Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The existence of divine Providence having been intimated and proved at the same time, its very nature is now to be investigated and unfolded, which, since it is the internal operation of God by which He leads the things subject to Himself to suitable ends, thence, regarding the resolution of the present Question, a twofold difficulty arises and is proposed for solution. The first indeed is whether that divine Providence is formally an act of the intellect or of the will of God: for besides intellection and volition no internal operation of God can either be or be conceived. The second is whether this divine ordering and administration of things is engaged and occupied not only with suitable means, but also with the due ends to be infallibly attained, the solution of which, so that it may appear easier and more evident

Note 1. Divine Providence, for its constitution and integrity, requires a threefold act of the intellect and as many of the will; on the part of the intellect indeed, it is necessary first that the possibility both of the end and of the means be known; otherwise Providence will be vague and erroneous. Second, it is necessary that the power and efficacy of the means for attaining the proposed end be discerned: for if one does not know these, he will manifestly lie in the danger of never attaining the proposed end. Finally, a certain knowledge of the future attainment of the end through the proposed means is required; for no one would wisely decree that the end is to be attained through proposed means, unless he foresaw that that end could be obtained through such means. The first is disclosed through the knowledge of simple Intelligence, which is occupied with the possibility of things: the second through conditioned knowledge, by which the outcome of things is foreknown with this or that condition posited: finally the third through the knowledge of Vision, by which the certain future, present, or past existence of things is disclosed. Providence likewise desires three acts of the will, namely the intention of obtaining the end, the preparation and election of the means, that is, the efficacious decree of attaining the end through such suitable means: finally the actual use, that is, the will applying the divine Omnipotence to the supplying of the means.

Note 2. This order among the aforesaid acts required for the integrity of divine Providence is to be observed: first indeed God knows through the knowledge of simple intelligence the possibility and the goodness of the end and of the means: second, through conditioned knowledge He discerns the efficacy and suitability of the means: thence follows the intention of attaining the end, the election and application of the means: finally, by the knowledge of vision God sees the attainment of that end through such means. It is certain, however, that divine Providence does not formally consist in this knowledge of vision, for this presupposes providence and is posterior to it: whence only the difficulty remains concerning the other acts of intellect and will, in which of them the formal notion of divine providence is to be placed. Concerning this resolution different men think different things: some, with St. Thomas, wish providence to consist formally in the act of the intellect by which God foresees and judges the certain attainment of the end through suitable means: some, with our Alexander of Hales, contend that it formally imports a double act of intellect and will; finally, others more correctly, with our Subtle Doctor, hold that it is to be constituted formally in the act of the divine will, which presupposes and connotes indeed the act of divine knowledge.

Note 3. Means can be compared and related to the end in a twofold way. First indeed insofar as they are its cause and as the end is to be attained through them: second insofar as they are its effect and inasmuch as the end is at once the reason and the cause for the sake of which the means are chosen and employed. Hence it comes about that Election and Intention tend to the end and to the means in different ways; first indeed simpliciter and absolutely; second comparatively and respectively. In the former way, intention is borne directly and solely toward the end; election, however, is occupied only with the means. In the latter way, intention tends to the end primarily indeed and principally, but to the means only secondarily insofar as they are the cause or the effect of the end; election, however, quite to the contrary, is borne primarily to the means insofar as they are efficacious for attaining the end, and secondarily it intends the end itself to be attained and for its sake chooses the means which seem more suitable for its attainment.

First conclusion. — Providence consists formally in an act of the will. This is the teaching of the Doctor in 1. dist. 40. quaest. unica n. 2., where, unfolding the definition of Predestination (which is the noblest and principal species of Providence), he says: Predestination, properly taken, denotes an act of the divine will, namely the order of election through the divine will of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory.

Proof of the Conclusion. First indeed from Sacred Scripture, which expresses predestination and providence by names and verbs signifying the operation of the divine will; for it calls both election, purpose, decree, direction, hatred, mercy, wrath, complacency; which words designate an act of the will, not however of the intellect. Election indeed, Ephesians 1: He chose us in Him, etc. Purpose likewise in the same place: He predestined us according to the purpose of His will. Love and Hatred, Romans 9: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated. Mercy and wrath likewise in the same place: He has mercy on whom He wills, and whom He wills He hardens, etc. Finally complacency, Luke 12: It has pleased your Father to give you the kingdom: and Wisdom 1: His soul was pleasing to God: therefore He hastened to bring him out of the midst of iniquity. All these and many other similar texts of Sacred Scripture openly signify that Providence and Predestination are a genuine act of the divine will.

Proof 2. By the authority of the holy Fathers, most especially St. John Damascene, lib. 2. De Fide cap. 29: Providence, he says, is the will of God by which all things that are receive suitable governance. A little below: and its operative and contemplative and provisive power is the good will of God itself; whence he adds: therefore because He is good He provides; as if he would say that Goodness is, as it were, the cause by which the divine will provides for all things. Nemesius agrees with him, lib. De facultatibus animae c. 43.¹ where, defining divine Providence, he says: Providence is the will of God by which all things that are are suitably governed.

Proof 3. By theological reason. Dilection is an act of the will: but Providence and Predestination are acts of the highest divine dilection: therefore they are likewise acts of the will. Second, Providence is the efficacious ordering of things to their ends: but in God only the ordering of the will can be efficacious; for He works all things according to the counsel of His will: therefore only the ordering of the will is formally Providence. Third, Providence is an act of the executive potency, for God by His executive potency orders and fulfills all foreseen effects: but the executive potency in God is the will alone, not the intellect: for the executive potency is that in which the effect to be produced is contained, as illumination is in the illuminative power and heat in the calefactive potency: therefore Providence pertains above all to the divine will. Finally, Providence is necessarily an act either of the intellect or of the will; but it is not an act of the intellect: therefore it is necessarily an act of the will. The major is evident; for besides intellect and will there is in God no operative and productive potency. The minor is proved: if Providence were an act of the divine intellect, it would be either a speculative knowledge of the things to be made and ordered by God, antecedent to every actual determination of the divine will; or a practical knowledge, likewise preceding every act of the will and dictating and regulating the things which are to be done and ordered; or finally a certain command of the intellect, following upon the election of the will, and dictating to it that this is to be done, and so applying the executive potency to operating: but neither of these is the case. Not the first indeed; for Providence is only about those things which are and actually exist, not about those which are possible; for no one is said to provide for things which do not yet exist, but is only said to foresee them, so that when they exist they may lead to a suitable end. And so Providence is not that speculative knowledge of the divine intellect which is occupied only with possible and not yet existing things. Nor likewise the second; for the divine intellect admits no formally practical knowledge: for every practical knowledge is said to be that which is regulative of practice, which only the act of the will is: but the act of the divine will does not need regulation and direction, and so, since the act of the divine intellect cannot be regulative of the divine will, it cannot be truly practical either. Nor finally the third; since that act of command is superfluous in us, and consequently in God. The consequence is evident: for we must speak of divine things with proportion to human things, especially in those which are superfluous, because since God is of more excellent and infinite power, He requires fewer things for eliciting His acts and producing His effects. The antecedent is proved: if a command were required, it would be most of all for determining our will; but for that it is superfluous; then because a command presupposes a volition in whose power it moves; whence if any volition presupposed some command, it would also presuppose another volition and determination of the will; and so there would be a process to infinity; or some efficacious volition would have to be admitted which no command had preceded: but by the same reason that that efficacious volition would not need a preceding command, by the same reason the following volitions will not need one. Then because if a volition were to be determined by a command, none would be formally free and of itself, but only by reason of another, namely by reason of the command freely determining the will: the consequence is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. Then finally because, although a command might be desired for determining the created will, nevertheless in God it would be superfluous for executing a transient operation, since for the immanent action of the divine will the direction of reason would be required no less than for a transient action: but for the immanent action of the divine will the command of the intellect and of reason is not required: therefore neither for the transient action.

It is confirmed. If in the divine intellect there were given such an act of command, it would belong either to the knowledge of simple Intelligence, or to the knowledge of Vision: but it belongs to neither: not indeed to the first, since the knowledge of simple intelligence precedes the decree, and is natural and necessary: but a command is a free act and presupposes the election and motion of the will. Nor to the second, because an act of command is efficacious and produces creatures ad extra: but the knowledge of Vision is purely speculative, nor does it cause things, but rather presupposes and contemplates them as present and existing, either in their own measure or in the superior measure of eternity: therefore in the divine intellect there is no such act of command.

You will say 1. From St. Dionysius, cap. 2. De divinis Nominibus: The Deity looks upon all things with wonderful Providence; but to look upon is an act of the intellect: therefore Providence too. The same is confirmed from Boethius, lib. 4. De Consolatione: Providence, he says, is the divine reason itself established in the Supreme Ruler, which disposes all things: therefore in truth Providence is an act of the divine intellect.

I answer. By these and similar sayings it is only proved that Providence requires an act of the intellect foreseeing and foreknowing how things can lead to and be ordered toward a suitable end; not however that it does not formally and specifically import an act of the divine will. Whence the Doctor, after having said that Predestination is an act of the divine will, adds that it can nevertheless be taken for the act of the intellect accompanying the election of the will; not that it really consists formally in that act of the intellect, but that it connotes and presupposes it.

You will say 2. As often as Sacred Scripture speaks of divine Providence, so often it designates and expresses it by names signifying knowledge and an act of the intellect. For first it frequently uses the verb of seeing, which designates intuitive knowledge: thus Genesis 22., when Abraham had said: God will provide for Himself the victim of the holocaust; it is added: He called the name of that place, The Lord sees; whence even to this day it is said, On the mountain the Lord will see. Second, Sacred Scripture for the most part expresses Providence by the name of the eyes, thus Psalm 10.: His eyes look upon the poor, and His eyelids question the sons of men. Third finally, it often uses the verb of looking upon, which denotes a special reflection and attention of the one seeing; thus Exodus 2.: The Lord looked upon the sons of Israel: and cap. 4.: That He had looked upon their affliction, etc. and Psalm 21.: My God, my God, look upon me, why have You forsaken me? And Psalm 79.: Look from heaven, and see, and visit this vine.

I answer. that these and similar contexts designate only the transient operations and effects of divine Providence, not however the internal divine Providence itself, which presupposes indeed the vision and consideration of the intellect, but formally denotes and imports an act of the will.

You will say 3. Prudence is most of all in an act of the intellect: but Providence is a part of prudence: therefore Providence consists formally in an act of the intellect. The minor is proved: first indeed from the Sacred Scriptures, Wisdom is written for the Prudence and Providence of God; thus Isaiah 40.: Nor is there any searching out of His wisdom; which the Septuagint read, Nor is there any finding out of His prudence. Second, the holy Fathers constitute prudence in an act of the intellect; thus St. Ambrose, lib. 3. De Virginibus: Prudence, he says, is of human reason: and St. Augustine, lib. De libero arbitrio cap. 13.: Prudence is the knowledge of things to be sought and avoided. Third finally, Aristotle, lib. 6. Ethicorum cap. 9. near the beginning and cap. 5. a little from the beginning: Those, he says, are called prudent who have well devised for some virtuous end the things of which there is no art; wherefore also he is altogether prudent who is apt for taking counsel. The minor, however, is evident per se: for Providence and Prudence, on account of their greatest affinity, enjoy the same definition of the name; for the provider and the prudent man is said to be, as it were, one seeing far ahead: whence Bede, lib. 2. on chapter 10. of Proverbiorum, says: Prudence took its name from providing: therefore Providence, just like Prudence, is an act of the intellect.

I distinguish the minor. Providence is a part of Prudence insofar as it imports the prevision of a thing future and to be ordered, I concede: insofar as it denotes the study and care of the things to be done, I deny; for as such it formally pertains to the will: in the same way the proof of the minor is to be solved; for Providence has affinity of name with Prudence to that extent, inasmuch as both foresee the things to be done and ordered so that they may lead as good to the end.

You will say finally. Predestination, from what has been said, is the noblest species of Providence: but this is formally an act of the intellect: therefore that too. The minor is proved from Sacred Scripture, which many times explains Predestination by the name of knowledge and foreknowledge; thus Rom. 8. the Apostle writes Predestination and Foreknowledge as synonyms, saying: Those whom He foreknew He also predestined. Which words St. Augustine, lib. De bono Perseverantiae cap. 18., thus weighs: This, he says, that He foreknew is not rightly understood except that He predestined, which the circumstance of the passage itself shows: for he was speaking of the remnants of the Jews, which were saved while the rest perished. The same Apostle, ibidem cap. 11.: God, he says, has not cast off the people whom He foreknew: whence St. Augustine, ibidem, in cap. 17.: These gifts of God, if there is no Predestination, which we defend, are not foreknown by God; but they are foreknown: this therefore is the predestination which we defend. By which both the Apostle and Aug. define Predestination through foreknowledge: but foreknowledge is an act of the intellect: therefore Predestination, and so Providence, of which predestination is the noblest species.

I deny the minor and to its proof I say that St. Paul does not write foreknowledge and predestination as synonyms, but as two distinct divine acts subordinated to one another: whence after he had said; those whom He foreknew He also predestined; he adds: Those whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also justified; but whom He justified, those He also glorified. By which he explains the whole order of Predestination; so that foreknowledge precedes, thence predestination follows, finally the three effects of predestination, which are calling, election and glorification. Likewise to St. Augustine I say that he does not use foreknowledge and predestination for one and the same act, nay rather he distinguishes both acts. For he adds after the praised words, cap. 18.: In this election therefore and in these remnants, which, as Paul testifies, were saved by the election of grace, he wished the people to be understood; therefore God did not cast them off, because He foreknew them: this is that election by which He chose in Christ those whom He willed before the constitution of the world, that they might be holy and immaculate in His sight in charity, predestining them to the adoption of sons. By which Aug. openly acknowledges Predestination to be an election, and so an act of the will distinct from foreknowledge. Which he declares more evidently in lib. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum: Predestination, he says, is the preparation of grace, which cannot be without foreknowledge; but foreknowledge can be without predestination; for by predestination God foreknew what He Himself was about to do. Whence foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination, and so they are not one single act, but a double one, that indeed of the intellect, this of the will.

Second conclusion. — Divine Providence, from its formal notion, does not necessarily and infallibly infer the attainment of any particular end intended by a creature. But it suffices that it infer the attainment of the general end befitting His glory and the good of the universe. This is against Cajetan, 1. p. qu. 22. art. 1., where he wishes it to pertain to the perfection of divine Providence that it infallibly attain the particular end to which it orders any creature whatsoever.

Proof 1. Providence, as we said in the preceding Conclusion, is, according to St. John Damascene, the will of God by which all things that are receive suitable governance: but suitable governance of things requires that means proportionate to their freedom be supplied to free causes, by which they can cooperate or not cooperate as they please; whence Wisdom 12., addressing God, says: With great reverence You dispose us, doing violence indeed to no one, but leading free creatures also freely to the end through means suitable to their freedom: therefore since a free creature can deviate from the intended end and will not to attain it, even when some means have already been taken up and applied to its attainment, it follows that God, by supplying such means, does not efficaciously intend the attainment of this end.

Proof 2. Providence has no greater efficacy regarding the attainment of the end than the divine will; for the whole efficacy and power of Providence is drawn from the divine will itself: but the divine will is not always fulfilled regarding the attainment of a particular end. For God truly wills all to be saved, and that not by simple complacency alone, but by a sincere antecedent will, as will be shown at length below in treating of supernatural Providence, even regarding the reprobate: therefore divine Providence, from its formal notion, does not infallibly infer the attainment of any particular end.

Proof 3. Finally, there are two things from which that infallibility of divine Providence in attaining a particular end could arise. The first indeed is the intention of attaining such an end, which exists in the will of God. The second is the will of conferring those means which God foreknew would be most efficacious for such attainment: but from neither source can such infallibility of Providence arise. Not indeed from the first, because God does not always intend the end with absolute will; but either with simple affection, or with a will including some condition, which either God does not absolutely will, or which so depends on the creature that it can be impeded by it. Which is clear from the example of the Reprobate, whom although God truly wills to be saved, nevertheless because salvation depends on their freedom and on the cooperation which they do not supply, therefore that divine will is not fulfilled. Add that since God is supremely free, He can intend particular ends as He will have wished, especially with respect to the supernatural end, whose ordering and tendency is joined to the rational nature from the freedom of God alone, and consequently God could, at His nod and choice, not confer such a tendency to the supernatural end on all, nor order all to that end by an absolute decree, but only by a simple affection and antecedent will, not however a consequent one.

Nor yet from the second. because God is not bound to give creatures those means which He foreknew to be more efficacious for attaining the end; nay, any means supplied by God the rational creature can render inefficacious by its freedom, for a means is rendered inefficacious in two ways. First indeed, from the intrinsic condition of the rational creature itself, which, since it is free, can resist, nor is God bound in any way always so to prevent it that it incline infallibly to the other side. Second, a means becomes inefficacious on account of an impeding efficient cause, as happens in natural agents, which, since they lack reason, are directed and ordered by the First Cause alone to attain their ends, nevertheless for the most part deviate from them and are impeded by the concurrence of other causes: whence monstrous births and casual effects arise in them. Therefore divine Providence does not attain that particular end which it antecedently and inefficaciously intends through one cause, although it attains the ends proposed in common, for example the manifestation of its attributes, which is the most universal end of Providence itself, or the good, or the advantage, of the universe itself.

All these things St. Thomas expresses lucidly in the Tract. De Veritate quaest. 6. art. 3:

The order of Providence, he says, is found to be certain in two ways: in one way in particular, when namely the things which are ordered by divine Providence to some end attain that particular end without defect; as is clear in the celestial motions and in all things that are done necessarily in nature: in another way in general and not in particular, as we see in generable and corruptible things, whose powers sometimes fail of their proper effects to which they are ordered as to their proper ends, just as the formative power sometimes fails of the perfect completion of the members; but nevertheless that very defect is divinely ordered to some end, and thus nothing can fail of the general end of Providence, although it sometimes fails of some particular end.

You will say 1. All things, as far as the order of providence is concerned, are fixed, stable, immovable and certain: therefore the attainment of the end intended by the creatures themselves is equally stable and certain. The antecedent is proved from St. Gregory of Nazianzus Oratione ad Iulianum, where he says: All our affairs are at once fluctuating and least fluctuating, as things which are indeed moved through changes and are agitated up and down, and one is otherwise disposed than another; but as far as the order and constitution of divine Providence is concerned, they are fixed and stable, even if they proceed through contraries. Boethius urges the same, lib. 4. De Consolatione, prose 6, where after he had said: God by providence indeed singularly and stably disposes the things to be done, he adds:

This, namely Providence, binds also the acts and fortunes of men in an indissoluble connection of causes, which, since they proceed from the immovable beginnings of Providence, must themselves also be immutable. Thus also are things best governed, if the simplicity remaining in the divine mind lays beforehand an unswerving order of causes. But this order restrains mutable things, otherwise about to flow away at random, by its own incommutability.

By these words he confirms that not only general providence, but also special providence, efficaciously intends and attains the end: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. That all things are stable and fixed in their ordination with respect to the ultimate, adequate and principal end intended by divine Providence itself, I concede: with respect to particular ends, I deny: nor did Boethius intend anything else either, for there, toward the end of the chapter, he says: A certain order embraces all things, so that what has departed from the assigned reason of order, this falls back nevertheless into another order, lest anything be permitted to temerity in the kingdom of Providence. Thus, therefore, are the stability, immovability, incommutability and indissoluble nexus of Providence to be understood, which does not bind to one particular end, but constrains so that he who has deviated from one falls back into another end. By a similar reason is that little prayer of the Church to be explained: God, whose providence in his disposition is not deceived: for although the special end intended by a creature is not attained, this comes about because Providence itself so wills to permit this non-attainment of the end and to order it to a better end.

You will say 2. Even particular providence supposes this willing and intention of the end; for the farmer would be imprudent who would scatter seeds in the field unless he absolutely willed to gather the fruit, although this gathering is sometimes impeded by the concurrence of other causes: therefore even particular providence, even concerning the end intended by the creature, ought to be efficacious and infallible. It is confirmed: for the efficacious will of the means arises only from the efficacious and absolute willing of the end; for the means, as means, is not appetible, nor willed except on account of the end: therefore the absolute will, that is, particular providence, which supplies to creatures the means for attaining the particular end intended, ought also efficaciously and absolutely to infer and intend the attainment of that end.

I deny the antecedent. Its falsity is shown by that very example of the farmer; for the farmer would not be imprudent if he scattered seeds in the field, although he did not have a certain and efficacious will of gathering fruit from each of the individual grains sown, indeed although he certainly knew which grains would be eaten by the birds, which would be trodden down by travelers, or dried up and trodden down upon the rock; for the fruit will always be more copious from the grains hidden in the earth, and far more grains will be gathered than had been sown, although many of the sown grains may have failed and perished.

Add. that from material things no fitting and apt argument can be drawn to express that divine Providence which especially applies itself to governing creatures endowed with reason.

I distinguish the antecedent. That providence supposes an absolute willing of the end, whether particular or universal, I concede: that it always supposes a particular one, I deny: and similarly, with the confirmation distinguished, the consequence is to be denied.

You will say 3. Divine Providence would be only conditional, not truly absolute, if it provided for some end not to be attained: but it involves a contradiction that the Providence of God be conditional, for that would argue impotence in the provider who could not attain the intended end unless a condition were posited, such as, v. g., would be the providence of a merchant who would will to preserve his wares, which end nevertheless he could not attain except by avoiding shipwreck, or by the jettison of part of the wares being made: therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. For conditioned providence does not belong only to a provider who cannot attain the intended end unless a condition is posited; but it is more proper to a provider who can, but does not will, both on account of the sweet ordination of Providence, and on account of some more excellent good, namely the good of the universe, which he judges to be preferred to the proper good of each particular creature.

You will say 1. It would be the greatest imperfection in a provider if he used and ordered means to an end whose attainment he did not intend: for this empty and ineffectual use of means would arise either from ignorance of the efficacy of such means, or from impotence to apply them; for if someone knows which means conduce to the end and can use and apply them, certainly the will to attain the end cannot be lacking to him, if the end is truly intended: therefore if God intends the particular end of his Providence, either he attains it infallibly, or he is ignorant of the means by which it is most certainly to be obtained.

I deny the antecedent. For the failure to attain the end does not arise from impotence or ignorance; but from the freedom of the divine will, and because this is more in keeping with the things themselves, and more befits and profits the office of the Governor and general Provider. Nor, however, does it follow from this that God in no way intends the end, but only that he does not intend it efficaciously and with absolute will: nor does it equally follow that divine Providence is frustrated; for what fails of one order of divine Providence necessarily falls into another, as St. Anselm teaches, lib. 1. Cur Deus homo, c. 15.

Although, he says, man, or the evil Angel, may not will to be subject to the divine ordination, he cannot nevertheless escape it: because if he wills to flee from under the commanding will, he runs under the punishing will, and passes under the will of the one permitting. And this very thing that he perversely wills or does, the supreme Wisdom converts into the order and beauty of the aforementioned universe.

With him St. Thomas agrees, quaest. 19, art. 6.² saying:

Since, therefore, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not attain its effect; whence what seems to recede from the divine will according to one order falls back into it according to another: just as the sinner who, as far as in him lies, recedes from the divine will by sinning, falls into the order of the divine will while he is punished through its justice.

Finally you will say. Even particular providence pertains to the consequent will: but the consequent will is always fulfilled: therefore it brings about the attainment of the end. It is confirmed: Providence, as a per se cause, extends to all beings whatsoever: but every per se cause always attains its end: therefore Providence also attains its end.

I deny the antecedent. For Providence embraces the antecedent will and the consequent will together. The former, indeed, inasmuch as God wills to administer to each thing the suitable means by which they may attain their end: the latter, indeed, inasmuch as he administers those means in fact to creatures and sometimes leads them to the desired end. Thus teaches St. John Damascene, lib. 2. De Fide, cap. 29, where he enumerates among the principal modes of providing the will by which God wills all men to be saved, not only metaphorically, but properly and really, and that by the antecedent will. For when he had said: It must be known that there are many modes of the providence of God, which can neither be explained by speech nor comprehended by the mind; he adds finally: and especially and antecedently to will all to be saved; for he did not form us to punish us, but that he might make us partakers of his goodness. This effect, however, namely the salvation of all, is not obtained by divine Providence.

You will ask. What is Fate, and in what way is it distinguished from divine Providence?

I answer. Fate is so called from the verb Fandi, because it signifies the divine word or decree concerning created things. But according to the truth of the matter, Fate, says Boethius, lib. 4. De Consolatione, prose sixth, is an inherent disposition in mutable things, through which Providence also binds all things in its own orders. Providence, however, according to the same author, is the very reason constituted in the highest prince of all things, by which he disposes all things. Whence Fate is distinguished from Providence as effect from cause, and disposition from the one disposing. For Providence is the eternal disposition of God concerning things, but Fate is the application and execution of that disposition itself, or, as Boethius speaks there, Fate disposes individual things distributed in motion, places, forms and times; so that this unfolding of the temporal order, gathered in the prospect of the divine mind, is providence; the same gathering, however, when digested and as it were unfolded in times, is called Fate. And having adduced the example of the craftsman who, beholding in his mind the form of the thing to be made, sets in motion the effect of the work, he concludes: That certainly is manifest, that the immovable and simple form of things to be done is Providence; but Fate is the movable nexus and temporal order of those things which divine simplicity has disposed to be done. Hence it appears how disgracefully the ancient Philosophers wandered from the truth, who judged Fate to be a certain eternal and immutable thing, bringing so great a necessity upon individual things that not even the Gods could free themselves from it. Seneca follows this error, lib. De Providentia, cap. 5, where he speaks thus of fate: Whatever it is that has commanded us so to live, so to die, the same necessity binds even the Gods; irrevocable, it carries alike human and divine things in its course: that very founder and ruler of all things wrote indeed the fates, but follows them; he always obeys, he commanded once: Whence the same author in Oedipo warns:

We are driven by the fates; yield to the fates: Anxious cares cannot Change the threads of the determined spindle. Whatever we suffer, mortal race, Whatever we do comes from on high. Scarcely may God turn those things Which, bound to their causes, run on. For each goes a fixed order, Movable by no prayer.

But this fatal necessity Nemesius learnedly and elegantly rejects from God, cap. 38, where he proves that God does not fall under necessity, nor does his will obey any necessity: for since he is power, and a nature endowed with power, he does nothing of nature by necessity; nor is he constrained by the obligation of law: and all things are contingent to him, even those which are necessary. To show which, he once restrained the course of the Sun and of the Moon, although they are carried necessarily and always in the same way, so that he might show that nothing happens to him necessarily, but that all things are contingent according to his power.