Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

It is certain that there is no real distinction, and no real order, among the divine decrees; for since the act in God is one and most simple, there can be no distinction in Him, nor consequently any ordering of that act itself; for nothing is truly said to be ordered to itself. Therefore the whole distinction and the whole order, if any exists, within the divine act itself can be considered only in accordance with our manner of understanding and according to the varied tendency and termination of that divine act toward external objects; so that a distinction is then judged to exist when that divine act is understood to tend toward decreeing some object, without its tendency toward another being understood; and order is conceived in it when it is understood to terminate at one decreed object before it terminates at another, yet in such a way that the tendency toward the one is, as it were, the reason why it tends toward the other. On this difficulty there are chiefly two opposed opinions among theologians; for Ockham, in 1. dist. 9. q. 3., seems to deny that there is any order among the divine decrees and pronounces that no priority and posteriority is to be admitted in them, and not a few theologians, both old and modern, subscribe to him. But the other Princes of Theology contend for establishing this order, and St. Thomas upholds it 1. p. q. 19. art. 5. and q. 28. art. 1. and 2. And the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 7. q. 3. n. 3. and 4., with his more faithful disciples. What sort of order this is, however, and by what source it is to be established and from what it arises, so that you may perceive it more clearly.

Note 1. Chiefly a twofold order can be assigned in the divine realities, namely that of Origin and that of Nature. The former is the presupposition of one to another, by whom it is produced and from whom it originates; thus the Son presupposes the Father, and the Holy Spirit the Father and the Son. The latter, however, is the natural pre-requirement of one for another; thus the divine will presupposes the divine intellect by order of nature; and the divine attributes and all the divine excellences can be said to presuppose the divine Essence, because they flow from it as rays from the Sun. But this order of nature is not to be understood in the divine realities as it is in created ones; for in created things the order of nature imports a true causality, according to which the cause is said to be prior by nature to the effect; causality, however, involves the dependence of the effect on the cause. Hence, since in the divine realities there is no dependence, neither can there be any priority of nature according to causality, but only according to presupposition: whence it is rather called a priority of a sign of reason than of the thing, that is, a priority according to concept, not according to reality.

Note 2. The order among the divine decrees can be derived from the objects in two ways, namely either permissively or positively. Permissively indeed, insofar as it is not repugnant to the nature of the objects themselves to have such an order among themselves; rather a certain capacity and proportion is in them, whether natural or obediential, by which they can be said to be congruously ordered among themselves in this way. Positively, however, when the objects themselves seem from their own nature to demand such an order, so that they cannot be ordered otherwise except with a certain violence and incongruity. Moreover, for means to be ordered to an end by a permissive ordering, it is not necessary that God impress something on them by which they are ordered to a preternatural end; rather it suffices that God wills such means to be employed and ordered to attaining the appointed end. For example, for the works of Christ to be meritorious and satisfactory for the whole human race, it suffices that the divine Father accept those works for that purpose and decree that, given those meritorious works, He will grant grace, the remission of sins and eternal glory to men.

Note 3. The authors who defend the order among the divine decrees chiefly go in three opposed directions. The first is that of Cajetan, 3. part. q. 1. art. 3., who affirms that the order of the divine decrees is to be borrowed from the order which the terms observe among themselves; so that, just as nature seems to be presupposed to grace and grace to the hypostatic union, so he assigns three orders to divine foreknowledge and providence: in the first of which are comprehended all those things which pertain to the uprightness or disorder of nature and reason; in the second are comprehended all the helps of grace and all the supernatural gifts with which Angels and men are adorned; in the third, however, are involved all those things which pertain to the order of the hypostatic union. And thus Cajetan concludes that God first ordered those things which pertain to the order of nature rather than those which pertain to the order of grace, and first those which pertain to the order of grace rather than those which pertain to the order of the hypostatic union; and hence that the union of the Word with human nature was ordered after the foreseen sin of Adam.

Some affirm that the order among the divine decrees is to be derived from the perfection of the divine objects, so that God first decreed those things which are more perfect, and afterwards those which are less perfect. Others, however, judge that this order is to be derived from the objects themselves, as they are subject to the divine will, insofar as He orders them as He wills, although from their own nature they do not demand to be ordered in such a way.

First conclusion. — Among the divine decrees there is truly, actually and intrinsically, an order of priority and posteriority, insofar as, namely, the one and most simple entitative act of the divine will, by reason of its infinity, intrinsically and per se is equivalent to the really distinct acts of creatures, one of which presupposes another. This is the teaching of the Doctor in many places, but especially in 3. dist. 7. q. 3. n. 3. and 4., where he teaches that the divine Word was to be incarnated even if Adam had not sinned, because the predestination of the soul of Christ to glory presupposes no foreseen sin; indeed it precedes the foreknowledge, at least the absolute foreknowledge, of all sins, and also of good works, because one who wills in an ordered way first wills the end rather than the means, that is, first glory rather than good works. Whence he concludes: It can therefore be said that, before anything was foreseen concerning the sinner, whether concerning sin or concerning punishment, God pre-elected to that court all those whom He willed to have as Angels and men in certain and determinate grades. Here it is to be observed that the Doctor, by order of nature, does not understand an order of causality, nor of duration, as the Nominalists and some Thomists falsely interpret; but he calls order of nature only that pre-requirement, or supposition, of one divine notion for another; in which manner even St. Thomas himself, 1. part. quaest. 42. art. 3., admits an order of Nature in the divine realities.

Hence the Conclusion is proved. For there to be a true intrinsic order among the divine acts, two things are required and suffice: first, that there be among them a certain at least virtual distinction, insofar as, namely, the one and same entitative and infinite act of the divine will virtually is equivalent to several acts of the created will; second, that among those acts, distinct through this equivalence, there be a virtual presupposition of one for another, that is, that there be, as it were, a dependence of one upon another; so that if those acts were really distinct, one would truly presuppose the other and in some measure depend upon it, as happens in the acts of the created will. But among the divine acts there is such a virtual distinction and presupposition: therefore among them there is an order of priority and posteriority. The major is evident from what was noted above: for by the order of priority and posteriority in the divine acts nothing else is understood than the distinction and presupposition which is conceived by the human intellect in that same infinite entitative act through its equivalence to the acts of the created will, one of which is ordered to another.

The minor is proved. If anything were to hinder that in that same entitative act there is no distinction and presupposition, it would chiefly be because distinction is repugnant to the divine Simplicity, and the priority and posteriority of order must be excluded by God's supreme actuality; but both of these are false.

Proof 1. from the comparison of the act of the intellect with the act of the will: since truly between the acts of the divine intellect and will there is a true distinction and priority of order; for each act is formally distinguished from the other, as has already been proved several times. Likewise the act of the will presupposes the act of the divine intellect; for the act of the will by which God freely wills some object presupposes the knowledge of it, and the act by which He wills efficaciously to do something presupposes that it can be done; for the divine will cannot be borne toward the unknown any more than the created will, nor is it attracted and moved to love by a good unless it is first known. Hence knowledge is a necessary and pre-required condition for the divine will to be borne toward its object under that notion under which it is foreknown; and the following contexts of Sacred Scripture signify this, Exod. 2. God saw the affliction of his people and took pity; that is, the knowledge of the affliction moved and stirred Him to have mercy: likewise Psal. 102. The Lord has had mercy on those who fear him, since he himself has known our formation. That is, the foreknowledge of human frailty was the incentive of divine mercy, etc.

Proof 2. by comparing the acts of the will with one another: among the acts of the divine will, on account of their equivalence to many acts of the created will, there is some at least virtual distinction, that is, it is equivalent to several distinct acts. Likewise, among some of them there is a virtual presupposition, insofar as one is conceived as being virtually the cause of another, and the willing of one object moves to the willing of another; thus, v. g., He willed Christ to be passible because He willed to redeem men. Therefore the will which He had concerning the salvation of men was, as it were, the cause and reason why He willed Christ to be passible; and hence among the acts of the divine will there is some presupposition and ordering.

Further, without such an order among the acts of the divine will, those things cannot be understood which Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers teach about the mystery of the Incarnation and Predestination; for everywhere they affirm that God willed the Incarnation for the salvation of men, and the whole Church professes this in the Nicene Creed, where it is read that the divine Word, for us men and for our salvation, came down from the Heavens. Likewise Scripture and the holy Fathers for the most part affirm that God willed glory for the Elect partly by an antecedent will and from Himself, out of His good pleasure and pure mercy; partly by a consequent and efficacious will, from the prevision of works and by way of reward; but that He in no way willed damnation from Himself, but only on the occasion given by the reprobate on account of their sins. But these things cannot be understood and reconciled without an order among the acts of the divine will, so that the prevision of good works was the reason why He efficaciously predestined us rather than them to glory, while the prevision of sins was the reason why from eternity He reprobated others: therefore this order must be asserted. The major is evident from the following texts of Scripture and the Fathers: Your perdition is Israel (supply: from you) only in me is your help: likewise 2. ad Timoth. 3. He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, namely by the antecedent will by which He wills no one to perish, but all to be converted to repentance, as St. Peter explains, Epist. 2. cap. 3. Since, however, not all are saved, nor are all efficaciously elected to glory, but some are reprobated and destined to eternal punishment; Christ the Lord teaches that this is to be traced back to the prevision of good or evil works: whence Matth. 25. He says: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was hungry and you gave me to eat, etc.: that is, as St. Chrysostom expounds, Hom. 80. in Matth.: Because I knew that you would be such before you were born; these things have been prepared for you by me: as if He said, the prescience of good works was the cause why God prepared glory for some, or decreed to give it to them rather than to others. St. Ambrose expresses the same thing elegantly, lib. De Fide, cap. 3.: Those whom he foreknew, he says, he also predestined, because he did not predestine before he foreknew; but those whose merits he foreknew, for them he predestined rewards.

Finally, the order of priority and posteriority which Scripture and the Fathers affirm to be among the acts of the divine will is not derived only from an extrinsic denomination to be sought from the objects, or from our manner of understanding and willing, insofar as we conceive one thing as prior and another as posterior: therefore that order is truly intrinsic. The consequence is evident; for if such an order were extrinsic, it would nonetheless have to be affirmed as intrinsic.

The antecedent is proved. The order of priority and posteriority belonging to the divine acts is often contrary to the order of the objects, and with the same order of the objects standing, such an order can be diverse: therefore it does not belong to the divine acts only through an extrinsic denomination. The consequence is evident: for if it belonged to it only by reason of the order of the objects, it would follow that whenever the order among the objects was the same, the order among the acts of the divine will would also be such. But the antecedent is proved as to the first part: the order of the objects is either an order of time, insofar as one is prior to another in duration; or of causality, insofar as one is the cause of another; or of dignity, insofar as one is more perfect than another; or one of the other modes which Aristotle reports and the Philosophers gather from him in the Categories. But God for the most part wills first that which is posterior by any of those modes; for He first willed the Word to be incarnated, v. g., before He willed to permit the fall of Adam from the state of grace conferred through Christ, and yet that fall of Adam was prior in time to the incarnation of the Word. Likewise He willed the blessed Virgin and her ancestors for the sake of Christ; nevertheless the blessed Virgin and her ancestors were prior to Christ not only in time but also in causality. Finally, God willed Christ, at least as passible, for the salvation of men; nevertheless Christ is far nobler than the salvation of men: therefore the order of the divine decrees is not derived from the order of the objects.

The same antecedent is proved as to the second part. Namely, that with the same order of the objects existing, the order in the divine acts could have been diverse: for whether God decreed the incarnation of the Word antecedently to the foreseen fall of Adam, as the Scotists contend, or only consequently, as the Thomists will, the order of the objects is the same: for Adam was created first, and grace was conferred on him, and he fell from the state of grace, before Christ came to repair the fall: and yet in both hypotheses the order of the divine acts concerning the Incarnation is entirely diverse. For in the first hypothesis the willing of the incarnation precedes the will of creating Adam; in the latter, however, it presupposes it: therefore a diverse order can exist in diverse acts, with the same order standing in the objects; and hence that order of the divine acts is not drawn out of the objects themselves.

You will say 1. Although our intellect forms various enunciations and various discourses about God and His will and other perfections, it does not follow from this that there is found in God an enunciative or discursive knowledge, even to be attributed to Him extrinsically: therefore, by parity of reasoning, although we conceive the acts of the divine intellect and of the divine will as prior or posterior in a certain order, it does not follow on that account that there is truly some order in those divine acts.

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that enunciative or discursive knowledge involves several imperfections altogether unbecoming to God; for since discourse is the inference of the less known from the more known, it supposes in the one who discourses some ignorance, which is altogether repugnant to God, the treasury and abyss of the sciences. But the order of priority and posteriority in the divine acts argues no imperfection, indeed the highest perfection; because it supposes the one and same entitative act of the divine will, which by reason of its infinity is equivalent to all created acts; and this equivalence includes no imperfection, indeed it signifies the infinity of that act. For just as it is of the highest and infinite perfection that one most simple divine real entity be equivalent to all created beings and infinitely transcend them; so likewise it is a highest and infinite perfection in that simple real act of the divine will that of itself it be equivalent to all the acts of the created will and comprehend in itself whatever the created will can do by its diverse acts.

You will say 2. Where there is a unique and simple entity altogether indistinct, no ordering can be found: but the act of the divine will is unique and altogether simple: therefore it recognizes no intrinsic order; but if there is any order in it, it must be only extrinsic and to be sought from the diversity of our intellections, or from the order of the objects with which it is concerned.

I distinguish the antecedent: where there is a unique and simple entity that is finite and limited, I concede: one that is infinite and indeed unique, and simple formally, but virtually manifold, I deny. It is certain, however, that although that act of the divine will is altogether simple according to entity, nevertheless by reason of its infinity it is virtually and equivalently manifold, as has already been said above: and hence although indeed there is in it no actual real or formal distinction, nevertheless there is to be admitted in it a virtual distinction, equivalent to the distinction which could be found in the acts of the created will; and consequently an order can also be affirmed in it intrinsically, equivalently and virtually.

Second conclusion. — The order among the divine decrees is not to be borrowed from the order which their objects observe among themselves: nor from the dignity of the objects themselves: nor from their natural disposition: but only insofar as the objects themselves are subject to the divine will.

This Conclusion has four parts, of which the first is proved against Cajetan. A diverse order can stand in the divine acts with the same order standing in their objects: therefore the order of the divine acts is not to be traced back to their objects. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent has been proved in the preceding Conclusion.

The antecedent is proved. First, for there are many objects in the order of nature which have no order and no connection with the order of grace; for example, that Peter is to be predestined blind or seeing, white or black. Second, the death of the predestined is of the order of nature, and yet it is posterior to the election to glory which pertains to the order of grace; for that death is an effect of predestination according to that text of Wisdom 4. He was taken away lest wickedness change his understanding. Third, from the foreseen merits of Christ God decreed to confer grace on all, especially that grace which was granted to men after the fall of Adam: therefore the decree of the Incarnation precedes the decree of conferring grace; and hence Cajetan falsely wove his order, and consequently the order of the divine acts is not to be borrowed from him.

The second part also remains proved from those things which we said in the preceding Conclusion, namely that that order in the divine acts does not arise from the dignity and excellence of the objects: for Christ the Lord, although far nobler than the salvation of men, is nevertheless ordered by God to the salvation of men themselves, so that God first willed the salvation of men rather than the Incarnation of the Word, because He first intends the end rather than the means.

Nor does it matter that the Subtle Doctor in 3. d. 7. quaest. 3. n. 3. asserts that one who wills in an ordered way universally seems first to will that which is nearer to the end, and so, just as he first wills glory for someone rather than grace, so also among the predestined to whom he wills glory, he seems in an ordered way first to will glory for him whom he wills to be nearest to the end, etc. For the Doctor, by that which is nearer to the end, did not understand that which is nearer in dignity precisely and absolutely, but that which is indeed nearer in dignity insofar as this dignity more conduces to the attainment of the end. In which manner, since the incarnation and glorification of the Word more conduces to the divine honor than the glorification of the rest of the predestined, therefore the Doctor rightly concludes in that place that God wills glory for the Soul of Christ before He wills glory for anyone else, and first wills grace and glory for everyone else before He foresees the opposites of those habits, namely of grace and glory, that is, sin and damnation: therefore He first wills glory for the soul of Christ before He foresees that Adam will fall.

But so that these things may be perceived more easily, it is to be observed that among the divine decrees there are two opposite orders, namely of intention and of execution, according to the diverse consideration of the end and of the means. The order of intention is that which first regards the end as to be attained through means; but the order of execution first regards the means themselves by which the intended end is in fact acquired. And since in intention the end is the cause of the means, which are not sought nor taken up by the one operating except for the sake of attaining the end, therefore in the order of intention the end is prior to the means: but since in the actual attainment of the end the means are taken up as efficient causes, so that the one operating obtains the intended end, therefore in the order of execution the means are prior to the end. Hence by the order of intention God first decrees the end rather than the means, and among the means first chooses that which is nearer to the end, and which contributes last to the attainment of the end.

Then He orders the less remote means, and so on with the rest up to the last: which the praised Subtle Doctor understood, saying that one who wills in an ordered way first wills the end, and afterwards those things which are the means to attaining the end, and among the means that which is nearer to the end according to causality and efficacy, whether it be the more worthy in the meantime, or have this efficacy from its own nature, or from divine ordering. But the order of execution is altogether opposite to it: for God first wills and decrees the last means, and each of the rest in its order; and last He intends and decrees the end to be attained, which St. Paul clearly discloses, ad Rom. 8., saying: Those whom he foreknew he also predestined... and those whom he predestined, these he also called; and those whom he called, these he also justified; and those whom he justified, them he also glorified. By which Words he signifies that divine foreknowledge is the first means of the predestination of the just, that final justification is the last means, and that glory is the end which is attained last.

The last part is proved, namely that the order of the divine decrees is not to be traced back to the natural order which the objects themselves observe among themselves; both because the act of the divine will is the cause of the order which creatures observe among themselves and toward God Himself: therefore the order of creatures cannot be the cause of the order which is to be found in the divine acts: and because there are many objects which from their own nature have no order among themselves, or toward God, but receive it from the divine will: therefore such an order in the divine acts is not to be traced back to the natural order which the objects observe among themselves. The antecedent is proved by various examples; for God instituted the Sacraments, as sensible signs, as means to the justification of the sinner and to the increase of grace, to which end from their own nature they have no order. Likewise He permits the Elect to fall at times into grave sins so that they may thereby be humbled and become more cautious and more fervent; between that good and the permission of sin there is no order ex natura rei, but rather the permission of sin by its own nature regards only the evil of fault. Likewise He willed the Incarnation of the divine Word for the redemption of the human race, to which that Incarnation is not ordered by its own nature.

Finally, to pass over other countless things, He willed to be served both in the old and in the new law by various ceremonies for Himself, which are not determined by nature to the worship of God: for ex natura rei it is all the same whether such an animal, for example, or another is offered in sacrifice, or whether bare bread and bare wine, or the accidents of bread and wine insofar as they contain the body and blood of Christ, are the holocaust of the new law.

It remains, therefore, that the order of the acts of the divine will is to be borrowed entirely from the order which the objects observe among themselves, as they are subject to the divine will itself and insofar as the divine will itself disposes and orders them; so that the intrinsic ordering of God is rightly gathered from the extrinsic ordering of the objects.