Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

That the twofold principal effect of Predestination, namely Grace and Glory, is plainly evident from what has been said; wherefore we shall fully resolve the proposed difficulty, if we show what are the causes of each. — That this may be done more plainly,

Note 1. Although Pelagius, Julian, and the Massilians fell into this foul error, asserting that free choice is in some part the cause of grace; yet their opinion was not entirely the same. For Pelagius, as St. Augustine reports, Epist. 107., after he had said in lib. 1. De libero arbitrio: He who uses well the freedom of choice so delivers himself wholly to God, and mortifies all his own will, that with the Apostle he can say, I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me; and places his heart in the hand of God, that He Himself may turn it whither He wills, adds: But this so great a help we then merit, when without that help we run to the Lord solely from the freedom of choice, desiring to be ruled by Him, etc. Julian, however, and his followers will, says St. Augustine lib. 2. Contra duas Epist. Pelagii c. 8., that the desire of good begins in man from man himself, so that for the merit of this beginning he may also obtain the grace of completing it. The Massilians, however, say, that eternal life is awarded to those who have believed God of their own accord and received the help of grace at the beginning of their belief, as St. Prosper writes Epistol. ad St. Augustine. Thus Pelagius held that by good works elicited by the powers of free choice we can obtain grace, not such as was altogether necessary, but such as conducted to the easier pursuit of the virtues: Julian, however, contended that we have from ourselves a right will and a pious endeavor, by which we would attain the grace necessary for eliciting a good work: the Massilians, however, conceded that our wills are anticipated by grace in every endeavor and good work; yet they asserted that there are in us certain beginnings of faith, by which God was moved to confer the first helping grace, against all of whom stands the Conclusion that follows

Unique conclusion. — By no powers of nature can we in any way merit helping grace. This is determined as a matter of faith in the Councils, the Arausican Council, Can. 6. If anyone says that mercy is conferred upon us when we will, desire, and knock, without the grace of God; and does not confess that it is brought about divinely in us, that we may be able to do all these things as we ought, through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, etc., let him be anathema. And the Tridentine Council, sess. 6. cap. 3. If anyone shall say that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help a man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. And ibidem cap. 5. it had said earlier: That the beginning of justification itself in adults is to be taken from the grace of God coming through Christ Jesus, that is, from His calling, by which they are called when no merits of theirs exist. That the Palestinian Council defined the same altogether, St. Prosper affirms adversus Collatorem cap. 10., saying: In the judgment of the Oriental Bishops, Pelagius was compelled to anathematize those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits, that he might be able to appear a Catholic.

St. Augustine proves this same truth in several ways: First indeed by the example of Christ the Lord: Christ the Lord was the exemplar of our Predestination, since He predestined us to be made conformable to the image of His Son, says the Apostle: but the hypostatic union, which is the primary effect of the predestination of Christ the Lord, was altogether gratuitous; for as Saint Augustine speaks in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 15. Let it be answered, I ask, whence did that man merit this, that, being assumed by the Word coeternal with the Father into unity of person, he might be the only-begotten Son of God? What good of his, of whatever kind, went before? What did he do before, what did he believe, what did he ask, that he might arrive at this ineffable excellence? Thence he concludes: By that grace any man whatsoever is made a Christian from the beginning of his faith, by which grace that man was made Christ from his own beginning. And below: As therefore that One was predestined, that He might be our Head, so we many have been predestined, that we might be His members.... Whoever in our Head shall have found the preceding merits of that singular generation, let him in us, His members, seek the preceding merits of the multiplied regeneration, etc. — Secondly, he proves the same by the example of St. Paul saying 1. Corinth. 15. I am not worthy to be called an Apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God, etc. Whom St. Augustine thus presses in the book De Gestis Pelagii c. 14.:

O Saint Paul the Apostle! Pelagius the Monk says that you were worthy to receive all the graces of your Apostleship; you yourself, what do you say? I am not worthy to be called an Apostle.... Is it so, that to pay honor to Paul, I should dare to believe Pelagius more than Paul about Paul? I will not do it. For I would rather burden myself, than honor him, if I did so. He adds: Let us hear also why he is not worthy to be called an Apostle? Because, he says, I persecuted the Church of God. If we followed the sense, who would not judge that this man ought rather to be damned by Christ than called? Who so loves the Preacher as not to detest the persecutor.... Doing therefore so much evil, whence did you merit so much good? Let all nations hear him answering: by the grace of God I am what I am. Is grace otherwise commended, except because it is given to one unworthy? And His grace in me was not void.

Whence, however, does he prove that grace in him was not void, except from that which follows: but I labored more than all of them? Therefore he did not labor that he might receive Grace; but he received it that he might labor; and so, that he might become worthy to receive the due rewards, being unworthy he received grace gratuitously. — He proves 3. ibidem from the nature of grace itself, The very name of Grace, he says, and its meaning is taken away, if it is not given gratuitously, but he who is worthy receives it. And serm. 41. De verbis Apostoli: Therefore it is grace, because it is given gratuitously, because it is not rendered as a kind of wage after the weighing of merits; but a gift is given after the pardon of offenses. Whence lib. 1. Contra duas Pelagii Epistolas cap. 2. he concludes: This is the intention by which they strive to destroy Grace, that they contend it is given according to our merits. From which it is established that Grace by its own nature requires that it be given gratuitously and with no preceding merits. For, says the Apostle ad Rom. 11. if by grace, then not from works, otherwise grace would no longer be grace. — He proves 4. From the fact that grace itself is the principle of all merit:

What merit, he says, Epist. 105. ad Sixtum, does a man have before grace, by which merit he may receive grace? since grace alone makes all our good merit in us: and when God crowns our merits, He crowns nothing else than His own gifts; and he had said before: No merits precede the receiving of this grace: since to the merits of the impious not grace, but punishment is due: nor would this be grace, if it were not given gratuitously, but were rendered as due.

All these proofs are confirmed by theological reason: No work of the natural order can merit anything supernatural: but grace is of the supernatural order: therefore by no work elicited by the powers of nature can anyone merit it. The minor is evident. The major is proved: there must be some equality and commensuration between debt and compensation, labor and wage, contest and prize: but there is none between a natural work and grace, which is of the supernatural order; and so by natural works no one can merit grace: whence rightly Saint Augustine cap. 14. De Gestis Pelagii: Although faith obtains grace for one working well, certainly that faith itself, that we might have it, we merited by no faith; but in giving it to us, in which we would follow the Lord, His mercy anticipated us.

You will object 1. If, no cause existing and no preceding merit or demerit on the part of man, God would grant or deny His grace, He would be an acceptor of persons, and not an equal bestower and distributor of His gifts: but this directly militates against the Apostle saying 2. ad Rom. and 6. ad Ephes. There is no acceptance of persons with God: therefore etc. — I deny the sequel of the major: for the acceptance of persons is turned into a vice only when that which is due to many equally deserving is conferred upon one alone: but divine grace and any gift of the supernatural order is due to no one at all, as is clear from what has been said: therefore God, granting grace to one, but not to another, is not to be regarded as an acceptor of persons: for in those things, says St. Thomas art. 5. ad 3., which are given from grace, one can give at his own pleasure, to whom he wills more or less (provided he withdraw from no one what is due) without prejudice to justice; and this is what the Father of the family says, Matth 20.: Take what is yours and go, am I not allowed to do what I will? Which St. Prosper excellently confirms lib. 2. De Vocatione Gentium saying:

We do not dare to complain of the judgment of carnal Parents, when they embrace some of their Sons with a more indulgent affection before any manners, before any services of piety. In masters also the disposition toward servants is free; nor is he justly reproached, who from a family of one condition chose some for himself whom he would more kindly honor and more liberally instruct: is complaint, then, to be made against the most benevolent equity of the supreme Father and true Lord, that in His great house all things vary with innumerable differences?

You will object 2. If God conferred His grace antecedently to the operation and merit of the will, human freedom would be altogether destroyed and would fall: but this directly militates against all the sacred Scriptures affirming and proving the free choice of man: therefore it is necessary that men merit grace through the suitable and right operation of their free will. — I deny the antecedent: for although divine grace anticipates human wills and prepares them for the good work, and is conferred with no preceding merits; nevertheless it does not extinguish, but rather perfects the free choice of man, since it moves it only morally, and does not physically promote and impel the will to consent and to the work. Whence rightly Saint Jerome Epist. ad Ctesiphontem, after he had said of the Pelagians: But that which they toss up and down, that free choice is destroyed by us: he adds: Let them hear on the contrary that those destroy the freedom of choice, who abuse it badly against the benefit of the Giver. Who destroys choice? He who always gives thanks to God and refers whatever flows in his little stream to the fountain? Or he who says: depart from me, because I am clean, I have no need of you; for you gave me once the freedom of choice, that I may do what I will: why do you again thrust yourself in, that I can do nothing, unless you complete your gifts in me? The same ibidem: *You think injury is done to you and the freedom of choice destroyed, if you always have recourse to God the author, if you depend on His will and say: My eyes are always to the Lord; for He Himself will pluck my feet out of the snare: whence you even dare to utter with a rash tongue that each one is ruled by his own choice! If he is ruled by his own choice, where is the help of God? If he does not need Christ as ruler, how does Jeremiah write: the way of a man is not in him, and the steps of a man are directed by the Lord? And a little after: In vain you blaspheme and thrust into the ears of the ignorant, that you condemn free choice. Let him be damned, who damns. — With which Saint Augustine agrees lib. De Spiritu et littera cap. 30.:

Do we then empty free choice through grace, he says? Far be it; but rather we establish free choice. For as the law through faith, so free choice through grace is not emptied, but is established. For the law is not fulfilled, except by free choice: but through the law comes the knowledge of sin, through faith the obtaining of grace against sin, through grace the healing of the soul from the vice of sin, through the health of the soul the freedom of choice, through free choice the love of justice, through the love of justice the operation of the law.