Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. It is beyond all controversy among Catholics that predestination, in the order of execution, depends entirely on merits and good works, especially with respect to adults, to whom eternal beatitude is conferred not only under the title of Inheritance, in the manner in which it is granted to infants reborn by baptismal water and departing this life before the use of reason; but also under the title of Reward, Crown and Wage: whence the only difficulty that remains to be resolved is whether the election itself of the predestined to glory, that is, the efficacious intention and willing which God has from eternity of conferring glory on the elect, and by which He separates them from the reprobate, presupposes foreseen merits, and depends on them as on a motive cause, in view of which God is stirred and moved to select them before others; or whether God begins to distinguish the predestined from the non-predestined by an election to glory proceeding from His sheer liberality and goodness, so that from this there follows only the election to grace and to the means by which the predestined will infallibly attain glory. In the resolution of this difficulty a threefold opinion of the authors is at work. For some, together with the Thomists, expressly affirm that predestination is not made from foreseen merits, nor are the foreseen merits of the predestined a cause, but rather an effect of predestination. Some, with Catharinus, assert that certain persons are eminently predestined and from eternity selected to glory antecedently to the prevision of their merits; while the election of others presupposes merits. The rest, however, together with Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Albert the Great, with whom the Subtle Doctor and the Angelic Doctor do not disagree, together with a numerous host of the more celebrated Doctors both ancient and modern, teach that the efficacious election of the predestined to glory presupposes foreseen merits and depends on them as on a motive cause: whence they suppose that, antecedently to the prevision of merits, there is in God only the will of complacency of giving glory, common to the predestined and the reprobate.

Note 2. Predestination, as far as the present difficulty is concerned, can be taken in a threefold way: first indeed, for predestination to grace alone, taken in itself and singly; second, for predestination to glory, precisely insofar as it is only glory and apart from grace; third, finally, for predestination to grace and to glory together conjointly: for it is one thing to predestine to grace, which is the primary effect of predestination; another to predestine to glory, which is the crown of predestination; and another to predestine at once to both conjointly. It is certain, however, and clear from the preceding Question, that predestination to grace is made independently of any good works and from the sheer liberality and mercy of God. It is equally certain that predestination to grace and glory together and conjointly also presupposes no merits; because grace, which in predestination itself is involved together with glory, is not given, nor destined to be conferred, on account of merits; therefore the only difficulty that remains to be resolved is that concerning predestination to glory considered separately.

Note 3. The opinion asserting that predestination to glory, considered singly and nakedly, is made before foreseen merits, has absolutely nothing in common with the erroneous opinion of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians: since the Pelagians (as has been said) either denied altogether every grace preceding, exciting and moving our wills to good work; or affirmed that it is not simpliciter and absolutely necessary, but only for working more easily; whence it is manifest that they asserted predestination to glory to be made not from foreseen merits proceeding from the grace of Christ and the human will, but only from works to be elicited by the power of free choice. The Semi-Pelagians, however, since they contended that the beginning of faith, that is, the first affection of belief, arises from us, and not from God, nor from His exciting and helping grace, also affirmed that our predestination to glory is not adequately and universally from foreseen merits proceeding from grace and the human will; whence it is clear that their opinion strays far from the teaching of the Catholic Doctors who affirm that our predestination is made from foreseen good works proceeding from grace and human freedom; with whom it stands

Only conclusion. — The efficacious election of the predestined to glory is made from their foreseen merits, by which God is induced and moved to choose them before others and to destine them to eternal beatitude. This is the open teaching of the weightier and better-known theologians, as will appear below; which indeed we are pleased to prove by four arguments in the following distinct paragraphs, so that the matter may appear more clearly and efficaciously.

§ 1. — First Proof from Sacred Scripture.

The Sacred Scriptures set forth this same conclusion in such express words that it seems impious to doubt its truth; and first indeed Christ expressly expresses it in Matth. 25., where He thus addresses the elect: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me to eat. By which words Christ signifies that the kingdom of glory was prepared for the elect from their foreseen good works; which is evident both from the causal particle for, which, being connected with the two words prepared and possess, shows that the kingdom of heaven is not only conferred in execution, but is also designed and prepared in intention on account of good works. And because the holy Fathers so interpret the aforesaid passage, above all St. Chrysostom in Homilia 80. in Matthaeum: I knew, he says in the person of Christ, that you would be such before you were born; these things were prepared for you by me: and also St. Augustine on Psalm. 49., where, weighing these words: Come, blessed of my Father, receive, he says: Receive what? The kingdom: For what reason? I was hungry and you gave me to eat... So much is the Kingdom of Heaven worth, etc. By which he indicates that the works of men are the motives of the justice rendering the Kingdom in return for works. And in sermon 50. De Tempore he says: Why the causes either of so great a reward, or of so great a punishment? Receive the Kingdom, and go into the eternal fire. Why are these to receive the Kingdom? For I was hungry and you gave me to eat. Why are these to go into the eternal fire? I was hungry and you did not give me to eat. By which he openly indicates that the causes and motives of glory were the works of mercy foreseen from eternity. It is confirmed from the following words of Christ, where, addressing the reprobate, He says: Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the Devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you did not give me to eat. From which I argue thus: we must reason in the same way about the destination of the Just to glory as about the destination of the reprobate to hell: but the Devil and his reprobate followers were not destined from eternity to hell, except on account of their foreseen demerits: therefore neither is the kingdom prepared for the Just, except on account of their foreseen merits. The major is evident: for in both cases there is the same causal particle, and a continuous antithesis of the elect and the reprobate, of good and evil works, of the kingdom and the eternal fire.

The adversaries reply. that a twofold decree is to be distinguished in God before the actual conferral of glory, one indeed of intention, by which God gratuitously and without foreseen merits wills to save them; the other is of execution, by which God wills to save those already predestined, indeed, and to confer glory on them, but through merits: about the first, they say, the aforesaid text does not treat, but only about the second: whence they infer that that causal particle for is to be referred not to the word prepared, which signifies the decree of intention, but to the antecedent words come and possess, which designate the executive decree, which presupposes the foreknowledge of merits. — On the contrary: first, that twofold decree is altogether fictitious, and unheard of not only among the holy Fathers and the older theologians, but also among the philosophers, who, besides the will and the decree about obtaining some end, acknowledged nothing else than the execution and the application of the means consequent upon such a decree. Second, those two decrees do not cohere with one another; for the second not only narrows and restricts the first, but also altogether changes and overturns it; since the first decree, which is of intention and gratuitous, either is altogether efficacious and absolute independently of the second, or it is not: if it is not, it is altogether useless, since it would have its efficacy only from the second, from which it would depend as from a condition: if it is, it cannot subsist with the second: for since the first decree is altogether gratuitous and absolute, it also altogether conflicts with the second decree, which is burdensome and conditional, because it depends on works to be elicited: for it is impossible that the same thing in the same respect be gratuitous and burdensome, absolute and conditional: for these things conflict no less than simple and composite, which are so impossible that they cannot stand together at once in the same respect. Add that the first decree is for this reason called gratuitous, because it is about giving glory simpliciter from the sheer liberality of God without any motive and any condition on the part of the Predestined: the second, however, is burdensome, because it involves the condition of merits and of labor; but that glory is to be given without any condition and with some condition, and by sheer liberality and from debt and wage, absolutely and conditionally, independently of anything extrinsic and dependently, are altogether contradictory things: therefore they cannot subsist with one another in the same respect. Finally, no one will deny that if someone had absolutely promised another that he would give him something, and wished afterwards that that other, to whom he promised, should merit or buy the thing itself; no one, I say, will deny that by the second statement he would have revoked the first; since the first was about a donation, the second, however, would be about a sale; but sale and donation are opposite acts, one of which revokes the other, because donation is purely gratuitous, whereas sale is burdensome: therefore a pari, if God had that twofold decree, by the former of which He would will to give glory freely and from pure liberality, by the latter, however, would will it to be conferred only through works; there is no doubt that the latter decree would revoke and overturn the first; and so it would not only make God mutable, but would also turn His divine goodness and infinite wisdom into a reproach; which can indeed be proved and illustrated by a most apt example: if some rich man had first had it in mind to receive all his parents and friends at an excellent and sumptuous banquet for free; while, however, they feast lavishly and magnificently, the rich man himself, thinking of what and how great expenses he incurred in preparing that banquet, would decree within himself that each of those reclining at table should pay his share of the dinner, and would exact it, saying indeed that he had first invited them freely and out of friendship, but that he had at last decided that they should pay all the expenses: who would not rightly laugh at and be angry with the sentiments of the inviter? The asserters of those two decrees think exactly the same of God, by the first of which God had decreed that glory was to be conferred on the elect from sheer liberality and gratuitously; by the second, however, He would decree that it was not to be bestowed except from presupposed good works by which it was to be merited.

Others reply. that there are not indeed two decrees, but a twofold connotation of the same decree and will, according to the notion of intention and of execution: so that in the first sign of reason God willed to confer glory efficaciously on all His elect from His sheer liberality; but yet to be obtained through merits infallibly future, and dependent in execution on merits of this kind: and therefore in the prior sign, in the order of intention, glory is destined before merits; in the posterior, however, and in the order of execution, it is not given to the elect except from merits. — On the contrary: it is contradictory that something be at once to be obtained from the pure liberality of the giver, and from the labor of the obtainer, as has been said: therefore it is equally contradictory that God decree that glory be obtained from His pure liberality and from the merits of the elect; for what is altogether gratuitous excludes every notion whatsoever of merit, labor and purchase. Then, this interpretation directly militates against the holy Fathers praised above and to be cited below, who so interpret the aforesaid passage as to assert that the merits of the elect are the cause of the preparation itself of glory; and not only of its conferral: so that God prepared glory for the elect before others in no other way than because these were foreseen as working well. Finally, the reason is the same for the kingdom prepared for the elect as for the eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his angels: but in the order of intention the eternal fire was not prepared for the Devil and his angels before their foreseen demerits: therefore in the order of intention likewise the kingdom was not prepared for the elect except from the prevision of their own merits: and so, just as a twofold will cannot be distinguished, namely executing and intending, with respect to the reprobate, so neither is one to be assigned with respect to the elect.

Finally they reply. that in the aforesaid passage of Sacred Scripture a reason is indeed rendered why the possession of the eternal kingdom is handed over to those to whom it is owed on account of works, but a cause is not assigned which impelled the Father to prepare the kingdom for them rather than for others. And they prove this from those words, Blessed of my Father, which signify that God by His Predestination was the cause of the whole happiness of the Saints; for the divine blessing in the Sacred Letters does not presuppose, but causes the good which it expresses, thus Genesis 1. He blessed them and said: Increase and multiply and fill the earth, etc. — On the contrary: first, the particle for is truly causal; and not merely explicative, as is established among all the interpreters of Sacred Scripture: therefore the reply is null. Second, it must be causal in the same way with respect to the destination of the elect to glory as with respect to the designation of the reprobate to hell: but no one will say that it is not causal with respect to the reprobate, to whom hell is decreed only on account of their evil merits: therefore no one likewise ought to deny that it is causal with respect to the elect. Finally, the very series of the words and the intention of Christ the judge pronouncing that sentence demand this very thing, for He says: possess the kingdom prepared for you, for I was hungry, etc., as if He were saying: because you rendered me so much good, because you were at hand to me in my urgent need and that of my own; therefore, in compensation for the benefit, Come, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. While, however, the Predestined answer: Lord, when did we see you hungry, and fed you; thirsty, and gave you drink? Christ always, adducing His gratitude and persisting in the aforesaid reason of compensating the benefit, says: Amen I say to you, as long as you did it to one of these my least brethren, you did it to me. Which words of Christ, by signifying gratitude, also undoubtedly indicate the motive why the kingdom was prepared for the elect, namely because their offices of charity were foreseen. For confirmation I say that, although the blessing of God is sometimes used in that sense in Scripture, nevertheless frequently by it there is signified something consequent upon the good work of the creature, on account of which the latter is loved and blessed by God; thus in Genesis 22. God, addressing Abraham, says: Because you have done this thing and have not spared your only-begotten Son for my sake, I will bless you, etc. That the blessing of which Christ speaks in the words cited above from Matth. 25.¹ is of this kind, however, the causal particle immediately subjoined shows, For I was hungry, etc.

Proof 2. from the first Ad Corinth. 2., where it is said that neither has the eye seen, nor the ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love Him; where there is speech about Predestination: for the word prepared sounds the same as predestined, as St. Thomas explains in the same place: but of this predestination, or preparation of glory, a cause is brought forth on the part of the elect, namely the love of God, which is the formal cause why God prepared glory for them, as is evident from the words. Then, if that preparation did not presuppose love, glory would not fittingly be said to be prepared for those loving God, but either for the enemies of God, if Predestination was made through original sin, by which all men are constituted enemies of God; or it would be said to be prepared for those altogether indifferent, if it had been made before the foreseen original sin, since in this state we would be neither friends nor enemies of His: therefore, when it is said to be prepared for those who love, it truly presupposes love, that is, the foreseen future state in which we love God. Finally, every act presupposes its object, because the object is the cause of the act: but the object of that preparation of glory is the love of men: for it is said that it is prepared for those who love: therefore that love of the elect is presupposed for the preparation of glory, and is the objective cause of that preparation. Nor does it avail to say that that preparation signifies the execution, and not the intention. For this reply openly militates against the text itself, in which there is no speech about the preparation of the means for making the execution: indeed rather those means are presupposed. For glory is said to be prepared for those who love, that is, for those already having love, which is the principal means for attaining glory; and consequently there is no speech there about the preparation of means, but about the preparation itself of glory with respect to those who are in fact foreseen to love God and by this love to merit eternal glory.

Proof 3. from the same Apostle, ad Rom. 8. Whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son, which text the holy Fathers interpret of the knowledge of future things, as it is directive of Predestination; and so as presupposing foreseen merits for Predestination. Thus St. Ambrose, lib. 5. De Fide cap. 3., where he thus has: Whom He foreknew, these He also predestined, because He did not predestine before He foreknew: but whose merits He foreknew, their rewards He predestined. In a similar manner Sedulius speaks in Epist. ad Rom.: Those whom He foreknew would be devoted to Him, he says, these He chose to take hold of the promised rewards: and a little later: It is one thing to foreknow, another to predestine: Foreknowledge therefore foreknows what is to be done; afterward predestination describes what is to be repaid; that one foresees merits; this one predestines rewards. And also Primasius, a disciple of August.: He predestined, he says, that he who by His gift would be conformable in life, would be conformable in glory. Then in the same place the Apostle skillfully places foreknowledge before predestination: Whom He foreknew, he says, He also predestined: by which he signifies that the foreknowledge of good works precedes Predestination of merits; for Sacred Scripture speaks nothing unadvisedly and imprudently. Finally, that very thing is evidently gathered from the antecedent and consequent words; since in verse 17. of the same chapter the Apostle begins to exhort the faithful to patience, on which, he says, our being future heirs of eternal life depends as on a necessary condition; But if sons, he says, also heirs: heirs indeed of God, coheirs, however, of Christ: if nevertheless we suffer with Him, that we may also be glorified; and in verse 28. he shows that tribulations cannot harm the elect, but rather turn out for them unto good, namely for attaining eternal glory: We know, he says, that to those loving God all things work together unto good, to those who according to His purpose are called holy: that is, according to the antecedent will of saving them, which passes from conditional into absolute, presupposed the prevision of their perseverance in the love of God; whence he adds: For whom He foreknew, supply: such as would be; these He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son in glory, just as they were conformable in patience; whence he infers: but whom He predestined, namely through that knowledge, these He also called with prevenient graces: and whom He called, these He also justified, those namely who consented to the calling; but whom He justified, these He also glorified; foreseeing of course that they would persevere in the love of God, and on that account He predestined them efficaciously and absolutely to the fellowship of the glory of Christ.

Proof 4. From those words of Christ in Matth. 20., where, addressing the sons of Zebedee, He says: To sit at my right hand or my left is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it is prepared by my Father; as if He were saying: eternal glory is not prepared by my Father so that it be conferred in the way in which earthly Kings are wont to confer their gifts at their pleasure and by mere will upon their Parents, Friends and Courtiers; but just as the Father has established, that is, according to the norm and measure of merits, as St. Augustine rightly weighs in Psalmum 126., expounding this verse, It is vain for you to rise before the light, where, when he had said:

Such were the Zebedees to themselves, who before they were humbled according to the Passion of the Lord were already choosing places for themselves where they would sit, where one at the right hand, the other at the left: they wanted to rise before the light, therefore they went in vain. The Lord recalls them to humility etc.; he adds: Rising from humility you arrive at the kingdom: for if you snatch the kingdom, you fall from the kingdom before you rise: Can you drink, he says, the Cup which I am about to drink? and they: We can; and He: You will drink my Cup, but to sit at the right hand, or the left, is not mine to give to you: It is prepared for others by my Father. What is, it is not mine to give to you, unless it is not mine to give to the proud? for this they still were; but if you wish to receive it, do not be what you are. It is prepared for others: And you, be others, and it is prepared for you. What is, be others? First be humbled, you who already wish to be exalted.

By which St. Augustine indicates that eternal glory is not prepared except for good works. The rest of the Fathers agree with him, interpreting the aforesaid passage in the same way; thus Epiphanius, haeres. 69.: This, he says, he wants to show, that this thing is not done according to acceptance of persons, but according to dignity: and below: If you have labored, it will be prepared for you by my Father. Cyril, lib. 10. Thesauri c. 6.: It is not mine to give the supreme honor to you who ask, which is reserved in the foreknowledge of the Father for those whom the excess of striving has commended: Theophylactus on this passage, Chrysostom, Hom. 63., and also St. Thomas agree with these, where he reports from St. Jerome: It is not mine to give, etc., as if he said: the eminence of dignity is not given to the person, but to merit, and this according to divine predestination, etc. Finally, it is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which eternal life is signified to be given as the wages of good works: thus Matth. 25., where the parable is proposed of the laborers working in the vineyard; and of the servants to whom the trading from the talents received had been entrusted; who all brought back wages according to their labor: but no Father of the family decrees that a wage is to be given to any laborer unless his labor is presupposed: therefore neither does God decree that glory is to be given except from foreseen works. Nor does it matter that, when the first laborers complained there that the Father of the family made those who had labored for a shorter time equal to them in the wage, he seems to refer this not to the more fervent labor of the later workers, but to his own goodness and liberality: for he does not attribute this to his goodness by reason of the total wage, but only by reason of the excess of the wage above the labor rendered: for he does not say simpliciter: I will to give this man a denarius, but: I will to give to this last one as to you, in which there is only a comparison of the one wage with the wage of the other, which indeed is equal in both: but it seems superabundant in one, namely on account of the lesser labor expended, which superabundance the Father of the family himself gives from pure liberality. — There are several other texts of Scripture insinuating the same thing; thus 2. Petri 1. Strive, brethren, that by good works you make your calling and election certain; as if he said: since your election depends on works, as long as this life lasts, insofar as it precedes the prevision of the end, it does not order us so firmly to salvation that it cannot be frustrated by the outcome; wherefore Strive, etc. The same thing is confirmed by Apocalypsis 3. Hold what you have, lest another take your crown; by which it is established that the crown is not so certainly and firmly decreed before the foreseen end of life that it cannot in fact be lost: that certainty of the crown, which is made through efficacious election, presupposes meritorious works. From these and other passages to be cited below it is clear that Sacred Scripture, according to the genuine interpretation of the holy Fathers, openly fights for the truth of our conclusion.

§ II. Second Proof from the holy Fathers.

Although several of the holy Fathers openly defend this very truth of our conclusion by their oracles, I nonetheless judge that those are to be heard above the rest whom the Council of Valence 3. called judges and arbiters in the controversy of Predestination, in these words:

Without hesitation, to the Doctors who piously and rightly handle the Word of truth, and to the most lucid expositors of Sacred Scripture themselves, that is, to Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and the others who rest in Christian piety, we submit reverent hearing and obedient understanding, and with all our strength we embrace what they have written for our salvation.

That I may carry this out more plainly, first I have judged that those are to be praised whom Augustine himself praised and commended. Then is to be opened what St. Augustine himself judged concerning this truth. Finally, what was the opinion of the Disciples of Augustine on this matter.

THE OPINION OF THE FATHERS PRAISED BY ST. AUGUSTINE.

St. Epiphanius, whom St. Augustine praises in the book ad Quodvult-Deum, in lib. Adversus haereses, haeresi 69., explaining those words of Matthew, It is not mine to give to you: This, he says, he wants to show, that this thing is not done according to acceptance of persons, namely, according to dignity, etc. Whence he gathers: It is not mine to give to you, but if you have labored, it will be prepared for you by my Father. By which he openly signifies the election before merits through that preparation. — St. Ambrose, whom St. Augustine in lib. 1. contra Iulianum calls the Excellent dispenser of God, whom, he says, I venerate as a Father, whose grace and constancy for the Catholic faith I have myself experienced, and the Roman world does not doubt to proclaim with me: he, I say, in the Commentary on the Epistle ad Rom. (if indeed it is his), expounding those words of chapter 8., Whom He foreknew and predestined, says: those whom He foreknew would be devoted to Him, these He chose to take hold of the promised rewards: and cap. 9. on that, I will have mercy on whom I have had mercy, he says: I will have mercy on him of whom I was foreknowing that I was about to give mercy, knowing that he would be converted and would remain with me: but because some deny that this book was written by St. Ambrose, therefore that same one is to be heard in lib. 5. De Fide cap. 3., where, expounding the praised words of Matthew, It is not mine to give to you, he says:

Finally, referring to the Father, he added to those for whom it is prepared, to show that the Father also is wont to defer not to petitions, but to merits, because God is not an acceptor of persons: whence the Apostle says whom He foreknew, He also predestined: for He did not predestine before He foreknew, but whose merits He foreknew, their rewards He predestined.

By which words he openly explains the truth of our conclusion. — St. Chrysostom, whom St. Augustine in lib. 1. contra Iulianum capitul. 6. pronounces learned in the Catholic Faith and instructing others, in Homil. 80. in Matthaeum, expounding those words, Come, blessed of my Father, says:

O how great in glory, how great in beatitude are these words! and he does not only say receive, but by inheritance, as it were your own, as it were paternal, as it were yours, which were owed to you from the beginning: for before you were born, because I knew you would be such, these things were prepared for you by me.

and in Sermon 1. in Epistolam ad Ephesios, expounding the same text, he says: But to be chosen is both the judgment of divine benignity and of the virtue of those who are chosen; for altogether he chooses the approved, etc. — St. Jerome, whose eloquence shone for us from the East to the West after the manner of a lamp, says St. Augustine in the praised book, chapter 7., he, I say, in the first chapter of Isaiah, expounding that, if you are willing, you will eat the good things of the earth: thus he says: He preserves free choice, so that on either side, not from the prejudice of God, but from the merits of individuals, there is either punishment or reward. Note (not from the prejudice of God), that is, from an anticipated sentence, preceding namely the examination of the cause; the same in chapter 1. of Malachi, expounding that, I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau, thus he has: The love and hatred of God arise either from the foreknowledge of future things, or from works. Otherwise we know that God loves all things, and hates nothing of those things which He created, namely antecedently and from Himself. Finally, in Epist. 105. ad Hedibiam quaest. 10., speaking about the Reprobate and those Predestined to glory, he says:

The vessels of mercy, which He prepared unto glory, which He called, that is, we who are not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles, He does not save irrationally and without the truth of judgment; but with preceding causes (namely merits), because some received the Son of God, others, however, of their own accord did not will to receive Him.

By which it appears that he speaks of election, and not indeed of execution alone: likewise of election to Glory, and not indeed to Grace; for everywhere he presupposes faith and the reception of the Son of God in those about whom he treats.

The adversaries reply. that the praised Fathers are to be understood only of a certain consequent and remuneratory election, which is made after foreseen merits; and not of a purely gratuitous election prior in notion to foreseen merits and antecedent to them. — On the contrary: the praised Fathers expressly assert that God, in efficaciously and sincerely preparing the Kingdom of Heaven for the elect, keeps justice, not grace; that He does not defer to petitions, but to merits, because He is not an acceptor of persons; and that He did not predestine before He foreknew; but whose merits He foreknew, their rewards He predestined: therefore they reject that efficacious election purely gratuitous and antecedent to foreseen works, in which justice is not kept, but grace; nor is anything deferred to merits, but all is from the mere acceptance of persons.

Second, the holy Fathers affirm that punishment and reward, that is, reprobation and predestination, are not from the prejudice of God, that is, from an anticipated sentence antecedent to the examination of the cause: and likewise that the love and hatred of God arise either from the foreknowledge of future things, or from works; since otherwise God loves all things, as the praised St. Jerome speaks: therefore they openly reject that gratuitous, absolute and efficacious election antecedently to the prevision of merits. Finally, the same holy Fathers with open words exclude that antecedent, absolute and efficacious election, while they affirm that election is made by reason of works and of foreknowledge preceding predestination: therefore, etc.

THE TESTIMONIES OF ST. AUGUSTINE HIMSELF.

Various are the arguments and statements of St. Augustine by which he declares that Predestination is made only from foreseen works; I bring forth, however, the principal ones.

First. Whenever St. Augustine speaks of the order of Predestination, he places foreknowledge before all those things which pertain to Predestination. Indeed he describes Predestination itself through foreknowledge, and judges the two so strictly conjoined that he very often uses foreknowledge for predestination. He thinks, therefore, that predestination is made from the foreknowledge of our cooperation with divine Grace. The antecedent is evident as to the first part, namely that he places foreknowledge before predestination; for in lib. De Natura et Gratia cap. 5., speaking of the sinners whom Christ came to save, he says: Whom He foreknew, He predestined, called, justified, glorified. He keeps the same order in lib. De Correctione et Gratia cap. 9., saying: All those things are already done: He foreknew, predestined, called, justified. And below: Whoever therefore in the most provident disposition of God have been foreknown, predestined, called, justified, glorified, etc. By which he sufficiently indicates that, just as calling precedes justification, and justification glorification, so also foreknowledge is presupposed to predestination. — The same antecedent is evident as to the second part, namely that he defines Predestination through foreknowledge, for in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 14. he says: This Predestination of the Saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed. It is consequent, therefore, that foreknowledge is not only intrinsic to Predestination, but is also to be placed before it according to the priority of concept. — Finally it is evident as to the third part, namely that St. Augustine uses that foreknowledge for predestination; for in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 17. he says: These gifts of God, if there is no predestination which we defend, are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown; this, therefore, is predestination; it is also signified by the name of foreknowledge, as the Apostle says: God has not cast off His people whom He foreknew. This which he says, He foreknew, is not rightly understood except as He predestined. And at the end of the chapter he adds: For without doubt He foreknew, if He predestined; but to have predestined is to have foreknown this, which He Himself was about to do. By which it is clear that, according to the opinion of St. Augustine, foreknowledge is so closely conjoined with predestination that he nonetheless judges it to precede it according to our concept.

The adversaries reply. that St. Augustine also at times places predestination before foreknowledge itself, for in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 10., speaking of good works and of perseverance in them, he says: that they are foreknown by God and on this account predestined: therefore, they say, that foreknowledge is posterior to predestination, since predestination is inferred from it. — Against this, first. Although from the passage cited by the adversaries that could perhaps be gathered, nevertheless it is certain that in the passages assigned by us St. Augustine is to be understood of the Foreknowledge that precedes Predestination; both because, as we have said, he expressly places foreknowledge before predestination and defines it through foreknowledge, as through something prior and in no way consequent upon Predestination itself. For if foreknowledge were something consequent upon Predestination itself, it would likewise be extrinsic to it and consequently impertinent to its definition. Then because from the cited cap. 18. of De Bono Perseverantiae St. Augustine infers foreknowledge from predestination, saying: Without doubt He foreknew, if He predestined: therefore he does not judge that foreknowledge presupposes predestination. Then because in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 10. he affirms that Foreknowledge can be without predestination, but not predestination without foreknowledge. He holds, therefore, that foreknowledge is prior to predestination, at least in the legitimate consequence of subsistence. Finally, because St. Augustine in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 17. 19. 22. affirms that there is no greater difficulty in Predestination than in simple foreknowledge, certainly for no other reason than that foreknowledge precedes predestination, so that in foreknowledge as prior God sweetly and kindly disposes the gifts and aids by which He orders and destines the creature to glory, whence it comes about that Predestination, following that foreknowledge and disposition, is easily conceived; and so he knew such foreknowledge and ordination. Add that in the passage cited by the adversaries it can also be said that Augustine is to be understood of antecedent foreknowledge, and that he therefore infers predestination from it, not because he judges predestination to be prior to foreknowledge, but because it is so closely connected with it that the one is rightly inferred from the other without distinction, in that manner, namely, in which the light of the sun is gathered from the day and the day from the light of the sun; for just as that inference is sound: the sun shines, therefore it is day, and conversely: it is day, therefore the sun shines, namely on account of the intrinsic connection of both, so likewise it is lawful to infer: God foresaw that He would give perseverance in good: therefore He predestined him; and conversely: God predestined this man: therefore He foresaw him persevering in good; which things are indeed true by reason of the very close connection of predestination with foreknowledge, not however from the fact that foreknowledge precedes predestination.

They reply, secondly. that not only in the passages assigned by us, but also elsewhere St. Augustine speaks of the foreknowledge of good works insofar as it follows upon predestination and coincides with the knowledge of vision; for he attributes to that foreknowledge the same object which is customarily attributed to the knowledge of vision, namely the thing not conditionally, but absolutely future; for he says that God by that foreknowledge knew what He would do if this or that had happened, which manifestly indicates absolute knowledge. From this this argument can be formed: that foreknowledge follows upon predestination and is the same as the knowledge of vision, which has the same object with them: but the foreknowledge of which St. Augustine speaks has the same object as predestination and the knowledge of vision, namely the things which are truly future: therefore, etc. — I distinguish the major: that which has the same object both materially and formally, I concede; only materially, I deny. Likewise I distinguish the minor: that foreknowledge has the same object as predestination, materially, I concede; formally, I deny. For this foreknowledge indeed regards the future, which is truly future, but not insofar as it is absolutely future. That this may be perceived more evidently, it must be noted that, although conditioned knowledge in itself is one and simple, yet if it is considered in order to its object, it can be distinguished as twofold, namely that which is concerned with an object conditionally indeed, but nevertheless truly future, such as was the knowledge by which God foreknew that Saul would truly be converted, if he were called in this or that manner; and that by which God knows what would have been future, if the condition had been posited, which since it is not to be posited, so neither are they future, such as was the future conversion of the Tyrians if Christ had been announced to them, which since it was not done, so neither were they converted.

Since, however, the Semipelagians abused that foreknowledge of things that would never be future, in order to defend their error, saying that some infants were therefore brought to baptism before death, because God had foreseen that if they had lived longer they would have led a just and pious life; others, on the contrary, departed from among the living before receiving baptism, because He had foreseen that they would be impious if they had lived; whence they inferred that the grace of baptism is granted according to merits although nowhere future. To destroy this error St. Augustine speaks only of the foreknowledge of things conditionally future, which nevertheless are truly future. But that foreknowledge of things nowhere future, which nevertheless would have been future if the condition required for their futurition had been posited, St. Augustine judges, as useless, to be rejected in the business of predestination, which to prove, he at length explodes this erroneous opinion of the Semipelagians.

Whence in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 9., wearied by their so absurd opinion, he says:

Are we to return to this, that we should still dispute with how great absurdity it is said that dead men are judged even for those sins which God foreknew they would have perpetrated, if they had lived, a thing which so abhors Christian, or utterly human, sentiments, that it can refute nothing at all? For why is it not also said that the Gospel itself was preached with so great labor and the passions of the Saints in vain, or is still preached in vain, if men could be judged even without having heard the Gospel according to the contumacy or obedience which He foreknew they would have had if they had heard?

It must be concluded, therefore, that although St. Augustine in the aforesaid passages does not speak conditionally, he is nonetheless to be understood of the conditioned knowledge antecedent to the decree and to predestination. — All these replies are confirmed and at the same time the aforesaid argument is strengthened from the fact that St. Augustine asserts Predestination to be the effect of divine foreknowledge: therefore he truly judges that predestination to glory is made after foreseen merits. The consequence is clear; for an effect is always posterior to its cause, either by the instant from which or in which, or by the posteriority of supposition or of duration. The antecedent is proved from the book De Spiritu et littera where he says: Through the Holy Spirit God diffuses charity in the hearts of those whom He foreknew in order to predestine, etc. As if he would say that foreknowledge is assumed as a cause for effecting predestination, and so he judges predestination to be posterior to foreknowledge itself and as it were its effect. This is confirmed from the similar manner of speaking of St. Augustine about Predestination to grace; for in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 18. he presses the Pelagians to confess that grace is prior to good works, from the fact that the Apostle says that God chose us, that we might be holy, not because we were holy: therefore likewise St. Augustine argues that foreknowledge is prior to predestination from the fact that he himself asserts that God foreknew in order to predestine, not however because He had predestined; for the manner of speaking is the same in both.

The second proof is drawn from lib. 1. to Simplicianus, qu. 2. where in express words he affirms that Predestination to glory is made from foreseen works, for explaining that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 9. When they had not yet been born, or had done anything good or evil, so that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from the one who calls it was said to her, because the greater will serve the lesser, as it is written: I have loved Jacob, but I have hated Esau; the same St. Augustine infers:

Therefore the purpose of God does not remain according to election: but election from purpose, that is, it is not because God finds good works in men which He may choose that the purpose of justification therefore remains, but because that purpose remains in order that He may justify believers, therefore He finds works which He may already choose for the kingdom.

As if he would say: it is not because He chose us for the kingdom of Heaven that He willed to justify us, but rather because He justified us, therefore He chose us for the kingdom of Heaven. Whence he subjoins:

Yet election does not precede justification, but justification precedes election. For no one is chosen unless already distant (by foreseen good works) from him who is rejected. Whence what was said: God chose us before the foundation of the world, I do not see how it was said, unless by the foreknowledge of good works, namely, together with the grace of God and final perseverance.

By which he clearly signifies that one is chosen before another because by reason of foreseen merit he is already distant from him who is rejected, for as he had said before: How is election just, or of any kind at all, where there is no distance? For if Jacob was chosen by no merit, he could not at all be chosen, no difference existing by which he would be chosen.

The adversaries reply. that this authority is not to be made much of, from the fact that St. Augustine wrote this book while he was younger and before the Pelagian heresy arose, and therefore did not so accurately unravel the questions about Predestination in that book, as he himself confesses in lib. 2. Retractat. — Against this: first, it is false that St. Augustine wrote those books to Simplicianus while he was younger, since he himself affirms in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae that he wrote them at the beginning of his episcopate, for he says in cap. 1., speaking of the Semipelagians:

Let them see whether in the later parts of the first book of those two which I wrote at the beginning of my episcopate, before the Pelagian heresy appeared, to Simplicianus, Bishop of Milan, anything remains by which it may be called into doubt that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, and whether I did not sufficiently treat there that even the beginning of faith is a gift of God, and whether from the things which were said it does not consequently shine forth, although it is not expressed, that even perseverance to the end is given by none other than Him who predestined us into His Kingdom and Glory:

therefore it is false that St. Augustine wrote those books to Simplicianus while he was younger. Likewise it is plainly false that he emended those books in the books of the Retractations. For although in book 2. of the Retractations cap. 1., treating of the first of those two questions which he unraveled in the first book to Simplicianus, he confesses that he afterwards discovered things more probable than those which he had written about that former question, nevertheless so far is he from having found anything worthy of reproach in the second question, from which the aforesaid text is excerpted, that he rather commends it there as most consonant with grace,

The latter, he says, in this book is the question from that place where the Apostle says: Not only, but also Rebecca, etc. up to and unless the Lord of hosts had left us seed, etc. In the solution of which question, indeed, labor was spent for the free choice of the human will, but the grace of God conquered, nor could it arrive at anything else than that the Apostle be understood to have said with the clearest truth: Who distinguishes you, etc.

By which things St. Augustine is so far from judging that in that latter question to Simplicianus there is anything worthy of emendation, that he rather approves and confirms the same in the aforesaid book of the Retractations. Add that Augustine himself in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae, which he wrote as an old man and after the books of the Retractations had already been written, approves the same Question to Simplicianus; for when he had said that before the Pelagian heresy arose he had preached the grace by which God frees us from our evil errors and morals, without our good merits preceding, doing this according to His gratuitous mercy; he subjoins: which I began to understand more fully in that Disputation which I wrote to Simplicianus, Bishop of the Church of Milan, of blessed memory, at the beginning of my episcopate, when I also knew and asserted that the beginning of faith is a gift of God. Moreover Primasius, the disciple of Augustine and most zealous defender of grace, judged these books to Simplicianus so orthodox that he wrote word for word in his Commentary on chapter 10. of the Romans that whole part from which the aforesaid second proof is drawn, saying: Here begins the exposition from the book of St. Augustine, excerpted from the passage to St. Simplicianus concerning Jacob and Esau, etc.

The third proof is drawn from Sermon 7. on the words of the Lord where, explaining that: No one putting his hand to the plow and looking back is fit for the Kingdom of God, he says: In this Chapter we learn that whom the Lord willed, these He chose. He chose, however, as the Apostle says, both according to His grace and according to their justice. And on those aforesaid words of the Apostle to Rom. 11. I have left for myself seven thousand who have not bowed the knee before Baal, he subjoins: What is I have left for myself? I chose them, because I saw their minds presuming of me, not of themselves, nor of Baal. By which he openly confesses that God chooses some for the Kingdom of God from His grace and their foreseen justice, or from the foreseen works of justice. But in what way that election is at once according to grace and according to justice, he himself explains in lib. De Correptione et Gratia cap. 13., namely because those good works on account of which we are efficaciously chosen for eternal life are not elicited from ourselves alone and the powers of nature, as the Pelagians wished, but from the grace of God preceding and aiding us.

The fourth and last proof is drawn from Sermon 233. De Tempore, where he assigns no other reason why some are chosen for glory, others on the contrary are rejected from it, than because their good or evil works are foreseen.

Many, he says, wish to know why the Lord calls that one and does not call that one, helps one and does not help another; this one He holds worthy and that one unworthy, honors this one and tortures that one. He answers: Hear, O man; He holds this one worthy for his good works, that one unworthy for his evil works.

The same he confirms in lib. 83. Quaestionum, quaest. 68. He has mercy on whom He will, he says, and hardens whom He will, but this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from most hidden merits, because even the sinners themselves, since on account of the general sin they have made one mass, yet there is not no diversity among them. Something therefore precedes in the sinners, by which although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification. And likewise there precedes in other sinners that by which they are worthy of hardening. By which words, although St. Augustine expressly treats of the conversion and hardening of the sinner, nevertheless since the reason on account of which God has mercy on one and hardens another equally fits the efficacious election of some to glory and the exclusion of others, namely because the will of God cannot be unjust, and it would be unjust unless from the part of the sinners some difference preceded on which it would be founded, therefore the aforesaid sentence confirms the truth of our conclusion and directly fights against the adversaries.

THE OPINION OF THE FATHERS, FOLLOWERS AND DISCIPLES OF AUGUSTINE.

What was the genuine mind and opinion of St. Augustine is clear from his Disciples and Followers, namely Prosper, Fulgentius, Primasius, Anselm and Bernard. — St. Prosper expressly asserts in many places that no one is Predestined except from the foreknowledge of his good works, most of all in the responses to the chapters of the Gauls; thus in the third response, speaking of sinners forsaken by God, he says: They left and were left, and were changed from good to evil by their own will, and although they had been reborn, had been justified, yet by Him who foreknew them such, they are not predestined. He has similar things in the response to the 7. and 15. objection. Likewise to the Vincentian objections in Response 12., explaining these words: They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us, he says: by will they went out, by will they fell, and because they were foreknown as about to fall, they are not predestined, but they would have been predestined if they were about to return and to remain in holiness and truth. — St. Fulgentius agrees with him in lib. 1. Ad Monimum around the middle, where he says:

Therefore God, about to show what He foreknew He would repay and what He would give, predestined to punishment those whom He foreknew would depart from Him by the vice of an evil will, and predestined to the Kingdom those whom He foreknew would return to Him with the help of prevenient mercy and would remain in Him with the help of subsequent mercy.

By which words he openly supposes the foreknowledge of works for election and reprobation, whence he subjoins: Because the Lord is merciful and just, He predestined the Just to glory and the Impious to punishment. But more clearly in lib. 3. De Veritate Praedestinationis et Gratiae around the end, he says:

As through mercy He prepared the gratuitous gift of justification, so through justice He prepared the reward of eternal justification. Thus the work of grace in all the predestined is begun by gratuitous mercy and perfected by just retribution. God therefore predestined His Saints both to the grace of a good life and to the grace of eternal life; God gives the prepared grace that men may be justified and live well, and may receive eternal life for things rightly done; and therefore even eternal life itself is the grace of God, as is said to the Apostle, because a good life is given to men freely.

By which he openly distinguishes the preparation of grace from the preparation of glory, in that the former is the work of mercy alone and altogether gratuitous, the latter the work of justice and presupposing our works. He speaks, however, not of the execution and actual collation, but of the eternal preparation, and so he explains and strengthens our opinion. — Primasius, finally, the most zealous defender of grace, in the Commentary on the Romans cap. 8. and 11. expressly affirms that Predestination presupposes foreknowledge, and likewise on 2. Timothy 4. on these words, I have kept the faith etc. I have kept, he says, the faith to the end through His grace, which the just Judge will render to me on that day, who knew me to have fought even to death with the help of His justice. As if he would say: therefore God will repay, because He foreknew fidelity and merits. — St. Anselm, whom the adversaries themselves affirm to be not the last follower of the Augustinian doctrine, teaches that Predestination is related to the predestined in the same way as foreknowledge is to foreknown things; for he writes in lib. De Concordia Praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii cap. 2.:

As foreknowledge, which is not deceived, foreknows nothing but the true, so predestination, which is not changed, predestines nothing but as it is in foreknowledge, and as what is foreknown, although in eternity it is immutable, yet in time it can sometimes be changed before it comes to be, so it is in all things concerning Predestination.

Whence he concludes that just as foreknowledge does not hinder liberty, because it does not precede the futurition of human actions, but supposes them as future, so he judges that Predestination also for that reason does not hinder liberty, because it does not precede the futurition of merits, but supposes it. — St. Bernard, the distinguished defender and follower of the Augustinian doctrine, in Sermon 23. on the Canticles expressly affirms that those are predestined who were foreknown as conformed to the image of the Son of God, for he says:

The eternal heavenly generation is Predestination, by which God loved His elect and graced them in His beloved Son before the foundation of the world, so appearing before Him in holiness that they might see His power and His glory, that they might be sharers of that inheritance to whose image they also appear conformed.

§ III. — Third Proof from Theological Reasons.

Various theological reasons are brought forward by the Authors defending this same conclusion of ours, as may be seen in Lessius, Treatise De Praedestinatione sect. 2., Albertus Pighius lib. 8. De libero arbitrio cap. 2., Osorius lib. 9. De Iustitia, Richard art. 7., Cardinal Sadoleto on cap. 8. ad Rom., Cardinal Contarini in the Opuscule De Praedestinatione, Turrianus De Electione divina, Carthagena in his Opuscules De Praedest., Vasquez and Gregory of Valencia in the first part q. 23., Joseph of Troyes in the Opuscule De Praedestinatione post praevisa merita, and our Pontius in the commentary on question 41. of the first book of the Sentences of Scotus. But the more pressing are:

First, that which is sincerely proposed to be obtained as a reward, a prize and a crown is decreed on account of merits and presupposes them: but eternal glory is proposed in this way in the sacred Scriptures: therefore, etc. The minor is evident: for in Matth. 5. eternal beatitude is proposed as a reward in these words: Rejoice and exult, because your reward is great in heaven; in 1. ad Corinth. 9. it is established as a crown: those indeed that they may receive a corruptible crown, we an incorruptible one. Finally it is proposed as a prize in Apocalypse 2.: To him who overcomes I will give to eat of the tree of life. And in Philippians 3.: I press toward the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus. But the major is proved: every effect of justice presupposes merit, otherwise it would not be an effect of justice, but either of mercy or of liberality: but reward, crown and prize are effects, or objects, of justice; for just as to render a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so likewise to compensate the reward of a work or of labor is an act and effect of justice; which the Apostle confirms in 2. ad Timoth. 4.: There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the just judge will render to me on that day. Add that since the motive of liberality and grace is directly opposed to the motive of reward and prize, it follows that as the motive of grace and liberality is pure love, without any regard to labor and work, so the motive of reward is the meritorious work itself, nor is a prize anywhere decreed without a merit being seen, either present or future. Hence, since the sacred Scripture expressly proposes glory to us as a reward and a prize, it follows that it presupposes merit as a motive foreseen by God before He decreed the prize.

The adversaries reply. that the volition of reward, prize and crown does not so necessarily presuppose the prevision of merits but that sometimes the volition of reward and prize is prior to the volition of labor and work, as is clear from the example of a King who out of liberality can decree that some good be conferred upon his subjects, which he nevertheless wills to be attained by them through generous acts. For that he wills that good for them proceeds from his liberality and grace; but that he intends it to be attained through merits arises from some justice, so that he first wills the good for them as an end, and then the generous acts as means conducing to the attainment of the decreed good. — On the contrary: he who intends a prize either formally and sincerely intends it under the notion of a prize, or he does not. If he intends it thus, it follows that he wills to confer it only in view of and from the presupposition of works and merit, for a prize has no formal notion of a prize except in relation to labor and merits. Hence although in the intention of him who hopes for a prize, merit comes before prize, because he regards merit as the means and prize as the end, yet in the intention of him who is to award the prize it happens otherwise; for the one who awards first intends the merit rather than the prize, first the labor rather than the reward, first the fight and victory rather than the crown, because through merit, labor and victory he is moved to decree the reward, prize and crown. But if he does not intend it thus, the reply is not to the point, since the sacred Scripture openly indicates enough that eternal glory is to be conferred under the notion of a prize. Nor does the adduced example of the King help at all; for in this hypothesis the King does not decree to confer the proposed good from a formal motive of justice, or insofar as it is formally a reward and prize, but either from a motive of friendship, or from a motive of magnificence and royal liberality. Nor does it matter that he establishes such a circumstance, namely that the subject attain the proposed good through works, for he orders this for this reason, that the acquisition may be more glorious to the subject, inasmuch as he will have contributed something from his own part to it.

Others reply. that although eternal beatitude is sometimes promised in the sacred Scripture under the notion of a prize, a crown and a reward, nevertheless it is also sometimes promised as an inheritance: but an inheritance passes by the law itself and not by industry, and presupposes only birth, not merits nor labor: therefore on this ground it is not decreed from foreseen merits.

I answer. that although beatitude is indeed promised as an inheritance, it is nevertheless not to be conferred by right of birth, but by the benefit of divine adoption alone; for which adoption two things are required: first, that through justification we be sealed as sons of God, as the Apostle speaks in ad Rom. 8.: You have received the spirit of adoption of sons of God, that is, sanctifying grace through which we are reborn spiritually and are constituted adopted sons of God. That being justified by his grace, he says in ad Titum 3., we may be heirs according to the hope of life everlasting. Secondly, for that adoption it is required that we preserve it and make it known through good works, according to that: Let them see your good works and glorify your Father. Hence that inheritance coincides with the notion of reward and prize, wherefore the Apostle in ad Colossenses 3. calls it the retribution of the inheritance, Whatever you do, he says, do it from the heart, as to the Lord and not to men, knowing that you will receive of the Lord the retribution of the inheritance. By which he signifies that that inheritance is not conferred, especially on adults, except in the manner of retribution and reward. Hence in ad Romanos 8., explaining the same, he says: And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and co-heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him. As if he would say, that divine inheritance is founded not only on the justifying grace which one may have had at some time, but also on labor and the exercise of virtues, and likewise on perseverance in them: For he who will have persevered to the end, he shall be saved: therefore also eternal glory, to be conferred in the manner of an inheritance, is not decreed except from presupposed merits.

The second argument is formed in this manner: that mode of predestining is to be attributed to God which is judged more suitable to His glory and to the salvation of men: but to predestine men after their merits have been foreseen befits the divine glory and the salvation of men more than if predestination were made antecedently to that prevision: therefore, etc. The major is evident from that celebrated rule of Saint Augustine in lib. 3. De libero arbitrio cap. 5. where he says: Whatever occurs to you as better by true reason, know that God has made it, as the Creator of all good things. By reason, moreover, it is persuaded that the ultimate end of predestination is the glory of God, and the proximate and less principal one is the salvation of men, and so the suitability of the modes of predestining must be taken in order to the greater glory of God and the salvation of men. The minor is also established as to its first part, namely that predestination from foreseen merits more redounds to the glory of God. For from this the supreme goodness and clemency of God is most highly commended, that as far as in Him lies He sincerely wills all men to be saved, and prepares and supplies sufficient graces to all, according to each one's state and condition, by which they can arrive at eternal life if they will, so that their perdition is to be traced not to the part of God, nor to His anticipated determination, but to their own perverse will. But this same thing does not follow from the opposite opinion, as is evident. The same minor is also evident as to its second part, namely that that mode is more in keeping with our salvation, namely from the fact that absolutely all men, not even one excepted, can and ought to strive with all their strength to attain eternal glory, inasmuch as they know that the attainment of it is left to themselves, and that they are not bound to a single one by any previous decrees on the part of God, as the opposite opinion contends: therefore etc.

Thirdly, from the opposite opinion various absurdities follow, which openly militate against the glory of God and the salvation of men. For first it follows that God does not sincerely will the salvation of absolutely all men: but that consequent is most absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The minor is evident from the countless texts of Scripture by which it is openly established that God wills the salvation of absolutely all men; thus 1. ad Timotheum 2.: God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. And in cap. 4. He is called God the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful, from which it is gathered that God has had from eternity a sincere will, as far as in Him lies, of saving absolutely all men, not even one excepted, which is more openly evident from these places, Matth. 18.: It is not the will before your Father that one of these little ones should perish. And 2. Petri 3.: He deals patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance. Which is to be understood not only of the kinds of individuals, as the adversaries say, but also of the individuals of the kinds; for since the word "not willing" contains a negation which removes all and excepts nothing, it follows that God wills that absolutely no man perish, as far as in Him lies; and likewise since that particle "any" is indefinite, it also pertains to individuals taken indefinitely, whence it comes about that if you except only two from that good will of God, it follows that He wills that some perish, namely those two whom you except; but this openly militates against the cited text: therefore truly God, no one excepted, wills all men to be saved. The major is proved: if God sincerely wills the salvation of all men, why, before the prevision of future things, does He elect so few and so neglect all the others not so elected that none of them is saved? For this defect of salvation on the part of the non-elect cannot be charged back to their own demerits, since they are not yet regarded as foreseen, and therefore it would have to be charged back to the very will of God not sincerely willing their salvation.

It is confirmed. he does not sincerely will the salvation of all men, especially of the reprobate, but only in pretense and delusively, who prepares for them only incongruous grace: but from the opposite opinion God prepares for the reprobate only grace incongruous to their salvation: therefore He does not truly will their salvation. The major is evident; the minor likewise; for according to the adversaries God, before the prevision of works or of the final state, elects absolutely and efficaciously as many as are to be led to glory, in the individual and in such a degree of glory, so that all of them are to be led there infallibly, and besides them absolutely no one else. Hence it follows that in a later sign God decrees the congruous means by which those so elected infallibly arrive at the place and degree of glory destined, and consequently that He supplies to the others only, who are not elected, incongruous means, lest perhaps one of them attain glory.

You will say. that God therefore does not industriously choose incongruous means for the reprobate, or the neglected; but gives as occasion offers, whatever the course of things and the opportunity of circumstances demands, not attending whether they are congruous or incongruous.

— On the contrary, if the matter is so, it seems incredible that absolutely no one from so great a multitude of the reprobate should obtain congruous grace and be saved, and on the other hand that none from so great a multitude of the elect should obtain incongruous grace and be damned. For let two huge multitudes of men be imagined standing on either side, and someone in the midst of both distributing to all of these and those coins from a huge chest full of silver coins, partly good, partly counterfeit: can it come about that some from each multitude do not receive good coins, and some false and counterfeit ones, unless he industriously selects all the good ones for one multitude and all the counterfeit ones for the other? In the same way, if God sincerely distributes all His graces to the Predestined as well as to the reprobate, and does not select incongruous ones for the reprobate, it cannot come about that some do not obtain congruous grace, and so they will be saved: therefore either that grace which God supplies to the reprobate is not sufficient, or its incongruity has been industriously sought.

The adversaries reply. that God has no less a sincere love and will of saving all men, although He has foreknown that many are not to be saved: therefore just as that sincere will of saving all stands together with such a foreknowledge of those not to be saved, so also it will be able to stand with their non-election. — On the contrary: there is no parity between Foreknowledge and Election, for the former depends in a certain way on the outcome of things, since things are not future because God foresaw them, but He foresaw them because they are future. Hence the foreseen fault of the reprobate is to be traced back not to the part of God, but to their own part. Wherefore there can stand in God a sincere will of saving all men together with the prevision of the sins which will be the causes why they are reprobated and damned. But it is otherwise with election, for that is wholly from the part of God, if it is made antecedently to foreseen merits, and so with it there cannot stand a sincere will of saving those whom God has not elected to eternal salvation.

The second inconvenience is that from the opinion of the Adversaries it follows that the reprobate are in that very instant of reprobation efficaciously and positively expelled from beatitude even before their evil works are foreseen: but this is foreign to the Catholic faith and wholly savors of Calvinism: therefore, etc. The minor is evident, and the Adversaries readily admit it. But the major is proved: he who wills absolutely and efficaciously some whole, coalescing from only certain parts known in the individual after the manner of a perfect aggregate, by that very fact excludes all other parts, even possible ones, and all those other parts left out are excluded efficaciously and infallibly, if that intention and determination is infallible. But God, according to the Adversaries, so conducts Himself that as many as He elects to glory, He elects them absolutely and efficaciously in the individual: therefore just as an Architect conceiving in his mind a building to be constructed, when he elects for it certain stones determined in number and in the individual, so that he wills to elect and mark out not others nor more for it, is by that very fact regarded as positively rejecting the neglected stones, because the stones cannot serve the building to be constructed unless they are elected, marked out and taken up by the Architect: so by parity, if God from eternity, with no merits foreseen, elects a certain number of the Predestined as living stones for constructing the heavenly Jerusalem, so that all and only those elect can serve this spiritual structure, it follows that all those who are not so destined nor taken up are positively reprobated, even if this reprobation is not understood to take place through a positive act and an actual decree by which God devotes them to eternal punishments; for he is sufficiently excluded from glory who is not included in the will of the one electing to glory.

Thirdly, from that antecedent decree it follows that human freedom is taken away, as regards the attainment of glory: but this is against the faith, which asserts that it is in our freedom and in our hand to lose glory if we will, or to acquire it with the grace of God: therefore a decree of this kind is not to be admitted. The sequel of the major is proved: because, with that decree posited in the composite sense, it is impossible that one should not attain eternal life; otherwise the efficacious divine decree could be deceived or frustrated, and the creature would be more powerful to reject glory than God to confer it: but that composite sense would be antecedent and independent of our will: therefore it would not have freedom with respect to attaining glory. The consequence is proved: because the will is not free with respect to that for the positing or not positing of which it has no power, once all the prerequisites and antecedents of its action are posited, which in no way depend on it: therefore if the efficacious decree is antecedent and independent of the will, and with it posited the will cannot bring it about that it does not have glory, it is not in its own hand to have and not to have glory, nor consequently will it have freedom in order to this.

Fourthly, from the opposite opinion all solicitude about attaining beatitude and securing salvation through good works is taken away and banished; for each one can reason thus within himself: either I am predestined from the sole good pleasure of God, or I am not: if I am, without doubt whatever I do I shall be saved; for since the decree of God is efficacious and invariable, it cannot be frustrated of its effect. If I am not, my diligence about pursuing virtue and eliciting good works will be utterly vain and useless, since those things serve nothing toward securing predestination, inasmuch as it has been fixed and ratified from eternity antecedently and independently of the prevision of good works; all of which directly militate against that admonition of Saint Peter: Be diligent, brethren, that by good works you make your calling and election sure.

§ IV. — The objections are solved. 1. From the sacred Scripture.

The adversaries object. various texts of the sacred Scripture, by which it is signified that the gratuitous election of men depends on the sole purpose and decree of God, and not on foreseen merits. First indeed that of Lucae 12.: Fear not, little flock, because it has pleased your Father to give you a kingdom; where by the little flock they wish the Predestined to be understood, who are called a little flock in comparison with the greater number of the reprobate. By the word "it has pleased" they hold that a special election and an antecedent will is designated, inasmuch as it is proposed to them: finally by the word Kingdom they contend that the election to glory is designated, which alone obtains the name of kingdom: therefore, etc.

I answer 1. that it is not certain that the Predestined are designated by the little flock, for Christ directed these words to absolutely all the Apostles and Disciples, who were not all Predestined, since Judas Iscariot was among them, the traitor and son of perdition; hence I judge that it is more truly said with Maldonado that the aforesaid words were spoken to those to whom the preceding ones had been directed, and those had been dictated to absolutely all the Hearers, and in their person to all future faithful.

I answer 2. that by the word "it has pleased" an antecedent efficacious will is not signified: both because an efficacious will attains its effect; but it is evident from that little flock, whether you understand all the Hearers or only the Apostles, that some did not attain the effect of Predestination, namely eternal glory: then because the revelation of such an efficacious will contributed nothing to establishing that confidence which Christ intended to excite in their souls; indeed it would have stirred them to a certain sloth and indolence, since they would have thought that no effort was to be applied on their part, because by the efficacious decree of God their blessed lot was already accomplished: and finally because, to provoke that confidence, it sufficed that the promised eternal reward be decreed consequently and from foreseen merits; for Christ intended to persuade the Apostles that they ought to place all their care and solicitude in the providence of God; not only because, He says, He who feeds the animals will not leave men unfed: but also drawing an argument from the greater to the less, if God has decreed to give you His kingdom, which is the greatest thing, how much more will He supply temporal things to you? For this it sufficed that eternal glory had been decreed to be given to men; whether meanwhile it was decreed before or after foreseen merits.

I answer 3. that although an efficacious will is signified by the aforesaid words, it is nevertheless not a pure will of good pleasure and by exclusion of merits; but a good pleasure from a motive of justice founded in the prevision of merits: both because that glory is signified to be given to the humble on account of their littleness, wherefore it is called a little flock, The little flock, says the venerable Beda, either in comparison with the greater number of the reprobate; or rather he names it on account of humility; in which manner also Christ in Matth. 19.: Suffer the little children (that is, the humble) to come to me, for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven: then because Christ insinuates the same thing there; for when He had proposed to the Apostles that riches were to be neglected for the glory of God, all earthly solicitude banished, and even life despised, that He might excite them to undergo these grave things with an even mind, He said: Fear not, etc., as if He would say: these things ought to seem sweet to you, since on account of the endurance of these it has pleased your Father to decree the Kingdom of Heaven as a reward and a prize: and finally because if the word "it has pleased" signified that the election is wholly gratuitous, it would also express a wholly gratuitous execution and conferral; for that whole sentence declares execution more than intention, since it is not said "it has pleased to elect", which pertains to intention, but "it has pleased to give", which imports execution: but no one would say that glory is conferred gratis according to execution: therefore neither ought he to assert that it is decreed gratis according to intention.

They object 2. several sentences of Saint Paul by which he seems to hint that divine Predestination is made from the sole absolute decree and purpose of God. Thus in ad Ephes. 1.: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in his sight, in charity, who has predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, unto the praise of the glory of his grace, etc. But he speaks, they say, of an absolute will, as is evident from the election to glory, because he speaks of those whom God blessed with every spiritual blessing in heavenly places; but grace, which is common to the reprobate and the Predestined, is not every blessing, since the blessing of glory still remains; nor a blessing in heavenly places, since it is bestowed on wayfarers only on earth: therefore according to Saint Paul Predestination is made from the mere absolute good pleasure of God, not from the foreseen works of men; and so our aforesaid conclusion openly contradicts the sacred Scripture.

I answer. by denying the consequence; since in that place the Apostle is to be understood of Predestination, not indeed to glory and eternal beatitude, but to grace, by exclusion of the works elicited by the powers of nature, as Saint Jerome interprets in his Commentary and August. in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum c. 19. For Saint Augustine strongly urges this place against the Semipelagians, who, since they asserted that the beginning of faith is to be attributed to the powers of free choice and not to grace; he confutes them from the fact that the Apostle says God chose us, not because we were, but that we might be holy. Hence Augustine himself there in cap. 18., treating the same text, says:

He did this according to the good pleasure of his will, that no one should glory in his own, but in his will: He did this according to the riches of his grace, according to his good will which he purposed in his beloved Son, in whom we have obtained a lot, being Predestinated according to the purpose not of ourselves, but of him who works all things;

by which it is evident that he explains the text of the Apostle about Predestination to grace. Then because the Apostle himself indicates these things through the subsequent words: He has predestinated us unto the adoption of children... in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins, all of which denote grace, not glory; for adoption, redemption and the remission of sins pertain to the grace of justification. And finally because he directed these words to all the Ephesians, of whom the Apostle was not certain that they were all Predestined to glory, since he himself was not secure about his own Predestination, but trembling and fearing said: I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself become a reprobate.

They object 3. that passage of ad Romanos 9.:

When they had not yet been born (namely Jacob and Esau) or had done anything good or evil; not of works, but of him that calls, it was said to her (Rebecca): the elder shall serve the younger: as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And a little after: So then it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy: therefore he has mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardens. And, cannot the potter make of the same lump one vessel indeed unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

But all these things signify the efficacious will of God in predestining men antecedently to their foreseen works: therefore Predestination to glory is from the mere mercy of God, and not from foreseen merits.

I deny the sequel. for first the Apostle indeed says that God loved Jacob before he had done anything good, but he does not say that He loved him before He had foreseen what Jacob was one day about to do; hence he excludes indeed the works already done, and says that they were not the reason of the love of Jacob and the hatred of Esau; but he does not exclude the foreseen works: and so God loved Jacob from eternity when he had not yet done anything good, namely from eternity, because he did not yet exist; although he had been foreseen as about to do good in time, which prevision was the cause why he was loved by God.

I answer 2. that the Apostle is to be understood of the election to grace, not to glory; otherwise it would follow from this that Esau also was reprobated and destined to gehenna before his demerits were foreseen: for in the same manner the Apostle speaks of the hatred of Esau and the love of Jacob, saying: Before they had done anything good or evil, I loved Jacob and I hated Esau: but no one, except Calvin, would say that reprobation is made before foreseen demerits; therefore no one likewise ought to assert that Jacob was predestined before his merits were foreseen, and so this election is to be understood not to glory, but to grace. Not that God truly willed to lavish grace on Jacob and deny it to Esau, for God denies His grace to no one; but the Apostle wished to signify that God loved Jacob because He conferred on him greater graces than on his brother, whom he is said to have hated for this reason, that by loving him less He also conferred lesser graces on him: for hatred in the sacred Scripture sometimes signifies lesser love; for so is to be understood what Christ said in Luca 14.: If any man come to me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple: which sentence in Matth. cap. 10. he renders thus: He that loves father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and he that loves son or daughter above me, is not worthy of me.

I answer 3. that the Apostle speaks of the election to faith; for in that whole chapter he teaches that the Jews were rejected from justice and salvation on account of unbelief, and that the Gentiles were admitted to it on account of faith in Christ: which is especially evident from vers. 30. where he concludes that whole chapter thus:

What then shall we say? That the Gentiles, who followed not after justice, have attained to justice; even the justice that is of faith; but Israel, by following after the law of justice, that is, the old law of legal justice, has not come to the law of justice, that is, of true holiness conferred through Christ; because not of faith, but as it were of works; for they stumbled at the stone of stumbling, as it is written: Behold I lay in Sion a stone of stumbling and a rock of scandal, and every one who believes in him shall not be confounded.

Thus Saint August. interprets this text in Epist. 105. and in lib. 1. Ad Simplicianum q. 2. and in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 16. and 19., and also the Master of the Sentences in lib. 1. dist. 41. cap. 1., and even Saint Thomas on this place, saying:

It can be understood figuratively (namely as the Apostle took it) so that by the Major is understood the people of the Jews, who first received the adoption of sonship, that is, grace; and by the Minor is figured the people of the Gentiles, who later was called to faith. The greater people therefore serves the lesser, inasmuch as the Jews are our book-bearers, keeping the books from which testimony is borne to our faith.

The same thing is also gathered openly enough from the following words of the Apostle, which chiefly indicate election to grace and faith; for dilection presupposes sanctifying grace, as the motive of divine love: hatred, on the other hand, proceeds from the privation of grace: similarly these words, It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy, do not look to predestination and eternal glory; otherwise the Apostle would have repeated for men, even those given to piety, the greatest occasion of despair, if those striving for glory with all their strength and with the help of grace had nevertheless understood that it was to be denied to them. They signify therefore only the concourse, or the actual grace of God, in good works, as may be gathered from this word "Running," which designates the actual course and striving toward eternal beatitude through good works, as St. Augustine explains in the same book cap. 8. and St. Thomas in the same place. These words likewise aim at the same thing, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; for the Apostle does not say "he reprobates," but "he hardens," which implies the privation of efficacious grace, and consequently signifies that the mercy preceding, to which it is opposed, is the conferral of efficacious grace. Since therefore all these words sound only of grace, it follows that the Apostle there uses election and purpose for election to grace, or to faith.

You will say. at least from these words, Vessels of mercy, which God hath prepared unto glory, it is gathered that the Apostle intends predestination to glory: therefore, etc.

I deny the antecedent. since these very words can also rightly be expounded of Predestination to grace; for Glory is not there taken for heavenly glory, but for that extrinsic glory of God, or the clarification and honor to which God ordered the elect as vessels unto honor, namely that men, seeing their good works, might glorify and praise God in them, as Haymo interprets: the Greek also agrees, for the word δόξα, which our Interpreter renders as glory, properly signifies honor, fame, splendor and the clarity of a name, as St. Augustine himself explains in tract. 10. on John, That very thing, he says, which in Greek is called δόξα, whence the word δοξάζειν is derived, is interpreted both as clarity and as glory: for by glory each one becomes clear, and by clarity glorious, and thus what is signified by both words is the same thing. Just as, moreover, the most renowned authors of the Latin language defined, Glory is the frequent fame of someone with praise.

They object 4. that passage of Actor. cap. 13. concerning the Antiochenes: As many as were ordained to life everlasting, believed; by which it is signified that Predestination is the cause of faith and of good works, and so that it is not made from foreseen merits.

I deny. that this is the sense of the context, for by that Preordination nothing else is signified than a predisposition, or the disposition of those very Antiochenes who had care and desire of their own salvation by the benefit of the grace granted to them, and this is gathered from the Greek text, where for "ordained" we read τεταγμένοι, that is, ordered, disposed, well prepared, which comes about through the desire of salvation: and because God by eternal counsel had put this into their minds, they can rightly be called preordained. This predisposition, however, in the same place vers. 46. is opposed to the evil disposition of the Jews who from malice contradicted the preaching of the Apostle, whom Paul therefore addresses with these words: To you it behooved first to speak the Word of God; but since you reject it and judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, behold we turn to the Gentiles.

I answer 2. that by the word "Preordained" there is signified not a complete Predestination and to glory, but an incomplete one, namely to grace; then because Predestination to glory is most hidden, nor does any reason appear why those who were Predestined in the city of Antioch should be revealed to the sacred Writer; then because this revelation would have given to those who then believed an occasion for laying aside all care of their own salvation, and would have redoubled the despair of those who did not believe; for if all who were predestined then believed, it follows that the others who did not believe were reprobates; then finally because it is not likely that in that most famous city there were no other Predestined than those who were then baptized in small number.

I answer 3. that by that preordination there can also be signified in another way Predestination to eternal life; not indeed antecedently, but consequently to the prevision of good works, which is therefore called preordination because it is made from eternity and before those works are elicited in time.

They object 5. That saying of Christ to the Apostles, Ioan. 13.: If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them: I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen; but that the Scripture may be fulfilled, he that eateth my bread shall lift up his heel against me; by which, they say, Christ speaks to the Apostles alone of an antecedent, absolute and efficacious election. First, because He excepts Judas from the number of the elect: but an antecedent, conditional and inefficacious election is common to all, and no one is excluded from it. Second, because Christ adduces that election as the cause why He excepts Judas, when He says: I speak not of you all; I know whom I have chosen, etc.; but an antecedent election, inefficacious only and conditional, is not the cause of excepting anyone: it is otherwise, however, with an antecedent will, absolute and inefficacious, by which the rest are virtually excluded: therefore Christ really speaks of an antecedent election by which the Apostles, except Judas, were predestined from the mere good pleasure of God.

I deny the consequence. For Christ there does not treat of election to glory, but to the offices of the Apostleship to be discharged after his death, from which offices Judas the traitor was to be kept away, both because of his treachery and because of his impenitent death before Christ the Lord was raised from the dead: as to the text, however, I say that this is its genuine sense: Blessed are you if you know these things, which I say to you, that is, if you believe and if you do them; since in fact you already believe and will someday do them, I speak not of you all, because you do not all believe, or will do them. I know whom I have chosen, that is, I know what you are interiorly, whom I chose as Apostles. From which it is evident that the discourse is only about election to the Apostleship.

You will say. St. Augustine interprets this text of election to glory. And that saying also favors this exposition, Blessed are you if you do these things, where there is discourse of the beatitude of glory.

I answer. that the interpretation of election to the Apostleship, as more literal and proper, is admitted by other Fathers, whom Maldonatus and Toletus follow; of which also that saying of Christ in John 15. is to be understood: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and have appointed you that you should go and bring forth fruit. He says "that you should go," for to go is proper to Apostles, that is, to the sent: and that saying of Ioann. 6.: Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? I add that not even that explanation of St. Augustine hurts us: for this can be the sense: I know whom I have chosen efficaciously to glory, foreseeing namely both what they would do and what final state they would have, from the prevision of which I chose them efficaciously.

They object 6. That saying of John 10. where Christ, addressing the unbelieving Jews, says: You do not believe, because you are not of my sheep: my sheep hear my voice; and I know them and they follow me, and I give them life everlasting, and they shall not perish forever, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand: from which the Adversaries infer that Predestination to glory is the cause of the calling to faith; for to be a sheep given to Christ and to be predestined is the same thing: therefore truly predestination to glory is made before foreseen merits: since indeed it is made before faith, which is the first principle of merit.

I deny the consequence 1. because even if the aforesaid text were understood of the Predestined to glory alone, it would not nevertheless follow from this that it is to be understood of predestination before foreseen merits: indeed St. Aug. seems to use the text itself of predestination after foreseen merits, since in lib. De Correptione et Gratia cap. 9. he says: Those therefore are understood to be given to Christ who are ordained to eternal life, for they are presupposed to be ordained, or made fit for eternal life, before they are given to Christ. — 2. I say that the aforesaid text is to be understood of Predestination to grace and faith; otherwise Christ would have unjustly reproached the Jews because they were not of his sheep, nor wished to believe in him. For since the absolute decree of predestination is immutable, it follows that if the defect of predestination had been the cause why they themselves did not believe, certainly that defect of faith would not be culpable in them, since indeed it would proceed not from their perverse will, but from the ordinance of God, who had not predestined them. And so the sense of that passage is that, since the Jews were of a perverse mind toward Christ, they were in no way ready and disposed to believe, so as to become his Sheep and Disciples, therefore he says: You do not believe me, because you are not of my sheep: that is, you do not have the docility of my sheep, indeed you are wolves seeking to devour and destroy the Shepherd together with the sheep: whence he adds: My sheep hear my voice, that is, they do not resist my words and the graces by which I call them to faith: but they readily acquiesce in the truth which I myself announce to you. Nor does it matter that he subjoins I give them life everlasting, etc.; for these are not taken absolutely, but under this condition: if they wish to consent to my words and obey my precepts; for God does not compel anyone to salvation; but only invites and calls that he consent freely and voluntarily. Nor likewise do the following words hinder: No one shall snatch them out of my hand: for there by "hand," power is signified, as St. Augustine affirms in Tract. 48. on John, whence the sense is that God so fortifies the faithful with his graces and helps that no one can lead them away from him, except by their consent; so that no one perishes except by his own will, not however by the defect of the protector: not otherwise than if someone had fled to the palace of a certain Prince, that there he might protect his life against the enemies, and the Prince had said to him: no one will snatch you from my hand, or lead you away from the Palace: and meanwhile he who had so fled should of his own accord go out of the Palace and give himself to his enemies; certainly the Prince could not be accused of fault or of lying. So by parity God is not to be accused because some of those to whom he supplies his helping hand fall away from grace, because this deviation is to be traced back to their evil will, not to a defect of divine protection.

The objections from the Fathers are solved: — They object 1. That saying of Cyril of Alexandria on John cap. 21. I have chosen you, not you me: I made myself known to you who were ignorant, moved by humanity and clemency; I have so strengthened you that you can proceed and advance to such great confidence with God, that whatever you ask in my name shall be granted to you. In which words the adversaries weigh 1. that the election of God precedes, which is the cause of each virtue in the predestined man; 2. that from this arises the power of obtaining in prayer; 3. that this grace was conferred by God without preceding merits, by the sole benignity and clemency of God.

I answer. that Cyril is not to be understood of all the Predestined, but of the Disciples alone, or the Apostles, and of their election to the Apostleship, as is manifest from the following words, by which the Apostles are said to have been chosen by Christ, instructed with knowledge, strengthened with confidence, etc. All of which stand very well without an antecedent election to glory. Add that Judas was then among the Disciples and Apostles to whom these words were directed; but it is certain that he was not efficaciously elected to glory, and so neither St. John nor St. Cyril are to be understood of election to glory, but to the Apostolic dignity.

They object 2. That saying of St. Chrysostom Homil. 51. on Matthew: Those whom he knows to be his own before the constitution of the world, he loads with such great labors and makes them labor so long, until they become worthy of the heavenly kingdom: therefore Predestination is the cause why they become worthy, not however is their dignity the motive and reason why they are predestined.

I answer 1. that this text is not of St. Chrysostom himself but of an anonymous author. 2. I say that all these things can easily be understood of the foreknowledge and efficacious election made from eternity after foreseen merits, which nevertheless will only come to be in time; so that there is not an antecedence of the decree, but a simple succession of time to that which God saw and approved from eternity; for he first foresaw the meritorious works, and thence decreed that glory was to be conferred, before those works had in fact been elicited.

The objections from St. Augustine are solved. — They object 1. St. Augustine in lib. De Correptione et Gratia cap. 7. where he thus has: Whoever have been separated from that original damnation by this largess of divine grace, there is no doubt that both the hearing of the Gospel is procured for them, and when they hear they believe, and in the faith which works through dilection they persevere to the end, and if at any time they wander they are corrected when reproved. And a little after: All these things he works in them, who has worked them as vessels of mercy, who also chose them in his Son before the constitution of the world by the election of grace. But if by grace, then not of works, otherwise grace is no more grace. From which words of St. Augustine the Adversaries gather that he undoubtedly thought that men were predestined to have been efficaciously elected to glory apart from the prevision of merits: and according to his mind this order is to be established in the decree of the divine will, that in the first instant of reason all men were foreseen in the mass of perdition; in the second, that God predestined some of them, that is, all, from this mass by a gratuitous and efficacious election to glory; in the 3rd, that he chose the means by which they would infallibly be led to the destined end; he chose, I say, by virtue of the preceding separation which drove him to choose the congruous and efficacious means.

I answer 1. with Lessius, Martinon and Iosephus Tricassinus, that St. Augustine is there to be understood of election to grace. For his scope was to teach how all good works and perseverance itself were not from us, that is, from the bare powers of free choice, but from the grace and gift of God; likewise that the separation from the mass of perdition and the election to the grace of justification and thence to glory are not from works, but from the grace and gratuitous mercy of God. That this, however, is the sense of St. Augustine is evident from the very text itself, for thus he has a little before the words quoted: They are distinguished, he says, not by their own merits, but through the grace of the Mediator, that is, justified freely in the blood of the second Adam, etc. From which it is evident that he affirms that justifying grace, which presupposes the free consent of man, is required for that separation, or Predestination. Then he himself in the same place explains that saying, Not of works, while he subjoins: They are chosen by the election of grace, not of their preceding merits, because grace is to them all merit; that is, not from merits preceding grace, because all their merit is from grace; and so that gratuitous election does not exclude the merits which are from grace, but only those which are not from grace. It is confirmed that this is the mind of St. Augustine, because in that place and other similar ones he disputes against the Pelagians, whose heresy did not consist in this, that they thought glory is given on account of the works of grace, but in this, that they said it is given on account of works done by the sole powers of nature, as is manifestly evident from the words of the same Augustine in lib. De Gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 6. where, expounding that saying of 2. Timoth. 4.² For the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will render to me in that day: he subjoins:

to whom would the just Judge render the crown, if the merciful Father had not given grace? And how would that crown be one of justice, if the grace which justifies the impious had not gone before? How would those debts be rendered, if that gratuitous one had not first been given? But when the Pelagians say that this is the only grace according to our merits, by which sins are forgiven to man: but that that which is given at the end, that is, eternal life, is rendered to our preceding merits; it must be answered to them: for if they so understood our merits, that they recognized even those very gifts themselves to be of God, that opinion would not be reprobated. But since they so preach human merits, that they say man has them from himself: most rightly indeed does the Apostle answer: For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received? Truly to one thinking such things it is most truly said: God crowns his own gifts, not your merits, if your merits are from yourself and not from him.

These are the words of St. Augustine; from which it openly appears that his intention is only to teach that perseverance and efficacious election to glory are not from the works of nature, but from grace and the works of grace.

You will insist. St. Augustine in the same place, explaining to what those who are called according to the purpose are elected, says: But they are chosen to reign with Christ and to obtain his Kingdom: where by the name of Kingdom he does not understand the militant Church, which he usually calls the Kingdom of Heaven in the Gospel; for he subjoins that those thus called will persevere to the end and that none of them will perish. Which certainly cannot be understood of the faithful of the militant Church, for many of them perish, and hence there he speaks only of Predestination to glory before foreseen merits.

I deny the consequence. for even if St. Augustine there treated of Predestination to glory, it would not nevertheless follow from this that he intends that Predestination to be made before the prevision of works; indeed the contrary is deduced from it. Then because in the same place he places foreknowledge before Predestination; for speaking of those who, when they have at some time been justified, yet having again fallen into sin die in it, he says: Without doubt neither at that time, in which they live well and piously, are they to be counted in that number of the Predestined: for they are not separated from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and Predestination of God, and therefore neither are they called according to the purpose, and by this neither chosen: therefore since the calling presupposes Predestination and this foreknowledge of works and of cooperation, it evidently follows that St. Augustine there treats only of Predestination after foreseen merits. Then because he gathers the certainty and infallibility of Predestination from that foreknowledge, for he says: If anyone perishes, God is deceived, but none of them perishes, because God is not deceived. For since this infallibility does not infer necessity to the human will, it follows that God is therefore not deceived, because he foreknows the merits of men before he decrees anything about their eternal beatitude. Then because he there speaks of the election of the Predestined to the kingdom, in the way he speaks of the election of Judas to shed the blood of Christ; those therefore, he says, he chose to obtain his kingdom, him to shed his blood: but Judas was not chosen to perpetrate so great a crime before the prevision of his own malice; for God is not a tempter of evils: therefore neither were the Predestined chosen to glory before the prevision of their own merits.

You will press. St. Augustine nowhere acknowledged that twofold incomplete Predestination to glory, or to grace, but as often as he speaks of Predestination, so often he understands only the complete destination to glory and grace at once: therefore there is no answer.

I deny the antecedent. for its falsity is gathered from various places of St. Augustine. For first, in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 17. and 18. he affirms that every gift of God which he works in us through the exciting and helping graces is truly predestined by God: for whatever God gives, he says, this he predestined to do and to give: but faith and justice even in the reprobate are gifts of God: therefore they are also predestined by God: and consequently St. Augustine acknowledged an incomplete Predestination to grace, and not only the complete one to grace and glory at once, for there is in the reprobate no Predestination to glory. Secondly, the same in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 10.: When God promised Abraham the faith of the Gentiles, etc., he promised not from the power of our will, but from his predestination; but he promised not only the faith which is given to the Predestined to glory alone, but also to those who from the same stock of Abraham are not Predestined: and consequently there St. Augustine admits an incomplete Predestination to grace. Thirdly, St. Augustine acknowledged a twofold separation of men; one to grace alone, the other indeed to grace and glory: therefore he also acknowledged a twofold Predestination, one incomplete to grace alone; the other indeed complete, to grace and glory at once. The consequence is clear, because separation and predestination sound the same with St. Augustine. The antecedent is proved from lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 9. where, speaking of the non-persevering, and so of the not-Predestined to glory, he says: According to these things, that is, according to faith and justice, they were of us; nevertheless according to a certain other separation they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us. What is this, "according to a certain other separation they were not of us," except according to a distinct separation by which the reprobate are set apart from the Predestined? and so a twofold separation is given, since another is given than that which is of the persevering and to-be-saved: but it cannot be except an incomplete predestination to grace, or to faith and christian justice: therefore it is false that according to St. Augustine no other Predestination is given than that which is to grace and glory at once. Fourthly finally, the same thing is certain from several places of the same holy Doctor, most especially from the praised book cap. 17. where he clearly speaks of the one predestined incompletely, that is, to some grace, abstracting from glory; for he says: Whom God predestined to be chaste in the future, although he holds this as uncertain, does not therefore not act so that he be chaste, since he hears by the gift of God that he will be what he believes. And below: what I said of Chastity, this can be most truly said of Faith, of Piety, of Charity, etc.: but Predestination to these virtues, which accompany grace, is only incomplete: therefore truly St. Augustine acknowledged a twofold Predestination, namely complete to grace and glory at once, and incomplete to grace alone; the same he affirms expressly in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 6. 9. 15. and 19.

They object 2. The same St. Augustine in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 18. where he thus says:

Of two infants therefore bound by original sin, why this one is taken up and that one is left; and of two now grown impious persons, why this one is so called that he follows the caller, but that one either is not called, or is not so called that he follows the caller, the judgments of God are inscrutable. Of two pious ones, however, why to this one perseverance to the end is given, and to that one is not given, the judgments of God are more inscrutable.

With which words D. August. seems to insinuate that this comes from the fact that one is elected, the other not elected to life; which he openly teaches with the following words when he says: That nevertheless ought to be most certain to the faithful, that this one is of the Predestined, that one is not: for if they had been of us, says one of the Predestined who had drunk this secret from the breast of the Lord, they would surely have remained with us. Then he asks what that is: they were not of us: and at length he answers: They were not of those who were not called according to the purpose, they were not chosen in Christ before the constitution of the world, they did not obtain a lot in him, they were not Predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things. With which words St. Augustine teaches that the reason of that calling, or non-calling, is to be traced back to the election, or non-election to glory: therefore truly St. Augustine contends that election, or Predestination to glory, is the cause of merits, not that it presupposes merits.

I deny the consequence. for the contrary is evinced from the very text itself: for either St. Augustine knew that Predestination to glory is the cause of the concession, or of the denial, of efficacious grace and perseverance; or he did not know: if he knew, why does he say those things are inscrutable, since he himself holds their reason; for that is not inscrutable whose cause does not lie hidden? If he did not know, why then does he affirm with such great certainty that Predestination to glory is the cause why one is called, another indeed is not? Since therefore in this there is an open contradiction, it is most certainly to be attributed not to Augustine, but to the false interpretation of the Adversaries: whence rightly St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 41. q. 2.: If, he says, there were no other reason why God chose this one and not that one, except because it so pleases God, certainly the divine judgments would no longer be called hidden, but manifest; since anyone grasps this reason; nor would they be called wonderful, but rather voluntary.

You will say. That the same difficulty arises in our opinion, namely this reason could be given, why this infant is not baptized and this pious man does not persevere; namely the negligence of the parents and the inconstant will of man: therefore in our opinion this mystery would not be inscrutable.

I indeed say. that some reasons can be brought forth, why of two infants baptism is procured for one, but not for the other, namely the common course of things which God does not wish nor is bound to change: the impiety or piety of the parents, by which God is moved to confer or to deny the grace of baptism, by not impeding the series and course of things. Likewise some reason could be brought forth on the part of those who are converted; namely because they wished to consent to the calling and to the helps conferred for persevering. But St. Augustine did not wish to apply his mind to bringing forth those reasons, so that he might the more easily proscribe the error of the Pelagians, who traced back the difference between the called and the not-called, on the part of adults, to the good use of free choice; on the part of infants, however, to their good works conditionally future, if they had lived longer. The whole secret of Predestination therefore is situated in the grace of the calling, wherefore

I answer 2. That St. Augustine in that passage does not treat of Predestination to glory, but of predestination to faith and to perseverance, and intends nothing other than that efficacious calling to faith and to perseverance is a gift of God granted purely gratis; and for that reason it is inscrutable why efficacious grace to faith is conferred on this man and not on that one; why perseverance is given to this man and not to that one: for since the conferral and the intention of conferring grace is purely voluntary on God's part, therefore no one can uncover its cause, for who has known the mind of the Lord? When moreover he adds; that nevertheless must be most certain, that he to whom he gives faith and perseverance is of the predestined, while he to whom he does not give these is not of the predestined; by these words he does not render the reason of the preceding things, but only, in that uncertainty and ignorance of the cause of the preceding things, asserts that which is certain, namely that that cause, whatever it may be, and which is unknown to us, holds on God's side, and not on the side of human choice alone, as the Pelagians wanted; for to be predestined and to be of God is the same thing for Augustine.

They object 3. St. Augustine, in lib. De Gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 9, where, expounding these words of the Apostle, the grace of God is eternal life, weighs them thus: since the Apostle could have said, and rightly said, the wages of justice is eternal life, he preferred to say, but the grace of God is eternal life, so that from this we might understand that God leads us to eternal life not on account of our merits, but on account of his mercy: by which he clearly signifies that in decreeing predestination he does not attend to our works. Moreover he openly teaches that same gratuitous Predestination in lib. 3. Soliloq. cap. 28, where, addressing God, he says: But you cleanse from among us the sons of men those in whom you have been pleased to dwell, whom, from the inaccessible depths of the more incomprehensible secrets of the judgments of your wisdom, always just though hidden, you predestined without their merits before the world, called out of the world, justified in the world, and you magnify them after the world.

I answer the first. St. Augustine calls eternal life a grace for this reason, that, as we said above with St. Fulgentius, we cannot attain it by the powers of nature, but through works elicited by the benefit of grace: hence St. Augustine rightly says, that God leads us to eternal life not on account of our merits, but on account of his mercy; because to be sure our merits are nothing unless they proceed from the grace of God together with free choice; but that this is the genuine opinion of St. Augustine is clear from his words; for if he altogether judged that merits, even those proceeding from grace, do not serve toward Predestination, he would also assert that they do not profit toward the attainment of eternal life; for he speaks rather of actual attainment than of destination to glory; but that consequence is heretical, and therefore that was not his opinion.

To the second. I say that St. Augustine published only two Soliloq. books, as he himself recalls in lib. 1. Retractationum cap. 4; for which reason the Doctors of Louvain rightly judge that this 3. Soliloq. book, from which the aforesaid opinion is taken, is to be placed among the works falsely ascribed to St. Augustine. Add that even if some credit were to be given to this book, it would nonetheless not favor the Adversaries; for it treats only of Predestination to cleanness, that is, to sanctifying grace, not indeed to glory. Finally, even if it spoke of predestination to glory, it would not have to be understood of predestination to glory alone, but of the predestination which involves grace and glory together, as was said in Note 3.

They object 4. The opinion of St. Augustine in the matter of Grace and Predestination was entirely different from and totally opposed to the teaching of Faustus of Riez, bishop of the Gauls and standard-bearer of the Semi-Pelagians: but that Faustus in the two books published De Gratia et libero arbitrio asserted that Predestination is made on the basis of foreseen merits, even merits elicited with grace: hence he calumniates St. Augustine, with his name nonetheless suppressed, as a Manichaean and guilty of gentile superstition, because he asserted the contrary: therefore in reality St. Augustine taught that Predestination is made before foreseen merits. The minor is proved from lib. 2 of Faustus himself, c. 6, where, expounding these words of the Apostle, It was said not on the basis of works, but of the one calling: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated, he speaks thus:

By these words the impiety of gentile superstition would have it understood that God, without any examination of a Moderator between good and evil, not by the order of one governing, but by the right of one condemning, renders that one worthy of affection and this one of hatred: that one he receives with zeal, this one he excludes by command, etc.

I distinguish the minor. That Faustus taught that Predestination supposes the foreknowledge of merits proceeding from the prior disposition of free choice alone, I concede: that they proceed from the help of grace, to the exclusion of that disposition which they called the beginning of faith, I deny: and so St. Augustine rightly opposed the opinion of Faustus of Riez and of the Semi-Pelagians, who wanted works preceding grace to be the reason why some were called while others were neglected, whom he attacks and assails, affirming that that calling to grace is purely gratuitous. Hence the only dispute he had with the Semi-Pelagians was about calling to grace, not indeed about calling to glory: likewise about works elicited by the power of free choice alone, not about works which are done dependently on the help of grace.

They press. Many of the Massilians against whom St. Augustine contends asserted that election to glory is on the basis of the foreseen merits of grace: therefore there is no solution. The antecedent is clear from the Epist. of St. Prosper to Augustine, where he has this:

This is their own (namely, of the Massilians) definition and profession: that every man indeed sinned with Adam sinning, and that no one is saved on account of his own works, but through the grace of God by regeneration. But God, before the constitution of the world, foreknew those who were going to believe, or who were going to remain in that faith which was to be kept through the grace of God, and predestined into his Kingdom those whom, freely called, he foresaw would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end.

I answer. Indeed some Semi-Pelagians were of that opinion, that God predestined only those whom, freely called, he foresaw would be worthy of the eternal kingdom through their own consent and their own works: but I deny that they were for that reason reproved by Augustine, for the controversy between Augustine and the Semi-Pelagians was not raised about election to glory, but to grace, as may be seen in the books On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance, in which he is wholly engaged in assigning and establishing predestination to grace as proceeding from the pure mercy of God, and not from any preparation on the part of free choice; that you may perceive this more easily — it must be observed that the Massilians suffered a twofold difficulty concerning the doctrine of St. Augustine, one indeed real and true, the other imaginary and fictitious: the former arose from that very doctrine of Predestination and Grace, which embraces so deep and so abstruse a mystery that Augustine himself rightly said in De Gratia Christi cap. 47: This question, he says, in which free choice of the will and the grace of God are disputed, is so difficult to discern that when free choice is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; when however the grace of God is asserted, free choice is thought to be taken away. Hence it came about that Augustine himself, before he had more accurately sifted this question, was involved in the same error of the Massilians, thinking that the beginning of faith is from man and not from God, and is repaid to human merits rather than granted gratis, as he himself frankly confesses in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 3.

For I did not think, he says, that faith is preceded by the grace of God, so that through it there might be given to us what we should ask profitably, unless because we cannot believe if the proclamation of the will does not go before: but that we should consent to the Gospel preached to us, I judged to be our own and to be from ourselves; which error of mine my little works sufficiently indicate before my episcopate, etc.

Wherefore it is no wonder if the Semi-Pelagians, excessively devoted to the vain philosophy and teaching of men and assertors of free choice, also went astray and could scarcely be brought to assert that free choice can effect nothing without the grace of God. The second difficulty of the Massilians, however, was entirely imaginary, because, wrongly interpreting the words of St. Augustine on prevenient grace and on the Gift of Perseverance, they imagined that St. Augustine, through those efficacious gifts dependent on God alone, introduced a certain fatal necessity and took away all faculty of free choice, whereas St. Augustine himself spoke only of an extrinsic and consequent necessity, by which a thing, while it is, cannot not be: whence the foreknowledge and futurition of things was certain and infallible. For he did not take perseverance for a habit infallibly moving and inclining a man to continue infallibly and immovably in grace, so that, with that grace posited, a man could live long with it, but could not with it deviate from virtue, as those erring ones imagined; but he employed the grace of perseverance for that instant of a death occurring in the state of grace; so that, in the mind of St. Augustine, to have the grace of perseverance was nothing other than to die in the state of sanctifying grace: hence he laughs at those erring ones in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 6.

Those brothers, as you write, do not want this perseverance to be so preached that it cannot either be humbly merited or contumaciously rejected; in which they attend too little to what they say: for we speak of that perseverance by which one perseveres up to the end, which, if it has been given, one has persevered up to the end; if however one has not persevered up to the end, it has not been given.... Let not men therefore say that perseverance has been given to anyone up to the end, unless when the end itself has come and he to whom it was given has been found to have persevered up to the end, etc.

By which words he clearly says that the grace of perseverance is not some habit infallibly moving the will to persevere in grace until the end, but that very sanctifying grace, in which the predestined one is found at the instant of death.

They object 5. St. Augustine affirming in many places, most especially in Letter 105 and in the books De Correptione et Gratia cap. 8, as well as in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, that the same judgment is to be made about adults as about infants departing this life before the use of reason and after receiving Baptism: but infants are not predestined by reason of foreseen merits, since they are not endowed with the use of free choice, nor consequently capable of their own merit: therefore neither are adults so predestined. The major will be evident to one reading the aforesaid books: the minor is also evident per se, and St. Fulgentius elegantly inculcates it in the book De Incarnatione et Gratia Christi cap. 30, where, gathering the gratuitous election of adults from the example of the gratuitous election of infants, he says:

That we may avoid prolixity, let us omit other things which could be replied to this depraved opinion on behalf of the truth of the faith: in the meantime let them be confounded and convicted by the testimony, not of speaking men, but of silent infants, in whom, for emptying the wisdom of the word, the power of Christ greatly shines, which shows that the same salvation is wrought by itself gratis in all men using their own will, which it deigns to work in infants having no will: for in them there is neither a good will, so that the reward may be just in those willing, nor an evil one, so that there may be a just damnation in those unwilling. If therefore, to save men, as these wish, he does not stir up nor change, but waits for the wills of men: how does he give eternal salvation to infants, who are baptized and die in that same infancy, whose good will he neither waits for nor finds?

He concludes therefore, from the example of infants, that the salvation of adults also is brought about by God, their will not being awaited nor found; but rather that God, to save them, stirs up and changes their will, as he speaks, so that the intention of saving is prior, and from it arises the will of stirring up and changing their will, and then at last the good work of such a will is found, that is, foreseen by God.

I answer 1. Sts. Augustine and Prosper are to be understood of works elicited by the power of free choice alone, as is clear both from their words and from the books cited; since the holy Fathers' business was with the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, who wanted the election of men to faith, grace and glory to be traced back to works elicited by the powers of nature; in order to proscribe whose error the Defenders and Assertors of grace urge them with the example of infants, some of whom, having received baptism, attain eternal life; others, however, with baptism denied, are reprobated, without any actual merit to be demanded of them. But that the aforesaid holy Fathers from this only gather that the election of adult men to faith and grace is gratuitous, and make no mention of election to glory, is clear from St. Fulgentius himself, who in the same place adds thus:

Therefore, because the Catholic Church truly believes and confesses God to be just and good, it must be most certainly believed and confidently confessed that one and the same grace of God works in the adults to be saved the beginning of a good will, by which in infants, without will, it works the effect of salvation. That same grace redeems infants neither willing nor unwilling, which, by enlightening adults, makes them willing from unwilling; and this work of salvation in infants is perfected by the grace of God working without the assent of their own will, which in adults is begun by the divinely given beginning of a good will, so that by the work of grace alone the will, which was evil, becomes good, and thereafter exhibits to grace working with it the service of cooperative obedience.

By which it is clearly established that he treats only of calling to grace; whence he adds: Just as God is not cruel in damning infants, to whom he does not grant the benefit of baptism; so he is not unjust in regard to adults when he does not bestow a good will; and just as their own evil will, so the condemned origin causes these to be punished justly, etc.

I answer 2. Infants indeed who depart this life after receiving baptism are predestined without any prevision of their own works and merits; they are, however, predestined on the basis of the merits of Christ, who willed to institute Baptism and to confer on it by his own blood the power of remitting sins, so that it might be salutarily applied as a remedy for sin to infants as well as adults, as we will demonstrate in the following Question.

They object 6. The genuine opinion of St. Augustine could not be detected more evidently than from his Disciples: but from these it is clear that the election of adults to glory is gratuitous: therefore, etc. The minor is proved: First, from St. Prosper, cap. 2, to the Vincentian objections, where he says: That many perish is the merit of those who perish; that many are saved is the gift of the one saving; and, in cap. 6, treating of the gratuitous election of men against the excerpts of the Genoese, he says:

If all these things have not been rightly said, the judgments of God are inscrutable and his ways unsearchable, and it is not hidden why that one rather than this one is saved; and he will glory in himself and not in the Lord, who, while others perish by their own fault, has been found worthy of election; and so it will indeed be justice that very many are damned, but it will not be grace that very many are freed. Far be this from catholic hearts, far be such impiety, that we should think that anyone is snatched by his own merits from the power of darkness and transferred into the kingdom of the Son of God by a due, not a gratuitous, adoption: and further on: From the whole race of men he saves innumerable ones, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and the grace which was given to us in Christ Jesus before eternal times.

Secondly, from Fulgentius, lib. 1. Ad Monimum cap. 13: He could, he says, as he willed, predestine some to glory, some to punishment: but those whom he predestined to glory he predestined to justice, while those whom he predestined to punishment he did not predestine to fault. Since in these words he opposes Predestination to Reprobation in this, that the former is gratuitous while the latter is from justice, it follows that he judged that Predestination to glory is not on the basis of foreseen merits: he confirms the same in De veritate Praedestinationis et Gratiae in many places. Thirdly, finally, from St. Bernard, who in his Sermon on that passage of Wisdom 10, The Lord led the just man through right ways and showed him the kingdom of God, says:

The kingdom of God is granted, promised, shown, received: it is granted in Predestination, promised in calling, shown in justification, received in glorification..... In Predestination there is grace, in calling power, in justification joy, in glorification there is glory.

Where, when he says that in Predestination there is the grace of God, he understands a gratuitous election: therefore not on the basis of foreseen merits.

I answer. From all those opinions this only is inferred, that men are not chosen on the basis of works elicited by the powers of nature, but of works done by the benefit of grace; wherefore election is rightly called gratuitous, because grace, which is the principle of those works, is granted gratis by God, who bestows it on whom and when he wills. Hence not incongruously does St. Bernard call it a gratuitous election, because it is made only on the basis of works foreseen in grace and elicited by grace.

The objections from theological reason are solved. — They object 1. The authority and argument of the Subtle Doctor, who in 1. dist. 41. q. unica, n. 11. embraces the contrary opinion and strengthens it with this argument: everyone willing ordinately wills the end before the means to the end: but God wills ordinately: therefore he wills the end before the means to it: but glory is the end and merits are the means leading to it: therefore God wills glory before merits, and consequently election to glory cannot be on the basis of the prevision of merits.

I answer. I deny the consequence, and to the authority of the Doctor I answer that it stands with us. For since the Doctor in that place had weighed the present question on both sides with the singular subtlety of his genius, and had examined the various opinions about it, he at length concludes in these words:

Concerning these opinions, because the Apostle, disputing about this matter at the end of the Epistle ad Rom., seems to leave the whole matter inscrutable, saying, O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God: and who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? therefore, lest by scrutinizing the deep, according to the saying of the Master, one go into the deep, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided that divine freedom is preserved, without any injustice, and the other things which must be preserved about God as one choosing liberally; and whoever has held the other opinion, let him answer to the things which have been brought against it.

By which words he clearly signifies that our Conclusion is probable, and that all things objected against it can be dissolved. — He seems, however, to think otherwise about the opposite opinion; for since he saw that it teemed on every side with the greatest difficulties, some of which he strives to solve, he affirms it indeed probable: Provided, he says, that divine freedom is preserved without any injustice, and the other things are preserved which must be preserved about God as one choosing liberally: which two things indeed can scarcely be preserved in the opposite opinion; for it imposes on God the greatest antecedent necessity against divine freedom and justice, of providing and taking care lest the elect finally fall away from grace: likewise, that the non-elect, however just, perfect and innocent they may become through good works and the Sacraments of the Church, nevertheless at length slip into sin, and die in that state, and perish eternally, which indeed seems very harsh and highly injurious to divine freedom and justice. Likewise the supreme freedom and kindness of God in choosing can scarcely be preserved; for why, since he could choose all, or at least more, did he choose so few and abandon almost innumerable ones to perish, and that from his mere and sole will: and with no least diversity supposed among those chosen? all which absurdities do not follow from our opinion, and so it is no slight indication that it pleased the Subtle Doctor more. — To the argument I answer first, that this argument proves too much; for it not only persuades that Predestination was made before foreseen merits, but also that it could not have been made otherwise, since indeed

Since God can will nothing in a disordered manner, because He is most wise, it follows that if He wills in an orderly way, He ought first to will our justification rather than our merits; He could not, even by absolute power, will merits before glorification, which is plainly absurd, as even the adversaries themselves admit. Secondly, I answer that the major is true only with respect to one's own end, and not another's: for one can will, for example, the victory to be obtained by a soldier before the reward to be given to him, although victory is not the end of the soldier himself, but the reward: thus, since our glorification is not the end of God but ours, nor are our merits means with respect to God but with respect to us, it is not necessary that God will our glorification before our merits, but He can rightly and in an orderly way will the merits before He wills our glorification. Add that our glorification has, as it were, the character of a means, whereas the bestowal of grace has, as it were, the character of an end with respect to God: since He Himself proposes glory to us so as to provoke us to merits and good works. — I answer 3., that the major is true of physical means, not of moral ones, which stand variously with respect to eternal life: for since a moral means concurs to the attainment of the end not really, but only by way of impetration; and it cannot concur by impetration unless it is supposed to be in the knowledge of him from whom the end is to be obtained by impetration, for nothing can move the will unless it is known, because nothing is willed that is not known; hence it is necessary that moral means be intended before the end to be obtained through them. — I answer 4. by distinguishing the major: he who wills in an orderly way first wills the end before the means, if the end is considered absolutely and under the formal notion of end, I concede: for as such, whoever wills the end efficaciously is moved by the end itself so as to will efficaciously also the means conducing to its attainment, and hence wills the end before the means; if it is considered conditionally and under the notion of reward, I deny: for as such, he who wills in an orderly way does not will efficaciously to give a reward to someone unless he has first foreseen the merit. But our glorification is called wages, crown, and retribution, and hence it is no wonder if God foresees and wills the merits before glory.

You will insist. God truly intends the end before the means: therefore no solution remains. The antecedent is proved from St. Augustine, book De Bono perseverantiae cap. 11, where, treating of the Tyrians and Sidonians, he says that they could have believed if they had seen those wonderful signs of Christ; but because it was not given to them to believe, even the means of believing were denied them: by which words he indicates that God first chooses unto faith, and then grants the means, namely the preaching and the signs by which faith is obtained: whence it came about that, since the Tyrians and Sidonians were not predestined to faith, efficacious means were not granted to them so that they might obtain faith: therefore, they say, God wills the end before the means.

I deny the consequence. Both because a general induction is not made from a single kind of act; here, however, a single kind of predestination is brought forward, namely predestination to grace, from which it is not lawful to gather that the same must be said of predestination to glory. And because where one thing is inferred from another compared with it, it is necessary that some parity obtain between the two; but there is no parity between predestination to faith, or grace, of which alone St. Augustine speaks in the objection, and predestination to glory, of which we now treat; for the end of the former is absolute, since faith does not depend on merits but on the liberality of God alone, and hence precedes all merits; whereas glory is a conditioned end depending on merits: whence, since it is repugnant that a conditioned thing be decreed before the prevision of the future condition, it is likewise repugnant that God will our glorification, which supposes merits, before He intends the merits themselves.

They object 2. An effect is posterior to its cause, at least in some sign of reason: but the meritorious works willed by God are effects of predestination: therefore they are willed by God in a posterior sign of reason, and hence predestination takes place before foreseen merits.

I deny the minor. With Ockham, Gabriel, St. Bonaventure, Faventinus, Valentia, Isambert, Joseph of Troyes, and others; for the one and proper effect of predestination properly so called, of which we are speaking, is the beatific vision itself and our glorification; for this is conferred on us by reason of the formal character of predestination, just as St. Augustine, lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 10, speaking of predestination to grace itself, says: Predestination, which is unto good, is, as I have said, the preparation of grace; but grace is the effect of that predestination. So, by analogy, while we treat of predestination to glory, we can truly assert that its one proper effect is glory itself and our beatification.

They object 3. Our salvation is predestined in the same way as our perseverance, for salvation depends on it totally and adequately, according to that saying of Matth. 12: He who perseveres to the end, this one will be saved: but our actual perseverance is predestined by God without any merits, and is a gratuitous gift of God, which indeed cannot be obtained from any other source than from Him who is able to establish him who stands, so that he stands perseveringly, and to restore him who falls, says the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 13. Therefore our salvation and predestination to eternal glory likewise depend on the gratuitous will of God, not on merits.

I distinguish the minor. Our perseverance is a gratuitous gift of God that cannot be merited by merit of condignity and from justice, I concede: by merit of congruity, of impetration, and of decency, I deny. For perseverance is not so gratuitous a gift of God that it depends on Him alone, without any other free cooperation of ours, in the manner in which the first graces of calling depend on Him alone, which He works in us without us; but it admits our free cooperation in consenting to grace, obeying the commandments of God, and resisting all occasions of sinning mortally; whence God does not predefine the grace of perseverance taken adequately, absolutely and efficaciously, apart from the prevision of our cooperation; and therefore the consequence must be denied.

You will insist. St. Augustine speaks of predestination to perseverance in the same way as of predestination to first grace: but predestination to first grace excludes all merit whatsoever: therefore perseverance too.

I deny the major. It is indeed true that he removes every merit whatsoever for first grace, but not so regarding the grace of perseverance: indeed, in lib. De Bono perseverantiae cap. 6, he declares that this grace can be merited: This gift of God, therefore, he says, can be humbly merited; but once it has been given, it cannot be lost contumaciously: whence in cap. 16 he distinguishes the grace of perseverance from the beginning of faith, in that God grants the latter freely, but bestows the former sometimes on those who pray: Since, he says, it is certain that God has prepared some things even for those who do not pray, such as the beginning of faith, and other things only for those who pray, such as perseverance to the end. Hence he exhorts to prayer, that we may be able to obtain that gift of perseverance, not indeed from merit of justice, but from merit of impetration and of decency.

They object 4. The predestination of Christ is the exemplar of our predestination, St. Augustine saying, lib. De Bono perseverantiae c. 24: There is no more illustrious exemplar of predestination than the Savior Himself: let any faithful person who wishes to understand it well attend to Him, and in Him find also himself: but the predestination of Christ was made entirely gratuitously and without any merits: therefore our predestination also.

I distinguish the major. The predestination of Christ is the exemplar of our predestination to grace, I concede: to glory, I deny: and, with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence, for Augustine intends nothing else; which is evident not only from the aim of the whole book, which is about predestination to grace and to the gift of perseverance, but especially from that very chapter cited, where, after the words placed in the objection, he concludes:

Therefore He who made this man from the seed of David righteous, who would never be unrighteous, without any merit of his preceding will, He it is who makes the unrighteous righteous without any merit of their preceding will, so that He is the Head, and they are His members. Therefore He who made that man without any of his preceding merits, drawing from his origin, or perpetrating by his will, no sin that would have to be forgiven him; He it is who, with none of their preceding merits, makes believers in Him those to whom He forgives every sin, etc.

It is clear, therefore, from these words that Augustine there treats only of predestination to grace.

They object 5. God confers on the predestined certain efficacious means, by which they attain glory, which He does not give to the reprobate: therefore it is a sign that God has an efficacious will of conferring glory on those, not on these, antecedently to their foreseen merits.

I distinguish the antecedent. He gives certain means which are efficacious on the part of God and before the foreseen cooperation of man, I deny: on the part of the recipient and cooperator, I concede. Thus the means, or graces granted, both to the predestined and to the reprobate, can be considered insofar as they are given by God, or insofar as they are received and applied by man. In the former way all graces are efficacious in actu primo, because of themselves they have sufficient power to attain their effect, if on the part of man no opposition intervenes which would impede their efficacy: but in the latter way they are called efficacious or inefficacious in actu secundo, according to the assent or dissent, the cooperation or rejection, of man. Add that even to the reprobate themselves there are sometimes granted more efficacious graces than to the predestined; for Judas, that worst of the reprobate, received far more and greater graces than some peasant who, keeping the precepts of God, ends his life in the state of sanctifying grace; yet the former is damned, the latter is saved: therefore it does not follow that the predestined have more efficacious graces than the reprobate.

You will insist. God chooses and confers on all the predestined, and on them alone, efficacious means, insofar as they are efficacious: therefore the means conferred on the predestined differ from the means conferred on the reprobate; but that difference can be traced back to no other source than that the predestined are chosen for the Kingdom before their foreseen merits and before the decree of conferring those efficacious means: therefore God truly predestines them before foreseen merits, and for that reason confers on them means different from those which are given to the reprobate.

I answer 1. By denying the major; otherwise it would follow that the reprobate are damned for this reason, that God had denied them sufficient means, and thus their damnation would have to be ascribed not to their evil works, but to the absolute decree of God, which smacks of Calvinism.

I answer 2. By distinguishing the major itself: God selects and distinguishes means for the predestined insofar as they are efficacious, I deny: insofar as they are apt and sufficient for attaining the end, I concede. Thus that those means are efficacious and will have their effect depends on the outcome and the free cooperation of man; which outcome, indeed, God foresaw and approved when He chose the means themselves, but He did not choose them because He foresaw that they would have their effect, as if He would not choose those means unless they were to have their effect; just as, on the other hand, He did not choose inefficacious means for the reprobate insofar as they are inefficacious, although He foresaw, from the depraved freedom and will of man, that they would be inefficacious, and decreed to permit it: but He chose them as good and suitable for attaining the effect, if those to whom these means were conferred had been willing.

You will press. Although God did not choose means for the reprobate insofar as they are inefficacious, nevertheless He knowingly and freely chose means which He knew would not in fact profit them: whence their damnation follows no less necessarily than if God had chosen those means insofar as they are inefficacious: therefore our opinion does not better safeguard and explain the sincere love of God for their salvation; for how would He have sincerely and from the heart willed to save those for whom He knowingly and freely chose means which He knew would not profit them, when He could nevertheless with equal ease have chosen means which would profit?

I distinguish the antecedent. God knowingly and freely chose for the reprobate means that would not profit, from a defect of efficacy of the means, I deny: means that would not profit from the malice or negligence of those who receive them, I concede. To the sequela I say: from this follows the damnation of the reprobate by defect of the efficacy of the means, I deny: by defect of the negligence or malice of the reprobate themselves and of the state of mortal sin in which they voluntarily die, I concede; whence the consequence must be denied: for the opposite opinion traces their damnation back to the very antecedent decree of God, excluding virtually or equivalently all those whom God looked down upon, or neglected, before the prevision of their works and with no occasion given on their part; and hence it cannot stand together with the sincere affection of God for saving men. But it is otherwise with our opinion, which traces reprobation itself back to their foreseen evil works and to the abuse of grace and of the means, not to the will of God itself, except only consequently to that prevision.

They object 6. God chose some who were eminently predestined to glory or to some supernatural dignity before all prevision of future things, as is evident concerning the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, the Apostles, and others eminently predestined: therefore, since the reason is similar in all the predestined, and no motive occurs for excepting anyone from this manner of choosing, it must be affirmed that all are thus predestined before foreseen merits.

I deny the antecedent. For it is more probable that no pure creature was chosen efficaciously and absolutely to glory, or to any dignity, before foreseen merits or the final condition; indeed, not even the Blessed Virgin was chosen, not only to glory, but not even to the Motherhood of God, without her foreseen consent: whence theologians probably maintain that she herself merited this divine Motherhood of hers; which the Church also indicates, both in the little prayer Queen of Heaven, rejoice, for He whom you merited to bear has risen; and also, that she might merit to be made a worthy dwelling of your Son. Add that, whatever be the case concerning the Most Blessed Virgin, whose privileges cannot be extended to any other pure creature, it can in no way be proved that others eminently predestined were chosen before their foreseen works; for neither does Sacred Scripture teach this, nor do the holy Fathers affirm it, nor can it be efficaciously gathered from any other source. For that St. John the Baptist and the Apostles and other most holy men should be called eminently predestined, for this it sufficed that God heaped upon them ampler benefits and supernatural gifts, by which they would more easily remain in grace, and would exclude all occasions of sinning mortally.

They object 7. Some infants are snatched away immediately after Baptism, others a little before receiving Baptism, even with every diligence employed that Baptism might be procured for them: whence it happens that the former are predestined to glory, while the others are destined to Gehenna: but this diversity of lot does not proceed from any foreseen merits or demerits: therefore it must be traced back to predestination alone, and not to merits.

I deny the consequence. For it is not necessary that this proceed from such an election and reprobation as would precede all prevision of future things; for that can happen either through the negligence or malice of the parents, or through the order of things being so disposed that an infant naturally cannot live longer, and hence cannot attain to the grace of Baptism; but God conducts Himself permissively toward this privation, because He is not bound to invert the common order of things impeding this reception of Baptism, nor to do violence to the will of the parents, who were unwilling that Baptism be conferred on the infant: for it pertains to the wise providence of God to allow things to act according to their own nature, free things freely, contingent things contingently, and not to work miracles indiscriminately, and thereafter to overturn everything, for the sake of the good of some particular persons. Whence this privation of Baptism in an infant holds in the supernatural order just as monsters do in the natural order; and just as the death of that adult who falls into madness, apoplexy, or lethargy after mortal sin. For God permits all these things, because, since He is the supreme and wise Provider of all things, He ought not to change the order of things for the sake of some particular good, unless perhaps He is moved to this by the prayers of parents or of others. But when He changes the ordinary course of things because of the prayers or vows of parents, this does not proceed from an antecedent absolute election, but from the prevision of such prayers.

Finally they object. If election to glory were made from foreseen merits, the mystery of predestination would not be incomprehensible: but this is contrary to the Apostle exclaiming ad Romanos, cap. 11.: O the depth of the riches of wisdom and knowledge! therefore, etc. The major is evident, for it does not seem wonderful that God should have decreed to save those whom He foresaw would act well, and to damn others whom He foresaw would live badly, just as no one wonders if he sees the guilty punished by a judge, and the innocent set free.

I deny the major. For although predestination is made from foreseen merits, nevertheless the greatest occasion for exclamation remains on account of the inscrutable judgments of God. For although all are called to glory, nevertheless sometimes He calls some with a calling so congruous that they respond, as He called Paul, Magdalen, etc.; but He calls others with only an ordinary calling, to which they can indeed respond, yet do not respond: but why He employs this diverse calling, that is altogether inscrutable, as St. Augustine openly declares in the Enchiridio cap. 95, where he clearly indicates that there are some causes why infants and adults are taken up to first grace, or are excluded from it: which, he says, we shall know in eternal blessedness, since they are hidden from us in this life: hence it is that when he seeks these causes of the diverse calling of God and administration of grace, he always recurs to the inscrutable judgments of God, and not to His mere will, because namely he supposes there to be some cause there, but one unknown to us.

FOURTH QUESTION. WHETHER AND HOW THE PREDESTINATION OF MEN WAS DECREED FROM THE FORESEEN MERITS OF CHRIST.

Note 1. Predestination can be considered in two ways, namely with respect to the act of the One who predestines, or with respect to the effect of predestination. Again, the act of the One who predestines can be viewed in two ways, namely either absolutely and according to entity; or respectively and according to its extrinsic termination at some effect of predestination. Likewise, predestination can be considered according to its effect, either according to the order of eternal intention, or according to the order of temporal execution. But it is certain that Christ the Lord is not the cause of our predestination with respect to the act of the One who predestines viewed absolutely, for since this divine act, according to entity, is altogether really the same as the divine Essence, it acknowledges no cause of itself, physical or moral, that is, neither productive nor meritorious: only the question therefore remains to be discussed concerning that very divine act of predestination insofar as it is terminated at some effect of predestination itself, namely at the grace that calls, aids, and sanctifies, and also at glory, which alone is properly the effect of predestination.

Note 2. Christ the Lord can be said to be the cause of our predestination in three ways, namely either exemplar, insofar as His predestination is the exemplar of our predestination: or final, in that our predestination is ordered to His glory; or finally meritorious, so that the merits of Christ were foreseen and accepted as reasons moving God to decree our predestination. But it is certain that Christ the Lord is truly the exemplar cause of our predestination, since God predestined us to be made conformable to the image of His Son, says the Apostle ad Rom. 8. Whence St. Augustine, lib. De Bono Perseverantiae cap. 24, says: There is no other more illustrious exemplar of predestination than Christ Jesus. It is likewise certain that He is the final cause of our predestination itself, since, as the Apostle says ad Ephes. 1., God predestined us through Jesus Christ unto Him, that is, for His sake: whence the Council of Trent rightly, Sess. 6, c. 7., speaking of justification, says: The causes of this justification are these: the final cause, indeed, the glory of God and of Christ. And the same seems to be said of predestination. Only this, therefore, remains to be discussed: whether truly

the foreseen merits of Christ were causes moving God to decree our predestination.

Note 3. It is certain that Christ the Lord is said to be the meritorious cause of our predestination and of all its effects, as to execution; this, namely, St. Paul indicates openly enough in Ephesians, cap. 1., saying: Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ, as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. With which words he embraces the effects of predestination, namely the grace that calls, aids, and sanctifies, granted to us for the sake of Christ, which he openly signifies when he adds: Who predestined us unto the adoption of sons of God through Jesus Christ unto Him, that is, for His sake. For in the Apostle these words are for the most part synonyms: through Christ, in Christ, and for Christ. The Council of Trent explains the same thing most clearly, Sess. 6, cap. 6., in these words: The holy Synod further declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults is to be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Christ Jesus, that is, from His calling, by which they are called while no merits of theirs exist, etc. An evident reason also persuades this: for the merits of Christ were foreseen before any supernatural gift to be granted to us, for He is the Firstborn before every creature, Eccl. 24.; and hence, with His merits and works at least in common, foreseen before those gifts, and consequently there is no doubt but that, in view of them, the divine Father decreed that all the means for attaining salvation and eternal glory were to be conferred on us: namely, that from Him, the divine Head, that sacred Spirit of grace might overflow and flow out upon all the faithful, His members; which the holy Church also indicates not obscurely, as often as it desires and demands all those offices and gifts from God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So much, therefore, remains to be resolved here: whether our predestination was truly decreed from the foreseen merits of Christ according to the order of intention; wherefore it is that

Single conclusion. — Christ is the meritorious cause of our predestination, even according to the order of intention and election. This seems more probable.

It is proved first. Christ, inasmuch as He is God-man, was predestined and foreseen before the predestination of any creature: therefore His foreseen merits were the reasons moving God to decree our Predestination. The consequence is clear; for if in that very sign of eternity, in which God chose the Predestined, the future merits of Christ are already present, it is evident that since those merits are worthy of any possible reward, and are offered to God the Father for the salvation and Predestination of men, they also move the divine Father to decree all the graces to be conferred on men in time, by which, if they will, they will obtain eternal glory. The antecedent is proved by all those texts of Scripture by which Christ is said to have been foreseen before any creature; thus 8. Proverb. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, etc.; where the Septuagint interpreters render, The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways; which words cannot be understood of Christ according to the Divinity, as being exempt from creation: nor of His temporal creation and formation according to execution, since the incarnation took place only in the midst of the years: it remains therefore that they be understood of the formation of the incarnate Word itself according to eternal destination and prevision. Likewise Ioann. 17. Christ says: Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with you, before the world was made. By these words He asks that there be conferred on Him the glory which He had before the world was founded: but He does not ask the glory of the Divinity, since He never lacked it: therefore that of the humanity, which He had in divine Predestination before the world was founded. Finally, Coloss. 1. Christ Himself is called the Firstborn of every creature, which surely must be understood according to the humanity: but He cannot be so called Firstborn, except by reason of predestination, namely inasmuch as He is predestined before every creature: therefore He was predestined and foreseen before any creature; and so His merits were present to God before the Predestination of any creature.

Secondly: Sacred Scripture expressly signifies that all graces and all spiritual gifts to be conferred on us in time were decreed by God from eternity through Christ Jesus: therefore it likewise indicates that His merits were the reasons moving God to decree that conferral of heavenly gifts. The antecedent is clear from the passage of the Ephesians already cited: He blessed us with every spiritual blessing in heavenly places in Christ, etc., where the particles in Christ and through Jesus Christ signify the merit of Christ; for what other signification could be imagined? This is also explained more clearly by the following words of the Apostle: for he adds: In which he hath graced us in his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood: by which he declares that that divine election, by which God chose us before the foundation of the world and predestined us to grace and glory, was made in view of the merits of Christ. 2. ad Timoth. 1. signifies the same thing more openly: Who hath delivered us and called us with his holy calling, not according to our works (elicited by the powers of nature), but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus, before the times of the ages. By which words the Apostle signifies that God decreed from eternity that grace be conferred on us in Christ, that is, on account of Christ; which the Council of Trent also expressly teaches, sess. 6. cap. 4., when it says:

The justification of the ungodly, that is, the translation from that state in which man is born a son of the first Adam, into the state of grace and of the adoption of the sons of God, is made through the second Adam, Jesus Christ our Savior: for this translation from the state of sin to the state of justice includes the first calling grace, on which depends the whole edifice of Predestination:

therefore since these gifts of graces, to be granted in view of the merits of Christ, were decreed from eternity, as the Council indicates in the same place, cap. 5., saying: It declares moreover that the beginning of justification itself in adults is to be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his calling, etc., the consequence is that Predestination itself was decreed only on account of those merits.

Thirdly, reason persuades the same thing: God in time executes nothing except according to the decree established from eternity concerning the things to be done in time: but all admit that any grace whatever, and glory itself as well, is granted to us on account of the merits of Christ: therefore since glory and grace are to be granted in time as the reward of the merits of Christ, certainly from eternity God also willed and disposed to grant them by reason of such merits of Christ: whence it comes about that it must be attributed to Christ alone and to His merits as to the moving and meriting cause. Then, our predestination, as has been amply proved, was decreed only after foreseen merits: but those very merits of ours depend entirely on the grace to be granted through Christ: therefore it was necessary that the merits of Christ be foreseen before our predestination was established.

The adversaries reply. All these things are indeed true according to the order of execution, but not according to the order of intention; so that when God from His good pleasure had chosen all who are to be saved, each to his own grade, the rest being negatively reprobated, and had predefined for them all good works, perseverance and congruous grace to be received and executed in time, He willed to execute all this through the merits of Christ. — On the contrary: from that opinion it follows that Christ is a mere executor of the paternal decrees, without any power of conferring on anyone a grace greater than each one in fact receives in time: for He could not exceed the prescription of the divine decree, which He clearly beholds in God and knows is to be discharged and carried out by Him: but this seems to fight against Sacred Scripture, which signifies that full power was granted to Christ the Lord, not only over temporal and earthly things, but also over heavenly, spiritual and eternal ones: thus Ioann. 13.³ He knew that the Father had given all things into his hands: and Matth. 28. All power is given to me in Heaven and on Earth: but how would He have all power, unless because He can dispose of all things by His own authority, most especially those which pertain to the salvation of men? This is further confirmed in Ioann. cap. 5. and 6., where Christ Himself affirms that all manner of authority was granted to Him of vivifying, judging and beatifying the dead; not indeed by reason of the Divinity, by which He holds supreme authority together with the Father, nor is there need that it be given to Him; but by reason of the humanity: whence He says:

He gave him power to do judgment, because he is the son of man. Do not wonder at this, because the hour comes in which all who are in the graves shall hear his voice (of the Son of man) and shall come forth, they who have done good things, to the resurrection of life, but they who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment.

and cap. 6. I will raise him up on the last day: by which words not merely simple execution, but also supreme power is signified as granted to Christ. — Then, Christ is called the Head and King of the whole Universe: therefore just as the Head vivifies and governs all the members, and an earthly King administers his whole kingdom and all his subjects, and decides about their functions, offices and state; so Christ directs the whole universe, most especially in those things which pertain to salvation, since God did not send His Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world might be saved through Him. — Finally, according to the Doctor, in 3. dist. 13., the humanity of Christ is to be exalted and dignified as much as it can be dignified without repugnance; for in commending Christ, he says, I prefer to exceed than to fall short of the praise due to him, if on account of ignorance one must fall into either: from which he gathers that in Christ the highest creatable grace is to be admitted, which he indeed confirms by that saying of St. Augustine on free choice: Whatever occurs to you as better by true reason, know that God has made this rather than not made it; but it redounds far more to the glory of Christ that He should have not only executive, but also authoritative power in those things which pertain to the salvation of men, and no reason persuades that this is repugnant; and so not only according to temporal execution, but also according to eternal prevision and destination, Christ by reason of His merits had authority concerning the establishing of our predestination; for it was fitting that He who on His part was to have merited all graces through His merits, should also have some liberty in applying His merits, and not be restricted to the mere execution of those things which had been decreed from eternity by the Father concerning such application.

You will say 1. God predestined us according to the mere good pleasure of His divine will: therefore not on account of the merits of Christ. The antecedent is proved from the cited passage of Ephes. 1. He predestined us to the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of his grace: by which he signifies that we were Predestined through Christ as to execution; but through the purpose of God as to intention.

I answer. That is not the sense of the Apostle; indeed from it is gathered that our predestination depends on the merits of Christ also according to intention, since that especially pertains to the glory and excellence of Christ; but predestination is said to be made according to the purpose of the will, not to exclude the merit of Christ, but only to signify that Christ efficaciously offered His merits for those only, for whom He knew God willed that they be so offered; for as the Doctor speaks in 3. dist. 19. n. 6.

Just as the Word foresaw the passion to be offered to the Father for the predestined and the elect, so He efficaciously offered it in effect: so the whole Trinity efficaciously accepted the passion for them, and for no others was it efficaciously offered, nor accepted from eternity, and therefore it merited for them only the first grace ordering to consummated glory.

You will say 2. The predestined were given to Christ that He might keep and sanctify them: therefore in truth He did not merit their predestination. The antecedent is clear from that passage of Ioann. 17. Those whom you gave me I have kept. The consequence, however, is proved: every donation is gratuitous, nor does it presuppose merits; thence St. Augustine gathers that first grace and faith are not granted on account of merits, but are given freely.

I deny the consequence. And to its proof I say that the donation is gratuitous with respect to the one to whom the donation is made, I concede: with respect to the one on account of whom the donation is made, I deny: thus the Apostle says in Ephes. 2.: By grace you are saved through faith, and this is not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God: and yet the holy Fathers, as well as the Council of Trent praised above, affirm that the grace of calling, and even faith itself, is granted to us on account of the merits of Christ, and consequently some donation can be at the same time gratuitous with respect to the one to whom it is made, although it presupposes some justice by reason of the one on account of whom it is made.

You will say 3. If Christ had merited predestination, He could have conferred it by His own authority: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The sequel is proved from that passage of Matth. 21. To sit at my right hand, or at my left, is not mine to give you, but to those for whom it is prepared by my Father.

I deny the sequel. For, as we have said, those words only signify that the eternal kingdom is not to be conferred by title of kinship, but only by reason of merit. Whence Christ does not exclude His authority concerning the conferral of eternal glory; indeed He establishes it, as is clear from that passage of Lucae 22. I dispose to you a kingdom, as my Father has disposed to me.

You will say 4. God predestined and chose us out of mere charity: therefore not on account of the foreseen merits of Christ. The antecedent is proved from that passage of Rom. 5. But God commends his charity towards us, because when as yet we were sinners, in due time Christ died for us.

I deny the antecedent. And to its proof I say that the Apostle there does not treat of predestination to glory, but of the decree of the incarnation of Christ, which depends on the mere liberality of God; for by no preceding merits, whether of Christ or of others, could God be moved to decree the Incarnation; but He decreed that it would be gratuitously and out of pure charity and mercy.

You will object 5. The Doctor, in 3. dist. 19. n. 6., where, proving that Christ was predestined before others, he establishes this order of predestination,

Then, he says, this was the order in the divine prevision. For first God understood Himself under the notion of the highest good. In the second sign He understood all other creatures. In the third He predestined these to glory and grace, and concerning the others He had a negative act by not predestining. In the fourth He foresaw that they would fall in Adam. In the fifth He preordained, or foresaw, the remedy, how they would be redeemed through the passion of the Son.

therefore Christ in the flesh, like all the elect, was foreseen and predestined to grace and glory before the passion of Christ was foreseen, as a medicine against the fall, just as a Physician first wills the health of a man before he orders the medicine for healing. Therefore the Doctor judges that men were predestined before the merits of Christ were foreseen; which he confirms by adding:

Just as the elect are predestined before the passion of Christ is foreseen as a remedy against their fall, so the whole Trinity first ordered the predestined and the elect to final grace and glory, as to efficacy, before it foresaw the passion of Christ as a medicine to be accepted for the elect falling in Adam, predestined before to final glory.

I answer. The Doctor is to be understood of predestination according to the order of execution, and inasmuch as it is in fact fulfilled in time; but not according to the order of intention, and as it was decreed from eternity; otherwise he would contradict himself, for he teaches that Christ is the first predestined: the incarnation of Christ, he says, was not foreseen occasionally, but as an end it was seen immediately by Him from eternity, and so Christ in human nature, since He is closer to the end, was predestined before the others. Therefore in truth he does not intend that the merits of Christ were foreseen only in the fifth sign according to intention, but according to execution; otherwise His Incarnation would have been decreed only on the occasion of sin, nor would He Himself have been foreseen and destined before every creature. — Or it must be said that he is to be understood of Christ in passible flesh, but not of that state in which He had been foreseen as to be incarnated if Adam had not sinned. — Whence, according to his own principles, if you regard the order of intention, this order is to be established. In the first sign the Incarnation of Christ was decreed, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh, and as yet decreeing nothing about the mortal or immortal state. In the second it was decreed that He would be the head of absolutely all men to be saved, and so likewise all the graces to be conferred were decreed in view of His merits. In the third Christ offered those very merits of His to the Father for those whom God foresaw, and Christ Himself knew, would use the graces and means well. In the fourth, the sin of Adam being foreseen, the incarnation in the passible state was then decreed; the passion of Christ likewise foreseen, and His merits offered for those very ones who were to persevere in grace; and then the decree of predestination was formed absolutely and efficaciously; and so, simpliciter and absolutely, the predestination of men was not completed according to the order of intention before the merits of Christ were foreseen.

You will say finally. If Christ merited predestination according to the order of intention, He also merited the reprobation of the abandoned: but the consequence is repugnant to the supreme charity of God and to His most excellent office of Redeemer: therefore it must not be said that He so merited Predestination.

I deny the sequel of the major. For although Christ merited the election of the Saints, He did not however merit the reprobation of the others; for just as the merits of the Just will on the day of judgment be the cause why they are separated from the impious, yet they will not be the cause of the abandonment and damnation of the impious: so the merits of Christ, which were offered efficaciously for the predestined, were not the cause why the others were left behind, since He offered those very merits of His sufficiently for all, and the reprobate were causes to themselves, on account of their malice and negligence, why those very merits of Christ were not also efficaciously offered for them, nor profited them.