Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. From the Doctor in 1. dist. 40. n. 1. That predestination, taken properly, denotes an act of the divine will, namely the ordering of election, through the divine will, of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory; although it could be taken for the act of the intellect accompanying that election. For, as St. Bonaventure observes in the same place, qu. 2, since the causality of grace and glory is attributed properly to the will, as efficient; to knowledge, as disposing; and to power, as executing; therefore, although predestination imports those three things, nevertheless it is principally in the genus of will, and for this reason predestination is defined by Aug. through those three: First, through that which regards power, in the book De Fide, cap. 35.: Predestination is the gratuitous preparation of the gift: Second, through that which regards knowledge, in the book De bono perseverantiae, cap. 14.: Predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed are most certainly freed; Third, through that which regards the will, and most properly, in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum: Predestination, he says, is the purpose of having mercy, etc. Whence the Apostle, ad Ephesios 1.: Predestination according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.

Note 2. From our Alexander of Hales, q. 28. art. 1., in the will of the one predestining three acts are found, namely Love, Election and Predestination, which acts are occupied not only with glory, but also with grace: For grace, he says, is first given, afterwards it is had, and thence someone uses it: Predestination, however, regards the conferral of grace, whence it is called the preparation of grace: Love regards grace possessed, for good is the reason of love: since, therefore, God loves someone, some good seems to be in him, by reason of which God loves him; whence it is called grace making one pleasing: Election, indeed, connotes the use of grace; for election is the acceptance of one over another among two goods proposed: whence he concludes another distinction among Predestination, Love, Election, Calling and Justification: that Predestination is simpliciter eternal, because it signifies the eternal approbation of God with respect to good: Love and Election, however, are both temporal and eternal, because they express the same approbation; but they do not determine it, namely whether it is with respect to good from eternity, or only from time: Calling and Justification, however, determine the divine approbation with respect to the good that is conferred in time.

Note 3. A twofold Predestination can be distinguished, one indeed in intention, the other in execution. The former efficaciously and immediately regards the glory to be given to men and to be attained as an end through means. The latter, indeed, immediately regards grace and supernatural helps as means necessary for attaining glory. I said immediately, for it is certain that Predestination, considered in either way, tends in reality to glory and grace; but according to our mode of understanding, intention immediately regards glory, and execution grace. Hence the Authors dispute among themselves which of these comprises the formal notion of predestination. Some, with Ockham, in 1. dist. 40. q. 1., contend that it is to be placed in the will alone of conferring glory; some, with Durandus, in the same place, dist. 41. quaest. 2., maintain that it is to be established in the will alone of conferring grace: the rest, however, more correctly with the Doctor, judge that Predestination in its formal concept involves both wills, of conferring grace and glory at once, which, that it may appear more plainly, let it be

First conclusion. — Predestination, formally taken, regards grace and glory at once. This is the teaching of the Doctor, as will appear in the following Conclusion.

That it regards grace is proved from the Apostle, ad Rom. 8., where he plainly indicates that Predestination is concerned not only with glory, but also with the means, which are calling and justification: Whom, he says, he predestined, them he also called, etc. And ad Ephesios 1.: He predestined us unto the adoption of the children of God: but adoption is made through sanctifying grace: therefore, etc. Saint Augustine plainly taught this in the places already cited above, especially in the Enchiridion, cap. 100, and De praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 10, and also in lib. De bono perseverantiae cap. 14., where he says: that Predestination is the preparation of grace and of the benefits of God.

That Predestination also formally regards glory, Sacred Scripture plainly testifies. Thus Actorum 13. it is said: As many as were preordained to eternal life believed. And Rom. 9.: That he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory. St. Augustine also testifies, not only in 16. De Civitate Dei, cap. 1., where he says: that the City of God is the predestination to the kingdom of Heaven; but also in the book De bono perseverantiae, cap. 14., affirming that Predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed are most certainly freed. No one, however, is perfectly freed from all misery, until he has attained glory. Whence the Council of Trent, Session 6., cap. 12. and Canon 17., calls Predestination to life, that is, eternal and blessed. Hence Fulgentius rightly concludes, lib. 1. Ad Monimum, cap. 8.: Therefore, he says, God always had in predestination all things, both the beginnings of calling and the increases of justification and the rewards of glorification.

Both parts are proved at once: Predestination is that divine preordination by which the predestined one is directed and sent unto eternal life: but a perfect mission and direction regards not only the end, but also the means: therefore God, in predestining, regards not only glory, but also grace.

You will say. As often as St. Augustine describes Predestination, so often he mentions election alone, not indeed to glory, but to grace. Whence modern Doctors distinguish three things in Predestination, namely the conferral of gifts and grace; the conditional foreknowledge by which God foresees that these and those are to be led to eternal life, if such things are conferred upon them; and the will, or purpose, of conferring those very gifts, in which they chiefly place the essence of predestination: therefore Predestination formally regards grace alone. — I answer. That Saint Augustine indeed asserts that Predestination is the preparation of grace and of divine benefits, not that he truly judged that the adequate formal notion of Predestination is to be placed in the preparation of grace alone. For no one assumes and prepares means, except with the intention of attaining the end; but he mentioned grace rather than glory for this reason, because he was dealing against the Pelagians, who indeed admitted Predestination to glory, but not to grace. For they judged that glory was to be attained through moral works and by the powers of nature. Whence Augustine himself, in lib. De Vocatione Sanctorum, says: Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future.

Second conclusion. — Predestination is rightly described by the Doctor in 1. dist. 40. n. 2. as the election of an intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory. Or, as he himself says in 3. dist. 7. qu. 3., Predestination is the preordination of someone to glory principally, and to other things in order to glory. The truth of these descriptions is established from the preceding Conclusion; therefore it needs only explanation. First, therefore, Predestination is called Preordination and Election. For the predestined are chosen and preordained by God from eternity and are separated from the Reprobate. Second, there is added rational and intellectual creature. For only a creature endowed with reason is the object and subject of divine Predestination, as will be established below. Finally, there is added to grace and glory; for Predestination formally regards both, as was said above.

You will say 1. Predestination regards only those to be beatified and the just, but election and preordination also regard the impious and the reprobate: therefore Predestination is incongruously called election and preordination. The minor is clear, Ioannis 6.: Have not I chosen you twelve, says Christ, and one of you is a devil? Nor does it avail to say that this is to be understood of temporal election, for temporal election is a sign of eternal election: therefore either both agree, or the sign is false. — Saint Bonaventure answers, in 1. dist. 40. art. 3. qu. 2. that a threefold election can be distinguished: For there is, he says, an election according to the affection of love, and according to the effect of final gratification, and according to the state of prelation. The first is eternal, and is the same as predestination. The second is temporal, and an infallible sign of the first. The third is likewise temporal, and is neither an effect nor a sign of eternal election; for many who are preferred are evil and reprobate, and would that there were not more evil than good. To the minor he says that Christ speaks of the election of prelation, which regards not only the upright, but also the wicked, and therefore it is not a certain sign of eternal election.

You will say 2. If there were no reprobate, there would be Predestination, but not election; for election signifies the acceptance of one over another: therefore election and predestination sound the same. — The Seraphic Doctor answers in the same place. That purpose, Predestination and Election do not differ according to reality, but only according to the notion of understanding: For purpose, he says, simpliciter denotes the will of doing something; for he is said to purpose who firmly wills to do something: Election, indeed, and Predestination add beyond the conception of the will; but differently, because Predestination adds order and direction to the end, namely, election adds discretion, or separation from its supposit. Whence purpose denotes the firm conception of the will, Predestination with conception denotes preordination, and Election a certain discretion by which the Predestined are distinguished from the Reprobate. Hence, according to our concept, purpose precedes, election follows, and finally predestination. Whence, in form: If there were no evil, there would be no Election: according to the notion of understanding, I concede: according to the truth of the matter, I deny: for one and the same entitative act of the divine will is at once purpose, election and predestination; and it is only conceived as diverse according to the diversity of our concept and of the connoted terms.