Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. In general a twofold freedom can be distinguished, namely in actu primo and in actu secundo. The former is the will itself considered in itself and insofar as it precedes its act, with a priority at least of nature, and it is of itself indifferent to acting or not acting. The latter is the act of the will itself, insofar as it is terminated at this or that object. This again is distinguished as twofold, namely one with respect to exercise, the other with respect to specification. The former freedom is wholly for acting or not acting, that is, for the positing or suspension of the act. The latter is for acting in one or another opposite and diverse way; and therefore the former is called freedom of contradiction; the latter, however, is called freedom of contrariety; not that it always requires contrary acts, for disparate acts also belong to it, v. g. willing this or that, such as occurs in the choice of one means over another, between which there is not always contrariety, indeed not even always specific diversity. Whether, however, all these notions of freedom are found in God is what must be resolved here.

Note 2. From the Doctor, in 1. dist. 39. n. 21, the divine will is not free and indifferent to diverse acts of willing and nilling. For this argues an imperfection in the created will, which does not tend to objects by willing and nilling with one simple act, but with diverse acts, namely on account of the limitation of each act. The divine will, however, since it is infinite, tends to opposite objects by one simple infinite act. So that, says the Doctor, just as our will can tend to diverse willables by diverse volitions, so that divine will can tend to any willables whatsoever by one simple volition, so that if that will, or that volition, were only of one willable, and could not be of its opposite, which nevertheless is of itself willable, this would be an imperfection in the divine will, just as it is in our will.

Note 3. From the same passage, the created will can be considered in three ways in relation to its act, namely: 1. Insofar as it is productive of its act. 2. As receptive of the same. 3. As operative by means of that act. For it is itself, says the Doctor, productive of acts, and it is that by which the one having it operates formally by willing, and it is receptive of its own volition. He infers, however, that it is most free insofar as it is operative, namely insofar as the one having it formally can by it tend to an object. This is to be understood of formal freedom, for although our will is free only formally insofar as it is operative, nevertheless it is also free effectively and insofar as it is productive of its acts, because it can produce this or that act, indeed even suspend the production of the act. The divine will, however, is neither productive of its act — otherwise it would be mutable — nor receptive of the same — otherwise it would be in potentia to it, which is repugnant to the most actual being. The divine Will, therefore, is said to be free only insofar as it is operative.

First conclusion. — God is truly free. This is of faith and

Proof 1. from Sacred Scripture; Psal. 93: The God of vengeance hath acted freely. And Psal. 134: Whatsoever the Lord willed, he hath done in heaven and in earth, in the sea and in all the deeps. For what is difficult to him for whom to have willed is to have done? says St. Ambrose, lib. 2. Hexameron, cap. 2. Matth. 20¹: Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? And in 1. Cor. 12 it is said of the Holy Spirit: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. All those texts of Scripture confirm the same truth in which God is said to act as Judge and to be the Rewarder of all works, and to treat each one according to his merits, and to hear our prayers, to show mercy, etc. For if he acted from the necessity of nature, he could not from eternity will goods or evils, and decree punishments according to each one's merits, nor could he have mercy, nor be moved by prayers, because he would be determined to one thing.

Many holy Fathers proclaim the same truth, especially St. Ambrose, lib. 2. de Fide, cap. 3, where, pressing the Arians, who denied that the Holy Spirit was of his own right and will, lest they should confess him to be of equal majesty with God;

if it is possible, he says, let us meanwhile teach that the Lord was of free will. So far have you advanced in impiety, that you deny that the Son of God is of free will. And certainly you are accustomed even to detract from the Holy Spirit, and you cannot deny that it is written, the Spirit breatheth where he will: therefore if the Spirit breatheth where he will, does not the Son do what he will?

Soon after he praises the Apostle writing thus in 1. Cor. 12: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. According as he will, he says, that is, by the free choice of the will, not in the service of necessity. He urges the same concerning the Father and the Son, from these words of Christ, Ioann. 5: The Father quickeneth whom he will, and the Son quickeneth whom he will. St. Epiphanius agrees with him, heresy 23: God the Father, he says, created man and all other things according to his own will. And Macarius, homil. 15, says that man is made to the image of God by this very fact, that he is free and of his own right, since like God he is of free choice and does what he wills.

St. Jerome agrees with this, in the epistle to Philemon, c. 1., explaining those words: but without thy counsel I would do nothing, that thy good might not be as it were of necessity, but voluntary, he says:

This question, which is raised by many and very often treated — that God, in making man, did not establish him good and upright — can be solved from the present passage. For if God is good voluntarily and not from necessity, he ought, in making man, to make him to his own image and likeness, that is, so that he himself would be good voluntarily and not from necessity. But those who assert that he ought to have been so made that he could not receive evil say this, that he ought to have been made such as to be good from necessity and not from will; but if he had been such as to perform good not from will but from necessity, he would not be like God, who is good for this reason, because he wills, not because he is compelled. That is, he produces the goods that exist spontaneously and freely, so that he chooses this good rather than that one from freedom, even though he can choose nothing but good.

This same truth is strengthened by a threefold reason. First, God is most perfect, and formally comprehends all the excellences that import no imperfection, which are called simpliciter simple: but freedom is a perfection of this kind: therefore it formally belongs to God. The major is clear from what we have said about divine infinity. The minor is also evident, for freedom is the most excellent perfection of the intellectual nature, which can at will embrace this or that object, elicit or suspend an act, in which it most excels the beasts and other natures lacking reason, which are so determined by objects and so necessitated to acting, that with everything desirable for operating being given, they can in no way remove themselves from action. Hence St. Bernard aptly said in the Cantica: the freedom of choice is plainly something divine, shining through in the soul, like a gem in gold. — Second, freedom is the dominion which the intellectual nature has over its acts, which it can elicit or not elicit at its nod, and over the objects which it can pursue or spurn at its own choice: but to God, the supreme of beings, supreme dominion ought to belong, not indeed over his acts, which are really identical with the essence, but at least over the objects which are made, preserved and ordered at his pleasure: therefore freedom belongs to him. — Third, the very fabrication of the world sufficiently convinces us that God acted freely in establishing it. For he either produced the world freely, or naturally and necessarily. But he did not produce it from the impulse of nature, because he is an agent endowed with reason and will: therefore he produced it freely, and consequently excels from himself in freedom.

The Doctor proves the minor in 1. dist. 8. q. 5. n. 17, where against the Philosophers he demonstrates by four reasons that God does not act necessarily: First, because it would follow that the most necessary being depends on a less necessary being, nor can the former subsist without the latter: for a necessary agent has a relation to the caused thing necessarily, which relation cannot stand unless both extremes stand, and therefore with one extreme posited the other is necessarily posited, and with one perishing the other perishes, and so God could not subsist without a creature likewise existing, indeed he would depend on its existence. Second, if God acted necessarily, nothing would be contingent in things, because if the first cause necessarily moves the second, the second also moves the third, and so all subordinating and superior causes will necessarily move the inferior and subordinate causes, and so none will operate contingently, and thus there will be no contingent effect: but that this is openly false is established by experience itself. Third, if God acted necessarily, there would be no sin and no blameworthy evil, because God would do it necessarily. Fourth, it would follow that the second cause would cause nothing at all, because it would be forestalled by the first in producing the effect. For if the first cause acted naturally and necessarily, it would also act according to all its activity and to the limit of its power, which since it is infinite, and so extends itself to absolutely every effect, it is evident that if God acted naturally and necessarily, he would leave nothing to be produced by second causes: but this is openly false: therefore it is certain that God does not act naturally and necessarily, but contingently and freely, and therefore is endowed with freedom.

You will say 1. Freedom is a potency indifferent to eliciting an act or not eliciting it: but in God there is no such indifference, for God, since he is pure act and most simple, excludes a plurality of acts and indifference to acts.

I distinguish the major: created freedom, I concede; uncreated, I deny. For since the act of the divine will is of itself infinite, simple and necessary according to entity, and is indifferent only with respect to the termination to various objects, therefore the divine will is not judged to be free and indifferent with respect to the act, but only with respect to the object. It is otherwise, however, with the created will, which claims indifference for itself not only with respect to the objects to be pursued or spurned, but also with respect to various acts.

You will say 2. If God were free toward creatures, he could communicate himself or not communicate himself to the creature: but it is not so. Proof: God has a natural inclination to communicate himself; for every good is diffusive of itself: therefore the supreme good, such as God is, is most diffusive of itself and most communicative, and so if he did not communicate himself, he would act against the inclination of his goodness: but he cannot so act: therefore neither can he not communicate himself to creatures. Again, God loves himself more perfectly when he communicates himself not only to himself but also to others. Finally, to will efficaciously to communicate himself is a right and honest action, which God would lack if he efficaciously willed nothing outside himself, and consequently without prejudice to his perfection and goodness he cannot not will to communicate himself to creatures.

I deny the major, and to its first proof I say that that inclination which God has to communicate himself is nothing other than a natural aptitude for communicating himself, and does not import or designate any exigency or tendency which has an attendant restlessness or imperfection until such communication is made: whence such an inclination of the divine goodness to communicate itself is subordinated to his freedom, namely insofar as the divine goodness is communicative of itself, on the hypothesis that the divine will commands and decrees it.

To the second proof I say that no perfection accrues to God from his willing to communicate himself ad extra, for he suffices to himself, and his love and supreme beatitude in no way depend on the existence of creatures, and therefore he does not love himself more perfectly when his love tends also to creatures, than if he loved only himself.

To the third proof I indeed acknowledge that such communication is an honest and right action, yet not such that if God were unwilling to make that communication, some indecency would arise in him. For just as he could have willed to communicate himself more abundantly and more perfectly than he in fact communicated himself, namely by producing creatures more perfect than those which he in fact produced, and that would not seem to disgrace his supreme goodness and liberality: so there is in him no indecency in not willing to communicate himself more or more perfectly. Since, therefore, the whole rectitude and honesty of the act arises from the free determination and will of God, which is the source and exemplar of all rectitude, for that reason the divine communication is judged to be right and perfect to the extent that it is freely decreed by God.

You will say 3. St. Dionysius seems to stand in the way of divine freedom in lib. De Divinis Nominibus, for he speaks thus in cap. 4:

Just as that sun of ours, using neither intelligence nor choice, but by the very fact that it is, illuminates all things which can participate in its light according to their proper measure; so also that supreme good, an archetype more excellent than the sun itself, as its obscure image, pours out upon all things that exist, proportionally, the rays of universal goodness.

St. Thomas answers 1. part. qu. 19. art. 4. ad primum, that St. Dionysius by those words does not intend to exclude choice from God simpliciter, but secundum quid, namely insofar as he communicates his goodness not to some only, but to all, inasmuch as choice imports a certain discrimination.

But St. Maximus the martyr answers more correctly in the Scholia on the same passage, that the similitude of the sun holds to this extent, that just as the sun has no adventitious light, but an innate and natural one, so God possesses not an accidental and adventitious goodness, but an inherent and native one. Indeed he is goodness itself, just as the sun is in a certain way light itself.

Second conclusion. — Freedom can be affirmed in God, both of contrariety and of contradiction, with respect to objects. This conclusion has two parts, of which the first becomes evident from what has been said; for freedom of contrariety is that by which the will is said to have opposite acts and to tend to objects that are, as it were, contrary to one another: but from what has been said it is clear that the divine will has the act of love and hatred formally, and can also tend to opposite objects through diverse acts, not indeed according to entity, but according to termination, namely to Peter the just man through an act of love, and to the same man afterwards as a sinner through an act of hatred: therefore this freedom of contrariety can be affirmed to be in God formally.

The second part is proved. Freedom of contradiction is that by which the will can act or not act, elicit or suspend an act: but this is in God: therefore, etc.

The minor is first proved. if God could not suspend the termination of his volition to creatures and the exercise of his freedom, it would follow that almost infinite conditional decrees would have to be admitted in him concerning almost infinite possible combinations and suppositions: but it is absurd, indeed even nugatory, that there be in God a positive and actual decree by which he positively wills and determines that if a dog barks, v. g., the vine will not sprout, if Peter sits at Rome, John will be converted at Paris, and the same is to be said of other similar ravings of the human mind: therefore it is more fitting to assert that the divine will remains, as it were, suspended with respect to conditionals of this kind, disparate as they are, and has only a negative decree about them, that is, a free negation of decree.

Then, if God could not suspend the exercise of his freedom toward creatures, this would be chiefly because this suspension would take something away from the divine perfection and actuality: but from such a suspension there follows no lack of perfection and actuality in God: therefore, etc.

The minor is proved. the free exercise of the divine volition neither connotes nor imports any intrinsic perfection in God, but only the notion of termination and tendency toward something extrinsic: therefore the suspension of that exercise takes nothing away from the divine perfection or actuality. The antecedent will be established from the following Question. The consequence, however, is proved: the divine Mercy, Justice and Omnipotence can remain suspended from all exercise without any imperfection for this reason, because they are terminated to creatures only freely, and if God had not produced them, he would have had no exercise of Justice, Mercy and Omnipotence toward them: therefore by a like reason the divine will can also suspend its act concerning the decree of the futurition of those creatures without any imperfection.

Finally, just as the divine concurrence is related to the existence of things, so is his free decree related to their futurition: but for the negation of the existence of some thing it is not necessary that God have a positive influx of his omnipotence, but only the suspension and negation of his influx suffices: therefore in like manner, for the negation of futurition it is not necessary that God form some positive decree by which he positively decrees that he wills not to decree the futurition of this or that possible creature; but the free negation of that positive decree concerning the futurition of things suffices, that is, the free suspension of the divine Will: therefore the divine Will can suspend its act with respect to the termination and tendency toward creatures, and so freedom of contradiction can be affirmed in it.

You will say 1. It is necessary that some thing be future or not be future: therefore it is equally necessary that God will it to be future, or nill it to be future. The consequence seems obvious, for the first is necessary for this reason, because it consists of terms opposed contradictorily; but the second is also such: therefore by the same reason it must be necessary.

I deny the consequence. for in truth the first proposition is truly contradictory, because between a thing being future and not being future no middle is given, just as neither is there between a thing being and not being. But it is otherwise with the second proposition, because since between willing a thing to be future and willing it not to be future there is not a contradictory but a contrary opposition, a middle is assigned between the two, namely not willing, through a mere suspension of volition.

You will say 2. The divine Will, as free, is no less in its ultimate actuality and pure act than the divine Essence is: therefore just as the divine Essence is determined in every way to existence, and is necessarily pure act, so also the divine Will must be determined in every way to operation, and therefore cannot remain suspended.

I distinguish the consequent: the divine Will must be in its ultimate actuality and determination as to the entity of the act, I concede; as to the exercise and its termination to an extrinsic object, I deny; otherwise if this argument proved anything, it would also conclude that the divine

Will must actually have all the positive terminations to the creatures which it can produce.

You will say 3. This suspension of decree injures the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge with respect to future contingents: therefore it is not to be admitted. The antecedent is proved from those things which we have said, that God knows future contingents in a conditional decree: therefore if there is a suspension of decree concerning certain future creatures, he will not be able to know with certainty their futurition or non-futurition.

I deny the antecedent. and to its proof I say that God indeed knows future things, whether absolute or conditional, in a positive conditional or absolute decree. As to those things, however, which he has known not to be future, the certainty of that knowledge is founded either on the positive decree by which God absolutely or conditionally nilled their futurition, or on the suspension, that is, the free negation of decree, by which he nilled to determine himself to their futurition or non-futurition. Whence a twofold medium can be affirmed in which divine knowledge can know with certainty that something is not future: the first indeed is the positive decree by which he positively established that the thing is not to be future. The second is the negative decree, that is, the suspension and free omission of every positive decree concerning the futurition or non-futurition of the same thing.