Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Now that the causes of divine Predestination have been declared and elucidated, its effects must be uncovered; all of which I judge to be distinguished into a threefold order: for some are principal and direct effects, others subsidiary and auxiliary; the rest, finally, occasional and indirect. I call principal and direct effects of Predestination those which are directly intended by God Himself as He predestines, and which follow immediately upon the decree of predestination itself: the subsidiary effects are those sensible and temporal goods which indeed are not intended by God per se and in general, nor are they conferred upon all the predestined without exception, but only upon certain ones, insofar as they may more easily attain glory: finally, the occasional effects are said to be the sins of the predestined, which afford them a handle and an occasion for doing penance and for watching more fervently over their own salvation. Wherefore the present article is to be completed in three Questions.

Note 1. Four conditions are required for something to be a direct effect of predestination. First, that it be caused immediately by God: for since predestination taken actively is the very divine will

of God choosing creatures for beatitude, it is necessary that it be done immediately by him; for which reason sins and any defects of the predestined cannot be reckoned effects of predestination, although they sometimes contribute to establishing it; since indeed they cannot arise from God himself, the ocean of holiness and the spring of grace. Second, that it be caused by the efficacious intention of conferring and bestowing glory; for this intention is the root and cause, and the motive of election, as well as of the conferral and application of all the means which concur to the work of predestination. Third, that in fact those effects lead per se to the attainment of glory itself; for since all the other effects of predestination are intended from the efficacious intention of giving glory to the predestined, it follows that those effects themselves must truly contribute per se to that attainment; for the efficacious will of God cannot be futile and void. Fourth and finally, that those effects of predestination depend on the merits of Christ: For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.

Note 2. Three direct effects of predestination are commonly numbered by theologians, namely the grace of calling, of justification, and of glorification; that is, beginning, continuing, and completing the work of predestination. These St. Paul enumerates in Romans 8 in these words: Whom he predestinated, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified: nevertheless, in establishing this truth, not all agree: for Durandus in 1. dist. 41. q. 2. holds only grace: Ockham, however, on the contrary contends there for only glory: St. Bonaventure, however, holds it to be glory and the first justifying grace: the other theologians, however, judge that not only glory itself, nor justification alone, but also all graces that call, cooperate, and dispose to justification and perseverance, are to be counted among the direct effects of predestination.

Note 3. Calling and justification can be distinguished as twofold. For one calling is efficacious, which has joined to it the consent of free choice, obtains the cooperation of the human will, and gains the end to which it is ordered, concerning which Job says: You will call me, and I will answer you. The other, however, is called inefficacious calling, which through the malice, stubbornness, or negligence of the one called is frustrated in its effect and end, and suffers rejection: for a threefold kind of men spurns grace, namely those devoted to business, those entangled in pleasures, and those blinded by malice, all of whom are expressed in the parable of the one inviting to the wedding; for one went off to his farm to refresh his mind: another to his business: while the rest seized the servants and killed them. Concerning these God complains: I called them, and you refused. Again, efficacious calling is in turn twofold; for some calling has only a temporal effect, as happens in the reprobate, who sometimes obey God as he calls and live piously; but since they finally fall away from grace, all those good works which they performed do not profit for obtaining eternal beatitude. Another, however, has effect unto eternal life; and that either proximately, as happens in those who persevere finally; or remotely, as happens in those who, having fallen from grace, rise again through penance. Likewise justification is twofold; for one has only a temporal effect, as happens in the reprobate, who sometimes frequent the Sacraments and are justified, but again given over headlong to sin, perish forever, and the preceding justification profits them nothing: another, however, has effect unto eternal life; and that either immediately, such as is justification persevering finally, or mediately, namely when the predestined, deviating from justice but rising again through penance more cautious and more fervent, have their mortified works likewise revive and again claim for themselves the right to glory previously acquired, which had been lost through sin. It is asked, therefore, whether all these species of calling and justification are to be counted among the direct effects of predestination.

First conclusion. — Every grace of calling of the predestined, insofar as it has effect unto eternal life, is truly a direct effect of predestination.

It is proved first. From that passage of John 16: Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me: which all the holy Fathers and sacred Interpreters understand of the grace of calling: but no one comes to Christ, nor remains with him, unless he is predestined: therefore since the one called comes to him and abides with him, it follows that the grace of calling is intended by God who predestines and is numbered among the effects of predestination. The same is confirmed from that passage of Rom. 8: Whom he predestinated, them he also called. This text St. Augustine expounds excellently in this way in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chapter 17.

For whom he predestinated, them he also called; that is to say, with that calling according to purpose. Not others, therefore, but those whom he predestinated, them he called: nor others, but those whom he so called, them he also glorified; nor others, but those whom he predestinated, called, justified, them he also glorified: with that end, of course, which has no end.

St. Fulgentius agrees with him in lib. 1. Ad Monimum cap. 11., where he expressly affirms that all the graces of calling, justification, and glorification pertain to predestination; for when he had weighed this passage of Psalm. 22. Thy mercy will follow me: and had said:

He precedes, therefore, the impious, that he may become just; he follows the just, that he may not become impious; he precedes the blind, that he may give the light which he did not find; he follows the seeing, that he may keep the light which he conferred; he precedes the one cast down, that he may rise; he follows the one lifted up, that he may not fall: he precedes, giving man a good will, he follows the well-willing, working in him the faculty of good work:

finally he concludes:

This mercy of God, therefore, follows in man that which, going before, it itself bestows; and so it not only recalls the erring to the way by justifying him, but also guards and helps the one walking well, that it may lead him to the gift of eternal glorification. All these things, however, that is, both the beginnings of our calling and the increases of justification and the rewards of glorification, God always had in predestination, because he foreknew the future works of his grace both in the calling and in the justification and in the glorification of the Saints.

It is also proved by reason. First, whatever is conferred on the predestined by reason of the decree of predestination, is its effect: but all efficacious callings, and all the helps preparing for justification, are conferred by reason of the decree of predestination: therefore, etc. The major is evident: for nothing has the effect of predestination, except by reason of that decree by which predestination is established and which is intended by the one predestining as a means leading to the end. The minor, however, is proved from that passage of the Apostle 2. ad Timoth. 1.: Who hath called us with his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace: where he expressly affirms that the grace of calling is from the purpose and decree of predestination. The same is confirmed from that passage of Rom. 8.: To them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints: where he says the predestined are called according to the purpose and decree, to signify that the grace of calling is conferred by reason and force of the decree. Add that, if from this sentence of St. Paul some infer that temporal goods are to be counted among the effects of predestination, much more ought all divine helps, such as the graces of calling, to be reckoned among the direct effects. — Then, according to St. Augustine, predestination is the preparation of the means by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated; but calling is one of those means, and indeed simpliciter necessary; for it is the beginning without which man cannot believe nor be justified: therefore it is truly an effect of predestination. — Finally, predestination according to the Doctor is the ordination of the intellectual creature unto eternal life, and so requires consent on the part of the creature, just as it also requires help on the part of God: but that consent and that help are not supplied except through the grace of calling, by which God calls the intellectual creature and orders it to that end: therefore that grace of calling is intended by God who predestines and is conferred by reason of the decree of predestination.

You will say 1. The effects of predestination cannot be common to the predestined and the reprobate: but the graces of calling, even of efficacious calling, are common to both, for many times they are granted to these just as to those; hence many are called, but few are elect: therefore they cannot be effects of predestination.

I deny the minor. For although calling and justification can be found in the reprobate, not however in the same way as in the predestined; because in these they are found with an efficacious ordination and perseverance up to the attainment of glory; in the reprobate, however, without it; hence they are not disposed in the same way.

You will insist. Not all the predestined have the grace of calling: therefore it is not to be judged a direct effect of predestination. The consequence is evident: for a direct effect necessarily follows upon the position of the cause, since from it the existence of the cause is argued, just as fire is perceived from heat and from illumination. The antecedent is proved by the example of infants dying after having received baptism; for since they are not in possession of reason and freedom, they are also incapable of consent and cooperation; and so also of the grace of calling.

I distinguish the antecedent. Not all the predestined have the grace of calling immediately, I concede: at least mediately, I deny: for although infants are not called per se and immediately to Baptism; they are nevertheless called through those who have care of them and bring them to Baptism. Add that it is not of the nature of an effect of predestination that it belong to all and only the predestined, but it suffices that, when it is conferred, it be granted only by force and reason of the decree of the one predestining.

You will say 2. There are many callings which do not contribute to predestination: therefore they are not its effects. The antecedent is evident in all those callings which are made void by subsequent sin.

I deny the antecedent. For although those callings are mortified through sin, nevertheless through the subsequent grace of justification they revive and are ordered to, and contribute to, obtaining glory.

You will ask. Whether even inefficacious calling in the predestined is to be counted among the effects of predestination?

I answer. Indeed, it is an effect of predestination, at least remotely and mediately: both because, as has been said, To them that love God, that is, to the predestined, as St. Augustine explains in lib. 1. contra duas Epistolas Pelagii, all things work together unto good: therefore also inefficacious callings, which dispose to conversion at least remotely, by bringing it about that the predestined, at length turning over in his mind his negligence and hardness, promptly answers God as he calls: and because those callings are an incentive and motive to humility, gratitude, and penance; for the predestined, called once, again, and a third time, at length recalling these callings to memory, grieves from his heart that he did not consent to them; and that grief leads to performing penance more earnestly, as well as to greater care and vigilance for salvation; and so it also contributes to obtaining glory.

You will say. These callings do not contribute to glory except occasionally: therefore they are not to be counted among the direct effects of predestination. The antecedent is evident from the reasons adduced; the consequence is also evident; otherwise even sin, since it is an occasion of humility and an incentive to greater penance, would also be called a direct effect of predestination.

I deny the antecedent. For at least remotely and mediately they lead to obtaining glory, as has been said; not otherwise than the first drops contribute to hollowing out and wearing away a stone. To the consequence I say that sin and the inefficacious calling grace do not have the same nature; because sin is not intended by God who predestines, as the calling itself is, which on the part of God is always efficacious, although on the part of the one called it becomes inefficacious, because of the refused consent.

Second conclusion. — Justification, both persevering and interrupted, which has effect unto eternal life, is truly an effect of predestination.

The first part is clear, and no one calls it into doubt; since the Apostle has said, Whom he justified, them he also glorified: whence St. Augustine in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 11. constantly affirms that grace is an effect of predestination; which indeed has been said of the grace justifying perseveringly, since it abides unto eternal life. — Add, that to this very persevering justification that definition of predestination by its effect, praised there by St. Augustine, fits most aptly: The predestination of the Saints, he says, is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated. For it is certain that through persevering justification itself the predestined are most certainly liberated from any temporal or spiritual captivity, since it transmits them into eternal liberty. — Finally, efficacious calling, although in itself it does not persevere unto eternal life, is nevertheless truly an effect of predestination: therefore much more so is justification itself, which is the happy close of the present life and the auspicious beginning of eternity.

The second part is proved. First indeed, from that oracle of St. Paul: Whom he predestinated, them he also justified, which indeed the holy Fathers and Interpreters take indefinitely of any justification which has effect unto eternal life; so that that word "justification" indifferently comprehends every justification, whether received in baptism, or repaired in penance, or persevering in the predestined even unto death. — Then, justification interrupted by sin finally leads the elect efficaciously to eternal life: therefore it is truly an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident: for predestination, as was just said, is the cause and preparation of all the benefits of God by which whosoever are liberated are most certainly liberated. The antecedent is proved from the three principal utilities which justification itself, lost and repaired, confers toward obtaining eternal life. First indeed, that justifying grace was without doubt the principle of some good work meritorious of eternal life; for since it is the seed of good works, it cannot long lack some effect of good work: but merit and good works mortified in sin revive through penance, and at length procure for the elect a special grade of glory corresponding to the merits themselves: therefore that interrupted justification truly contributes to glory. — Second, justification lost and at length repaired is for the elect themselves, through penance, an incentive to many good works: both because it provokes them to repent more vehemently: and because in them, by reason of the preceding good works, it left the best moral habits, or at least intelligible ones, by which man is rendered more prompt, not only to rise from sin, but also to operate well and piously, as soon as he has recovered the lost justice: and finally, because the elect, turning over in their minds that notable and most lamentable loss which they suffered through sin, are stirred to compensate this damage by works of penance and other exercises of piety, and to walk henceforth more cautiously in the way of salvation. Whence St. Augustine rightly says in lib. De corrept. et gratia cap. 9.:

To such as these, who love God, all things work together unto good, so utterly all things, that even if some of them deviate and go astray, he makes even this very thing profit them unto good, because they return more humble and more taught; for they learn that on the just way itself they ought to exult with trembling, not arrogating to themselves, as from their own virtue, the confidence of persevering, nor saying in their abundance: we shall not be moved forever.

The third and greatest utility, finally, which justification itself, lost and repaired, confers on the predestined, is that it grants him a right to a special grade of glory, which he would not attain if in fact he had not had that grace lost and repaired; for all theologians confess that through salutary penance man is restored to his former grade of justice and of merits; so that the preceding grace, together with the mortified works, revives either in the same individual, or in another individual of the same grade, which is equivalent for the present purpose, and so he recovers the same right to the grade of glory which he claimed for himself before sin.

The adversaries reply. that the grade of glory itself does not belong to the predestined by reason of the lost justifying grace, since it no longer subsists, nor returns the same in number; but it is granted to him only by reason of another grace, which is obtained through the penance that follows: therefore the prior grace is not the cause of attaining that special grade of glory, nor consequently is it an effect of predestination.

I deny the antecedent. and for its proof I say that it is not necessary for an effect of predestination that it remain in itself up to the attainment of glory itself, but that it suffice that it subsist in some effect of its own up to the final effect; or at least that it have a connection with the intermediate effects of predestination; otherwise the first efficacious calling would not be an effect of predestination, since in itself it does not remain in glory; similarly meritorious works would also be removed from this notion of effect, for they scarcely, indeed almost never, persevere to the very end: both because men at the very period of death are for some time deprived of the use of reason: and because many do not attain eternal glory immediately after death itself, but long in Purgatory pay off and wash away the remains of faults.

They insist. That special grade of glory is not granted to the predestined man on account of the repaired justification, but on account of penance: therefore that justification is in no way an effect of predestination. The antecedent is proved: for that right to that special grade of glory would not have existed any longer, unless penance had followed: therefore it is to be attributed to penance itself. Add that to cause presupposes being: but the justifying grace was entirely extinguished by sin: therefore it cannot be the cause of that right to the special grade of glory.

I distinguish the antecedent. That right is granted to the predestined on account of penance, as a cause per accidens and as removing that which was removing that right, I concede: as a cause per se, motive and moral, I deny: for that right is restored on account of that very former justice, which is truly the motive and moral cause, in view of which, once the impediment has been removed by penance, God infuses and restores either the prior grace in the same individual, or another similar one; in which grace that right to the special grade of glory is founded. Whence although that grace was physically extinguished by sin, nevertheless it remained morally in divine acceptance and estimation, so that God, out of his wonderful kindness and mercy toward the just and his friends, wills to restore them to their former glory, as soon as the impediment of sin has been removed by penance.

They press. Even the grace which the reprobate lost remains in God's acceptance, and yet that is not an effect of predestination, but of general Providence: therefore neither is the lost grace of the predestined.

I deny the consequence. For there is this disparity, that the grace of the predestined at some time had a right to obtain glory infallibly, which the justifying grace sometimes granted to the reprobate never claimed for itself; for its effect was only temporal.

Third conclusion. — Glorification is truly an effect of predestination. This is sufficiently evident from what has been said, especially from that passage of Rom. 8.: Whom he called and justified, them he also glorified; for calling and justification are causes of glory itself: but these are effects of predestination: therefore that also is, for what is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused. Nor does it matter that for the word Glorificavit the Greek version has Magnificavit, which several holy Fathers also retain, especially Jerome, Chrysostom, and Ambrose: for besides the fact that the Latin Vulgate, recognized by pontifical authority and that of the Council of Trent, judged that the word Glorificavit, long ago expressed by Saints Augustine and Fulgentius, is to be retained; St. Paul also clearly seems by the word Glorificavit to designate eternal glory, and not some renown through good fame and celebration of the name; for he speaks of the glory which is owed per se to justification, and which is especially intended by God who predestines. This, however, is nothing other than eternal beatitude: therefore this is truly an effect of predestination. Add. that in every deliberation and consultation the attainment of the end is its last effect and most intended through the application of the means; which is evident from the example of a man seeking and intending health, for health itself, which is his end, is also the principal effect of that inquiry and intention: but eternal glory is the end of predestination itself and of all the means which are applied for its sake: therefore it is also its effect.

You will say 1. Predestination is not about the end, but about the means by which one arrives at the end; for it is, says St. Augustine, the preparation of means, etc.: but glorification is the end and not a means: therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I deny the major. For just as the end, although in intention it is the cause of the means, nevertheless in execution is their effect, just as health is the final cause of Medicine and yet is caused through Medicine: so eternal glory, although in intention it is the cause of the preparation and conferral of the means, nevertheless in execution is their effect.

You will say 2. Every effect of predestination must be its object: but glorification is not an object of predestination: therefore neither is it its effect. The minor is proved: the object of predestination must be the object of election, insofar as it is distinguished from intention; for the object of the latter is the end, but of the former it is the means: but glorification is not a means in predestination, but its end: therefore it is not the object of election, nor consequently an effect of predestination.

I distinguish the major. It is not the immediate object, I concede; the mediate one, I deny. And likewise, with the minor of the proof distinguished, the consequence is to be denied. For since the end in intention is caused by the means in execution, as has been said, and since the means are the immediate object of election, it follows that glorification is at least the mediate object of predestination itself, not indeed according to the order of intention and insofar as it is the final cause, but according to the order of execution and insofar as it is caused by the means themselves; for glorification is not obtained except through efficacious calling and justification, which are the means to it.

Or I distinguish otherwise. Glorification according to its real being is not an effect, but an object of predestination, I concede: according to its conferral and possession, I deny: for thus it is truly caused through the other effects of predestination, which are ordered to its attainment.

Note 1. All natural goods are reduced to five principal heads: namely, first, to natural being, under which are comprehended the substance, the faculties, and the natural potencies of the predestined person himself. To the second belong a keen intellect, a temperament balanced toward virtue, a good disposition, and other natural seeds of virtue of this kind. To the third, in turn, are reduced the various circumstances regarding the life of the predestined person himself, v. g., that he is born at such a time, in such a place, of such parents, that he dies sooner or lives longer. Under the fourth are comprehended all moral goods performed for the sole honesty of virtue. To the fifth, finally, are reduced all resources and riches.

Note 2. Those same natural goods can be conceived in three ways as effects of Predestination: namely, either insofar as they would be meritorious or dispositive causes with respect to grace and glory, in the way in which the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians affirmed them to be effects of predestination; which was condemned by the holy Fathers, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the Councils: or insofar as they are the subject in which the other effects of Predestination are received: or insofar as they are the matter and the occasions of virtues by which the predestined person more easily accomplishes those things that pertain to salvation.

Note 3. Natural goods can be conceived as being granted to men by God in two ways: namely, either by reason of general Providence, which bestows on each and every one the means by which they may attain the appointed end; whether meanwhile that end is natural and to be obtained through merely natural means, or supernatural and to be obtained through supernatural means. Secondly, that they are conferred from the intention and decree of Predestination, so that God would not bestow them unless He foresaw that they would be aids to the predestined person, whereby he might more easily work out his salvation and obtain eternal glory. In the former way they are said to be ordered to Predestination only per accidens. In the latter way, however, they pertain to it per se and can be called its direct and subsidiary effects.

Only conclusion. — The natural goods of the first order are presupposed to Predestination, but the rest can be called its subsidiary effects. This is the teaching of the Doctor with respect to both parts; of which the first is proved, and that by the authority of the Doctor saying in 1. dist. 41. quaest. unica, that in the first instant Peter and Judas, equally willed by God in esse existentiae, are offered to God, and then God so wills glory for Peter that He wills nothing for Judas, but there is only there a negation of the volition of glory. He therefore holds that positive Predestination, just as negative reprobation, presupposes a man already foreseen according to the being of existence; and so existing being is not an effect of Predestination, but is presupposed to it.

It is confirmed. from the same Doctor in 3. dist. 39., where he says that this was the order in divine prevision: in the first instant God understood Himself under the notion of the highest good; in the second He understood creatures; and in the third He predestined these to glory, etc.

It is also proved by reason. An accidental form presupposes the being of the subject in which it is received; and consequently the volition of that same form presupposes the volition of the subject: but by the decree of Predestination God wills to confer glory on man as an accident superadded to him, perfecting him not substantially but only accidentally: therefore the decree of Predestination presupposes the decree of the production of that subject, which subject is indeed the very nature and substantial being of the predestined man. Secondly, that will by which God wills all men to be saved is prior to predestination, since it extends to absolutely all men, and comprehends both those who are afterwards ordered to beatitude from their foreseen merits, and those who are reprobated from their foreseen demerits: but that antecedent will presupposes, or at least is simultaneous with, the substantial being of men: therefore the decree of Predestination presupposes the decree of production, and so this is not its effect. Finally, if the natural being of the predestined man could be called an effect of that Predestination, it could also be called grace, and it would depend on the merits of Christ: but St. Augustine forbids saying both of these in Epist. 105. ad Sixtum, where, after having attacked at length the error of Pelagius affirming that creation is grace, because God gratuitously and out of pure liberality gives us being, not however from our merits, he finally concludes:

Let this fallacy be cast out from the hearts of Christians: for the Apostle does not at all commend that grace by which we were created, that we might be men: but that by which we were justified, that we might be just men: for this is the grace through Jesus Christ our Lord: for Christ did not die for any, that men might be created, but for the impious, that they might be justified.

By these words he openly indicates that natural being is in no way to be counted among the effects of Predestination, except remotely and fundamentally, that is, insofar as it is the subject of Predestination.

The second part is also proved. namely, that the other natural goods can be called subsidiary effects of Predestination: Whatever serves the predestined man for obtaining glory more easily is a subsidiary effect of Predestination: but so it is with the aforesaid goods: therefore etc. The minor is proved concerning the goods of the second order: that which helps a man, and serves him so that he becomes more prompt to embrace the faith, and so that he more easily pursues virtue, is truly an effect of Predestination: but so it is with the goods pertaining to the second head, as St. Augustine teaches in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 14. It appears, he says, that some have in their very talent a divine gift of intelligence naturally, by which they are moved to faith, if they either hear words congruent to their minds, or see signs. By these words Augustine holds that that gift of intelligence, which is per se natural, is an effect of Predestination in the elect. — It is clear also concerning the goods of the third head; since Christ Himself says in Math. 24. that, If those days had not been shortened (of the persecution of Antichrist) not all flesh would have been saved, but for the Elect, whom He chose, the days will be shortened: therefore that shortening of the days is intended by God predestinating, and is an extrinsic cause or a sine qua non condition of the salvation of the predestined. The same is confirmed from Wisdom 4., where of the just elect it is said: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding. Which text St. Aug. in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 14. interprets thus: It was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew this, that it would be, not that it would not be, that is, that He would have granted him an untimely death, so that he might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptations; and in the same place he praises St. Cyprian in lib. De mortalitate saying that death is found to be not only not useless to the faithful, but even useful, since it withdraws a man from the dangers of sinning, and places him in the security of not sinning. — The same concerning the other circumstances of times, places, temptations, etc. is affirmed by Aug. himself in lib. 50. homil. 23. around the middle, where he says: Were you not an adulterer? this your God says to you: I was governing you for Myself, I was keeping you for Myself, that you would not commit adultery; and explaining how He kept him, partly by the grace of paternal protection removing the occasions of sinning, partly by the grace of internal motion, he adds: The tempter was lacking, and that the tempter should be lacking I brought about: place and time were lacking, and that they should be lacking I brought about; the tempter was present, place was not lacking, time was not lacking: that you would not consent, I frightened you. Acknowledge therefore the grace of Him to whom you owe even that you did not commit. It is established therefore that the circumstances of places and times, in which the elect are born, live, and die, as well as the conditions of the parents from whom they are born, and of the men by whom they are educated, or with whom they associate, are effects of Predestination. — The same truth is clear concerning the goods of the fourth order: for moral works, which are done by the predestined without any concurrence of grace, are for them a help toward obtaining beatitude: both because they conduce to the accidental joy, which the predestined will perceive in the state of beatitude on their account: and because they contribute to avoiding sin, if the work which is elicited is commanded and ordered by the law: and because those good works, set before the mind, supply the predestined person with an occasion of praise and thanksgiving: and finally, because temporal goods, insofar as they can be and in fact will be instruments of virtue, are truly numbered among the effects of Predestination, and can fall under merit, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae quaest. 114. art. ultimo: therefore much more are good moral acts elicited for the sole honesty, for they pave the way to meritorious works to be elicited with grace, and lay down certain seeds of virtues. — Finally, the same is established concerning the goods of the fifth head; for resources and riches confer no small usefulness on the predestined person, so that he may more easily work out his salvation, for they are instruments of the virtues of liberality, mercy, almsgiving, by which sins are redeemed, graces are acquired, Christ saying: with what measure you have measured it will be measured back to you, and also; give alms; and behold all things are clean for you, etc. Moreover, they also afford him an occasion of serving God more willingly and easily, and also of frequenting works of piety and devotion; for since the rich are free from the occupations by which their life is sustained, they have the time to hear sacred things, to attend sermons, and to exercise other things of that kind most conducive to salvation. Finally, those same goods contribute to meritorious works and sometimes fall under merit, as St. Thomas, just cited, affirms: therefore they also contribute to salvation. Whence also in the Lord's Prayer and in other prayers we ask temporal goods from God in the name of the Savior: therefore those temporal goods can be effects of Predestination, for they are reduced to the order of grace, or they are salutary, and are contained under the object of infused Hope, as St. Thomas affirms in 2. 2. q. 17. art. 2.

You will object 1. Against the first part: whatever contributes efficaciously and influences the effects of Predestination and is intended in predestination itself is its effect: but the substance and natural being of the predestined person influences efficaciously the effects of Predestination, for it is the efficient cause of the acts by which a man is justified and merits glory; it is also the efficient cause of glory itself and of the beatific vision, which it produces through the intellect elevated by the light of glory; moreover, it can be a motive in the manner of an object, by which, namely, the predestined person may be stimulated to render thanks to God for the benefit of creation and conservation: therefore the substance of the predestined person conduces to predestination, and so is intended by it.

I deny the major. for not everything that concurs efficiently toward the effect of some Providence is an effect of such Providence, as is clear by example: for when someone provides a friend with a horse for riding, the friend himself is not deemed an effect of such Providence, although he efficaciously concurs toward the riding by mounting the horse, and by driving and urging it on.

Or I distinguish. whatever contributes efficaciously to predestination, in the manner of a means conducing to an end, is its effect, I concede: in the manner of a subject for receiving an accidental form, I deny: but the substance and the natural faculties of the predestined person are not ordered to glory as to an end; but only as a subject for an accidental form, which it receives and by which it is perfected, and so they cannot be effects of Predestination.

You will object 2. A good disposition and keenness of intellect are effects of Predestination, as has been said: but all these are identical with the substance and the natural faculties of the predestined person himself: therefore if these are not effects of Predestination, neither will those be able to be.

I answer 1. That when we said that a good disposition and other things of this kind are effects of Predestination, we abstracted from that philosophical question about the real or formal distinction of the faculties and rational potencies from the substance of the soul, of which they are the potencies. Whence, supposing the opinion about the real identity of the intellectual potencies with the intellectual substance, I distinguish the minor: a good disposition and keenness of mind is not an effect of Predestination, insofar as they are considered entitatively, I concede: operatively, that is, insofar as they are attended to with respect to operation and exercise, I deny: for taken in this way, since they depend on corporeal organs, they are not identified with the substance of the soul, and so they can be means toward glory

You will object 3. To be born at such or such a time, of such or such Parents, is an effect of Predestination, as has been said: therefore likewise to be born simpliciter, and to have natural being, ought to be counted among the effects of Predestination. The consequence is clear: because to have been born of such parents involves and signifies that the nature already is and has been born: therefore whatever is affirmed of the first cannot be denied of the second, and so if the first is an effect of Predestination, the second must also be.

I deny the sequel. for this does not follow any more than if you were to say: man's being involves matter and man's soul being: therefore just as man's being is an effect of generation, so man's matter and soul being is an effect of generation; which consequence is erroneous and sophistical; for man's soul is not generable. I say therefore that the sequel is rightly denied, because whenever in some whole there are several parts, something can rightly be the cause of one part, without being the cause of another; or be the cause of the whole, without being the cause of the parts separately; for in truth a man generating concurs in the production of the body and of the generated man, but not in the production of the soul: hence, in order that what is affirmed of one can also be affirmed of the other, it is necessary that the attribute which is affirmed belong to both. Whence, although to have been born of such parents is ordered as a means to glory, and so is an effect of Predestination, it does not however follow that to have been born simpliciter must likewise be an effect, since it cannot have the notion of a means, but only of a subject, with respect to the glory to be obtained.

You will object 4. One man's birth can be an effect of the Predestination of another; so, v. g., the Nativity of the Most Blessed Virgin was an effect of the Predestination of Christ. Therefore by parity a man's birth can be an effect of the Predestination of the same man.

I deny the consequence. and the reason for the disparity is that one man's birth can be a means to the salvation of another man, and so it can become an effect of the other's Predestination: but it is otherwise concerning the birth of some man with respect to himself; for this, since it cannot be a means to his own salvation, but pertains only to constituting the subject, which must be promoted to salvation through certain means, from this it comes about that it cannot be called an effect of Predestination.

You will object against the second part. natural goods have no proportion with grace and glory; and consequently they contribute in no way to their attainment: therefore they are not effects of Predestination.

I deny the consequence. for from this it only follows that they are not dispositions and meritorious causes with respect to grace and glory, which we readily admit; but it does not follow that those goods cannot serve to obtain these dispositions, and to have grace received and exercised more promptly and more easily.

You will object 2. Predestination is the preparation of the gifts of grace: but those goods are of nature, not indeed of grace: therefore they are not effects of Predestination.

I distinguish the antecedent. such goods are not from God, as the author of grace, productively and elicitively, I concede: imperatively and ordinatively, I deny: they are produced therefore by God as the author of nature, but they are ordered by Him as the author of grace, to beatitude.

Or I distinguish otherwise. they are goods of nature and natural according to substance, I concede: according to mode and supernatural operation, I deny: but taken in this way they can be effects of Predestination, just as external preaching and miracles, which, although they are natural with respect to substance, and only supernatural with respect to mode, are nevertheless said by St. Augustine in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 14. to be effects of Predestination.

You will object 3. The effects of Predestination are so related that the earlier ones are like causes with respect to the later ones, for so calling conduces to justification, and this to glorification: but those natural goods do not conduce to the other effects of Predestination, namely to grace and glory, otherwise they would be dispositions in consideration of which God would bestow grace, which is the error of the Semi-Pelagians: therefore, etc.

I answer. the major is true of direct and per se effects; not indeed of indirect and per accidens effects, such as natural goods are. Secondly I say that it is not necessary that there be that connection among all the effects of Predestination, that the second is given on account of the first, as on account of merit, or on account of a proper end; but those two effects can be two means to one third. For just as light, v. g., and the species are given for causing vision; but among themselves they have only proportion and connection for completing the principle of vision: so by parity predestination presupposes nature, and is accommodated to it in the manner of a subject, or of a foundation, to which from the liberality of God supernatural help is added, by which it is elevated and constituted as it were an integral principle of a meritorious work, or of one dispositive to the other effects of Predestination.

Note 1. Evil is customarily distinguished as twofold, namely of nature and of morals. Evil of nature, or natural evil, is that which is out of harmony with nature itself, considered according to its natural principles, and adversely affects it, whether meanwhile it is something privative, such as blindness, deafness, ignorance, death, etc.; or something positive, such as pain, sadness, error, etc. Evil of morals is said to be that which is out of harmony with rational nature, insofar as it is a free agent, or that which is against the rule of right reason; of such a kind are all sins, whether of commission or of omission. Again, each of these two evils, both of nature and of morals, is twofold: for one is pure evil and without any admixture of good; such as any privation of a good owed to nature or to right reason, for example blindness and the omission of a precept; for these, although they are necessarily connected with a good thing, namely the subject, which is good per se, are nevertheless evil per se, because they are pure negations unsuited to such a subject, and have in themselves neither any entity nor, consequently, any entitative goodness. The other is not pure evil, but has in itself entitative goodness and a perfection owed to it according to its species; but it is evil to another, insofar as through that very entitative perfection of its own it is out of harmony with and repugnant to another and adversely affects it; thus pain is said to be the evil of a living being, because it is unsuited to it and grieves it.

Note 2. God is not the efficient cause of moral evil, insofar as it is purely evil: both because this is repugnant to His own divine goodness and infinite holiness, and because moral evil has not an efficient but a deficient and deviating cause; and so it is not an effect but a defect: rather, He is only its permissive cause. But to permit is the same as not to impede, when the power of impeding is nevertheless at hand; whence, for something to be truly said to be permitted, five things are required: first, that it displease the one permitting; second, that it would come to pass unless its cause is impeded; third, that the one permitting know that it would come to pass unless he himself impedes it; fourth, that the power of impeding be present; fifth, that he voluntarily omit to impede, that is, that he not oppose the thing that is to come to pass; for he who opposes himself and strives to impede is not said to permit, even if the thing comes to pass.

Note 3. Every divine permission falls under the eternal decree of God, no less than all of God's positive operations; for just as God does nothing in time, nor impedes any effect of a creature, without having decreed from eternity to do it or to impede it, so too He permits nothing at all without having decreed that permission from eternity: and so no sin is committed in the world without God having determined in particular from eternity to permit it. Moreover, just as every permission of God is good, and God is to be praised and blessed on account of it, so too all His permissions are good, and He Himself is to be celebrated with praises on account of them, although the things He permits are detestable and most wicked: for He has most just and most holy reasons why He permits them: whence St. Augustine in Enchiridio cap. 96. Nothing comes to pass unless the Almighty wills it to come to pass, either by allowing that it be done, or by doing it Himself: nor do we doubt that God does well even in allowing evils to be done, for He does not allow this save by a just judgment.

It has already been said in the preceding Disputation that all evils, both of nature and of morals, are ordered by divine Providence to fitting ends; it therefore remains to be resolved in the present Question only whether this twofold evil is also intended by divine Predestination, as something that occasionally conduces to the salvation of the predestined person himself.

First conclusion. — Truly, the evils of nature are intended by God predestining, so that they occasionally conduce to the salvation of men.

Proof first. from Sacred Scripture, ad Philippenses 2.: To you it is given for Christ, not only that you believe in Him, but also that you suffer for Him. By these words the Apostle affirms that the tribulations of the faithful are not only divinely ordered to their salvation, but are even intended by God as something conducing to the attainment of eternal glory. Whence St. Peter in I. Epist. cap. 2. firmly affirms that Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow His footsteps. For if, says St. Paul ad Rom. cap. 8., we suffer with Him, we shall also be glorified with Him. And 2. ad Corinth. 1. As you are partakers of the sufferings, so shall you be also of the consolation. All the Fathers commended in the preceding Disputation on this matter confirm the same thing.

Proof second, by reason. whatever most certainly contributes to the salvation of the predestined person is truly an effect of Predestination: but the natural evils and the punishments of this life contribute to the salvation of the predestined person: therefore, etc. The major is evident from what has been said.

The minor is proved. both because these evils provide the elect with the means and the manner of satisfying divine Justice for their sins: and because they offer the occasion for the exercise of fortitude, patience, and any other virtue; and because they are occasions and incentives for avoiding sins, curbing desires, taming passions, invoking God, and performing the other works of piety of this kind, by which the salvation of man is especially promoted.

You will say. The punishments of Purgatory are not effects of predestination, but are ordered only by supernatural Providence and divine Justice: therefore neither are the punishments of this life. The consequence is evident by the parity of reason; for those punishments are as satisfactory to God as any whatsoever that can be received and borne in this life. But the antecedent is proved: an effect of Predestination must be a benefit granted by God, by which the elect are most certainly saved: but those punishments of Purgatory are not reckoned a divine benefit, since they take their origin not from the goodness and liberality of God, but only from His vindicative justice: therefore, etc.

I deny the consequence. and the reason for the disparity is manifold: First indeed, because the punishment of this life, by reason of the present state, holds the character of a grace and a benefit that can be ordered to the end of Predestination, that is, to the salvation of the Elect; for either they are voluntarily undertaken by the elect, and so can be meritorious; or at least, with them not objecting, they are inflicted by God to pay in this life all that they contracted as a debt through sin, lest they afterwards incur the heavier punishments of Purgatory, which surely has the place of the greatest benefit. But the punishments of Purgatory can neither be meritorious, since the souls given over to those punishments are already at the term, and so can no longer merit, nor can they be means of avoiding other greater punishments. Second, the punishments of this life especially conduce to obtaining the other benefits of God in the order of salvation, namely to obtaining more ample graces and to exercising the virtue of patience, which especially attracts and provokes divine mercy; not so with the punishments of Purgatory; since the souls undergoing them are at the term of merit, grace, and virtue.

Second conclusion. — The permission of sin can be called an occasional effect of Predestination.

Proof. That is said to be an occasional effect of divine Predestination which truly offers the occasion to the Predestined to pursue and accomplish all those things that conduce to salvation: but such is the permission of sin: therefore, etc. The major is evident from what has been said.

The minor is proved. from that passage ad Romanos octavo: To them that love God all things work together unto good. Where the gloss adds: Even sins, insofar as they are the matter for exercising the virtue of humility, etc. With this St. Augustine agrees in lib. De Correctione et Gratia cap. 9., saying: To such an extent, indeed, all things, that if any of those Predestined deviate and go astray, this itself makes them profit unto good, because they return humbler and more cautious. Second, that permission especially conduces to the manifestation and commendation of divine grace and mercy in the Predestined and Elect, for the Apostle says ad Rom. 9. God endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy which He prepared unto glory. Therefore this permission is truly intended by God predestining. Third, finally, for the most part this permission of sin profits the predestined unto salvation. For, says St. Augustine, serm. 33. de verbis Domini, I dare to say: it is expedient for the proud continent to fall, that in that very thing in which they exalt themselves they may be humbled, and with fear and trembling work out their salvation. Thus many of the Saints, on the occasion of their fall, afterwards rise again more cautious, humbler, and more fervent.

You will say 1. An effect of Predestination is a benefit of grace: but the permission of sin is not a gift of grace, nay, it is a subtraction of congruent and efficacious grace: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the minor. it is not a gift of grace in itself, I concede; insofar as it is intended and ordered by God to the salvation of the predestined person himself, namely, that he may become more cautious, humbler, and more fervent, I deny.

You will say 2. Christ merited the effects of Predestination for us: but He did not merit that permission of sin: therefore that is not an effect of Predestination.

I distinguish the minor. He did not merit it precisely insofar as it is the permission of sin, I concede; insofar as it can be ordered to the salvation of the predestined, I deny. For this can be reduced to one of the three direct effects, since it contributes to vocation, insofar as the elect, turning over his sins in his mind, is stirred to consent more promptly and more fervently to God calling, and since this very recollection provokes to greater penance, it also offers the occasion of obtaining new grace and consequently of acquiring a new right to glory.

You will subsume. therefore it will be lawful to ask of God the permission of one's own sin: but this is absurd: therefore etc. The sequel is evident, for it is lawful to ask for all that Christ merited.

I deny the sequel. For since sin cannot be in a man without coming to be by his own will, therefore a man cannot desire the permission of sin without likewise desiring the will and the occasion of committing sins, which is truly evil, although it can conduce to a greater good, as St. Paul teaches ad Rom. 3. Not, he says, as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil, that good may come. Whence to the proof I say: it is lawful to ask for what Christ merited per se, I concede; what He merited only consequentially, I deny. But He merited that permission of sin only consequentially, namely insofar as He offered His merits to the divine Father, that from that permission He might elicit the graces and virtues to be conferred on the predestined.

You will say finally. For this reason the permission of sin would be an occasional effect of Predestination, because from it man rises again humbler and more fervent: but it is not from the permission, but from the consideration of sin, that man so rises: therefore not the divine permission itself, but sin itself will be the effect of predestination, which is absurd.

I deny the minor. since it is precisely from the consideration of the divine permission itself that man rises again more cautious and more fervent through penance; for from it he beholds that the lot of men is so fragile and slippery that, with the divine permission alone posited, he immediately strays from virtue and rushes headlong into sin, according to that saying: Thou hast turned away Thy face from me, and I was troubled.