannot long lack some effect of good work: but merit and good works mortified in sin revive through penance, and at length procure for the elect a special grade of glory corresponding to the merits themselves: therefore that interrupted justification truly contributes to glory. — Second, justification lost and at length repaired is for the elect themselves, through penance, an incentive to many good works: both because it provokes them to repent more vehemently: and because in them, by reason of the preceding good works, it left the best moral habits, or at least intelligible ones, by which man is rendered more prompt, not only to rise from sin, but also to operate well and piously, as soon as he has recovered the lost justice: and finally, because the elect, turning over in their minds that notable and most lamentable loss which they suffered through sin, are stirred to compensate this damage by works of penance and other exercises of piety, and to walk henceforth more cautiously in the way of salvation. Whence St. Augustine rightly says in lib. De corrept. et gratia cap. 9.:

To such as these, who love God, all things work together unto good, so utterly all things, that even if some of them deviate and go astray, he makes even this very thing profit them unto good, because they return more humble and more taught; for they learn that on the just way itself they ought to exult with trembling, not arrogating to themselves, as from their own virtue, the confidence of persevering, nor saying in their abundance: we shall not be moved forever.

The third and greatest utility, finally, which justification itself, lost and repaired, confers on the predestined, is that it grants him a right to a special grade of glory, which he would not attain if in fact he had not had that grace lost and repaired; for all theologians confess that through salutary penance man is restored to his former grade of justice and of merits; so that the preceding grace, together with the mortified works, revives either in the same individual, or in another individual of the same grade, which is equivalent for the present purpose, and so he recovers the same right to the grade of glory which he claimed for himself before sin.

The adversaries reply. that the grade of glory itself does not belong to the predestined by reason of the lost justifying grace, since it no longer subsists, nor returns the same in number; but it is granted to him only by reason of another grace, which is obtained through the penance that follows: therefore the prior grace is not the cause of attaining that special grade of glory, nor consequently is it an effect of predestination.

I deny the antecedent. and for its proof I say that it is not necessary for an effect of predestination that it remain in itself up to the attainment of glory itself, but that it suffice that it subsist in some effect of its own up to the final effect; or at least that it have a connection with the intermediate effects of predestination; otherwise the first efficacious calling would not be an effect of predestination, since in itself it does not remain in glory; similarly meritorious works would also be removed from this notion of effect, for they scarcely, indeed almost never, persevere to the very end: both because men at the very period of death are for some time deprived of the use of reason: and because many do not attain eternal glory immediately after death itself, but long in Purgatory pay off and wash away the remains of faults.

They insist. That special grade of glory is not granted to the predestined man on account of the repaired justification, but on account of penance: therefore that justification is in no way an effect of predestination. The antecedent is proved: for that right to that special grade of glory would not have existed any longer, unless penance had followed: therefore it is to be attributed to penance itself. Add that to cause presupposes being: but the justifying grace was entirely extinguished by sin: therefore it cannot be the cause of that right to the special grade of glory.

I distinguish the antecedent. That right is granted to the predestined on account of penance, as a cause per accidens and as removing that which was removing that right, I concede: as a cause per se, motive and moral, I deny: for that right is restored on account of that very former justice, which is truly the motive and moral cause, in view of which, once the impediment has been removed by penance, God infuses and restores either the prior grace in the same individual, or another similar one; in which grace that right to the special grade of glory is founded. Whence although that grace was physically extinguished by sin, nevertheless it remained morally in divine acceptance and estimation, so that God, out of his wonderful kindness and mercy toward the just and his friends, wills to restore them to their former glory, as soon as the impediment of sin has been removed by penance.

They press. Even the grace which the reprobate lost remains in God's acceptance, and yet that is not an effect of predestination, but of general Providence: therefore neither is the lost grace of the predestined.

I deny the consequence. For there is this disparity, that the grace of the predestined at some time had a right to obtain glory infallibly, which the justifying grace sometimes granted to the reprobate never claimed for itself; for its effect was only temporal.

Third conclusion. — Glorification is truly an effect of predestination. This is sufficiently evident from what has been said, especially from that passage of Rom. 8.: Whom he called and justified, them he also glorified; for calling and justification are causes of glory itself: but these are effects of predestination: therefore that also is, for what is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused. Nor does it matter that for the word Glorificavit the Greek version has Magnificavit, which several holy Fathers also retain, especially Jerome, Chrysostom, and Ambrose: for besides the fact that the Latin Vulgate, recognized by pontifical authority and that of the Council of Trent, judged that the word Glorificavit, long ago expressed by Saints Augustine and Fulgentius, is to be retained; St. Paul also clearly seems by the word Glorificavit to designate eternal glory, and not some renown through good fame and celebration of the name; for he speaks of the glory which is owed per se to justification, and which is especially intended by God who predestines. This, however, is nothing other than eternal beatitude: therefore this is truly an effect of predestination. Add. that in every deliberation and consultation the attainment of the end is its last effect and most intended through the application of the means; which is evident from the example of a man seeking and intending health, for health itself, which is his end, is also the principal effect of that inquiry and intention: but eternal glory is the end of predestination itself and of all the means which are applied for its sake: therefore it is also its effect.

You will say 1. Predestination is not about the end, but about the means by which one arrives at the end; for it is, says St. Augustine, the preparation of means, etc.: but glorification is the end and not a means: therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I deny the major. For just as the end, although in intention it is the cause of the means, nevertheless in execution is their effect, just as health is the final cause of Medicine and yet is caused through Medicine: so eternal glory, although in intention it is the cause of the preparation and conferral of the means, nevertheless in execution is their effect.

You will say 2. Every effect of predestination must be its object: but glorification is not an object of predestination: therefore neither is it its effect. The minor is proved: the object of predestination must be the object of election, insofar as it is distinguished from intention; for the object of the latter is the end, but of the former it is the means: but glorification is not a means in predestination, but its end: therefore it is not the object of election, nor consequently an effect of predestination.

I distinguish the major. It is not the immediate object, I concede; the mediate one, I deny. And likewise, with the minor of the proof distinguished, the consequence is to be denied. For since the end in intention is caused by the means in execution, as has been said, and since the means are the immediate object of election, it follows that glorification is at least the mediate object of predestination itself, not indeed according to the order of intention and insofar as it is the final cause, but according to the order of execution and insofar as it is caused by the means themselves; for glorification is not obtained except through efficacious calling and justification, which are the means to it.

Or I distinguish otherwise. Glorification according to its real being is not an effect, but an object of predestination, I concede: according to its conferral and possession, I deny: for thus it is truly caused through the other effects of predestination, which are ordered to its attainment.