Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

A twofold difficulty is proposed in the present Question. The first is whether God truly determines and orders some creature to a certain supernatural, blessed and perpetual end. The second is whether that same divine ordination is so necessary that without it a rational creature cannot attain the aforesaid end, so that this may be perceived more evidently.

Note 1. Predestination is taken in three ways. First, insofar as it signifies any predetermination, or eternal preordination, of any thing whatsoever to be effected by God at a fixed difference of time, in which sense St. Augustine, lib. De Praedest. Sanctorum, says: By His predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to do. Second, it is sometimes used for the destination of rational creatures to an eternal and unchangeable state, whether good or evil; thus St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, cap. 100, uses the word Predestination to signify the eternal lot of the saints and of the reprobate: God, he says, using even evils well, as supremely good, for the damnation of those whom He justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom He kindly predestined to grace. With him agrees Honorius of Autun, saying: Predestination is nothing else than God's preparation, according to the merits of each one, either for glory or for eternal punishment. And likewise the Council of Valence, cap. 3: We confidently profess the Predestination of the elect to life, and the Predestination of the impious to death. These two former significations, however, are less proper and foreign to the present mystery. Therefore, more strictly and more fittingly, Predestination signifies the eternal destination, or transmission, of a rational creature to perpetual happiness, which St. Augustine thus defines, lib. De Bono perseverantiae, c. 14: The predestination of the saints, he says, is nothing else than the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which most certainly are freed whosoever are freed. Hence

Note 2. Predestination can be distinguished as twofold, namely incomplete and complete. The first is to grace and the supernatural means conducing to the attainment of eternal happiness, which can again be distinguished in as many ways as the grace preordained and destined is itself manifold; the second, however, is to glory, the possession of which is man's complete salvation. St. Paul points to both of these: the first indeed in Ephesians, cap. 1, where he calls all the faithful Ephesians to whom he was writing elect and predestined by God: He chose us, he says, in Him, that is, in Christ, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in His sight in charity, who predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. Not that the Apostle truly judged that all the Ephesians would infallibly attain eternal glory, but that all were ordered and predestined to sanctifying grace. The second, however, he hands on in Rom. 8, saying: Whom He foreknew He also predestined; and whom He predestined, them He also called, etc. St. Anselm likewise teaches both predestinations in the aforesaid words on Ephesians: God, he says, preordained that in the time of grace He would separate some from those who were to be lost, and make them just and immaculate. He also preordained that He would lead those same ones to eternity. Of these predestinations He fulfills the one here, when He makes them saints; the other He will complete in the future by giving immortality and beatitude. Concerning both of these predestinations we ask whether it is to be admitted.

Note 3. Predestination has had various opponents of its existence; for, leaving aside all those assailants of divine Providence, as well as the atheists, or politicians, who, denying the immortality of the soul, likewise deny predestination to glory, of whom it is said in Wisdom 2 that they knew not the mysteries of God, nor hoped for the wages of justice, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls: there were also not wanting among the faithful and Catholics those who denied even predestination in God, because they judged it to be a certain fatal necessity which would extinguish created freedom and close the way to every merit, as may be gathered from St. Augustine, 2. De Bono perseverantiae, cap. 11: and also from the holy Prosper, in his response to the objections of the Gauls, cap. 1, where he says: He who preaches fate under the name of Predestination is no more to be approved than he who, under the name of fate, defames the certainty of predestination. For the opinion of fate is vain and conceived of falsehood: but the faith of Predestination is united to the authority of many holy Scriptures, as will be proved

First conclusion. — Divine Predestination, by which some rational creatures are destined and ordered by God to beatitude from eternity, is truly to be admitted. This is of faith, and it is proved by various texts of Sacred Scripture: Matth. 25. Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you, etc. Rom. 8. Whom He foreknew and predestined, etc. Ephesians 1. He predestined us unto the adoption of the children of God. Acts 13. As many as were ordained to life everlasting believed, and elsewhere passim. All the sacred Doctors abundantly affirm this same truth by their testimonies, as will appear in the course of this disputation. Therefore:

Proof 2. By theological reason: According to St. Augustine, lib. De Praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 17, Predestination is the divine will of giving grace and glory, which God truly predestined to confer in time: but God does nothing in time which He did not decree from eternity to do: therefore God decreed from eternity to give grace and glory to some, and so He predestined some. — Then, whenever someone cannot attain his end by the strength of his nature, and yet does attain it, it is necessary that he be transmitted to that end by another: but eternal Beatitude is an end which those who attain it cannot reach by the strength of their nature: therefore it is necessary that God transmit them to it, just as an arrow, which cannot direct itself, needs an archer that it may be sent and directed at the target. This similitude points to the present mystery not obscurely; for the Royal Prophet, speaking of the elect, says: As arrows in the hand of the mighty, so the children of the outcasts. That is, the children of the Apostles, who were shaken out and struck everywhere on earth. Hence Gennadius, Epist. de Praedest., says that it is indeed from eternity: Although, he says, it takes place in time, because God sends man to his destined term, just as the archer shoots an arrow at the target. With him agrees St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. art. 1.¹ where, concluding the necessity of predestination, he says: To that which a thing cannot reach by the power of its own nature, it must be transmitted by another, just as an arrow is sent by the archer to the mark. But this actual transmission supposes Predestination, that is, the decree of transmitting the rational creature into eternal life: therefore, etc. — Finally, it belongs to the Provider of the Universe, says Durandus, in 1. dist. 40. q. 1., to confer on some of the Universe remedies, or aids, by which they may attain the best end, which is within the universe of beings itself; otherwise that end would be possible to creatures in vain: but the best end, which is within the universe of beings, is eternal life: therefore it belongs to God to confer on some of the Universe aids by which they may attain eternal life. Hence, since the reason for the donation of the means, pre-existing in God, is called Predestination, it follows that it is to be admitted.

You will say 1. God does not predestine creatures devoid of reason, nor order them per se to their natural end: therefore neither ought He to predestine and order those endowed with reason to a supernatural end. — I deny the consequence. And the reason for the disparity is manifest, since creatures considered in the order of nature have from their constitution whatever is necessary, so that by their native powers they can attain an end not exceeding the limits, perfections and grasp of their nature. But it is otherwise with creatures endowed with reason in relation to glory and eternal beatitude, which, since it far exceeds their natural power of operating, they can neither be directed to it, nor attain it without supernatural aid, and therefore it is necessary that they be directed and helped by God.

You will insist. Rational creatures are not of a worse condition than brute animals and all other things devoid of reason: but these attain their adequate, quieting and satiating end without any divinely implanted aid, but of themselves and per se: therefore much more will rational creatures be ordered per se and of themselves to eternal glory, which is their adequate and quieting end, and consequently they will not need God's ordination and predestination. — I deny the consequence. For a twofold end of rational creatures is distinguished. One natural, and that either corporeal, which is obtained through the correct and perfect operation of the senses, or spiritual, which is obtained through the contemplation of truth and delight in the best. The supernatural, which is the very eternal and delightful possession of God. For the attainment of the former, man's natural powers indeed suffice: but for the possession of the latter they wholly fail, since it is of an order exceeding the powers of nature. The second Conclusion will resolve the other objections.

Second conclusion. — Predestination is so necessary for salvation that no one can be saved without it. This is against Catharinus, who, lib. 2. De Praedestinatione, cap. ultimo, distinguishes two kinds of those who are saved, of which the foremost — namely, the blessed Virgin, the Apostles, etc. — are indeed predestined by God; but others are saved without any special predestination of God, and for their salvation he affirms that the general supernatural providence of God and the antecedent will of saving all men suffice. Against him not only do the other Scholastic Doctors hold, but the holy Fathers also cry out, especially Augustine, who, libr. 2. De Bono Perseverantiae, cap. 9, expressly affirms that no one is to be saved unless he has been predestined. That very thing he excellently proves lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 17, from the words of the Apostle in Rom. 8, where, when he had said that they are the elect out of the world, but before the constitution of the world, by that calling by which God fulfilled what He predestined, he adds:

for whom He predestined, them He also called, namely with that calling according to His purpose; therefore not others, but those whom He predestined He also called, and not others; but those whom He thus called He also justified, and not others; but those whom He predestined He justified and glorified, with that end, of course, which has no end.

By these words St. Augustine openly teaches that only he will be glorified who has been predestined. With him agrees the holy Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, cap. 35, saying:

hold most firmly and doubt in no way that all whom God, by gratuitous goodness, made vessels of mercy before the constitution of the world were predestined by God unto the adoption of the children of God, and that none of those whom God predestined to the Kingdoms of Heaven can perish, nor can any of those whom He did not predestine to life be saved by any means.

Therefore from his mind it is clear that predestination is so necessary that without it no one can be saved.

This same Conclusion can be proved by exactly the same arguments by which the preceding one was established; but beyond this it is confirmed by these reasons. First, if for the salvation of the blessed the general supernatural providence of God alone sufficed, by which God decreed to grant to individual men sufficient means, it would follow that on the part of God no distinction is made between the predestined and the reprobate; but the whole discernment between the two would arise from the part of free choice and the proper will of him who is saved: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear; for if God does not discern the predestined from the reprobate by some special act of His divine will, it is evident that their discernment must be sought from elsewhere, and consequently from the part of the will alone of him who is saved. The minor likewise is clear from the Apostle, 1. ad Corinth. 4, saying: Who discerns you, etc. — Then, if the Predestined had only general and sufficient aids, and God were not specially affected toward them by a consequent act of His will, it is evident that they would not be chosen by God above the rest, but rather they themselves would choose God: but that is repugnant to Christ saying to the Predestined, John 15: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. — Finally, from the same opinion it would follow that God has no special love toward the elect, nor bears particular care for them: but this is repugnant to the words of Christ the Lord, John 10: My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall not perish forever, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.

You will say 1. The necessity of Predestination destroys all vigilance and care for procuring and securing salvation, and it instills in ignorant and wicked men this most harmful opinion: either I am predestined, or I am not. If I am, I shall undoubtedly be saved, and so no solicitude about procuring salvation ought to remain for me. If I am not, all cares will be utterly vain and the labors for obtaining salvation empty, since only the predestined can be saved: therefore the necessity of predestination does not seem to be asserted, nor preached. The holy Augustine confirms the antecedent, libr. De Praedestinatione, cap. 15, with the example of a monk:

There was, he says, a certain man in our Monastery who, when the brethren reproved him because he did some things that ought not to be done and did not do things that ought to be done, replied: whatever I am now, such I shall be as God foreknew that I would be. He indeed spoke truly, and yet he did not profit in good; but he so far profited in evil that, having abandoned the fellowship of the Monastery, he became a dog returned to his own vomit, etc.

I deny the antecedent. For so far is it from being the case that the necessity of predestination instills and strengthens the aforesaid opinion, that rather it wholly dissolves and empties it, since God does not predestine the elect to glory without works, but to be obtained through good works. For just as He did not decree to grant an end except through suitable means — health, say, through medicine, victory through a noble and strenuous fight, knowledge through assiduity in studies, the abundant fruits of the harvest through agriculture — so too He foresaw and established that eternal salvation is to be attained through good works. Wherefore the holy Peter had admonished, 2. c. 1: Brethren, labor the more, that by good works you may make your calling and election sure.... for so an entrance shall be ministered to you abundantly into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. Add that the salvation of someone is so predestined by God that whatever promotes him to salvation falls also under the order of predestination: for, says St. Gregory, lib. 3. Dialogorum, cap. 13., the very predestination of the reward is so disposed by the Almighty that the elect arrive at it through labor, inasmuch as by asking they may merit to receive what the omnipotent God disposes to give them. Hence it appears that the necessity of predestination is not therefore to be kept silent, because the wicked and unlearned seize from it an occasion for a looser life; rather, says St. Augustine, lib. laudato, cap. 20.:

Just as Piety is to be preached, that God may be rightly worshiped by him who has ears to hear; Chastity is to be preached, that nothing unlawful may be perpetrated with the genital members by him who has ears to hear; Charity is to be preached, that God and neighbor may be loved by him who has ears to hear: so is the Predestination of God's benefits to be preached, that he who has ears to hear may glory not in himself, but in the Lord.

You will say 2. If Predestination were necessary for salvation, it would follow that the reprobate could in no way be saved, and consequently that his own damnation would not be imputable to him: but the consequence seems absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence of the major is clear, for since the decree of predestination is altogether invariable, it plainly stands that the reprobate cannot be predestined, nor consequently saved. — The Doctor distinguishes the major in 1. dist. 39. That the reprobate could not be saved by consequent potency and in the composite and formal sense, that is, insofar as he is formally reprobate, he concedes: that he could not be saved by antecedent potency and in the divided sense, insofar as in the first sign of eternity he who is reprobate on account of foreseen evil works could have become predestined, because he was foreseen as able, from his freedom, to perform good works by reason of which he could be predestined, he denies. These things will be explained more fully below.