Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The sense of the Question is whether divine Predestination is an immanent or transient act; eternal or temporal; free or necessary, for the understanding of which

Note 1. Of the divine acts, some are purely immanent, others purely transient, and others immanent as to entity, but connoting secondary objects and terminated to them; the purely immanent acts are the divine intellection and volition, by which God knows and loves Himself. The purely transient acts are those which are poured back into creatures, such as creation, justification, and the like: but the acts immanent with termination to secondary objects are acts indeed proceeding from the divine intellect and will, which nevertheless cannot be understood by us without a respect to secondary objects, such as are foreknowledge, predestination, etc.

Note 2. The eternity of Predestination can be regarded in two ways; first indeed by inquiring whether it is an eternal act elicited by the divine will or intellect; secondly, whether Predestination was so made in the very first instant and sign of eternity, that it nevertheless coexists with the individual parts of time, so that it is neither past nor future, but only present. That this may be perceived more evidently, it must further be observed that a threefold instant can be distinguished, namely the pure instant of eternity, the pure instant of time, and a certain instant mixed from both, in which are explained certain past, present, or future actions, connoting indeed the instant of eternity, but inasmuch as that instant coexists with the various parts of time.

Note 3. As far as the present undertaking is concerned, a twofold necessity can be distinguished, namely absolute and respective; the first is that by which something is said to be necessarily such or such in itself and from its constitutive principles; thus existence is necessary for God, and it is necessary that man be a rational animal, etc. For if he were not such, he would not be a man. The second is that by which something is said to be necessary in order to another; and that either simpliciter, so that the one cannot be obtained without the other; or secundum quid, when something can indeed be obtained without the other, but not with so great facility.

First conclusion. — Predestination is an immanent act in God with termination to secondary objects.

Proof. Every act of the divine intellect and of the divine will connoting a respect of reason ad extra is an immanent act in the manner just explained; but predestination is such; both because, as has been proved, it is truly an act of the divine will; and because predestination does not signify in God something belonging to Him by way of a first and essential act, but by way of a final and vital act, just as are intellection and knowledge, volition and election, as is evident from the very signification of the word and the opinion of all. Finally, because predestination expresses something free in God; but whatever is denominated free in God belongs to Him by way of an immanent act; therefore Predestination is truly an immanent act.

You will say. Predestination is formally in the predestined; therefore it is not an immanent act in God. The consequence is evident, for what is formally created is not in God immanently and intrinsically, but only denominatively and extrinsically. The antecedent is proved; Predestination is formally in him who is denominated predestined; but only the creature is denominated predestined; therefore in it alone is Predestination formally. — I deny the antecedent and also the major of that proof; for the creature is indeed denominated predestined not formally, as if predestination were a form inhering in it; but effectively, on account namely of the various effects which Predestination works in it; whence Predestination is formally only in God, and formally denominates Him as predestining. Hence the word predestination is taken rather actively than passively: that is, it signifies the predestiner more than the predestined.

Second conclusion. — Predestination is an eternal act, which is measured by the mixed instant, inasmuch as the instant of eternity coexists with the various parts of time. This Conclusion has two parts, namely that Predestination is an eternal act and that it is measured by the mixed instant.

The first part is proved. First indeed from Sacred Scripture, ad Ephesios 1. He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, etc. Here the particle "before" denotes the antecedence of time and consequently eternity. Election likewise signifies predestination; for the Apostle adds: who predestined us, namely then when He chose us; and below: Predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will; so likewise in primae ad Corint. 2. the Incarnate Wisdom is said: Predestined before the ages for our glory: all of which texts of Sacred Scripture the holy Fathers, as many as dispute about Predestination, interpret concerning its eternity.

It is proved likewise by reason. No formal denomination belongs to God in time, whose thing itself does not formally belong to Him from eternity: but God is in time formally and really denominated predestining: therefore Predestination truly belongs to Him from eternity. The major is evident; for God is altogether immutable, not only as to entity, but also as to intrinsic operation. The minor also is evident: for God is truly in time denominated predestining.

You will say. Predestination is a part of Providence: but Providence is not eternal, but temporal: for Providence is posterior to creation, because it consults for things already created; but creation is temporal: therefore Predestination too is temporal. — I distinguish the minor. Providence is temporal according to execution and the actual ordering of things to their ends, I concede: according to the destination and act of the divine will, by which God provides for created things from eternity, or determines within Himself that He will provide for them in time, I deny: for above we said that Providence is a divine and eternal purpose, by which God decreed within Himself that He would order created things through suitable means to their ends according to the varying difference of time. Add that even if Providence were temporal, nevertheless predestination would be eternal; for the particle "pre" signifies the antecedence of time, and so eternity, and abstracts from the actual existence of the things which are predestined, and consequently from the temporal duration of things: and so it is not temporal, but eternal.

You will say 2. What imports and signifies an order to something temporal is also temporal: but predestination is such, for it signifies the transmission and ordering of the predestined to grace and glory to be conferred in time: therefore it is temporal. — I distinguish the major. What imports only an actual order to a thing existing only in act is temporal, I concede: to a thing future and about to come into existence in time, I deny. Predestination, however, does indeed express from eternity an order to a thing future in time, but not actually existing; and so it is no less eternal than the other acts of the divine intellect and of the divine will, namely foreknowledge, decree, election, which regard creatures that are to come into existence in time.

You will say 3. Predestination is the preparation of the means for salvation: but that preparation is temporal: therefore predestination too is temporal. — I answer. There is a twofold preparation, one internal in the mind of the Governor or Provider, who conceives in his mind some work to be undertaken and prepares the means necessary to perfect it; the other external, by which he in fact selects the means for completing the work, just as an artisan selects stones, wood, etc. to build a house. The former can be eternal in the mind of the eternal artisan: the latter, however, is only temporal: but predestination according to its formal concept is only an internal preparation; according to execution, however, it also imports an external preparation. Whence it can be said to be at once eternal and temporal: eternal indeed formally and considered in itself; temporal, however, only denominatively and according to execution, that is, the actual application of grace and glory.

The second part is proved. God does not predestine in the instant of time only, because predestination is eternal, nor in the pure instant of eternity, because only acts ad intra are measured by that instant: therefore it is necessary that Predestination take place in the mixed instant, which is indeed eternal, but corresponding to the various differences of past, present, and future time: for God is said by one and simple and indivisible act of His will to have at once predestined, to predestine, and to be about to predestine, for the reason that that very eternal act of Predestination, one and most simple, since it is eternal, involves and embraces the various differences of time. Which things will again appear more evidently in what follows.

Third conclusion. — The act of divine Predestination is not only free, but also contingent, although it is also necessary, not indeed with absolute necessity, but respective. This Conclusion involves four parts, of which the two former are proved together by the Subtle Doctor in q. ultima Prologi and in 1. dist. 8. q. ultima, where he teaches that every act of the divine will regarding creatures is contingent and indifferent with the indifference of contradiction. He subjoins the reason of this truth, because God predestines most freely, and with so great indifference that He could have not predestined if He had so willed: which St. Paul openly indicates in ad Ephesios 1, saying: Predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will. With which words he signifies the free will of God most of all in predestining; and indeed truly, for the freedom of the divine will is most of all discerned in Predestination; because not only was it free for Him to predestine or not to predestine; but also according to His free will He predestined this one rather than that one. Hence the act of predestination is sometimes called by the Apostle good will, purpose, election, counsel of the will, and other similar things, which indicate that act to be altogether indifferent, free and at the same time contingent. I say free and at the same time contingent, so that the act of divine predestination may be distinguished from those purely immanent acts of the divine will which are indeed free, yet not contingent, but absolutely necessary, such as are, v. g., the act of love by which God loves Himself and the act of spiration by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit: Predestination, however, is not of this sort; for although it is free, nevertheless it is contingent.

The third and fourth parts are also evident: the third indeed, because it was not absolutely necessary for God to predestine anyone, but as we have just said He orders creatures to eternal glory according to the will and good pleasure of His divine will. The fourth likewise, for it was necessary, ex hypothesi, that God, having willed to confer the gifts of grace and glory on certain intellectual creatures, should decree this conferral and ordering from eternity: this decree, however, is called predestination, and so it is necessary with a respective necessity; namely in order to grace and glory which are its effects. Hence St. Augustine in lib. De Bono Perseverantiae, cap. 11. affirms that Predestination is as necessary as is the very foreknowledge of God.