Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. The resolution of the present Question seems so entangled in so many and such great difficulties that most Theologians have not hesitated to assert that this truth is inaccessible to mortals and is to be openly manifested only to blessed minds in the clear vision of God. Nor indeed without reason; for it abounds in so many sandbanks and rocks that it foretells certain shipwreck to any inquirer, and it embraces such enormous difficulties that the wiser Theologians scarcely have anything to reply. For that divine liberty is asserted to be either something intrinsic or something extrinsic. If the first, since every free act by its formal concept requires to be done or not done, and so can be or not be, if the liberty of the act itself is something intrinsic to God, it follows that God can lack something intrinsic to Himself; which is repugnant to His own divine immutability. But if something extrinsic is affirmed, no lesser difficulty arises, for it is of the nature of a free act that it be immanent and vital, and therefore it cannot be constituted by an extrinsic and non-vital form. Nevertheless, that according to our small measure we may disclose what, among so many varied opinions of Theologians, ought to be held more certainly and more truly regarding this Question.

Note 2. Although the opinions of Theologians regarding the resolution of the present Question are various, nevertheless there are two principal and extreme opinions altogether opposed to each other, from which the rest have flowed, as it were, like rivulets from their sources. The first, in order to establish God's immutability in every respect, seems to destroy His liberty; for it affirms that the free act in God is not something intrinsic, but altogether extrinsic, and is nothing other than the effect produced externally. So that, although the freely productive principle of the act itself is within God and truly vital, nevertheless it is denominated free by an extrinsic denomination taken from the action by which He produces creatures ad extra, which action according to this opinion is formally transient and received in the creatures themselves. So judges Aureolus in 1. dist. 47. art. 1, whom many Moderns follow.

The second opinion, extremely opposed to the first, in order to preserve God's liberty intact, seems to destroy His immutability; for it teaches that the free decree of God is a certain free perfection intrinsic to God, distinct by reason from the necessary perfection, which, because it is free, can be absent from the divine will without any imperfection. So teaches Cajetan qu. 19. art. 2, with whom Fonseca and Salas, and many other Moderns, seem to agree, among whom our Poncius especially shines in his commentary on distinction 39 of the Doctor, n. 18 and following, where he resolves the principal difficulties which can be objected against Cajetan's opinion.

Among these opposed opinions, however, there are many intermediate ones, and especially three, which strive to soften and temper the rigor of each extreme opinion. The first indeed asserts that the free decree of God does not consist adequately in an intrinsic formality, nor in something extrinsic, but in both at once, so that to divine liberty there contribute together both the act of the divine Will and the productive action of the creature, or the creature itself produced by God. So think Basil of Leon disp. 6. c. 5, Grenado in his Tract. De Voluntate Dei, disp. 5, Arrubal disp. 16. art. 61., and the rest.

The second affirms that the free act of God is constituted formally, or at least inadequately, by a relation of reason to creatures existing or future. So Capreolus in 1. dist. 45. quaest. 1., and the Ferrarese in the First Book against the Gentiles cap. 82., with whom Vasquez seems to agree, Disp. 22. cap. 2., where he says: The free will of God is the divine Essence itself after the manner of an elicited act; it includes, however, a certain relation of reason to future things.

The third finally affirms that the liberty of God is nothing other than the entitative act of the divine Will itself, which, inasmuch as it is infinite, freely tends toward created objects, and is terminated by them and, as it were, objectively completed through the extrinsic object and effect. So that the divine free willing is the very act of God, necessary as to entity, and free only as to tendency and termination: which opinion, since it seems more certain than the others, is also to be preferred to the others: but so that it may appear more evidently.

Note 3. The act of the divine Will relates in a certain way to free objects, just as our will relates to free acts, especially in this: that just as our will, remaining in itself the same intrinsically, without any change of itself or real addition, exercises an act or does not exercise it, and elicits this act or the opposite of it — otherwise there would be a regress to infinity, if between the will itself and the act to be produced some real medium were required, by which the will would determine itself to act and to produce the act — so the divine act, the same as to real entity, can will or not will an object, or nill and will this or the opposite of it, so much so that that actual and most perfect entity which is called divine volition is not to be compared with our free acts, but rather with our liberty. For in this way that act relates in a certain manner to free objects, as our will relates to its free acts. Nor should it seem a wonder that God does many things through a single act, and exercises in a most excellent manner what we are able to accomplish only through many acts, and that with the greatest imperfection because of the finitude and limitation of our acts.

First conclusion. — Divine liberty is constituted formally neither adequately nor inadequately through something extrinsic to God, but is a perfection intrinsic to God. This is against Aureolus and his followers.

Proof first. Divine liberty is not constituted formally by that which is by nature posterior to it: but extrinsic operation and every external effect is by nature posterior to the free volition of God: therefore this liberty is constituted by neither. The major is evident: for what presupposes another thing as essentially constituted cannot be its essential constituent: but what is by nature posterior to divine liberty presupposes it as essentially and formally constituted; therefore it cannot be its constituent.

Proof of the minor. That which is caused by the free volition of God is by nature posterior to divine liberty: but every external effect is truly caused by the omnipotent free volition of God: therefore it is posterior to it. The major is evident, for every cause is by nature prior to its effect.

The minor is proved. First indeed from Sacred Scripture, which in many places asserts that God freely produces creatures. Thus Psalm 134: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done in Heaven and in Earth. Ephesians 1: He worketh all things according to the counsel, that is, the decree, of his will, etc. And Apocalypse 4: Thou hast created all things, and for thy will they were and have been created: therefore the free volition of God is the cause of the futurition of things, and not, on the contrary, is the futurition of things the constitutive notion of the free volition itself.

Next, the free volition, as free, is said to be the cause of things just as omnipotence is: but omnipotence formally considered is truly productive of things and prior to the effects produced by it, nor is it constituted through them in the notion of omnipotence: therefore neither is the free divine volition constituted formally, adequately or inadequately, through the effects produced by it.

Finally, if the produced effect were the formal constitutive notion of divine liberty, it would follow that the divine Will is more imperfect than the created will; for the created will is intrinsically and adequately free antecedently to extrinsic operation: therefore the divine will, since it is by far more excellent, is perfectly and adequately free antecedently to every produced effect.

Proof second. If divine liberty were constituted through something extrinsic, it would follow that God from eternity had no actual free decree: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident from several texts of Sacred Scripture, by which the divine decree is declared eternal: thus Matt. 25: Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. And Ephesians 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, etc.

Proof of the consequence of the major. A free decree is not then held to be actual when that which is formally constituted through that free decree is not in act: but the extrinsic effect through which divine liberty would be said to be constituted is not in act from eternity: therefore neither is that decree actual from eternity. Nor may you say that it suffices for this that the external effect be future: for the decree is in the same condition as its constituent: but the constituent of the divine decree, namely the creation of the world, is not in act from eternity: therefore in like manner, if that creation of the world, v. gr., were the constituent of the free decree of God, it follows that that decree would not be in act from eternity, but would only be future.

Third. God has many free acts by which He produces nothing physical outside Himself: therefore that free act is not constituted physically and formally through an effect produced extrinsically.

The antecedent is proved by various examples, especially in the dispensation of a vow and in the remission of venial sin, as well as of the debt of punishment through indulgences and suffrages, by which nothing at all is produced outside God, through which that dispensation and remission, made by pure condonation, would be constituted free.

Next, God has various conditional decrees, and also the knowledge of future conditionals, which cannot be made free through an extrinsic effect, since through those decrees nothing is produced in reality; v. g., God sees and decrees conditionally that if He called Peter at such a time and in such a way, he would be converted, whom nevertheless He does not call.

Finally, those positive acts by which God does not will to do something, v. g., not to produce a more perfect world, cannot be constituted through something extrinsic, since nothing extrinsic is produced: but those acts are truly free: therefore the liberty of the divine act is not derived from what is extrinsic.

Moreover: the act of complacency by which God takes complacency in the goods already produced by Himself, according to that saying of Genesis 1: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, that act, I say, effects no change in the creature, otherwise there would be a process to infinity; for regarding that thing caused by God through this complacency God would have another act of complacency, and so on: nevertheless that act is free; for it is about an existing created object: in like manner the act by which God decreed to give glory to all, if they died in grace, places no change in the very many who do not attain glory because of the failure of that condition: yet that act is free: therefore divine liberty is not constituted formally through something extrinsic.

Fourth and last. If the free decree of God consisted formally in the extrinsic denomination taken from the transient action by which God produces creatures ad extra, many absurdities would follow. First indeed it would follow that God is not formally, but only metaphorically free: for the external production of creatures can be called God's volition only metaphorically; and it can be only the will of sign, not of good pleasure. Second, it would follow that God could, without any inconvenience, newly will something that He did not will from eternity, for it is no inconvenience that that transient action productive of creatures be newly posited. Finally, it would follow from that opinion that these propositions from Sacred Scripture would have a nugatory sense; for this one: whatsoever He willed, He did would mean: all things which He made, since He was able not to make them, He nevertheless made. Likewise so God loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son would have to be expounded thus: He gave His Son to the world in order to give His Son, which is ridiculous.

From these things gather that God is not constituted formally free, even partially and inadequately, through something extrinsic, namely through the effects which He produces outside Himself, or through the transient action through which He produced them. Both because it implies a contradiction that a cause, even inadequately, be constituted through an effect by nature posterior to it: but the produced creatures and the productive action of them are effects of the free decree of the divine will: therefore this decree cannot be constituted free, neither through the produced effects, nor through the productive action: then because nothing can freely follow upon the will, unless either the volition itself, or something else through the mediation of the free volition itself; otherwise volition would not be required for the actual exercise of liberty, which is false both in God and in us: but the transient action itself, or the effect produced or to be produced, is not formally the divine volition, as is evident: therefore that transient action, or the effect produced or to be produced through it, presupposes the free volition of God from which it follows, and consequently does not constitute it: then finally because the free volition of creating, v. gr., the world, belongs to God from eternity, and consequently from eternity God has the adequate constituent of that free decree: but neither the effect to be produced, or produced, nor the productive action of it (on the hypothesis that it is transient) are in God formally from eternity, as is clear: therefore that free volition is not constituted, even inadequately, through the produced effect, nor through the transient productive action of it.

Second conclusion. — Divine liberty is not constituted through some intrinsic form distinct from the necessary perfections and contingently found in God. This is against Cajetan 1. p. quaest. 19. art. 2.¹

Proof first. If divine liberty were an intrinsic form which God could lack, it would follow that He is intrinsically mutable: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident from what has been said on divine Immutability.

The consequence of the major, however, is proved. He is said to be intrinsically mutable who can have or not have some intrinsic perfection: but if the free volition, or the free decree of God, consisted in some contingent intrinsic form, God could have or not have some intrinsic perfection: and so He would be intrinsically mutable. The major is certain.

The minor, however, is proved. Liberty is an intrinsic perfection: therefore the formal constituent of divine liberty must also be an intrinsic perfection. The consequence is clear: the antecedent is proved: every vital act is a perfection of the living being, for it is life in actu secundo; but life is the most excellent perfection, by which living beings exceed the perfection of those lacking life: but every free act of God is a vital act; for it is the intrinsic exercise of God freely determining Himself to those things which He wills: therefore it is also an intrinsic perfection.

Add that every act of virtue is a perfection, not only physical, but also moral and worthy of praise and of special love: but the free acts of God are acts of the virtues of Charity, Justice, Mercy, Liberality, etc. Therefore truly the acts, insofar as they are free, are perfect; and so divine liberty is a perfection: and consequently the constitutive form of liberty is formally also a perfection, which, since it is free and contingent, can be or not be. For God could have willed not to create the world, not that the Word be incarnated, not that men and Angels be predestined to eternal life, and other things of this kind which He efficaciously willed outside Himself: therefore if liberty is constituted through some intrinsic form, extensive and superadded to the necessary perfections, it follows that God is intrinsically mutable.

Secondly. That form intrinsic to God is either really identified with the divine entity, or it is not: if the first, it cannot entitatively fail, nor be absent from God, and so it will be contingent and free only terminatively and extrinsically, not intrinsically. If the second, it follows that the divine Essence is in potentia to that form, which is repugnant to pure act and to infinite perfection.

Furthermore, every perfection that can entitatively fail imports imperfection; since to be able to be and not to be is the greatest imperfection, and so if that form through which God is constituted free could entitatively fail, God would have something intrinsic that would be imperfect.

Thirdly. That form through which God would will freely, and which would not be necessarily identified with him, would be either God or a creature, for it would be a real being, and so either created or uncreated: if God: therefore two Gods really distinct would be given; and besides there would be given something having the notion of Deity that would not be necessarily existing, since this form could exist or not exist. If a creature, since God would have to be determined intrinsically by that form to act, it would follow that he depends on a creature, and cannot act independently of it: but all these consequences are most absurd, and repugnant to the unity and independence of God: and consequently not undeservedly is the opinion of Cajetan sharply attacked by theologians of better note, and rejected as suspect and less safe in faith.

From these things gather that the free act of God is not also constituted through some real mode distinct from God, which could fail God as to its modal reality, as Fonseca and Salas will. Then because every entity, whether real or modal, mixed with imperfection, is to be removed from God, the most perfect of beings: but that modal entity, since it can fail, has imperfection mixed in, for something's being able not to be is the greatest imperfection, since it can pass into nothing, which is the lowest grade of imperfection: therefore it is to be removed from God.

Add that all the same arguments which fight against the form intrinsically constitutive of divine liberty militate against the real mode itself.

Third conclusion. — Divine liberty is not also formally constituted through some relation of reason to creatures.

Proof first. That relation of reason, if there were one, would be fashioned either by the created intellect or by the uncreated: but neither can be said. Not the first, otherwise it would not exist before the created intellect existed, and so it would not be from eternity, nor consequently would God be free from eternity. Not the second either: both because the divine intellect does not make fictitious beings of reason, as all commonly confess: and because that relation would be fashioned either necessarily or freely: if necessarily: therefore God would necessarily have free volition, because he would necessarily have that fictitious relation of reason through which the free volition would be constituted. If freely: therefore the divine intellect would be a free potency from itself, because from itself it could fashion or not fashion that relation, and so the divine will would not be the root of divine liberty, which no theologian would admit.

If you say that that relation is not fashioned, but results from the position of the necessary volition of God.

On the contrary first: what follows and results directly from the existence and position of a real cause formally not knowing nor fashioning is wholly real: but the necessary volition to which that relation of reason would follow would be a real cause not knowing nor fashioning; and so that relation too would be real.

Furthermore, that relation which would result from the position of the necessary volition of God would result necessarily or freely. If necessarily: therefore God would necessarily will freely to produce the world, v. g. for thus he would will in the manner in which he would have this relation; but he would have it necessarily. If freely: therefore just as that relation could freely result or not result from the position of that necessary volition; so also the production itself of the world could follow per se immediately from the position of the volition itself without that relation; for the difficulty of the one is not greater than that of the other, and so that relation is asserted gratis and without any foundation.

Add to these that God is formally and intrinsically free: but such cannot be constituted through any relation of reason, as is evident, for no fictitious form intrinsically affects and denominates a real entity: therefore much less will it affect and denominate God, the most real of all beings.

You will say from the Doctor in 4. dist. 13. qu. 1. n. 18. the divine production ad intra is a real relation, but ad extra it is a relation of reason. Likewise no. 20. the divine production by which God produces something ad extra is not something absolute in him, according to all, because according to nothing absolute in himself does he regard a creature: therefore all must say that that production by which God is said to be producing is a relation not indeed real, but of reason, as he himself explains no. 23. Therefore by parity the free volition about creatures is also a relation of reason.

I deny the consequence. For this is the difference between creation and the free decree of God, or free volition, that, as the praised Doctor says num. 23. To create signifies a relation of passion and connotes the essential divine act intrinsic, not only absolutely, but as it passes over an external object: but for God to will a creature to be principally, says the divine act, although it connotes its passage over the object, etc. Whence in the form of arguing there is a figure of speech, because ad aliquid is changed: that is, a relation into ad se, that is, into an absolute, just as if one argued thus; to be similar is to relate: but to be white is to be similar: therefore to be white is to relate.

Add that free volition is from eternity, but creation, or the relation of reason of the creating God to the creature, is only in time: whence although God would be constituted and called formally creating through a relation of reason, he would not on that account be called formally freely willing through the same relation.

You will press. the free decree from the Doctor is said to connote a passage over the created object; but this connotation is a relation of reason; therefore in reality the decree is constituted in the notion of free through a relation of reason.

I answer to the major that the Doctor for that reason asserts that the free will of God connotes a passage over the object, so as to signify the difference between the created and uncreated object, inasmuch as it is attained by the same volition: so that that volition is called necessary inasmuch as it regards and terminates at that which is divine: but it is called free when it passes over a creature, which is contingent and can be or not be. But the Doctor does not will that such a passage or tendency constitute the free act formally; for any volition, whether free or necessary, says a tendency, or passage over the object; therefore since the volition is not constituted, nor called necessary, because of the tendency, neither on account of the same will it be called free.

Fourth conclusion. — Divine liberty is the entitative and infinite act itself of the divine will, inasmuch as it tends to objects contingently future or existing, and connotes them in obliquo. This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as is gathered from his various texts, especially from 1. dist. 39, num. 21. where he says,

the divine will is not indifferent to the diverse acts of nilling and willing, because this in my will was not without imperfection of the will, for our will was free to opposite acts, in order that it might be free to opposite objects, and this because of the limitation of each act with respect to its object: therefore, given the illimitation of the same will to diverse objects, it is not necessary on account of freedom to opposite objects to posit freedom to opposite acts. The divine will itself also is free to opposite effects: but this is not the first freedom in God, just as neither in us.

From which he concludes three things. First indeed that divine liberty does not consist in indifference to acts, because that argues imperfection, namely the finitude and limitation of the created will, which by one finite act cannot tend to diverse objects; there remains therefore, he says, in God that liberty which is per se of perfection and without imperfection, namely to opposite objects; so that just as our will can by diverse volitions tend to diverse willables; so that divine will can by one simple and illimited volition tend to whatsoever willables; so that if that will, or that volition, were only of one willable and could not be of the opposite, which nevertheless is of itself willable, this would be of imperfection in the divine will, as was earlier deduced about our will.

The second thing he infers is that just as the created will is called formally free, not inasmuch as it is productive of an effect, nor inasmuch as it is receptive of an act of volition, but precisely inasmuch as it is operative; so, he says, liberty is placed in the divine will per se and first, inasmuch as it is an operative potency, although it itself is not productive, nor receptive, of its volition.

The third, finally, is his inference, that although the divine will can also be said free inasmuch as it is productive of a created effect, nevertheless that liberty which connotes an effect does not precisely connote it according to its being willed, because the being of existence is only in time, but the being willed is from eternity; or, as he himself speaks, the production in esse existentiae does not necessarily accompany the operation of that divine will, because the operation is in eternity and the production of the being of existence is in time: nevertheless the production in esse volito necessarily accompanies its operation; and then that potency of the divine will cannot first indeed be free as productive, but secundum quid and in esse volito, and that production accompanies it as operative. And a little after, the divine will inasmuch as it itself is under volition, is prior to such a tendency, namely free; and so it tends to that object contingently, which in the same instant it could tend to the opposite object.

By which it openly appears that the Doctor attacks the three principal opinions attacked in the prior conclusions: First indeed the opinion which Aureolus afterwards taught, namely that divine liberty arises from the production of a contingent effect according to the being of existence, which he shows to be false from the fact that the free volition is from eternity; but the production according to the being of existence is only in time.

Secondly he teaches against Cajetan that the divine will is not called free through something intrinsic that could fail from it, because that argues imperfection in us, namely that our will is intrinsically mutable from act to act, and also to the suspension and privation of act: but it is otherwise with the divine will, which is altogether intrinsically immutable.

Thirdly, finally, he teaches against the third opinion, that the free volition is constituted through a relation of reason to the willed; because the will is first in itself formally free inasmuch as it is operative, before it is free effectively, inasmuch as it is productive of the effect in esse volito, from which results, or is feigned to result, such a relation of reason of the willing to the willed and of the willed to the willing. These things I have set forth a little more at length, so that the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor might appear more clearly, and how wrongly some affirm that he thought otherwise.

The foregoing Conclusion is therefore proved. Through that by which God is formally constituted free, through that he is truly said to will or nill an object contingently future or existing, and that in this or that way; but he does this through the entitative and infinite act itself of his will: therefore in it the divine liberty formally consists. The major is evident; for liberty formally taken is nothing else than the potency itself of the will inasmuch as it is indifferent to willing or nilling this or that, and that in such or such a way.

The minor indeed is proved. God does all that through one unique and indivisible infinite act of his will, which the created will by reason of its finitude and limitation executes by a multiple act and a repeated volition or nolition: but the created will by various and distinct acts can will or nill diverse objects, and that in this or that way: therefore God through one unique infinite act of his will can nill or will any object whatsoever. The minor is evident by experience itself. The major also is certain, both from the first inference of the Doctor placed above; and because the act of the divine Will, inasmuch as it is infinite, on account of its eminence and supreme perfection is entitatively every act of volition and nolition, and is equivalent to all acts of the created will; otherwise it would not be the purest act, nor simple, nor infinitely perfect. Not indeed the purest act, if it said order and potentiality to another act, or to something intrinsic or extrinsic through which it would be constituted formally free; nor simple, if it received a plurality of acts, or the adjunction of some intrinsic or extrinsic form; nor finally infinite, if in itself formally or virtually and eminently it did not comprehend every perfection of any act of the created will: therefore it is necessary that the entitative act itself be per se and immediately free.

Furthermore; if that divine act of the will were not free from itself and without any added thing, it would be made such either through something real or of reason: but it cannot be made such through any relation of reason, as the third conclusion proves; nor through something real, because that added real thing would be either extrinsic, which the first conclusion rejects; or intrinsic, which was wholly attacked in the second. It remains therefore that that divine act of the will is free from itself and without any added thing; and so divine liberty is to be constituted formally in it.

Finally, that perfection cannot be denied to the divine volition which is freely granted to the created will: but the created will has this perfection, that from itself and with nothing added to it it can determine itself to willing something, or to nilling it, or to not willing it: therefore much more will the divine volition, which is altogether infinite and pure act, be able by itself to tend toward some object, or not to tend, and that formally through volition or nolition.

You will say 1. A necessary and a contingent act are formally opposed and really distinct: therefore one and the same act of the divine Will cannot be at once formally necessary and contingent, and consequently not free.

I distinguish the antecedent. Finite necessary and contingent acts are formally opposed and really distinct through the diverse intrinsic forms that constitute and distinguish them, I concede: an infinite necessary act, such as the divine volition is, must be distinguished from itself insofar as it is contingent and free, I deny: for just as the same real divine entity is at once communicable insofar as it is essence, and incommunicable insofar as it is a personal relation, because this entity, since it is infinite, can be one and the same principle of diverse predicates, which in creatures suppose and connote diverse entities; so with all the more right can one and the same infinite divine volition be at once necessary and contingent; necessary indeed, insofar as it is a divine act altogether indefectible from itself and tending to, and terminated at, those things which are divine; contingent, however, by reason of its tendency toward objects which are contingent from themselves.

You will insist. One and the same thing altogether unvaried cannot have diverse opposed denominations: therefore one and the same unvaried act of the divine Will cannot at once be, nor be called, necessary and contingent.

I distinguish the antecedent. Altogether unvaried, both intrinsically and extrinsically; both as regards entity and as regards termination and tendency toward another, I concede: unvaried only intrinsically and as regards entity, but varied as regards tendency and termination toward extrinsic objects, I deny: and I similarly distinguish the consequent: one and the same act of the divine Will cannot at once be, nor be called, necessary and contingent, if it were unvaried both according to entity and according to tendency and termination, I concede: if it is indeed unvaried according to entity, but diverse according to a diverse tendency toward necessary and contingent objects, from which tendency it has those diverse denominations of necessary and contingent, I deny: for if the same altogether finite heat of the Sun, unvaried in itself, can melt wax and harden clay, namely by reason of the diverse and opposed disposition which is in those subjects and from which it borrows the opposed denomination of hardening and melting; how much more can one and the same act of the divine Will, infinite from itself and entitatively unvaried, be denominated necessary and contingent by reason of a diverse tendency toward necessary and contingent objects?

You will press. That tendency and termination toward contingent objects, from which that divine act of the will is denominated contingent and free, is either something extrinsic to the act itself, or intrinsic; but neither can be said: not the first, because if that tendency is altogether extrinsic, it follows that God is not formally free but only denominatively and effectively: just as the Sun is hot only denominatively and virtually, and effectively, because it produces heat in subjects, but is not such formally: but this has been impugned above against Aureolus.

Nor the second, because since the contingent has from its formal notion that it can fail, if that tendency is something intrinsic to the act of the divine will, it follows that something intrinsic to God can fail; and so that God is intrinsically mutable, just as was demonstrated against Cajetan in the second Conclusion.

I answer that that tendency of the divine volition toward contingent objects can be considered either on the part of the act itself that tends and is terminated, or on the part of the object terminating that tendency. In the former way it is the entitative act itself, which by reason of its infinity is borne toward any willable object, in the manner in which it is willable; and that with nothing added to itself, but from its infinite power and perfection, by which it comes about that it is borne from itself necessarily toward necessary things, and freely toward contingent things. In the latter way, however, they are the contingent or necessary objects themselves, which terminate that divine act as they are; and so necessary things terminate it necessarily, and contingent things contingently. Whence in form, I distinguish the major: that tendency is purely intrinsic, or extrinsic, I deny; it is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, I concede: for it is the intrinsic and entitative act itself of the divine Will, which with nothing added, but from itself immediately, is borne toward willable objects as they are willable, and connotes them as they are, so that it is said to be borne necessarily toward necessary things, and contingently and freely toward free things, and so that tendency is intrinsic on the part of the act, extrinsic, however, on the part of the connoted object.

You will subsume. Therefore divine freedom formally considered is to be called partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic; but this consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is proved: the act of the divine will is called free insofar as it itself tends toward contingent objects, and consequently divine freedom is such as is the tendency toward contingent objects: but from what has been conceded this is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic: therefore divine freedom too will be partly intrinsic to God and partly extrinsic. The minor remains sufficiently proved from what has been said, by which we asserted that divine freedom is altogether and formally intrinsic to God.

I deny the consequence of the major. and I distinguish the major of that proof: divine freedom of the divine volition is such as is its tendency on the part of the act tending toward and connoting the object, I concede; such as it is on the part of the object terminating and connoted, I deny. And so the freedom of the act is intrinsic, since it is the intrinsic entitative and infinite act itself, which tends toward anything willable in the manner in which it is willable; and so it tends freely toward the free and contingently toward the contingent.

You will insist again. That connotation of the object either contributes something to the formal notion of freedom, or nothing. If the first: therefore since this connotation is extrinsic, divine freedom too will be at least partly extrinsic. If the second: therefore it is uselessly employed to distinguish that divine free act from itself insofar as it is necessary.

I answer that this connotation indeed contributes something, not to constituting formally and intrinsically divine freedom itself, but to specifying and explaining it. For although the entitative act itself, which is formally necessary, is also formally free from itself and in itself, because it is infinite; nevertheless, since we cannot conceive that intrinsic notion by which one and the same act is formally free and necessary, therefore we are compelled to explain the diversity through that diverse tendency toward necessary or free objects and their distinct connotation.

You will say 2. What is adequately intrinsic to God and adequately identified with him is also simpliciter necessary: but a free act cannot be simpliciter necessary, for from its formal notion it must be contingent and can fail: therefore a free act is not adequately intrinsic to God nor altogether identified with him; and consequently divine freedom does not consist formally in the intrinsic entitative act of God alone.

I distinguish the major: it is simpliciter necessary according to entity, so that in respect of it it is altogether indefectible and immutable, I concede: according to tendency and termination toward extrinsic objects, I deny: for this tendency and termination is altogether free and contingent.

You will insist. That termination and tendency is either something intrinsic or something extrinsic formally; if something intrinsic: therefore it is simpliciter necessary, nor is it indifferent whether it be or not be; and so it is neither contingent nor free. If something extrinsic; therefore divine freedom in its formal concept includes something extrinsic, at least obliquely.

I answer that this termination is at once intrinsic and extrinsic; intrinsic indeed formally on the part of the act terminated and connoted; extrinsic, however, specifically and explicatively, on the part of the object terminating and connoting; yet from this it does not follow that divine freedom is at once intrinsic and extrinsic in its formal concept, for this is formally wholly intrinsic, since it is the entitative act itself of God insofar as it is infinite and is equivalent to all the acts whatsoever of the created will, and is borne toward any willable object in the manner in which it is willable, as has already been said above.

You will press. The entitative act is from eternity, but the termination and connotation of an extrinsic object is only in time; therefore either divine freedom does not consist in actu entitativo, or it does not import this connotation and termination.

I distinguish the antecedent; the termination and connotation of the object in esse existentiae is only in time, I concede; in esse voliti, I deny. For future things have a willed being from eternity through the act of the divine will freely tending to decree their production; whence the termination and tendency of the divine will toward future objects can be conceived by us after the manner of an eternal production of things in esse volito, and insofar as it is a certain emanation of that willed being from the divine will itself, until by the force of such volition and according to the time prefixed by it the things at length emerge to the being of existence.

You will say 3. If divine freedom consisted formally and adequately in actu divinae voluntatis intrinseco et infinito: it would follow that the whole form could be adequately in a subject, to which it would nevertheless not communicate its formal effect: but this is absurd; for the formal effect is nothing other than the form itself united to the subject, v. gr. the wall's being white is nothing other than whiteness's being united to the wall: therefore also that from which it follows. The consequence of the major is proved: God can freely will to create another world: but if his divine freedom consists formally and adequately in actu intrinseco entitativo, since this act is eternal and immutable, it follows that he has now that by which he is said to will to create another world, and yet he is not really said to be now willing to create another world: therefore the divine volition about creating another world can be in God without his being denominated by it as actually willing to create another world: and so the form could be in a subject capable of denomination without denominating it; which is contradictory.

I distinguish the minor. It is absurd for a form to be in a subject capable of denomination and not to denominate it, if the form is finite and natural, I concede: if it is infinite and virtually free, that is, equivalent to a free form as regards bestowing a free denomination, I deny; but the divine volition is infinite and not only formally free in itself, but also virtually, as regards bestowing the denomination of one freely willing, because insofar as it is infinite it is equivalent to all created volitions. And therefore it can bestow this denomination at will, or not bestow it.

You will insist. God, from not willing to create another world, cannot become and be denominated willing the creation of another world, unless something happens to him by which from not willing he is said to be willing: therefore besides the entitative act something else is wanting in him, by which he is said freely to will the creation of another world, which he previously did not will. The antecedent is proved: both because a new denomination is sought from a new form: and because a passage from one contradictory to the other cannot take place without a real or formal mutation of the subject: and finally because Arist. 2. De Generat. text 56: The same remaining the same is always wont to do the same.

I deny the antecedent and to its proofs I say that they are indeed true of the created will, which, since it is said to be willing or nilling through various and diverse acts, therefore from not willing cannot be said to will freely, except through a new volition coming to it. But it is otherwise with the uncreated and infinite volition, which, since it is equivalent to all the acts of the created will, can also bestow on itself the notion of willing, or of nilling, without any intrinsic addition, but only through a new connotation of the extrinsic object willed, or nilled; which the Doctor excellently explains and illustrates with the example of the Sun:

If the Sun, he says in 2. d. 1. q. 2. n. 7., is supposed always to be equally luminous in itself, and some transparent medium is created and brought near, it will newly illuminate it; so that there will be nothing new in the Sun for there to be a new illumination from it; and if it could from itself place a transparent medium under the light, just as it causes light in it; so it would place in esse this whole, namely the illuminated medium, without any newness in itself.

Therefore much more can the divine will, since it is infinite, be said to will, or to nill, objects without any real or formal mutation of itself, but only through a new connotation of the extrinsic object.

You will press. God can really be said now to will to create another world, if nothing is wanting to him by which he is said to be willing the creation of another world: but really nothing would now be wanting to him for this volition, if his divine free volition consists formally in the entitative act alone: therefore he really ought now to be said to be willing to create another world. The minor is proved: if God now has wholly for creating another world that which I have while I will to write, nothing is now wanting to him for willing the creation of another world: but so it is. It is proved; for just as to me willing to write only the actual writing can be wanting, so that I am really said to write; so if anything were wanting to God willing to create a world, it would be most of all another world: but it is absurd to assert that, in order that I be said to be willing to write, the actual writing is wanting to me: therefore it would be equally absurd to affirm that, in order that God be said to be willing to create another world, only another world is wanting to him; and so nothing would now be wanting to God for willing the creation of another world, if his divine freedom consists formally in his entitative and intrinsic act.

I deny the minor: for God really does not have an actual decree about creating another world for this reason, because his divine will, from the dominion which it has over external objects, does not tend toward the creation of another world, although it could nevertheless through the same entitative volition by which it created this world also will the creation of another.

To the proof I say that not only is another world wanting for this divine volition about the creation of another world, but also the tendency itself of the infinite will toward the creation of another world is wanting; which tendency, although it is necessary on the part of the act, is nevertheless contingent and in every way free on the part of the object, namely of another world, which from itself can be or not be.