Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. Justice is defined by theologians and jurists as follows: Justice is the constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right, or by St. Augustine, lib. 9. De Civit. cap. 21., Justice is the virtue by which each one's own is distributed to him: whence the name of Justice is derived from right; but another's right is the same as a debt owed to another; hence it comes about that justice is deemed to be of as many kinds as there are kinds of debt. Now something can be said to be owed in four ways. First, by reason of a natural congruence and connection with another; thus to any thing whatsoever, for its natural perfection, there is owed a certain quantity, shape, temperament, power, and perfection, according as each one's nature demands; to this debt there corresponds a certain general justice, which is nothing other than the effect of giving to each thing what is owed or necessary to it for the perfection of its nature. Second, something is said to be owed by reason of the obligation of the law, in the manner in which in rational nature there is owed a conformity both of affection and of work with the eternal law. To this debt there corresponds that justice which is formed from the acts of each virtue, insofar as it is conformed to the divine law; and hence throughout Sacred Scripture men are called just, because they are conformed in affection and work to the eternal law. Third, something is said to be owed by reason of a promise made to someone; to this debt there correspond fidelity and truthfulness, whose office it is to render those things which have been promised to another, even if he has no perfect right to them. Fourth and finally, something is said to be owed to another by reason of a perfect right, to which unless satisfaction is made, it is judged that an injury is done: this debt arises from two heads: First, from the taking of another's thing, as happens in contracts and pacts for damages and injuries inflicted; whence he who destroys another's thing, or harms his reputation or honor, is no less a debtor than he who takes away some thing and keeps it for himself. Second, from the office of distributing common goods with a certain proportion: to each of these two debts, moreover, there corresponds the form of each of the two justices, of which one is called commutative, by which there is rendered to each one as much as is owed to him, either by reason of a thing received, or of damage and injury inflicted: the other, however, is called distributive, by which goods are distributed to each member of the community, according to each one's state, condition, and proportion. The former constitutes the equality of thing to thing: the latter, however, constitutes the equality of proportion to proportion.

Note 2. Between these two species of justice there intervenes this difference, that commutative justice in the payment of a debt must preserve an arithmetical and absolute equality, which is made according to the computation of number to number: for if a debtor owes a creditor twenty coins, he is bound by commutative justice to restore just as many to him. Distributive justice, however, must preserve only a geometrical, or respective, proportion, which is made according to the proportion of the diverse respects which the Geometer considers in different figures and quantities. Whence in distributing the goods of the republic through distributive justice, this distribution is not attended to according to number and the equality of the thing, so that he who has a hundred grades of merit should also have to have a hundred parts of the distributed good: but according to proportion, so that if forty parts of the goods of the republic are assigned to him who has a hundred grades of merit, twenty parts ought by distributive justice to be assigned to him who has fifty grades of merit.

Note 3. That besides those two assigned species of justice, there are other virtues which are reduced to justice and which are wont to be called its potential parts, because they indeed imitate and emulate the notion of justice: yet they fall short of it, either because they cannot render an equal, as Religion, which is concerned with the right to be rendered to God, and Piety, which is concerned with the right to be rendered to parents and fatherland, and Observance, which regards the right to be assigned to superiors; for as Aristotle says, 4. Ethicorum cap. 4.¹ to God, Parents, Fatherland, and Superiors a right and debt cannot be repaid to equality: or because although they can render an equal, they do not have a rigorous and legal debt, to the rendering of which each one is bound by law, but only a moral debt, to the rendering of which one is bound only from the honesty and decency of virtue, so that without its payment the honesty of morals cannot be preserved. Since, however, a twofold debt can be assigned: first indeed, that which so regards the honesty of morals that this cannot subsist without it; second, that which pertains only to the greater honesty of morals: hence according to that twofold moral debt, the species of justice are also of a twofold kind; for the first debt is attended to either on the part of the debtor himself, that he show himself to another in words and deeds such as he is, and this debt is regarded by Truthfulness; whether in a simple assertion, or in a promise, which is called fidelity: or it is attended to on the part of him to whom it is owed, in compensation of some good or evil deed, and with this Gratitude or Vindication is concerned. The last debt, namely that whose payment pertains only to the honesty of morals, is regarded by Liberality, Magnificence, Friendship, Charity, Affability, Eutrapelia, Mercy.

These things having been premised, three things are to be resolved in the present question. The first, whether in God there is the formal notion of the virtue of justice, insofar as it is distinguished from the other virtues. The second, whether legal, commutative, and distributive justice, which are the subjective species of justice, have a seat in God. The third, whether the aforementioned potential species of justice, namely Truthfulness, Fidelity, Gratitude, Liberality, etc., are also found in Him according to their proper and formal notions.

First conclusion. — Justice is truly and properly to be affirmed in God.

Proof 1. From many texts of Sacred Scripture, by which God is truly proclaimed just, and this especially from the very beginning of Scripture, for where the Vulgate version has In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth; the Hebrew reads in the beginning Elohim created, that is, judges, because, says Tertullian, lib. 2. against Marcionem, cap. 12.:

From the very beginning the Creator proceeded as much good as just, both alike. His goodness wrought the world, justice modulated it... it is the work of justice that a separation was pronounced between light and darkness, between day and night, between Heaven and Earth, between the upper and the lower water, between the gathering of the sea and the mass of the dry land, between the greater and the lesser lights, the diurnal and the nocturnal, etc.

from which he concludes: As Goodness conceived all things, so Justice distinguished them. The Royal Psalmist proves the same by many passages, especially from Psal. 84. Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace have kissed; Truth is sprung out of the earth and justice hath looked down from Heaven; for the Lord will give kindness... Justice shall walk before him. By these words the Royal Prophet attributes justice to God as distinct from mercy, kindness, and peace, or concord, and from truth or divine truthfulness. Likewise in Psalm. 118., addressing God he says: You are just, O Lord, and your judgment is right: by which words he attributes justice to God specially, insofar as it regards a right judgment, that is, as He brings forth an equitable and just sentence, as equitable Judges do from the special virtue of justice. St. Paul agrees with him, 2. ad Timotheum 4., saying: I have fought a good fight... henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. Where note the words will render, just judge, and crown of justice, all of which signify the debt of justice; for the retribution of a just judge supposes a right in him to whom the retribution is made and a debt in him whose part it is to render or retribute. The same Apostle confirms the same thing, ad Hebraeos 6. For God is not unjust, that he should forget your good work, etc. By which words Paul signifies that God would be unjust if He denied the promised reward to good works; because that reward is owed from justice, according to that saying of the same Apostle, ad Rom. 4. Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. And also according to the parable of Matthew 20., by which God is compared to a Father of a family hiring workers with these words: Go you also into my vineyard, and I will give you what shall be just. Whence in the same place He says to His steward: Call the laborers and pay them their hire, namely the owed and just hire, from the agreement made with them about the daily denarius.

Proof 2. From the holy Fathers, especially from holy Augustine, lib. De Natura et Gratia c. 2: For God is not unjust, who should defraud the just of the reward of justice: and serm. 16. de verbis Apost. cap. 2: In those things which we already have, let us praise God the giver: in those things which we do not yet have, we hold Him a debtor. For He was made a debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but by promising what pleased Him, namely eternal life, etc. And Ambros. in Psalm. 118. serm. 7., around the beginning: God wills, he says, to be summoned to court, so that if anyone, having followed the rewards proposed to the virtues, has fought well, he may expect the fruit of recompense, and even demand it, as it is written: I have fought a good fight and there is laid up for me a crown of Justice. Note the word to be summoned to court, namely in judgment, which is proper to the debt of justice.

Proof 3. By reason: That virtue which in its formal concept says no imperfection is to be attributed to God formally: but Justice strictly taken is such: therefore it is to be attributed to God. The major is conceded by all theologians; for to God, the most perfect of beings, every perfection is to be attributed which savors of no imperfection. The minor, however, is proved: Justice can be considered either insofar as it is concerned with debts or non-debts among others through a simple affection, namely loving them insofar as they are just and hating them insofar as they are unjust; or insofar as it is concerned with just things, or debts, between us and others: but from neither head does the virtue of justice have an imperfection annexed in its formal concept. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved as to the first part; for just things insofar as they are such, whosesoever they are, whether ours or another's, are worthy of love; unjust things, however, as such, are worthy of hatred, and consequently the affections which are concerned with them have nothing of imperfection and incongruity. The same minor is proved as to the second part; for many things are owed by creatures with a strict and rigorous debt, which God can will and exact from them, because they are owed, that is, from the affection of justice; for it is owed to God that honor be repaid to Him, that His commandments be kept, etc., which if they are not done, satisfaction and restitution of the injured honor ought to be made to Him, and God can exact all those things for His right from creatures, nor is there any imperfection in this, that God exacts them, or that creatures owe them: therefore Justice taken in itself and insofar as it abstracts from its species does not disgrace God.

You will say 1. Justice supposes a debt and consequently a debtor: but God cannot be made, nor be called, a debtor with respect to a creature: therefore neither can He have justice toward them. The minor is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers; and indeed holy Basil on Psalm 114.: There remains, he says, an everlasting rest for those who have lawfully striven in this life; not according to the debt of works, but according to the debt of the most manifest God. St. Augustine, sermon 16. De verbis Apostoli:

God has been made a debtor to us, not by receiving anything, but by promising what pleased Him; for in one way we say to a man, you owe me because I gave to you, and in another way we say, you owe me because you promised me. To God, therefore, what do we say: render to me because I gave to you? when what we are and what we have, we have from Him? We have therefore given Him nothing; there is no way in which we may exact God as a debtor with that utterance. By that utterance, therefore, we can exact from our Lord: render what you promised, because we have done what you commanded, and you yourself did this, because you helped us laboring.

And Bernard, first sermon De Annuntiatione: Nor are the merits of men such, he says, that on that account eternal life is owed by right, or that God would do some injury, unless He gave it as a gift: therefore God cannot have the notion of a debtor; but only of a promisor with respect to the creature, even by reason of good works.

I distinguish the minor: God cannot be, nor be called, a debtor of the creature contrary to His will and through a certain exigency which would prejudice His voluntary benignity, I concede: He cannot be called a debtor from His free will and benignity by which He promises a reward under the burdensome and laborious condition of some work to be shown by the creature, I deny: for this, not only have St. Ambrose and August. insinuated above, but also Chrysost. affirms it, homil. 8. in Epist. ad Rom., saying that God is a debtor to the just not of base things; but of great and sublime ones: and Cyprianus, lib. De Opere et Eleemosyna, in De vero Misericorde says: He merits Christ as judge, he reckons God a debtor to himself. The same thing the Councils of Arausicanum, can. 18., and Trident., sess. 6. c. 16., assert, where the Council, referring various texts of Scripture by which a reward is promised to good works done in grace, concludes:

And therefore to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus and as a reward, by the promise of God Himself, faithfully to be rendered to their good works and merits: for this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his contest and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge, etc.

Whence although to have a right to something and with respect to someone, when the right is contracted contrary to the will of the debtor himself, imports a certain imperfection and as it were inferiority in the debtor with respect to the creditor, nevertheless to have a right only dependently on the will, benignity, and promise of the debtor himself sounds of no imperfection.

You will insist. The creditor has dominion over that which is owed to him by right, but not the debtor: but the creature cannot bring it about that that which is owed to it as a reward should be withdrawn from the supreme dominion of God and transferred into the dominion of the creature itself: therefore God cannot have the notion of a debtor with respect to the creature, nor the creature the notion of a creditor with respect to God, and consequently true justice cannot intervene between them.

I distinguish the major: The creditor has supreme and sole dominion over that which is owed to him by right, I deny: he has some dominion by reason of which he can justly exact it, although it also supposes the dominion of another superior over the very thing owed, I concede: To the minor I say: that while the dominion of God over some things perseveres, nevertheless the creature can have some right in those same things; for while the supreme dominion of God over creatures subsists, nevertheless creatures have rights in other things: just as by parity citizens have a right in their own goods, while the high dominion and right of the Republic, to which those same goods are subject, perseveres; similarly when a Prince by donation, sale, or another contract gives a right to a subject in something, and transfers to him the dominion of property, he does not on that account divest himself of the high right and supreme dominion, by which he can dispose both of the things themselves and of the subject himself as the common good requires. And so there is no imperfection in God, nor is anything detracted from His supreme dominion, although He constitutes Himself a debtor of creatures from will and benignity, and they have a certain right in the thing owed to them.

You will press. If God were a debtor to the creature and obligated from justice to His creature, there would result in the creature itself a right against God, so that the creature itself would have a right in something which God could not deny to it from justice; and so God would not have supreme dominion over that thing: but this is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows: The consequence of the major is clear: for he does not have supreme dominion over a thing of which he cannot dispose according to his good pleasure and without injustice. The minor is also clear; for God has supreme dominion over all things, and if He could abdicate from Himself the dominion of some operation of ours, He could also abdicate the dominion of all our actions, and also the dominion of Heaven and Earth, and transfer it to the creature, all of which are most absurd.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. God would not have supreme dominion over that very thing in which the creature would have a right, if such a right were contracted contrary to the will and free pact of God Himself, I concede: if such a right is contracted from the good pleasure of God Himself and His voluntary promise and benignity, I deny: for that right which the creature can have in some thing does not dissolve the supreme dominion over it; rather it supposes that God so orders the thing itself that it falls into the proper utility and property of the creature itself. Add that since God always has supreme dominion over the creature itself, which is said to have a right at some time, He also has dominion over that very right of the same creature.

You will say 2. There cannot be true and strictly taken Justice in God toward creatures, unless likewise the Justice of creatures, v. g. of men toward God, is perfect and strict: but there cannot be strict justice of man toward God: therefore neither of God toward creatures. The major is evident; for justice is the reciprocal relation of debtor to creditor. The minor is proved: the strict justice of man toward God cannot exist, if in man there cannot be injustice against strictly taken justice: but this cannot exist: therefore neither that. The minor is proved: if man could work some injustice against God, especially through sin: but it cannot happen so. It is proved: if God could be unjustly injured by man through sin; it would follow that there is no sin which would not be injustice, because there is none by which God is not dishonored, whether gravely or lightly. Moreover, it would follow that every sin has a twofold malice, one indeed of injustice against the virtue of justice, the other however repugnant to that virtue against which the sinful action directly fights, v. g. drunkenness against temperance; but the consequence is false: therefore also the antecedent.

I deny the minor and to its proof I say that every sin is a true injustice, or injury of God materially, because there is none by which the divine honor is not wounded: formally, however, sin is injustice only when the sinner acts directly and from intention against the divine right, or against God commanding, for His right, the opposite of the sinful action; whose violation of right indeed inflicts injury on God and contracts in the sinner an obligation to punishment. To the second argument I say that there is no sin which does not have a malice of a certain injustice annexed to it; for there is no sin which is not opposed to divine honor, just as there is also none which does not have at least a material malice of ingratitude, disobedience, injustice, etc. These diverse general notions of malice, however, when they are joined to some special sin, v. gr. theft, do not produce a malice diverse in species or number from the malice of that special sin; but they are involved and comprehended in it.

You will say 3. If there were strict justice and injustice of man toward God, it would follow that man is obligated per se and ex natura rei, after any sin committed, to do penance immediately so as to satisfy God: but the consequence seems absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is clear, because from every strict justice, per se and ex natura rei, there arises the obligation of satisfying immediately.

I answer that a twofold satisfaction owed for injustice can be distinguished. The first is the restitution of the good taken away, or the removal of the evil inflicted: the other is the punishment to be undergone for the sin and transgression of the law. Of the first it is true that immediately after the injury the obligation of satisfying urges; thus he who has detracted a good reputation and taken away goods is bound to restore immediately: whence he who by blasphemies, heresies, and other things of that kind has taken away the divine honor among others, namely by inducing in them a perverse estimation of God, is bound to repair the injured honor of God immediately. The second obligation, however, urges only when the punishment is exacted by the offended party and inflicted by the judge; and such is the satisfaction which commonly arises from sins committed against God.

You will insist. Everyone sinning wounds the divine honor, because he esteems God less than is fitting: therefore if in sin there is some injustice, immediately the sinner is bound to restore to God the honor taken away.

I deny the antecedent: for very many sin by a defect of the perverse will; not however by reason of an intellect badly disposed toward God and esteeming Him less. If, however, anyone had a bad estimation of God, he would be bound to lay it aside immediately: if anyone likewise had introduced this bad estimation of God among others by words or deeds, immediately from Justice he would be bound to take care that it be laid aside.

Second conclusion. — Legal and commutative justice are not in God according to their proper formal notions.

This Conclusion, as to both parts, is the Doctor's, in 4. d. 46. q. 1.

Proof of the first part: That species of justice cannot be in God formally which in its formal concept includes the debt of the inferior to the superior and of the part to the whole: but such is legal Justice: therefore etc. The major is evident, for God cannot have the notion of the inferior and of a part with respect to another being. The minor, however, is proved: since every Justice properly so called is toward another, a threefold comparison to another can be made: namely, either by comparing the part to the whole, or the whole to the part, or the part to the part. If the part is compared to the whole, thence arises legal Justice, by which any member of the Republic is bound, even with his own loss, to procure the good of the whole political body, and duly to execute those things which are commanded by the Head of the Republic and of the political body for the common utility of the members. If a comparison of part to part is made, it is commutative Justice, by which one member of the political body preserves equality toward another in contracts, dealings, and exchanges. Finally, if a comparison of whole to part is made, it is distributive Justice, by which the Head of the Republic in its name distributes goods or punishments according to the measure and proportion of merits and demerits. Therefore just as distributive Justice in its concept includes the notion of the proportion and measure to be preserved in the distribution of goods and punishments, and commutative justice must preserve equality between the mutually contracting parts: so likewise legal Justice in its formal concept includes the debt of the part to the whole, and so the debt of the inferior and dependent to the superior, which is chiefly fulfilled and discharged by the observance of laws: these things, however, supremely disgrace God: therefore legal Justice is not to be asserted in Him according to its formal and proper notion.

You will say 1. The Subtle Doctor in 4. d. 46. q. 1. n. 2. expressly affirms that legal justice can be placed in God: therefore he is against us, and we against him.

I answer that the Doctor is not speaking of that legal justice by which an inferior is ordered to a superior, which is true and strict legal justice: but of that by which someone, as a subject or quasi-subject, is bound to be in accord with the law and the lawgiver, if it be true that before the determination of the divine will there is some law to which that divine will ought to conform itself as to another, v. g. to this dictate, or to this first practical principle, God is to be loved; or, as he himself speaks in the same place, saying:

the first of these, namely legal, could be placed in God, if there were another law prior to the determination of his will, with which law, and in this with the lawgiver, as with another, his will would rightly accord; and indeed this law is, God is to be loved; but if it ought not to be called a law or a practical principle of law, at least it is a practical truth preceding every determination of the divine will.

You will say 2. Just as distributive justice is not only in the Prince, but also in him who in the name of the Community distributes the goods or burdens of the Community, but also in private individuals, not as if the distribution were to be made through them, but so that they are content with the just distribution made to them and are rightly affected about it: so legal justice is not only in subjects and inferiors, but also in the Prince and the Community itself; not indeed with respect to the Prince and the Community themselves, but also with respect to the inferiors subject to them, over whose goods and rights Princes or the Community can dispose for the sake of the common good, and can require from subjects those things which they ought to render and carry out by reason of that common good: therefore on this account legal justice is in God.

I distinguish the antecedent: that legal justice, strictly taken and insofar as it expresses the ordering of man to keeping the law to which he is subject, is not only in subjects but also in the Prince and the Community, I deny: insofar as it expresses the affection and will of keeping the law on the part of him who is subject to the law, I concede: and I admit that by this latter consideration legal justice can be affirmed in God, but this is not the employment of legal justice strictly taken, about which alone we speak here.

You will say 3. Legal justice regards not only the edicts of Princes concerning the governing of the Community, but also their debts and duties for duly governing and ruling it: but these duties are not unbecoming to God: therefore neither is legal justice.

I deny the minor: for God is in no way bound by debt to the governance of the universe; for if there were in him any obligation to this, it would especially be by reason of his being the head and principal part of the universe: but this cannot be said, for it belongs to the head and the nobler part of the body to attend more to the common good than to its own, indeed to neglect its own and to expend it for the utility of the common good, just as all subjects are also bound to this: but God cannot prefer the good of creatures to his own good: therefore neither can he be bound in the capacity of head to the governance of the universe.

Third conclusion. — Commutative justice properly is not in God, but distributive justice can truly be affirmed in him.

This conclusion, as to both parts, is that of the Doctor praised above, 4. d. 46. q. 1., where, after having distinguished justice into commutative and distributive, he had said:

commutative properly regards punishment and reward, namely that rewards be rendered as it were by exchange for merits and punishments for sins: distributive regards as it were natures and superadded perfections, namely that a perfection proportioned to the nature be distributed to it. Just as in our republic, goods belonging to their grades are distributively distributed to persons according to their grades proportionally: just as in the hierarchy of the universe, to the nobler nature by the hierarchy, that is by God the prince, nobler perfections or ones suitable to such a nature are distributed, and to the inferior nature perfections suitable to it are distributed.

He adds:

The first of these cannot simpliciter be in God with respect to a creature, because there cannot be simpliciter equality, but there can be in some way according to proportion, as between a lord and a servant. For it befits a liberal lord to repay a greater good than the servant can merit, provided there be such a proportion that just as the servant does what is his, so the lord repays what is his, and in the same way in punishing short of the condign. But the second justice can be here simpliciter, because he can simpliciter give to natures the perfections due to them or suitable to them according to the perfecting grades.

The conclusion is proved: Commutative justice strictly taken consists in the equality of the given and the received: but this equality cannot be found between God and creatures: For who, says the Apostle to Rom. 11.² has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him and through him and in him are all things: and Job. 35. If you act justly, what will you give him? Or what will he receive from your hand? Clearly because, since he is the Lord of all, nothing can be offered to him that is not already his: therefore neither can commutative justice be found in him.

Again, by commutative justice strictly taken, some thing is constituted under the power and dominion of another, to whom it previously in no way belonged: but it is repugnant that any action of a creature be constituted under the power and dominion of God; for whatever action of a creature, just like the creature itself, is more under the dominion of God than under its own dominion: therefore it is repugnant that a creature give and bestow something on God simpliciter.

Finally, he who repays something from commutative justice must have a strict debt of repaying it: but in God there is not, nor can there be, a strict debt and obligation with respect to a creature: for a strict debt imports some inferiority and dependence of the one owing on the one to whom it is owed, and it seems to be incompatible with supreme dominion; for he who has supreme dominion over someone is equally the supreme Lord of all those things that are: whence the Lord can, without any injustice, deny to his servant a thing promised, indeed even take away a thing given; because whatever the servant possesses is the Lord's.

You will say 1. Buying and selling are acts of commutative justice: but God sells to the just the Kingdom of Heaven for meritorious labors and works, as Augustine says in a certain sermon: What do I have for sale, Lord? The Kingdom of Heaven. With what is it bought? With poverty the Kingdom, with sorrow joy, with labor rest, with lowliness glory, with death life: therefore he distributes the Kingdom of Heaven from commutative justice.

I distinguish the minor: that God sells to the just the Kingdom of Heaven through a strict pact and strict convention by which God would be bound from true and strict justice to bestow the Kingdom of Heaven, I deny: from the voluntary acceptance of those good works for a reward far excelling and antecedent to the good works themselves, I concede: for, as the Apostle speaks, Romans 8. The sufferings of this time are not condign with the future glory which shall be revealed in us.

You will say 2. In order that God be bound to bestow something on man from commutative justice, it is not necessary that man give something to God and that God receive from him new dominion over some thing, but it suffices that man show him due honor and worship: but man can render these; for he can show God due honor, worship and obedience, which has a certain commensuration with the reward of eternal life: therefore God can be bound to this from strict justice.

I deny the major: for that honor and worship which we show to God is already owed to God in a thousand ways and by almost infinite titles, nor can it be repaid to him without his influx, causality and concurrence. Whence this action, by which worship and honor is repaid to God by a creature, arises and proceeds from God as from the first principle: whence whatever we can offer to him is already his, according to that 1. Paralip. All things are yours, and what we have received from your hand we have given to you: whence St. Bernard: God burdens us when he unburdens us; for he burdens us with benefits when he unburdens us of sins.

The second part is proved: First indeed by the reasoning of the Doctor. Distributive justice is that by which perfection and benefit is bestowed on each according to his dignity: but God distributes perfections to created things according to their dignity: therefore in him there is perfect and strict distributive justice. The minor is proved by the authority of St. Dionysius, cap. 8. De Divinis nominibus: Divine justice, he says, disposes and determines all things, and keeping all things unconfused among themselves and unmixed, bestows on all things that are whatever is accommodated to each, according to the dignity which each one of the things that are attains. And in the same chapter: One ought to see in this the true justice of God, that he bestows on all their own according to the nature of each one, saving each in its own order and virtue. And Tertullian, lib. 2. against Marcion. cap. 12.: The goodness of God wrought the world, the justice of God modulated it.

Again, distributive justice does not have the attached defects which commutative imports, for it does not induce in the distributor any debt simpliciter arising from the reception of a thing that another bestows; for a Prince can justly distribute all goods without receiving or hoping anything from those to whom he distributes them: nor is it likewise required for distributive justice that he who distributes goods abdicate his supreme right over them: for a prince can lavish goods while always keeping for himself the ultimate and supreme right in those same goods. Moreover, distributive justice imports the highest perfection, for it signifies the right of a superior toward inferiors: since it belongs to the superior to distribute of the common goods to each according to his proportion: therefore it is not unbecoming to God.

Finally, the retribution of eternal life for good works done in grace and charity proceeds not only from divine fidelity and gratitude, but also from strict justice, as was proved in the first Conclusion: but this retribution does not proceed from commutative justice, as was said in the preceding Conclusion: therefore it is necessary that it arise from distributive justice.

You will say. Distributive justice, since it is a species of strict justice, supposes a strict debt and obligation as much as commutative does; for every strict justice supposes a strict debt: therefore if commutative justice is repugnant to God on the ground that he is incapable of a strict debt, by the same reason distributive justice ought not to be admitted in him.

I deny the antecedent. For a debt contracted from commutative justice arises from the action and right of one person, by which he burdens another; but God cannot be burdened and strictly obligated by any action of a creature, because every action of a creature is under the dominion and disposition of God, as has been said: but the debt of distributive justice does not arise from an action, nor from the right of one person burdening another or strictly obliging him to do something, but is born only from natural rectitude and the very equity of the law, by which the distributor is bound to commensurate the reward with the perfection of merits. This debt indeed in a human prince obliges from the ordination of the natural law; in God, however, it is born from the fact that he himself is the first law and the first rule of all rectitude.

From these gather that vindicative justice can also be affirmed in God, not insofar as it is commutative and as it imports equality between the offense and the punishment, but insofar as it signifies the due proportion and comparative and geometric commensuration between sin and vengeance, according to that of Apocalypse 18. As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment and mourning give her; in which things properly consists the office of vindicative justice; for, says St. Aug. comm. 1. in Psalm. 58., Every iniquity, whether small or great, must be punished, either by a repentant man or by a vindicating God: rightly does Tertullian, lib. De Poenitentia cap. 3., say: A good deed has God as its debtor, just as an evil one, because every judge is the remunerator of the cause; God the judge presides over the justice most dear to himself by requiring and defending it, and sanctions in it the whole sum of his discipline: nothing is removed from his sight, whence no offense at all is committed; because he is not ignorant; nor does he fail to decree it in judgment: he is no dissembler or prevaricator of his own perspicacity. Therefore for all offenses committed, whether in the flesh or in the spirit, whether by deed or by will, he has destined punishment through judgment.

You will say. Vindicative justice includes two things, namely the punishment of the injury and the removal of the harm inflicted through it: but a creature can inflict no harm on God: therefore God cannot truly exercise vindicative justice on it.

I answer 1. That it is not necessary for inflicting vengeance and punishment that harm have been inflicted on someone; but it suffices that it have been acted against his right and that someone have willed to inflict harm: 2. Harm can be inflicted on God in external goods, as if his glory and good reputation among others is diminished by blasphemies and heresies: 3. Vindicative justice, in demanding vengeance insofar as it is due to the injured right for repairing it, is true justice, although insofar as it tends to the repulsion of one's own harm as such, it is only a potestative part of justice.

Gather 2. That Religion, Piety, Observance, Gratitude, according to the proper offices and objects of those virtues, are not found in God formally. For Religion inclines to repaying honor and worship to be shown to another as the first principle and supreme Lord of all things: Piety indeed to showing honor and obedience to another as a secondary principle, such as parents are: Observance, whose parts are Dulia and Obedience, inclines to showing honor and obedience to another by reason of dignity and eminence above him who shows the honor and obedience: Gratitude finally to returning thanks for benefits received from another. But God cannot be inclined toward another as toward a primary or secondary principle, nor as toward a superior benefactor; for that directly militates against the notion of the supreme and wholly independent being: therefore these appendices and potential species of justice cannot be found in God formally.