Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Although the divine Will is celebrated by Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers with almost countless titles of glory, nevertheless, above all the rest, like the sun among the stars, there shines in it infinite Holiness, together with those eminent virtues which are the appendages, offspring, and crown of holiness. Therefore, having passed over and consigned to silence the other perfections of the divine Will, which will be unfolded hereafter by a more suitable method according to the diversity and opportuneness of the matter, in this Article alone we undertake to explain the divine Holiness and the divine Virtues which they call moral.

Note 1. That although the divine perfections are infinite, and consequently of equal grade and merit; nevertheless, if we defer to the divine Scriptures, which express divine things in human fashion, we will surely acknowledge that divine Holiness holds the first place among the other excellences: for, as the royal psalmist sings, addressing God, Ps. 137. Thou hast magnified thy holy name above every name — as though God glories more in the name of holiness than in the other divine titles.

To which that passage of Exodus 28 not incongruously squares, where Moses, at God's command, describing the priestly ornaments, ordered a golden plate to be made, in which, by the engraver's work, was inscribed: Holy to the Lord; which plate the high Priest bore on his forehead, showing it to all the peoples, to make known to them that the name of holiness is not only a character of the true Divinity, but also a special and more radiant perfection.

Hence it came about that although God, out of His infinite patience, so long endured the idolaters who adulterated His Divinity, and suffered that any of His perfections whatsoever should be consecrated to false deities — attributing, namely, strength to Mars, fecundity to Venus, knowledge to Pallas, empire to Jupiter, etc. — yet He never suffered this injury to be inflicted upon His holiness.

For there was never any deity among the Gentile idolaters to whom Holiness was attributed as a special character.

Whence, whenever the true Divinity is designated in the Scriptures, it is signified by the name of holiness.

Hence also the Seraphim, burning with fire for God, who are wholly given to celebrating the divine perfections, do not extol God with praises and encomiums on account of His Strength, Wisdom, Majesty, etc., but with unceasing voice proclaim: Holy, Holy, Holy.

Nor undeservedly, says St. Ambrose, lib. 3. De Spiritu Sancto cap. 18. For we find nothing more precious by which we can name God, unless we call Him Holy; anything else is inferior to God, inferior to the Lord.

With whom St. Bernard agrees, homil. 4. on the Missus est, saying that the Archangel Gabriel rightly said to the Virgin Mary: The Holy One that shall be born of thee, because, he says, he had no other name by which he could better express the Divinity of Christ.

The same thing St. Dionysius seems to have taught earlier, lib. De Divinis Nominibus cap. 12, saying: Since He is the Author of all things, and most full of all things, from the one supereminence which surpasses all, He is called the Holy of Holies.

Indeed, God Himself sufficiently indicates that His holiness is to be esteemed above His other divine excellences, when He proposes it alone to be imitated by men, Leviticus 19.¹ Be ye holy, because I am holy.

It is established, therefore, that God is not only holy, but that divine Holiness also stands out among His other perfections.

Note 2. From our Harphius, lib. 1. Theologiae mysticae part 2. cap. 103, the name of holiness is used in four ways, according to its fourfold etymology. For, he says, Holy first means the same as without stain, that is, without sin; because just as a dye takes away the natural color of cloth, penetrating the whole cloth, so sin takes away from the soul the innocence of baptism and penetrates the whole man; concerning which sanctification the Apostle says: Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. Secondly, Holy means the same as without earth; for ἅγιος in Greek is sanctum in Latin, or ἅγιος means the same as without earth; and so we ought to sanctify ourselves by despising all things, saying with the Apostle: I have counted all things as dung that I may gain Christ, so that thus we may be raised up to God in pure love vitally. Thirdly, Holy means the same as stained with blood. For of old the victims were stained with blood and purified, and almost all things were cleansed in blood. So also we ought to sanctify ourselves by sprinkling both posts, namely of the concupiscible and of the irascible, and the lintel of the rational. Whence blessed Agnes, he says, His blood adorned my cheeks.

Fourthly, Holy means the same as firm and holy: and therefore laws are called holy because they are firm; so also we ought to sanctify ourselves through patience, as the Apostle says: Follow peace with all men: the Gloss, even with persecutors; and sanctimony, that is, perfection, perseverance in good works, without which no man shall see God. This firmness and holiness the Apostle attained when he said: I am certain that neither death nor life, etc.

Note 3. From Hugh of St. Victor, lib. 1. Eruditionis Theologicae title 30: Holiness is attributed to God, to men, and to places, with this distinction, that God is holy, not sanctified, but sanctifying; man is holy, sanctified and sanctifying; a place, however, is holy and sanctified, but not sanctifying: for God is holy of Himself, not of us, as the Prophet says, Ps. 15. Thou hast no need of my goods: man, however, is holy not of himself, but of God; for of His fullness we have all received, as is said in John, chapter 1. A place, indeed, is sanctified either without man or through man; it does not sanctify, because just as a place not holy does not defile the holy, as Lot in Sodom; so a holy place does not sanctify what is not holy, as the heavenly Paradise did not sanctify the Devil, and the earthly the first man; man, however, for the most part sanctifies a place in two ways, by merit and by office. For sanctification is threefold: there is the Sanctification of the Sacrament, the Sanctification of justice or merit, and the Sanctification of glory or reward. For churches are sanctified when they are dedicated, men are sanctified when they are justified, the elect are sanctified when they are rewarded with the gifts of eternal glory. Having set aside the two latter modes of holiness, we here inquire only two things concerning the former: first, in what divine Holiness consists; second, in how many ways it differs from the holiness of men.

First conclusion. — The holiness of God is the complete conformity of His divine will with the eternal and invariable law, whereby, separate and free from every stain and contagion of sin, He adheres immutably to Himself with perpetual affection, and operates all things solely for the sake of Himself.

This conclusion contains four parts, by which divine holiness is explained and made known. For first it is a complete conformity with the eternal law, which is nothing other than right divine reason, inasmuch as it dictates all things that are fitting to a rational nature: that rectitude, therefore, and the conformity of the divine will with it, is rightly called His Holiness. For just as the natural perfection of created things consists chiefly in this, that each of them is commensurate with the rule and idea according to which it was made; so their moral perfection is situated in commensuration with the eternal law, according to which it is necessary to operate: because just as the concept and idea of the divine mind is the measure and rule of the natural perfection of things; so the eternal law is the measure of the moral perfection of the rational nature itself: and so, since Holiness is the apex and crown of all moral perfection, it is rightly established in conformity with the eternal law of God. Hence Christ the Lord, who is surnamed the Holy of Holies, was wholly intent on fulfilling the divine law and executing the command and prescription of His eternal Father, and that in the most perfect manner. 1. For He fulfilled all the divine commands, He Himself for the most part testifying, John 6. I came not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me, the Father. 2. He executed them in the manner in which they had been ordained, John 14. As the Father hath given me commandment, so do I. 3. He observed all things most exactly: One jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law till all things be fulfilled. 4. He wrought all things for the paternal glory, and for a divine end He executed all things solely: I seek not my own glory, but the glory of him who sent me, the Father. By which things He taught by His example that complete holiness is to be established in conformity with the divine and eternal law.

Secondly, since the eternal law, says Lessius, Book 8. Opuscul. num. 3., arises from the divine Essence itself (which, just as it is the origin and primordial source of every entitative and natural perfection, so likewise is the root of every moral perfection, and the rule of all rectitude of affection and love): hence it comes about that the divine Holiness itself also consists in that supreme conjunction of God with Himself, not only by nature, but also by affection and love; whence it comes about that God is therefore called holy: 1. Because He loves Himself more than other things; 2. Because He loves other things in Himself; 3. Because He loves them for the sake of Himself; 4. Because He loves them through Himself.

Thirdly, because right reason dictates that a rational nature should undertake all things with a view to some certain end, lest, aiming at an uncertain mark, it be convicted of imprudence and blindness; whence it comes about that for right operation a fitting end is always required; hence no will can be called right, nor consequently holy, unless it directs all its affections and motions to God Himself, the end of all things per se, sincerely and solely. Whence St. Paul rightly admonished the Corinthians, 1. 10: Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God. He gives the reason for this in Romans 14: For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself; for whether we live, we live unto the Lord; or whether we die, we are the Lord's.

And so divine holiness shines forth chiefly in this, that God operates all things solely for the sake of Himself: For my own sake, He says, Isaiah 48, for my own sake I will do it, and I will not give my glory to another: I myself, I am the first and the last. And Apoc. 1. I am α and ω, the beginning and the end, saith the Lord God. Hence it is rightly said in Proverbs 16: The Lord hath wrought all things for himself.

Fourthly and finally, divine Holiness shines forth in every way from God's separation from every stain and contagion of sin: for God is therefore proclaimed holy, because He is altogether impeccable; for holiness, as St. Dionysius says, cap. 12. De Divinis Nominibus, is purity free from every crime and altogether perfect, and in every part immaculate. But such purity most befits God, who is good by His nature, indeed is the very highest Goodness; wherefore, just as, if infinite heat were given, it would admit no particle of coldness; so infinite goodness excludes all malice, both as regards effect and as regards affection.

Hence St. Gregory of Nyssa, in Catechetico cap. 1, removing from the divine Word every affection of sin, says:

Since, however, the free will of the Word can do all things, it has no propensity toward evil; for propensity toward malice is foreign to the divine Nature, but everything that is good, that also it must will, and what it wills it is altogether able to do as well. Moreover, since it can, it does not remain idle, but brings every choice of the good to effect.

St. Basil removes from God the efficient causality of evil, Homil. 2. in Hexameron: And neither is it pious to say, he says, that evil was produced by God, because none of the contraries is generated from its contrary; for life cannot generate death, nor can darkness be the principle of light, nor can disease be the efficient cause of health: but in the changes of affections one passes from contraries to contraries. How, however, God is not the author of all the sins which arise from a created will turning aside, although He concurs in its operation, will be resolved below.

From these gather that God is holy in every conceivable way, but especially in a fivefold manner. First, indeed, Radically: because His divine essence itself is the first root and primordial source of all holiness and purity; for from it the eternal law, and every love and the divine love, and divine purity in the intellect and will arise. Second, Objectively: for He is the object of absolutely all holiness; for holiness is commensuration with the eternal law, like the love of it: whence to adhere to God through love is to be pure and holy, just as to adhere by affection to lower things is to be impure. Third, He is holy Exemplarily: because He Himself is the right reason and eternal law written with the rays of the Deity itself in the mind of God, to which absolutely all holiness must be conformed. Fourth, He is holy Formally: because He is formally the love of Himself, and so formally He is His own holiness: whence, since He loves Himself infinitely, He is therefore also infinitely holy, both intensively and extensively, because, namely, He loves Himself and His own rectitude and the eternal law infinitely, as much, that is, as He is lovable. Likewise that divine holiness is infinite extensively, because God loves absolutely nothing except for the sake of Himself; therefore He is holy also in the love of all creatures: whence the Psalmist, 144, says: The Lord is just in all his ways and holy in all his works.

Hence it comes about that He pursues sin with infinite hatred; for since He necessarily loves the rectitude of the eternal law, He necessarily hates whatever is opposed to this rectitude: but every sin is opposed to it, because the notion of sin is located in this, that it is against the eternal law of God. Fifthly and finally, He is holy eminently and causally, as the fount and principle of all holiness and purity; for He sanctifies all creatures, either by the presence of His Divinity, as the whole world, which He consecrates as a temple: or by love and knowledge of Himself, as rational creatures: or by substantial and personal union, as Christ Himself, in whom all the fullness of divinity and holiness dwells corporally, and from whose fullness we all receive.

Second conclusion. — Divine holiness differs from created holiness in many things, but especially in a fivefold circumstance.

First, divine holiness is essential, because it penetrates the divine Essence and flows from it as a rivulet from a fountain and a ray from the Sun; but no creature can be holy essentially, but only through an adventitious quality and accessory acts and affections, and all its holiness emanates from supernatural gifts superadded to its nature.

Second, the holiness of God is substantial, like wisdom and love and all the other divine excellences; but created holiness is accidental, because, as the praised Lessius says, it comprises various acts and habits, both of the intellect and of the will; for the intellect must be illumined by faith or by the light of glory: but the will must be ordered by charity, religion, and the other supernatural virtues subservient to charity.

Third, divine holiness is altogether infinite, both intensively and extensively, because, as we have said, God loves Himself as much as He is lovable, and there is as much purity in His love as there is in the perfection of His essence; it also extends to infinite things, namely to all those things which He beholds either in His essence or outside His essence, for in them He takes supreme complacency for His own sake and for His glory: but the holiness of creatures is limited and finite in both ways, for we do not love God as much as He is lovable: whence St. Bernard, The measure of loving God is to love without measure.

Fourth, divine holiness cannot increase, because it is the universality and fullness of holiness altogether infinite, nor can it be diminished, because it is altogether immutable and indefectible. But it is otherwise with created holiness, which can increase and be diminished: whence St. Gregory the Pope, in Pastorali parte 3. cap. 35.: In this world the human soul, as a ship against the onslaught of a descending river, is by no means permitted to stand still in one place, because it slips back to the depths unless it strives for the heights. With which Alcimus elegantly concurs in a poem to his sister Fuscina:

But if one is loath to exercise holy labors, And slothful idleness dissolves the accustomed cares, The glory of a ruinous life slips headlong, If virtue gains no strength by advancing, Returning, it gradually loses its former powers, extinguished.

Fifthly and finally, divine holiness is altogether indefectible and immutable; but created holiness is subject to many defects: whence St. Cyril, lib. 5. in Ioannem:

In created things, he says, inasmuch as they can be changed for the worse and yield by conversions from better to baser things, the fruit of a religious mind inclined to virtue will be a good; but in the divine substance, which exceeds all things, it is not so; for with all change and conversion removed, and no place left for it, the fruit will henceforth be the good of an immutable substance, just as heat is in fire and cold in snow.

With this St. Jerome concurs, Dialogo 1. contra Pelagianos:

In the holy Scriptures, he says, there are two perfections, two justices, and two fears: the first, a perfection and incomparable truth, and a perfect justice of God to be fitted to His virtues: the second, however, is that which suits our frailty, according to what is said in the Psalms, no living man shall be justified in thy sight; to that justice which is said to be perfect not by comparison, but as the justice of God. Job also, and Zacharias and Elisabeth, are called just according to that justice which can at some time be changed into injustice, and not according to that which can never be changed.

Hence God is called not only the Holy of holies, but is also proclaimed by the Church in the Angelic Hymn: You alone are holy, You alone are the Lord, because evidently His divine holiness alone is free of all blemishes, and is altogether indefectible and immutable.

Since, however, divine holiness, like created holiness, must be illustrated with the crown of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the supreme rectitude of the will, which is fulfilled and strengthened only through the virtues; therefore, in order that the splendor of that divine holiness may shine forth more brilliantly, certain things concerning the divine virtues must be woven in.

That this may be examined more plainly and in a more fitting order, first of all it must be noted that all those virtues which in their formal concept connote and import some defect are to be far removed from God, the center and source of all conceivable perfection. From which it is permissible to infer that all those virtues which tend toward another, whether superior or equal, such as religion, obedience, piety, observance, etc., have no seat in God, the supreme of all beings. Likewise all those virtues are absent from Him which consist wholly in taming and regulating the movements of the passions and of the sensitive appetite; for since God is altogether incorporeal and subject to no passions, therefore neither are virtues to be asserted in Him which have commerce with the body and with passions.

Hence almost all theologians agree that neither fortitude, nor patience, nor meekness, nor temperance is found in God formally, but only metaphorically, because fortitude must moderate fear and daring, patience sadness and despair, meekness wrath and cruelty, temperance bodily delights and pleasures.

Nevertheless the Doctor, in 3. dist. 33., proves that those virtues have their place and seat more in the will than in the sensitive appetite: first, because the will, since it is free and has command over the sensitive appetite, and also over the external senses, as it were the ministers of that appetite, can therefore more efficaciously restrain the movements of the passions than the appetite can, which is neither free, but is determined to act by its object, nor has despotic command over the external senses. Second, because the will can more refer a commanded or elicited act to an end consonant with right reason than the sensitive appetite can, because the will is properly the rational appetite, and so should properly direct the act to that end which right reason demonstrates, which does not befit the sensitive appetite. Third and finally, because those virtues would have existed in the state of innocence, since they contribute greatly to the splendor of the soul, in which, nevertheless, there would have been no inordinate movement of the passions.

Finally the Doctor concludes that those virtues, the moderators of the sensitive passions, can be affirmed to be truly in the Angels, and even in God, insofar as they are concerned with the passions of the sensitive appetite, not as existing in God Himself or in the Angels; but only as concerned with such passions, inasmuch as in general and universally those passions are shown by the intellect to be moderated, v. g., in ourselves. For this divine or angelic volition is honest and virtuous, as is evident.

Nor can it be of another virtue than fortitude and temperance, because, as the Doctor proves ibidem, num. 16., if that volition proceeded from another virtue, it would especially proceed from charity; but it is not so, because the motive of charity is the divine good willed for God's own sake: but when God or an Angel wills that I live bravely or temperately, that volition tends to the good itself for the sake of its formal honesty, and consequently it must arise from the virtue of temperance and fortitude, not from charity.

Nor should you say that the virtue of temperance and fortitude does not incline in any way to moderating the passions concerning the pleasurable and the terrible, but even to regulating and moderating them in the proper subject in which they inhere; for this is false;

Because, says the Doctor, the formal notion of the habit is not varied by 'for me' and 'for you': for this is material, because from the fact that the honest good inheres in me or in you, the formal and essential notion of honesty is not varied; for the good of temperance in me and in you is of the same species: therefore from the fact that a virtue inclines to willing the honest good in its own subject or in another, the formal notion of the virtue is not varied; whence the Doctor concludes:

In this way, consequently, one could posit in God the notion of the moral virtues, just as Charity is conceded in Him without its accidentality: and so from that notion concerning the Angel.... For the will of the Angel can will for me the good of temperance, inasmuch as it is such a good, the willing of which is the proper act of temperance: therefore from the habit of temperance it can will that.

Nevertheless, since those virtues cannot have in God all their formal notions entirely, namely the moderation of their own passions; therefore the Doctor judges more probably that they do not belong to God formally and properly; but only metaphorically and according to a certain proportion of the infinite act of the divine will with the acts of the created will, which is illustrated and informed by these virtues.

Only this, therefore, remains to be examined: whether Justice and Mercy with their attendant virtues are in God formally, or only virtually and eminently, which will be weighed in the two following Questions.

Note 1. Justice is defined by theologians and jurists as follows: Justice is the constant and perpetual will of giving each one his right, or by St. Augustine, lib. 9. De Civit. cap. 21., Justice is the virtue by which each one's own is distributed to him: whence the name of Justice is derived from right; but another's right is the same as a debt owed to another; hence it comes about that justice is deemed to be of as many kinds as there are kinds of debt. Now something can be said to be owed in four ways. First, by reason of a natural congruence and connection with another; thus to any thing whatsoever, for its natural perfection, there is owed a certain quantity, shape, temperament, power, and perfection, according as each one's nature demands; to this debt there corresponds a certain general justice, which is nothing other than the effect of giving to each thing what is owed or necessary to it for the perfection of its nature. Second, something is said to be owed by reason of the obligation of the law, in the manner in which in rational nature there is owed a conformity both of affection and of work with the eternal law. To this debt there corresponds that justice which is formed from the acts of each virtue, insofar as it is conformed to the divine law; and hence throughout Sacred Scripture men are called just, because they are conformed in affection and work to the eternal law. Third, something is said to be owed by reason of a promise made to someone; to this debt there correspond fidelity and truthfulness, whose office it is to render those things which have been promised to another, even if he has no perfect right to them. Fourth and finally, something is said to be owed to another by reason of a perfect right, to which unless satisfaction is made, it is judged that an injury is done: this debt arises from two heads: First, from the taking of another's thing, as happens in contracts and pacts for damages and injuries inflicted; whence he who destroys another's thing, or harms his reputation or honor, is no less a debtor than he who takes away some thing and keeps it for himself. Second, from the office of distributing common goods with a certain proportion: to each of these two debts, moreover, there corresponds the form of each of the two justices, of which one is called commutative, by which there is rendered to each one as much as is owed to him, either by reason of a thing received, or of damage and injury inflicted: the other, however, is called distributive, by which goods are distributed to each member of the community, according to each one's state, condition, and proportion. The former constitutes the equality of thing to thing: the latter, however, constitutes the equality of proportion to proportion.

Note 2. Between these two species of justice there intervenes this difference, that commutative justice in the payment of a debt must preserve an arithmetical and absolute equality, which is made according to the computation of number to number: for if a debtor owes a creditor twenty coins, he is bound by commutative justice to restore just as many to him. Distributive justice, however, must preserve only a geometrical, or respective, proportion, which is made according to the proportion of the diverse respects which the Geometer considers in different figures and quantities. Whence in distributing the goods of the republic through distributive justice, this distribution is not attended to according to number and the equality of the thing, so that he who has a hundred grades of merit should also have to have a hundred parts of the distributed good: but according to proportion, so that if forty parts of the goods of the republic are assigned to him who has a hundred grades of merit, twenty parts ought by distributive justice to be assigned to him who has fifty grades of merit.

Note 3. That besides those two assigned species of justice, there are other virtues which are reduced to justice and which are wont to be called its potential parts, because they indeed imitate and emulate the notion of justice: yet they fall short of it, either because they cannot render an equal, as Religion, which is concerned with the right to be rendered to God, and Piety, which is concerned with the right to be rendered to parents and fatherland, and Observance, which regards the right to be assigned to superiors; for as Aristotle says, 4. Ethicorum cap. 4.¹ to God, Parents, Fatherland, and Superiors a right and debt cannot be repaid to equality: or because although they can render an equal, they do not have a rigorous and legal debt, to the rendering of which each one is bound by law, but only a moral debt, to the rendering of which one is bound only from the honesty and decency of virtue, so that without its payment the honesty of morals cannot be preserved. Since, however, a twofold debt can be assigned: first indeed, that which so regards the honesty of morals that this cannot subsist without it; second, that which pertains only to the greater honesty of morals: hence according to that twofold moral debt, the species of justice are also of a twofold kind; for the first debt is attended to either on the part of the debtor himself, that he show himself to another in words and deeds such as he is, and this debt is regarded by Truthfulness; whether in a simple assertion, or in a promise, which is called fidelity: or it is attended to on the part of him to whom it is owed, in compensation of some good or evil deed, and with this Gratitude or Vindication is concerned. The last debt, namely that whose payment pertains only to the honesty of morals, is regarded by Liberality, Magnificence, Friendship, Charity, Affability, Eutrapelia, Mercy.

These things having been premised, three things are to be resolved in the present question. The first, whether in God there is the formal notion of the virtue of justice, insofar as it is distinguished from the other virtues. The second, whether legal, commutative, and distributive justice, which are the subjective species of justice, have a seat in God. The third, whether the aforementioned potential species of justice, namely Truthfulness, Fidelity, Gratitude, Liberality, etc., are also found in Him according to their proper and formal notions.

First conclusion. — Justice is truly and properly to be affirmed in God.

Proof 1. From many texts of Sacred Scripture, by which God is truly proclaimed just, and this especially from the very beginning of Scripture, for where the Vulgate version has In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth; the Hebrew reads in the beginning Elohim created, that is, judges, because, says Tertullian, lib. 2. against Marcionem, cap. 12.:

From the very beginning the Creator proceeded as much good as just, both alike. His goodness wrought the world, justice modulated it... it is the work of justice that a separation was pronounced between light and darkness, between day and night, between Heaven and Earth, between the upper and the lower water, between the gathering of the sea and the mass of the dry land, between the greater and the lesser lights, the diurnal and the nocturnal, etc.

from which he concludes: As Goodness conceived all things, so Justice distinguished them. The Royal Psalmist proves the same by many passages, especially from Psal. 84. Mercy and truth have met each other; justice and peace have kissed; Truth is sprung out of the earth and justice hath looked down from Heaven; for the Lord will give kindness... Justice shall walk before him. By these words the Royal Prophet attributes justice to God as distinct from mercy, kindness, and peace, or concord, and from truth or divine truthfulness. Likewise in Psalm. 118., addressing God he says: You are just, O Lord, and your judgment is right: by which words he attributes justice to God specially, insofar as it regards a right judgment, that is, as He brings forth an equitable and just sentence, as equitable Judges do from the special virtue of justice. St. Paul agrees with him, 2. ad Timotheum 4., saying: I have fought a good fight... henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day. Where note the words will render, just judge, and crown of justice, all of which signify the debt of justice; for the retribution of a just judge supposes a right in him to whom the retribution is made and a debt in him whose part it is to render or retribute. The same Apostle confirms the same thing, ad Hebraeos 6. For God is not unjust, that he should forget your good work, etc. By which words Paul signifies that God would be unjust if He denied the promised reward to good works; because that reward is owed from justice, according to that saying of the same Apostle, ad Rom. 4. Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. And also according to the parable of Matthew 20., by which God is compared to a Father of a family hiring workers with these words: Go you also into my vineyard, and I will give you what shall be just. Whence in the same place He says to His steward: Call the laborers and pay them their hire, namely the owed and just hire, from the agreement made with them about the daily denarius.

Proof 2. From the holy Fathers, especially from holy Augustine, lib. De Natura et Gratia c. 2: For God is not unjust, who should defraud the just of the reward of justice: and serm. 16. de verbis Apost. cap. 2: In those things which we already have, let us praise God the giver: in those things which we do not yet have, we hold Him a debtor. For He was made a debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but by promising what pleased Him, namely eternal life, etc. And Ambros. in Psalm. 118. serm. 7., around the beginning: God wills, he says, to be summoned to court, so that if anyone, having followed the rewards proposed to the virtues, has fought well, he may expect the fruit of recompense, and even demand it, as it is written: I have fought a good fight and there is laid up for me a crown of Justice. Note the word to be summoned to court, namely in judgment, which is proper to the debt of justice.

Proof 3. By reason: That virtue which in its formal concept says no imperfection is to be attributed to God formally: but Justice strictly taken is such: therefore it is to be attributed to God. The major is conceded by all theologians; for to God, the most perfect of beings, every perfection is to be attributed which savors of no imperfection. The minor, however, is proved: Justice can be considered either insofar as it is concerned with debts or non-debts among others through a simple affection, namely loving them insofar as they are just and hating them insofar as they are unjust; or insofar as it is concerned with just things, or debts, between us and others: but from neither head does the virtue of justice have an imperfection annexed in its formal concept. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved as to the first part; for just things insofar as they are such, whosesoever they are, whether ours or another's, are worthy of love; unjust things, however, as such, are worthy of hatred, and consequently the affections which are concerned with them have nothing of imperfection and incongruity. The same minor is proved as to the second part; for many things are owed by creatures with a strict and rigorous debt, which God can will and exact from them, because they are owed, that is, from the affection of justice; for it is owed to God that honor be repaid to Him, that His commandments be kept, etc., which if they are not done, satisfaction and restitution of the injured honor ought to be made to Him, and God can exact all those things for His right from creatures, nor is there any imperfection in this, that God exacts them, or that creatures owe them: therefore Justice taken in itself and insofar as it abstracts from its species does not disgrace God.

You will say 1. Justice supposes a debt and consequently a debtor: but God cannot be made, nor be called, a debtor with respect to a creature: therefore neither can He have justice toward them. The minor is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers; and indeed holy Basil on Psalm 114.: There remains, he says, an everlasting rest for those who have lawfully striven in this life; not according to the debt of works, but according to the debt of the most manifest God. St. Augustine, sermon 16. De verbis Apostoli:

God has been made a debtor to us, not by receiving anything, but by promising what pleased Him; for in one way we say to a man, you owe me because I gave to you, and in another way we say, you owe me because you promised me. To God, therefore, what do we say: render to me because I gave to you? when what we are and what we have, we have from Him? We have therefore given Him nothing; there is no way in which we may exact God as a debtor with that utterance. By that utterance, therefore, we can exact from our Lord: render what you promised, because we have done what you commanded, and you yourself did this, because you helped us laboring.

And Bernard, first sermon De Annuntiatione: Nor are the merits of men such, he says, that on that account eternal life is owed by right, or that God would do some injury, unless He gave it as a gift: therefore God cannot have the notion of a debtor; but only of a promisor with respect to the creature, even by reason of good works.

I distinguish the minor: God cannot be, nor be called, a debtor of the creature contrary to His will and through a certain exigency which would prejudice His voluntary benignity, I concede: He cannot be called a debtor from His free will and benignity by which He promises a reward under the burdensome and laborious condition of some work to be shown by the creature, I deny: for this, not only have St. Ambrose and August. insinuated above, but also Chrysost. affirms it, homil. 8. in Epist. ad Rom., saying that God is a debtor to the just not of base things; but of great and sublime ones: and Cyprianus, lib. De Opere et Eleemosyna, in De vero Misericorde says: He merits Christ as judge, he reckons God a debtor to himself. The same thing the Councils of Arausicanum, can. 18., and Trident., sess. 6. c. 16., assert, where the Council, referring various texts of Scripture by which a reward is promised to good works done in grace, concludes:

And therefore to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus and as a reward, by the promise of God Himself, faithfully to be rendered to their good works and merits: for this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his contest and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge, etc.

Whence although to have a right to something and with respect to someone, when the right is contracted contrary to the will of the debtor himself, imports a certain imperfection and as it were inferiority in the debtor with respect to the creditor, nevertheless to have a right only dependently on the will, benignity, and promise of the debtor himself sounds of no imperfection.

You will insist. The creditor has dominion over that which is owed to him by right, but not the debtor: but the creature cannot bring it about that that which is owed to it as a reward should be withdrawn from the supreme dominion of God and transferred into the dominion of the creature itself: therefore God cannot have the notion of a debtor with respect to the creature, nor the creature the notion of a creditor with respect to God, and consequently true justice cannot intervene between them.

I distinguish the major: The creditor has supreme and sole dominion over that which is owed to him by right, I deny: he has some dominion by reason of which he can justly exact it, although it also supposes the dominion of another superior over the very thing owed, I concede: To the minor I say: that while the dominion of God over some things perseveres, nevertheless the creature can have some right in those same things; for while the supreme dominion of God over creatures subsists, nevertheless creatures have rights in other things: just as by parity citizens have a right in their own goods, while the high dominion and right of the Republic, to which those same goods are subject, perseveres; similarly when a Prince by donation, sale, or another contract gives a right to a subject in something, and transfers to him the dominion of property, he does not on that account divest himself of the high right and supreme dominion, by which he can dispose both of the things themselves and of the subject himself as the common good requires. And so there is no imperfection in God, nor is anything detracted from His supreme dominion, although He constitutes Himself a debtor of creatures from will and benignity, and they have a certain right in the thing owed to them.

You will press. If God were a debtor to the creature and obligated from justice to His creature, there would result in the creature itself a right against God, so that the creature itself would have a right in something which God could not deny to it from justice; and so God would not have supreme dominion over that thing: but this is absurd: therefore also that from which it follows: The consequence of the major is clear: for he does not have supreme dominion over a thing of which he cannot dispose according to his good pleasure and without injustice. The minor is also clear; for God has supreme dominion over all things, and if He could abdicate from Himself the dominion of some operation of ours, He could also abdicate the dominion of all our actions, and also the dominion of Heaven and Earth, and transfer it to the creature, all of which are most absurd.

I distinguish the consequence of the major. God would not have supreme dominion over that very thing in which the creature would have a right, if such a right were contracted contrary to the will and free pact of God Himself, I concede: if such a right is contracted from the good pleasure of God Himself and His voluntary promise and benignity, I deny: for that right which the creature can have in some thing does not dissolve the supreme dominion over it; rather it supposes that God so orders the thing itself that it falls into the proper utility and property of the creature itself. Add that since God always has supreme dominion over the creature itself, which is said to have a right at some time, He also has dominion over that very right of the same creature.

You will say 2. There cannot be true and strictly taken Justice in God toward creatures, unless likewise the Justice of creatures, v. g. of men toward God, is perfect and strict: but there cannot be strict justice of man toward God: therefore neither of God toward creatures. The major is evident; for justice is the reciprocal relation of debtor to creditor. The minor is proved: the strict justice of man toward God cannot exist, if in man there cannot be injustice against strictly taken justice: but this cannot exist: therefore neither that. The minor is proved: if man could work some injustice against God, especially through sin: but it cannot happen so. It is proved: if God could be unjustly injured by man through sin; it would follow that there is no sin which would not be injustice, because there is none by which God is not dishonored, whether gravely or lightly. Moreover, it would follow that every sin has a twofold malice, one indeed of injustice against the virtue of justice, the other however repugnant to that virtue against which the sinful action directly fights, v. g. drunkenness against temperance; but the consequence is false: therefore also the antecedent.

I deny the minor and to its proof I say that every sin is a true injustice, or injury of God materially, because there is none by which the divine honor is not wounded: formally, however, sin is injustice only when the sinner acts directly and from intention against the divine right, or against God commanding, for His right, the opposite of the sinful action; whose violation of right indeed inflicts injury on God and contracts in the sinner an obligation to punishment. To the second argument I say that there is no sin which does not have a malice of a certain injustice annexed to it; for there is no sin which is not opposed to divine honor, just as there is also none which does not have at least a material malice of ingratitude, disobedience, injustice, etc. These diverse general notions of malice, however, when they are joined to some special sin, v. gr. theft, do not produce a malice diverse in species or number from the malice of that special sin; but they are involved and comprehended in it.

You will say 3. If there were strict justice and injustice of man toward God, it would follow that man is obligated per se and ex natura rei, after any sin committed, to do penance immediately so as to satisfy God: but the consequence seems absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is clear, because from every strict justice, per se and ex natura rei, there arises the obligation of satisfying immediately.

I answer that a twofold satisfaction owed for injustice can be distinguished. The first is the restitution of the good taken away, or the removal of the evil inflicted: the other is the punishment to be undergone for the sin and transgression of the law. Of the first it is true that immediately after the injury the obligation of satisfying urges; thus he who has detracted a good reputation and taken away goods is bound to restore immediately: whence he who by blasphemies, heresies, and other things of that kind has taken away the divine honor among others, namely by inducing in them a perverse estimation of God, is bound to repair the injured honor of God immediately. The second obligation, however, urges only when the punishment is exacted by the offended party and inflicted by the judge; and such is the satisfaction which commonly arises from sins committed against God.

You will insist. Everyone sinning wounds the divine honor, because he esteems God less than is fitting: therefore if in sin there is some injustice, immediately the sinner is bound to restore to God the honor taken away.

I deny the antecedent: for very many sin by a defect of the perverse will; not however by reason of an intellect badly disposed toward God and esteeming Him less. If, however, anyone had a bad estimation of God, he would be bound to lay it aside immediately: if anyone likewise had introduced this bad estimation of God among others by words or deeds, immediately from Justice he would be bound to take care that it be laid aside.

Second conclusion. — Legal and commutative justice are not in God according to their proper formal notions.

This Conclusion, as to both parts, is the Doctor's, in 4. d. 46. q. 1.

Proof of the first part: That species of justice cannot be in God formally which in its formal concept includes the debt of the inferior to the superior and of the part to the whole: but such is legal Justice: therefore etc. The major is evident, for God cannot have the notion of the inferior and of a part with respect to another being. The minor, however, is proved: since every Justice properly so called is toward another, a threefold comparison to another can be made: namely, either by comparing the part to the whole, or the whole to the part, or the part to the part. If the part is compared to the whole, thence arises legal Justice, by which any member of the Republic is bound, even with his own loss, to procure the good of the whole political body, and duly to execute those things which are commanded by the Head of the Republic and of the political body for the common utility of the members. If a comparison of part to part is made, it is commutative Justice, by which one member of the political body preserves equality toward another in contracts, dealings, and exchanges. Finally, if a comparison of whole to part is made, it is distributive Justice, by which the Head of the Republic in its name distributes goods or punishments according to the measure and proportion of merits and demerits. Therefore just as distributive Justice in its concept includes the notion of the proportion and measure to be preserved in the distribution of goods and punishments, and commutative justice must preserve equality between the mutually contracting parts: so likewise legal Justice in its formal concept includes the debt of the part to the whole, and so the debt of the inferior and dependent to the superior, which is chiefly fulfilled and discharged by the observance of laws: these things, however, supremely disgrace God: therefore legal Justice is not to be asserted in Him according to its formal and proper notion.

You will say 1. The Subtle Doctor in 4. d. 46. q. 1. n. 2. expressly affirms that legal justice can be placed in God: therefore he is against us, and we against him.

I answer that the Doctor is not speaking of that legal justice by which an inferior is ordered to a superior, which is true and strict legal justice: but of that by which someone, as a subject or quasi-subject, is bound to be in accord with the law and the lawgiver, if it be true that before the determination of the divine will there is some law to which that divine will ought to conform itself as to another, v. g. to this dictate, or to this first practical principle, God is to be loved; or, as he himself speaks in the same place, saying:

the first of these, namely legal, could be placed in God, if there were another law prior to the determination of his will, with which law, and in this with the lawgiver, as with another, his will would rightly accord; and indeed this law is, God is to be loved; but if it ought not to be called a law or a practical principle of law, at least it is a practical truth preceding every determination of the divine will.

You will say 2. Just as distributive justice is not only in the Prince, but also in him who in the name of the Community distributes the goods or burdens of the Community, but also in private individuals, not as if the distribution were to be made through them, but so that they are content with the just distribution made to them and are rightly affected about it: so legal justice is not only in subjects and inferiors, but also in the Prince and the Community itself; not indeed with respect to the Prince and the Community themselves, but also with respect to the inferiors subject to them, over whose goods and rights Princes or the Community can dispose for the sake of the common good, and can require from subjects those things which they ought to render and carry out by reason of that common good: therefore on this account legal justice is in God.

I distinguish the antecedent: that legal justice, strictly taken and insofar as it expresses the ordering of man to keeping the law to which he is subject, is not only in subjects but also in the Prince and the Community, I deny: insofar as it expresses the affection and will of keeping the law on the part of him who is subject to the law, I concede: and I admit that by this latter consideration legal justice can be affirmed in God, but this is not the employment of legal justice strictly taken, about which alone we speak here.

You will say 3. Legal justice regards not only the edicts of Princes concerning the governing of the Community, but also their debts and duties for duly governing and ruling it: but these duties are not unbecoming to God: therefore neither is legal justice.

I deny the minor: for God is in no way bound by debt to the governance of the universe; for if there were in him any obligation to this, it would especially be by reason of his being the head and principal part of the universe: but this cannot be said, for it belongs to the head and the nobler part of the body to attend more to the common good than to its own, indeed to neglect its own and to expend it for the utility of the common good, just as all subjects are also bound to this: but God cannot prefer the good of creatures to his own good: therefore neither can he be bound in the capacity of head to the governance of the universe.

Third conclusion. — Commutative justice properly is not in God, but distributive justice can truly be affirmed in him.

This conclusion, as to both parts, is that of the Doctor praised above, 4. d. 46. q. 1., where, after having distinguished justice into commutative and distributive, he had said:

commutative properly regards punishment and reward, namely that rewards be rendered as it were by exchange for merits and punishments for sins: distributive regards as it were natures and superadded perfections, namely that a perfection proportioned to the nature be distributed to it. Just as in our republic, goods belonging to their grades are distributively distributed to persons according to their grades proportionally: just as in the hierarchy of the universe, to the nobler nature by the hierarchy, that is by God the prince, nobler perfections or ones suitable to such a nature are distributed, and to the inferior nature perfections suitable to it are distributed.

He adds:

The first of these cannot simpliciter be in God with respect to a creature, because there cannot be simpliciter equality, but there can be in some way according to proportion, as between a lord and a servant. For it befits a liberal lord to repay a greater good than the servant can merit, provided there be such a proportion that just as the servant does what is his, so the lord repays what is his, and in the same way in punishing short of the condign. But the second justice can be here simpliciter, because he can simpliciter give to natures the perfections due to them or suitable to them according to the perfecting grades.

The conclusion is proved: Commutative justice strictly taken consists in the equality of the given and the received: but this equality cannot be found between God and creatures: For who, says the Apostle to Rom. 11.² has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him and through him and in him are all things: and Job. 35. If you act justly, what will you give him? Or what will he receive from your hand? Clearly because, since he is the Lord of all, nothing can be offered to him that is not already his: therefore neither can commutative justice be found in him.

Again, by commutative justice strictly taken, some thing is constituted under the power and dominion of another, to whom it previously in no way belonged: but it is repugnant that any action of a creature be constituted under the power and dominion of God; for whatever action of a creature, just like the creature itself, is more under the dominion of God than under its own dominion: therefore it is repugnant that a creature give and bestow something on God simpliciter.

Finally, he who repays something from commutative justice must have a strict debt of repaying it: but in God there is not, nor can there be, a strict debt and obligation with respect to a creature: for a strict debt imports some inferiority and dependence of the one owing on the one to whom it is owed, and it seems to be incompatible with supreme dominion; for he who has supreme dominion over someone is equally the supreme Lord of all those things that are: whence the Lord can, without any injustice, deny to his servant a thing promised, indeed even take away a thing given; because whatever the servant possesses is the Lord's.

You will say 1. Buying and selling are acts of commutative justice: but God sells to the just the Kingdom of Heaven for meritorious labors and works, as Augustine says in a certain sermon: What do I have for sale, Lord? The Kingdom of Heaven. With what is it bought? With poverty the Kingdom, with sorrow joy, with labor rest, with lowliness glory, with death life: therefore he distributes the Kingdom of Heaven from commutative justice.

I distinguish the minor: that God sells to the just the Kingdom of Heaven through a strict pact and strict convention by which God would be bound from true and strict justice to bestow the Kingdom of Heaven, I deny: from the voluntary acceptance of those good works for a reward far excelling and antecedent to the good works themselves, I concede: for, as the Apostle speaks, Romans 8. The sufferings of this time are not condign with the future glory which shall be revealed in us.

You will say 2. In order that God be bound to bestow something on man from commutative justice, it is not necessary that man give something to God and that God receive from him new dominion over some thing, but it suffices that man show him due honor and worship: but man can render these; for he can show God due honor, worship and obedience, which has a certain commensuration with the reward of eternal life: therefore God can be bound to this from strict justice.

I deny the major: for that honor and worship which we show to God is already owed to God in a thousand ways and by almost infinite titles, nor can it be repaid to him without his influx, causality and concurrence. Whence this action, by which worship and honor is repaid to God by a creature, arises and proceeds from God as from the first principle: whence whatever we can offer to him is already his, according to that 1. Paralip. All things are yours, and what we have received from your hand we have given to you: whence St. Bernard: God burdens us when he unburdens us; for he burdens us with benefits when he unburdens us of sins.

The second part is proved: First indeed by the reasoning of the Doctor. Distributive justice is that by which perfection and benefit is bestowed on each according to his dignity: but God distributes perfections to created things according to their dignity: therefore in him there is perfect and strict distributive justice. The minor is proved by the authority of St. Dionysius, cap. 8. De Divinis nominibus: Divine justice, he says, disposes and determines all things, and keeping all things unconfused among themselves and unmixed, bestows on all things that are whatever is accommodated to each, according to the dignity which each one of the things that are attains. And in the same chapter: One ought to see in this the true justice of God, that he bestows on all their own according to the nature of each one, saving each in its own order and virtue. And Tertullian, lib. 2. against Marcion. cap. 12.: The goodness of God wrought the world, the justice of God modulated it.

Again, distributive justice does not have the attached defects which commutative imports, for it does not induce in the distributor any debt simpliciter arising from the reception of a thing that another bestows; for a Prince can justly distribute all goods without receiving or hoping anything from those to whom he distributes them: nor is it likewise required for distributive justice that he who distributes goods abdicate his supreme right over them: for a prince can lavish goods while always keeping for himself the ultimate and supreme right in those same goods. Moreover, distributive justice imports the highest perfection, for it signifies the right of a superior toward inferiors: since it belongs to the superior to distribute of the common goods to each according to his proportion: therefore it is not unbecoming to God.

Finally, the retribution of eternal life for good works done in grace and charity proceeds not only from divine fidelity and gratitude, but also from strict justice, as was proved in the first Conclusion: but this retribution does not proceed from commutative justice, as was said in the preceding Conclusion: therefore it is necessary that it arise from distributive justice.

You will say. Distributive justice, since it is a species of strict justice, supposes a strict debt and obligation as much as commutative does; for every strict justice supposes a strict debt: therefore if commutative justice is repugnant to God on the ground that he is incapable of a strict debt, by the same reason distributive justice ought not to be admitted in him.

I deny the antecedent. For a debt contracted from commutative justice arises from the action and right of one person, by which he burdens another; but God cannot be burdened and strictly obligated by any action of a creature, because every action of a creature is under the dominion and disposition of God, as has been said: but the debt of distributive justice does not arise from an action, nor from the right of one person burdening another or strictly obliging him to do something, but is born only from natural rectitude and the very equity of the law, by which the distributor is bound to commensurate the reward with the perfection of merits. This debt indeed in a human prince obliges from the ordination of the natural law; in God, however, it is born from the fact that he himself is the first law and the first rule of all rectitude.

From these gather that vindicative justice can also be affirmed in God, not insofar as it is commutative and as it imports equality between the offense and the punishment, but insofar as it signifies the due proportion and comparative and geometric commensuration between sin and vengeance, according to that of Apocalypse 18. As much as she has glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment and mourning give her; in which things properly consists the office of vindicative justice; for, says St. Aug. comm. 1. in Psalm. 58., Every iniquity, whether small or great, must be punished, either by a repentant man or by a vindicating God: rightly does Tertullian, lib. De Poenitentia cap. 3., say: A good deed has God as its debtor, just as an evil one, because every judge is the remunerator of the cause; God the judge presides over the justice most dear to himself by requiring and defending it, and sanctions in it the whole sum of his discipline: nothing is removed from his sight, whence no offense at all is committed; because he is not ignorant; nor does he fail to decree it in judgment: he is no dissembler or prevaricator of his own perspicacity. Therefore for all offenses committed, whether in the flesh or in the spirit, whether by deed or by will, he has destined punishment through judgment.

You will say. Vindicative justice includes two things, namely the punishment of the injury and the removal of the harm inflicted through it: but a creature can inflict no harm on God: therefore God cannot truly exercise vindicative justice on it.

I answer 1. That it is not necessary for inflicting vengeance and punishment that harm have been inflicted on someone; but it suffices that it have been acted against his right and that someone have willed to inflict harm: 2. Harm can be inflicted on God in external goods, as if his glory and good reputation among others is diminished by blasphemies and heresies: 3. Vindicative justice, in demanding vengeance insofar as it is due to the injured right for repairing it, is true justice, although insofar as it tends to the repulsion of one's own harm as such, it is only a potestative part of justice.

Gather 2. That Religion, Piety, Observance, Gratitude, according to the proper offices and objects of those virtues, are not found in God formally. For Religion inclines to repaying honor and worship to be shown to another as the first principle and supreme Lord of all things: Piety indeed to showing honor and obedience to another as a secondary principle, such as parents are: Observance, whose parts are Dulia and Obedience, inclines to showing honor and obedience to another by reason of dignity and eminence above him who shows the honor and obedience: Gratitude finally to returning thanks for benefits received from another. But God cannot be inclined toward another as toward a primary or secondary principle, nor as toward a superior benefactor; for that directly militates against the notion of the supreme and wholly independent being: therefore these appendices and potential species of justice cannot be found in God formally.

Note 1. According to the etymology of the name, mercy signifies the same as a miserable heart, so that someone is called merciful as one having a miserable heart; because he is affected by another's misery with sadness, as if it were his own misery, as the Doctor observes in 4. d. 46. q. 2. n. 2. With him agree the holy Fathers and Philosophers. First of all, indeed, St. Augustine lib. 9. De Civit. Dei, cap. 5: Mercy, he says, is compassion for another's misery in our heart, by which we are certainly compelled to help if we can: whence St. John Damascene in lib. 2. De Fide cap. 4. says: Mercy is sadness at another's evils. The Philosophers consent to these: Aristotle indeed in 2. Rhetoric. cap. 2. says: that mercy is a certain pain arising from an apparent corruptive evil, and bringing pain upon one who does not deserve to suffer, which he thought that he himself, or one of his own, could also suffer, and in such a way that it seems near: and Cicero in 4. Tusculanarum quaestionum: Mercy is distress from sadness at another suffering injury: finally Seneca in lib. 1. De Clementia says: Mercy is distress at the sight of another's miseries. But all these descriptions of mercy are made only according to the effect which that affection toward one's neighbor generates in us from the consideration of our own infirmity, so that it can be doubtful to no one that mercy is not found formally in God, from whom all misery and infirmity are far removed. Therefore

Note 2. From the same Doctor in the same place, mercy, insofar as it is found in us, imports, as it were, two things: one indeed formally, the other materially. For formally it denotes an act or affection of the will by which one desires and intends to relieve another's misery; which affection, if it is efficacious and powerful, de facto removes and drives out the misery from the subject in which it is or can be. Materially, however, it signifies a certain movement of the sensitive appetite by which someone grieves over another's evil and condoles and sympathizes with him through affection: or as the Doctor puts it: Mercy in us is a habit, or however it may be called, a form, by which we do not will another's misery; so that it first inclines to the act of not willing misery in another, and this either as future, and then it preserves him from it if it can; or as present, and then it relieves him from misery if it can; and consequently, after the operation, it disposes to the passion, namely to displeasure at imminent or present misery.

Note 3. From the same, n. 3: just as a twofold volition is distinguished in God, namely the Antecedent and the Consequent, so a twofold nolition can be distinguished in Him with respect to another's misery: and just as He always has an antecedent will with respect to the evil of a creature to be prevented or removed, according to that saying of the Apostle 1. ad Tim. He wills all men to be saved: but just as He does not always have a consequent will with respect to good, so neither a consequent nolition with respect to imminent evil, totally or partially. If in the first way, it is called mercy freeing, by which He excludes every evil, whether imminent or already present; in the second way it is called mercy sparing, or mitigating, which indeed does not exclude the whole evil, but some part of the evil owed to him according to his merits. In both ways, however, mercy is in God, because He either helps some by preventing all imminent misery or relieving present misery; but to others by remitting the misery owed. These things having been premised, let it be:

First conclusion. — Mercy is in God formally, not only as regards the effect; but also as regards the affection of relieving another's misery.

This is common among the Theologians, and the Doctor defends and explains it in the cited place, where, after he had said that mercy, insofar as it inclines to the passion or compassion of another's misery and makes a miserable heart from affection toward another, is not in God, he adds: But as regards that operation of not willing misery, whether imminent or present, mercy is properly in God. This is proved with respect to imminent misery, because just as no good happens unless God wills it, so nothing is prevented from happening unless God does not will it. Many miseries, however, that are possible to befall someone are prevented from happening: therefore God has a nolition with respect to them. Similarly with respect to present misery, because no misery is removed unless God does not will it to be present, but many are frequently removed: therefore, etc. Sacred Scripture indicates and confirms this same truth in so many oracles that there is scarcely a page in which that divine mercy is not most brilliantly commended. And since it cannot be sufficiently expressed, inasmuch as it surpasses every thought and speech and includes every affection of pitying, therefore it expresses it through a certain exuberance, especially Exod. 34. Ruler, O Lord, God merciful and clement, patient and of much compassion and true, who keepest mercy unto thousands, who takest away iniquity and wickedness and sins: And Psalm 85. Thou, O Lord God, art compassionate and merciful, patient, and of much mercy. And Psalm 32.¹ The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord. And rightly indeed, says Augustine:

for on earth man's misery abounds, the Lord's mercy superabounds; man's misery fills the earth and the Lord's mercy fills the earth. But if the earth is full of divine mercy, will heaven be empty of it, where there is no misery? Far from it, he elegantly adds, all things need the Lord, both the miserable and the happy; without Him the miserable are not lifted up, without Him the happy one is not governed: therefore, lest perchance you ask about the heavens when you hear that the earth is full of the mercy of the Lord; hear that even the heavens need the Lord: by the word of the Lord the heavens were established; for they were not a firmament for themselves from themselves, nor did the heavens themselves provide firmness proper to themselves: by the word of the Lord the heavens were made firm, and by the spirit of His mouth all their power. They had nothing from themselves, but as a supplement they received it from the Lord.

St. Thomas clearly declares this truth in the first part, art. 3., where, after he had observed that the communication of perfections to created things arises from divine Goodness, Justice, Liberality and Mercy according to a different notion, he adds:

the communication of perfections absolutely communicated belongs to goodness, but insofar as perfections are given by God to things according to their proportion, it belongs to justice: insofar, however, as He does not bestow perfections on things for His own utility, but only for His own goodness, it belongs to liberality: insofar, moreover, as the perfections given to things by God expel every defect, they belong to mercy.

All these things are to be understood not only of mercy as regards the Effect and the relief of eternal misery, but also as regards the Affection by which the divine will is moved to relieve another's misery; for since that relief of misery is an effect of the divine will, it necessarily follows its affection; and therefore if mercy is attributed to God according to the effect, it must also be attributed according to the affection, not indeed of passion or of the sensitive appetite, but of the will and charity: whence St. Augustine lib. 2. ad Simplicianum, on Mercy: If you take away compassion, so that a tranquil goodness of helping and of freeing from misery remains, some kind of knowledge of divine Mercy is intimated: and lib. 1. contra Adversarium legis: God, he says, is zealous without love, is angry without disturbance, and has mercy without any grief: therefore both parts of the Conclusion remain sufficiently proved, namely that mercy is found in God according to the effect and according to the affection.

Second conclusion. — A twofold divine mercy can be distinguished, one general, the other special, not indeed according to itself, but by reason of the external work and the created effect.

The former is that by which from the beginning each rational nature, namely the Angelic and the human, was destined for supernatural goods and the blessed state through designed and supplied congruent means. For since, says Lessius in lib. 12. De perfectionibus divinis cap. 2., rational nature per se and left to itself is subject to many defects, imperfections and, as it were, miseries: the immense goodness of God, when it had determined to create it from nothing and to adorn it with all the gifts owed to nature; and saw it still exposed to so many defects and separated from the vision of Himself by so great an interval: moved by mercy, it determined to raise and exalt it to the supernatural order and to the communion of His eternal goods, by which all those defects would be removed. Concerning this mercy the Royal Bard says in Psalm 144. The Lord is sweet to all, and His mercies are over all His works, but especially over rational creatures.

The particular is that by which God by a special benefit relieves the misery of some creature, leaving others in the same misery: thus He willed to repair the human race rather than the Angelic choir, which had likewise fallen, chiefly for three reasons, which Lessius reports in cap. 3. and weighs out from the holy Fathers. The first: because man fell into guilt by the deception of a higher nature; the Angel by his own will. And although the higher ones perhaps led the lower ones astray, nevertheless the latter saw their other companions resisting the pestilential persuasion and ought to have been strengthened by their example. The second: because the human race, except the two first men, fell by another's will without its own consent: the Angels, however, sinned by their own judgment, their own choice and the election of their own will. The third: because on account of their most perfect knowledge and absolute command of soul, their sin was incomparably graver: just as for the same reason their good works are most meritorious. Man's knowledge is much more obscure, and his affection, overgrown with passions, far weaker. Whence a long road and a long time of meriting was appointed for man, but a very short one for the Angel.

Moreover, a threefold mercy, or work of mercy, can be established. The first, by which God brought all things, especially those endowed with reason, forth into light from nothing, in which from eternity they had lain hidden as if buried: whence saint Bernard in Sermon 1. on the Salve Regina says: The primordial mercy of God is the very cause of all things and the most causal of causes. The second is that by which He ordered rational nature to the supernatural state through supernatural means: the third finally is that by which He determined to repair nature fallen from the supernatural state, both into sin, and into its natural miseries, and into eternal death, and to shore it up with more efficacious supernatural aids than before: for where sin abounded, grace superabounded there. The first indeed is great and admirable; for infinitely better is the essence with which creatures were gifted than the nothing from which they emerged. But the second is far more excellent, for grace is more excellent than nature, and that divine state than the natural condition. But the third surpasses all, and more designates the infinite power and virtue of God: whence that oracle of the Sage, Thou hast mercy on all, because Thou canst do all things, and that of Paul to the Romans 9: God, willing to show His power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction. With these the words of the Church agree: God, who dost manifest Thine omnipotence chiefly by sparing and having mercy. Which saint Thomas thus luculently weighs out in the first part, quaest. 25. art. 3.

The omnipotence of God is shown chiefly in sparing and having mercy; because by this it is shown that God has supreme power, in that He freely remits sins, for it is not his who is bound by the law of a superior to freely pardon sins; or because by sparing men and having mercy He leads them to the participation of the infinite good, which is the ultimate effect of divine power: or because the effect of divine mercy is the foundation of all divine works; for nothing is owed to anyone, except on account of that which is given to him by God and not owed, etc.

From these things it is clear that the attribute of mercy belongs indeed to the divine will, yet presupposes omnipotence, in which it is founded and, as it were, rooted; because that divine mercy is an attribute not only affective, by which God wills to come to the aid of another's misery, but also effective, by which de facto He relieves all the miseries and defects of rational creatures.

I pass over the other considerations of divine Mercy, as well as of the other excellences of the divine will, inasmuch as they seem moral rather than Scholastic.