Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The meaning of the question is whether only the rational creature, angelic as well as human, can properly be predestined.

Note 1. Something can be said to be predestined in two ways, namely either to entity and existence, or to a perfection consequent upon its being. In the former way, whatever things are decreed by God so that they at some time exist and are produced can be called predestined, because they are decreed and destined by God before they are made; for which reason St. Augustine, lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum cap. 10., says: By predestination God knew what He Himself was about to do. Whence it comes about that all creatures can be called predestined, but in a broader and improper use of the name of predestination; for more truly and more correctly they could be called predetermined and decreed than predestined. In the latter way, those things are called predestined which are preordained to something else as to a certain perfective term of themselves; thus men and Angels are called predestined because they are ordered to grace and glory, by which the angelic and human nature alike are most fully perfected.

Note 2. It is certain that Predestination does not regard the divine Persons or Properties: for these belong to God not freely, but altogether necessarily; not through free will, but through essence and nature. But those things which are predestined depend upon the free will of God. Whence St. Augustine, tractatu 185. in Ioannem, excellently declares in what manner the Son of God is said to be at once predestined and not predestined: Rightly, he says, is He said not to be Predestined according to that which He is, the Word of God, God with God; for why would He be predestined, since He already was what He was, without beginning, without end, everlasting? That is, since from eternity and from His own nature He is blessed, He could not be destined by free election to that same beatitude: yet He is said to be predestined inasmuch as He is the incarnate Word and by reason of the hypostatic union with human nature, to which He was destined from eternity: whence he adds in the same place: Whoever denies that the Son of God is predestined denies this same Son of Man. Only the difficulty, therefore, remains concerning the created intellectual nature, angelic and human.

Note 3. Our Alexander of Hales, 1. p. q. 28. memb. 1. art. 1., holds that the blessed Angels were not destined to eternal glory by predestination properly so called: for in that same place he distinguishes a twofold Predestination, one common, by which is meant the foreknowledge of God's benefits and the preordination of someone to glory; the other special, which is called the purpose of mercy, and the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future:

But since, he says, in the blessed Angels there was no misery, therefore neither is the purpose of mercy said with respect to them: nor did grace in them precede glory: but the human state was twofold, namely before sin and after sin, inasmuch as before sin it is called predestination, the preparation of grace in the present, etc., but after sin it is called the purpose of mercy.

But whether these things accord with the truth, the single Conclusion will resolve.

Single conclusion. — The sole and entire intellectual nature, angelic as well as human, is the object of predestination properly so called. This Conclusion has two parts; of which

The first is proved. Divine predestination is a free and contingent act by which something is ordered to possess grace in the present and glory in the future: but this act can have nothing else for its object than the created intellectual nature: therefore this is truly the object of divine predestination. The major is evident from what has been said. The minor is also established as to its first part from the second Note, in which it is evident that nothing divine has the character of the predestined, and so whatever is called predestined must necessarily be created. It is established also as to the second part; for that nature alone can be ordered to grace and glory which can use grace itself and enjoy glory; but only the intellectual nature can accomplish these, for the use of grace is made chiefly through the operations of the intellect and the will, as is also the very fruition of glory, which necessarily presupposes the beatific vision and formally consists in love: therefore, etc.

You will say. That creature can be predestined which can be elevated to some supernatural end; but any creature, even one devoid of reason, can be elevated to some supernatural end and effect; thus baptismal water is ordered to washing away original sin and to conferring sanctifying grace, and that from eternity: for God from eternity decreed and ordered all the Sacraments, and destined their efficacy and effects: therefore not only the intellectual creature is the object of predestination. — I deny the major. For not every eternal ordering of a creature to a supernatural effect ought to be reckoned the predestination of that thing, because such an ordering to a supernatural effect is not made as to the ultimate end of that thing; indeed the thing itself is ordered to that supernatural end as a means serving man to attain his ultimate end, to which he is destined from eternity and in which chiefly is placed the formal notion of predestination: for this expresses an efficacious ordering of the thing, by which it is said to be predestined to attain its ultimate end, and therefore it is proper to the intellectual creature alone.

The second part is also proved. Every nature that is capable of the use of grace and the fruition of glory is the object of predestination: but such is every intellectual nature, angelic as well as human, as is evident: therefore truly every intellectual nature can be the object of divine predestination.

You will say. Predestination is the purpose of mercy, according to St. Augustine cited by Alexander of Hales: therefore it presupposes misery: but the blessed Angels never experienced any misery, because they committed no sin: therefore God had no purpose of mercy toward them, nor consequently any predestination; and so they cannot be called the object of divine predestination. — I answer 1. The aforesaid definition of predestination is not found in St. Augustine, and therefore it is not to be made much of. Secondly, I answer that a twofold predestination can be distinguished, one indeed ordering to good; the other raising up from evil and freeing from misery. The first falls upon the Angels, and also upon Christ and the Most Blessed Virgin, in whom there never was any misery of sin. The second, however, regards all who are freed from sin before they are destined to beatitude.

You will ask. Whether the intellectual nature, setting aside its personality, can be the proximate object of Predestination?

The Doctor affirms in 3. dist. 7. n. 2. and proves it by the example of the human nature assumed by the divine Word, which, setting aside its personality, was ordered not only to the hypostatic union, but also to the fullness of all graces and to supereminent glory:

For just as, he says, God can love every other good besides Himself, not only the supposit, but the nature; so also can He preordain and prechoose for it from Himself the good befitting it; and so He can prechoose for this nature the good befitting it, and so He can prechoose for it that union in order to glory, and not for the person.

It can be confirmed; for the rational soul in Christ, setting aside its own personality, enjoys God: therefore it is predestined to such fruition, and so a nature separated from personality can be the object of predestination. Then again, grace and glory are habits and effects of the will depending upon its potencies: therefore since such potencies and the nature from which they flow can exist without their own personality, God will be able to predestine the nature itself and the will itself to supernatural habits, and also to grace and glory.

You will say. The use of grace and the fruition of glory, as we have just said, are accomplished through acts of the intellect and the will; but actions belong to supposits: therefore since a nature, setting aside its personality, cannot operate, nor consequently use grace and enjoy glory, so neither will it be able to be predestined. — I distinguish the minor. Actions belong to supposits denominatively, I concede, that is, they denominate the supposits in which they are received in the way in which accidents are wont to denominate not only the principle from which they are made, but also the subject in which they are received; for which reason the whole man is said to see, although vision is formed only by the eye: actions belong to supposits elicitive; that is, they are elicited and proceed from the supposits as from their operative and productive principles, I deny. The Doctor nevertheless notes and warns that these things are said of others besides Christ only as possible, not in fact:

For it is true, he says, that in all others besides this one, predestination regards the person, because in no other did God preordain the good of the nature except by preordaining the good of the person; and the reason of this is that no nature is predestinable unless it is personated with a created personality, except this one; and therefore in no other way can good be preordained to it, except to this one.