Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

In this Article we undertake to explain the greatest of all theological difficulties, one that so torments, or rather absorbs, the minds of theologians, that it may deservedly be called a sanctuary impervious to all mortals and a riddle wholly inexplicable to human reasoning. Hence, what Augustine once said of original sin, that nothing is better known for preaching, nothing more hidden for understanding, may rightly and with fuller truth be affirmed of the Liberty of God: for nothing is more evident to natural reason, and nothing is more firmly held by divine faith, than that God possesses liberty; yet nothing is likewise more difficult to explain than what is the genuine nature and notion of divine liberty itself. However, so that, in proportion to our small ability, we may resolve something amid so many windings of difficulties, we propose three points for discussion in the present Article: first, whether liberty is to be admitted in God, and how many kinds of it there are. Second, what is the formal notion of divine liberty. Third, whether there is an order among all the free acts of the divine will, and of what sort it is.

Note 1. In general a twofold freedom can be distinguished, namely in actu primo and in actu secundo. The former is the will itself considered in itself and insofar as it precedes its act, with a priority at least of nature, and it is of itself indifferent to acting or not acting. The latter is the act of the will itself, insofar as it is terminated at this or that object. This again is distinguished as twofold, namely one with respect to exercise, the other with respect to specification. The former freedom is wholly for acting or not acting, that is, for the positing or suspension of the act. The latter is for acting in one or another opposite and diverse way; and therefore the former is called freedom of contradiction; the latter, however, is called freedom of contrariety; not that it always requires contrary acts, for disparate acts also belong to it, v. g. willing this or that, such as occurs in the choice of one means over another, between which there is not always contrariety, indeed not even always specific diversity. Whether, however, all these notions of freedom are found in God is what must be resolved here.

Note 2. From the Doctor, in 1. dist. 39. n. 21, the divine will is not free and indifferent to diverse acts of willing and nilling. For this argues an imperfection in the created will, which does not tend to objects by willing and nilling with one simple act, but with diverse acts, namely on account of the limitation of each act. The divine will, however, since it is infinite, tends to opposite objects by one simple infinite act. So that, says the Doctor, just as our will can tend to diverse willables by diverse volitions, so that divine will can tend to any willables whatsoever by one simple volition, so that if that will, or that volition, were only of one willable, and could not be of its opposite, which nevertheless is of itself willable, this would be an imperfection in the divine will, just as it is in our will.

Note 3. From the same passage, the created will can be considered in three ways in relation to its act, namely: 1. Insofar as it is productive of its act. 2. As receptive of the same. 3. As operative by means of that act. For it is itself, says the Doctor, productive of acts, and it is that by which the one having it operates formally by willing, and it is receptive of its own volition. He infers, however, that it is most free insofar as it is operative, namely insofar as the one having it formally can by it tend to an object. This is to be understood of formal freedom, for although our will is free only formally insofar as it is operative, nevertheless it is also free effectively and insofar as it is productive of its acts, because it can produce this or that act, indeed even suspend the production of the act. The divine will, however, is neither productive of its act — otherwise it would be mutable — nor receptive of the same — otherwise it would be in potentia to it, which is repugnant to the most actual being. The divine Will, therefore, is said to be free only insofar as it is operative.

First conclusion. — God is truly free. This is of faith and

Proof 1. from Sacred Scripture; Psal. 93: The God of vengeance hath acted freely. And Psal. 134: Whatsoever the Lord willed, he hath done in heaven and in earth, in the sea and in all the deeps. For what is difficult to him for whom to have willed is to have done? says St. Ambrose, lib. 2. Hexameron, cap. 2. Matth. 20¹: Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? And in 1. Cor. 12 it is said of the Holy Spirit: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. All those texts of Scripture confirm the same truth in which God is said to act as Judge and to be the Rewarder of all works, and to treat each one according to his merits, and to hear our prayers, to show mercy, etc. For if he acted from the necessity of nature, he could not from eternity will goods or evils, and decree punishments according to each one's merits, nor could he have mercy, nor be moved by prayers, because he would be determined to one thing.

Many holy Fathers proclaim the same truth, especially St. Ambrose, lib. 2. de Fide, cap. 3, where, pressing the Arians, who denied that the Holy Spirit was of his own right and will, lest they should confess him to be of equal majesty with God;

if it is possible, he says, let us meanwhile teach that the Lord was of free will. So far have you advanced in impiety, that you deny that the Son of God is of free will. And certainly you are accustomed even to detract from the Holy Spirit, and you cannot deny that it is written, the Spirit breatheth where he will: therefore if the Spirit breatheth where he will, does not the Son do what he will?

Soon after he praises the Apostle writing thus in 1. Cor. 12: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. According as he will, he says, that is, by the free choice of the will, not in the service of necessity. He urges the same concerning the Father and the Son, from these words of Christ, Ioann. 5: The Father quickeneth whom he will, and the Son quickeneth whom he will. St. Epiphanius agrees with him, heresy 23: God the Father, he says, created man and all other things according to his own will. And Macarius, homil. 15, says that man is made to the image of God by this very fact, that he is free and of his own right, since like God he is of free choice and does what he wills.

St. Jerome agrees with this, in the epistle to Philemon, c. 1., explaining those words: but without thy counsel I would do nothing, that thy good might not be as it were of necessity, but voluntary, he says:

This question, which is raised by many and very often treated — that God, in making man, did not establish him good and upright — can be solved from the present passage. For if God is good voluntarily and not from necessity, he ought, in making man, to make him to his own image and likeness, that is, so that he himself would be good voluntarily and not from necessity. But those who assert that he ought to have been so made that he could not receive evil say this, that he ought to have been made such as to be good from necessity and not from will; but if he had been such as to perform good not from will but from necessity, he would not be like God, who is good for this reason, because he wills, not because he is compelled. That is, he produces the goods that exist spontaneously and freely, so that he chooses this good rather than that one from freedom, even though he can choose nothing but good.

This same truth is strengthened by a threefold reason. First, God is most perfect, and formally comprehends all the excellences that import no imperfection, which are called simpliciter simple: but freedom is a perfection of this kind: therefore it formally belongs to God. The major is clear from what we have said about divine infinity. The minor is also evident, for freedom is the most excellent perfection of the intellectual nature, which can at will embrace this or that object, elicit or suspend an act, in which it most excels the beasts and other natures lacking reason, which are so determined by objects and so necessitated to acting, that with everything desirable for operating being given, they can in no way remove themselves from action. Hence St. Bernard aptly said in the Cantica: the freedom of choice is plainly something divine, shining through in the soul, like a gem in gold. — Second, freedom is the dominion which the intellectual nature has over its acts, which it can elicit or not elicit at its nod, and over the objects which it can pursue or spurn at its own choice: but to God, the supreme of beings, supreme dominion ought to belong, not indeed over his acts, which are really identical with the essence, but at least over the objects which are made, preserved and ordered at his pleasure: therefore freedom belongs to him. — Third, the very fabrication of the world sufficiently convinces us that God acted freely in establishing it. For he either produced the world freely, or naturally and necessarily. But he did not produce it from the impulse of nature, because he is an agent endowed with reason and will: therefore he produced it freely, and consequently excels from himself in freedom.

The Doctor proves the minor in 1. dist. 8. q. 5. n. 17, where against the Philosophers he demonstrates by four reasons that God does not act necessarily: First, because it would follow that the most necessary being depends on a less necessary being, nor can the former subsist without the latter: for a necessary agent has a relation to the caused thing necessarily, which relation cannot stand unless both extremes stand, and therefore with one extreme posited the other is necessarily posited, and with one perishing the other perishes, and so God could not subsist without a creature likewise existing, indeed he would depend on its existence. Second, if God acted necessarily, nothing would be contingent in things, because if the first cause necessarily moves the second, the second also moves the third, and so all subordinating and superior causes will necessarily move the inferior and subordinate causes, and so none will operate contingently, and thus there will be no contingent effect: but that this is openly false is established by experience itself. Third, if God acted necessarily, there would be no sin and no blameworthy evil, because God would do it necessarily. Fourth, it would follow that the second cause would cause nothing at all, because it would be forestalled by the first in producing the effect. For if the first cause acted naturally and necessarily, it would also act according to all its activity and to the limit of its power, which since it is infinite, and so extends itself to absolutely every effect, it is evident that if God acted naturally and necessarily, he would leave nothing to be produced by second causes: but this is openly false: therefore it is certain that God does not act naturally and necessarily, but contingently and freely, and therefore is endowed with freedom.

You will say 1. Freedom is a potency indifferent to eliciting an act or not eliciting it: but in God there is no such indifference, for God, since he is pure act and most simple, excludes a plurality of acts and indifference to acts.

I distinguish the major: created freedom, I concede; uncreated, I deny. For since the act of the divine will is of itself infinite, simple and necessary according to entity, and is indifferent only with respect to the termination to various objects, therefore the divine will is not judged to be free and indifferent with respect to the act, but only with respect to the object. It is otherwise, however, with the created will, which claims indifference for itself not only with respect to the objects to be pursued or spurned, but also with respect to various acts.

You will say 2. If God were free toward creatures, he could communicate himself or not communicate himself to the creature: but it is not so. Proof: God has a natural inclination to communicate himself; for every good is diffusive of itself: therefore the supreme good, such as God is, is most diffusive of itself and most communicative, and so if he did not communicate himself, he would act against the inclination of his goodness: but he cannot so act: therefore neither can he not communicate himself to creatures. Again, God loves himself more perfectly when he communicates himself not only to himself but also to others. Finally, to will efficaciously to communicate himself is a right and honest action, which God would lack if he efficaciously willed nothing outside himself, and consequently without prejudice to his perfection and goodness he cannot not will to communicate himself to creatures.

I deny the major, and to its first proof I say that that inclination which God has to communicate himself is nothing other than a natural aptitude for communicating himself, and does not import or designate any exigency or tendency which has an attendant restlessness or imperfection until such communication is made: whence such an inclination of the divine goodness to communicate itself is subordinated to his freedom, namely insofar as the divine goodness is communicative of itself, on the hypothesis that the divine will commands and decrees it.

To the second proof I say that no perfection accrues to God from his willing to communicate himself ad extra, for he suffices to himself, and his love and supreme beatitude in no way depend on the existence of creatures, and therefore he does not love himself more perfectly when his love tends also to creatures, than if he loved only himself.

To the third proof I indeed acknowledge that such communication is an honest and right action, yet not such that if God were unwilling to make that communication, some indecency would arise in him. For just as he could have willed to communicate himself more abundantly and more perfectly than he in fact communicated himself, namely by producing creatures more perfect than those which he in fact produced, and that would not seem to disgrace his supreme goodness and liberality: so there is in him no indecency in not willing to communicate himself more or more perfectly. Since, therefore, the whole rectitude and honesty of the act arises from the free determination and will of God, which is the source and exemplar of all rectitude, for that reason the divine communication is judged to be right and perfect to the extent that it is freely decreed by God.

You will say 3. St. Dionysius seems to stand in the way of divine freedom in lib. De Divinis Nominibus, for he speaks thus in cap. 4:

Just as that sun of ours, using neither intelligence nor choice, but by the very fact that it is, illuminates all things which can participate in its light according to their proper measure; so also that supreme good, an archetype more excellent than the sun itself, as its obscure image, pours out upon all things that exist, proportionally, the rays of universal goodness.

St. Thomas answers 1. part. qu. 19. art. 4. ad primum, that St. Dionysius by those words does not intend to exclude choice from God simpliciter, but secundum quid, namely insofar as he communicates his goodness not to some only, but to all, inasmuch as choice imports a certain discrimination.

But St. Maximus the martyr answers more correctly in the Scholia on the same passage, that the similitude of the sun holds to this extent, that just as the sun has no adventitious light, but an innate and natural one, so God possesses not an accidental and adventitious goodness, but an inherent and native one. Indeed he is goodness itself, just as the sun is in a certain way light itself.

Second conclusion. — Freedom can be affirmed in God, both of contrariety and of contradiction, with respect to objects. This conclusion has two parts, of which the first becomes evident from what has been said; for freedom of contrariety is that by which the will is said to have opposite acts and to tend to objects that are, as it were, contrary to one another: but from what has been said it is clear that the divine will has the act of love and hatred formally, and can also tend to opposite objects through diverse acts, not indeed according to entity, but according to termination, namely to Peter the just man through an act of love, and to the same man afterwards as a sinner through an act of hatred: therefore this freedom of contrariety can be affirmed to be in God formally.

The second part is proved. Freedom of contradiction is that by which the will can act or not act, elicit or suspend an act: but this is in God: therefore, etc.

The minor is first proved. if God could not suspend the termination of his volition to creatures and the exercise of his freedom, it would follow that almost infinite conditional decrees would have to be admitted in him concerning almost infinite possible combinations and suppositions: but it is absurd, indeed even nugatory, that there be in God a positive and actual decree by which he positively wills and determines that if a dog barks, v. g., the vine will not sprout, if Peter sits at Rome, John will be converted at Paris, and the same is to be said of other similar ravings of the human mind: therefore it is more fitting to assert that the divine will remains, as it were, suspended with respect to conditionals of this kind, disparate as they are, and has only a negative decree about them, that is, a free negation of decree.

Then, if God could not suspend the exercise of his freedom toward creatures, this would be chiefly because this suspension would take something away from the divine perfection and actuality: but from such a suspension there follows no lack of perfection and actuality in God: therefore, etc.

The minor is proved. the free exercise of the divine volition neither connotes nor imports any intrinsic perfection in God, but only the notion of termination and tendency toward something extrinsic: therefore the suspension of that exercise takes nothing away from the divine perfection or actuality. The antecedent will be established from the following Question. The consequence, however, is proved: the divine Mercy, Justice and Omnipotence can remain suspended from all exercise without any imperfection for this reason, because they are terminated to creatures only freely, and if God had not produced them, he would have had no exercise of Justice, Mercy and Omnipotence toward them: therefore by a like reason the divine will can also suspend its act concerning the decree of the futurition of those creatures without any imperfection.

Finally, just as the divine concurrence is related to the existence of things, so is his free decree related to their futurition: but for the negation of the existence of some thing it is not necessary that God have a positive influx of his omnipotence, but only the suspension and negation of his influx suffices: therefore in like manner, for the negation of futurition it is not necessary that God form some positive decree by which he positively decrees that he wills not to decree the futurition of this or that possible creature; but the free negation of that positive decree concerning the futurition of things suffices, that is, the free suspension of the divine Will: therefore the divine Will can suspend its act with respect to the termination and tendency toward creatures, and so freedom of contradiction can be affirmed in it.

You will say 1. It is necessary that some thing be future or not be future: therefore it is equally necessary that God will it to be future, or nill it to be future. The consequence seems obvious, for the first is necessary for this reason, because it consists of terms opposed contradictorily; but the second is also such: therefore by the same reason it must be necessary.

I deny the consequence. for in truth the first proposition is truly contradictory, because between a thing being future and not being future no middle is given, just as neither is there between a thing being and not being. But it is otherwise with the second proposition, because since between willing a thing to be future and willing it not to be future there is not a contradictory but a contrary opposition, a middle is assigned between the two, namely not willing, through a mere suspension of volition.

You will say 2. The divine Will, as free, is no less in its ultimate actuality and pure act than the divine Essence is: therefore just as the divine Essence is determined in every way to existence, and is necessarily pure act, so also the divine Will must be determined in every way to operation, and therefore cannot remain suspended.

I distinguish the consequent: the divine Will must be in its ultimate actuality and determination as to the entity of the act, I concede; as to the exercise and its termination to an extrinsic object, I deny; otherwise if this argument proved anything, it would also conclude that the divine

Will must actually have all the positive terminations to the creatures which it can produce.

You will say 3. This suspension of decree injures the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge with respect to future contingents: therefore it is not to be admitted. The antecedent is proved from those things which we have said, that God knows future contingents in a conditional decree: therefore if there is a suspension of decree concerning certain future creatures, he will not be able to know with certainty their futurition or non-futurition.

I deny the antecedent. and to its proof I say that God indeed knows future things, whether absolute or conditional, in a positive conditional or absolute decree. As to those things, however, which he has known not to be future, the certainty of that knowledge is founded either on the positive decree by which God absolutely or conditionally nilled their futurition, or on the suspension, that is, the free negation of decree, by which he nilled to determine himself to their futurition or non-futurition. Whence a twofold medium can be affirmed in which divine knowledge can know with certainty that something is not future: the first indeed is the positive decree by which he positively established that the thing is not to be future. The second is the negative decree, that is, the suspension and free omission of every positive decree concerning the futurition or non-futurition of the same thing.

Note 1. The resolution of the present Question seems so entangled in so many and such great difficulties that most Theologians have not hesitated to assert that this truth is inaccessible to mortals and is to be openly manifested only to blessed minds in the clear vision of God. Nor indeed without reason; for it abounds in so many sandbanks and rocks that it foretells certain shipwreck to any inquirer, and it embraces such enormous difficulties that the wiser Theologians scarcely have anything to reply. For that divine liberty is asserted to be either something intrinsic or something extrinsic. If the first, since every free act by its formal concept requires to be done or not done, and so can be or not be, if the liberty of the act itself is something intrinsic to God, it follows that God can lack something intrinsic to Himself; which is repugnant to His own divine immutability. But if something extrinsic is affirmed, no lesser difficulty arises, for it is of the nature of a free act that it be immanent and vital, and therefore it cannot be constituted by an extrinsic and non-vital form. Nevertheless, that according to our small measure we may disclose what, among so many varied opinions of Theologians, ought to be held more certainly and more truly regarding this Question.

Note 2. Although the opinions of Theologians regarding the resolution of the present Question are various, nevertheless there are two principal and extreme opinions altogether opposed to each other, from which the rest have flowed, as it were, like rivulets from their sources. The first, in order to establish God's immutability in every respect, seems to destroy His liberty; for it affirms that the free act in God is not something intrinsic, but altogether extrinsic, and is nothing other than the effect produced externally. So that, although the freely productive principle of the act itself is within God and truly vital, nevertheless it is denominated free by an extrinsic denomination taken from the action by which He produces creatures ad extra, which action according to this opinion is formally transient and received in the creatures themselves. So judges Aureolus in 1. dist. 47. art. 1, whom many Moderns follow.

The second opinion, extremely opposed to the first, in order to preserve God's liberty intact, seems to destroy His immutability; for it teaches that the free decree of God is a certain free perfection intrinsic to God, distinct by reason from the necessary perfection, which, because it is free, can be absent from the divine will without any imperfection. So teaches Cajetan qu. 19. art. 2, with whom Fonseca and Salas, and many other Moderns, seem to agree, among whom our Poncius especially shines in his commentary on distinction 39 of the Doctor, n. 18 and following, where he resolves the principal difficulties which can be objected against Cajetan's opinion.

Among these opposed opinions, however, there are many intermediate ones, and especially three, which strive to soften and temper the rigor of each extreme opinion. The first indeed asserts that the free decree of God does not consist adequately in an intrinsic formality, nor in something extrinsic, but in both at once, so that to divine liberty there contribute together both the act of the divine Will and the productive action of the creature, or the creature itself produced by God. So think Basil of Leon disp. 6. c. 5, Grenado in his Tract. De Voluntate Dei, disp. 5, Arrubal disp. 16. art. 61., and the rest.

The second affirms that the free act of God is constituted formally, or at least inadequately, by a relation of reason to creatures existing or future. So Capreolus in 1. dist. 45. quaest. 1., and the Ferrarese in the First Book against the Gentiles cap. 82., with whom Vasquez seems to agree, Disp. 22. cap. 2., where he says: The free will of God is the divine Essence itself after the manner of an elicited act; it includes, however, a certain relation of reason to future things.

The third finally affirms that the liberty of God is nothing other than the entitative act of the divine Will itself, which, inasmuch as it is infinite, freely tends toward created objects, and is terminated by them and, as it were, objectively completed through the extrinsic object and effect. So that the divine free willing is the very act of God, necessary as to entity, and free only as to tendency and termination: which opinion, since it seems more certain than the others, is also to be preferred to the others: but so that it may appear more evidently.

Note 3. The act of the divine Will relates in a certain way to free objects, just as our will relates to free acts, especially in this: that just as our will, remaining in itself the same intrinsically, without any change of itself or real addition, exercises an act or does not exercise it, and elicits this act or the opposite of it — otherwise there would be a regress to infinity, if between the will itself and the act to be produced some real medium were required, by which the will would determine itself to act and to produce the act — so the divine act, the same as to real entity, can will or not will an object, or nill and will this or the opposite of it, so much so that that actual and most perfect entity which is called divine volition is not to be compared with our free acts, but rather with our liberty. For in this way that act relates in a certain manner to free objects, as our will relates to its free acts. Nor should it seem a wonder that God does many things through a single act, and exercises in a most excellent manner what we are able to accomplish only through many acts, and that with the greatest imperfection because of the finitude and limitation of our acts.

First conclusion. — Divine liberty is constituted formally neither adequately nor inadequately through something extrinsic to God, but is a perfection intrinsic to God. This is against Aureolus and his followers.

Proof first. Divine liberty is not constituted formally by that which is by nature posterior to it: but extrinsic operation and every external effect is by nature posterior to the free volition of God: therefore this liberty is constituted by neither. The major is evident: for what presupposes another thing as essentially constituted cannot be its essential constituent: but what is by nature posterior to divine liberty presupposes it as essentially and formally constituted; therefore it cannot be its constituent.

Proof of the minor. That which is caused by the free volition of God is by nature posterior to divine liberty: but every external effect is truly caused by the omnipotent free volition of God: therefore it is posterior to it. The major is evident, for every cause is by nature prior to its effect.

The minor is proved. First indeed from Sacred Scripture, which in many places asserts that God freely produces creatures. Thus Psalm 134: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done in Heaven and in Earth. Ephesians 1: He worketh all things according to the counsel, that is, the decree, of his will, etc. And Apocalypse 4: Thou hast created all things, and for thy will they were and have been created: therefore the free volition of God is the cause of the futurition of things, and not, on the contrary, is the futurition of things the constitutive notion of the free volition itself.

Next, the free volition, as free, is said to be the cause of things just as omnipotence is: but omnipotence formally considered is truly productive of things and prior to the effects produced by it, nor is it constituted through them in the notion of omnipotence: therefore neither is the free divine volition constituted formally, adequately or inadequately, through the effects produced by it.

Finally, if the produced effect were the formal constitutive notion of divine liberty, it would follow that the divine Will is more imperfect than the created will; for the created will is intrinsically and adequately free antecedently to extrinsic operation: therefore the divine will, since it is by far more excellent, is perfectly and adequately free antecedently to every produced effect.

Proof second. If divine liberty were constituted through something extrinsic, it would follow that God from eternity had no actual free decree: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident from several texts of Sacred Scripture, by which the divine decree is declared eternal: thus Matt. 25: Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. And Ephesians 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, etc.

Proof of the consequence of the major. A free decree is not then held to be actual when that which is formally constituted through that free decree is not in act: but the extrinsic effect through which divine liberty would be said to be constituted is not in act from eternity: therefore neither is that decree actual from eternity. Nor may you say that it suffices for this that the external effect be future: for the decree is in the same condition as its constituent: but the constituent of the divine decree, namely the creation of the world, is not in act from eternity: therefore in like manner, if that creation of the world, v. gr., were the constituent of the free decree of God, it follows that that decree would not be in act from eternity, but would only be future.

Third. God has many free acts by which He produces nothing physical outside Himself: therefore that free act is not constituted physically and formally through an effect produced extrinsically.

The antecedent is proved by various examples, especially in the dispensation of a vow and in the remission of venial sin, as well as of the debt of punishment through indulgences and suffrages, by which nothing at all is produced outside God, through which that dispensation and remission, made by pure condonation, would be constituted free.

Next, God has various conditional decrees, and also the knowledge of future conditionals, which cannot be made free through an extrinsic effect, since through those decrees nothing is produced in reality; v. g., God sees and decrees conditionally that if He called Peter at such a time and in such a way, he would be converted, whom nevertheless He does not call.

Finally, those positive acts by which God does not will to do something, v. g., not to produce a more perfect world, cannot be constituted through something extrinsic, since nothing extrinsic is produced: but those acts are truly free: therefore the liberty of the divine act is not derived from what is extrinsic.

Moreover: the act of complacency by which God takes complacency in the goods already produced by Himself, according to that saying of Genesis 1: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, that act, I say, effects no change in the creature, otherwise there would be a process to infinity; for regarding that thing caused by God through this complacency God would have another act of complacency, and so on: nevertheless that act is free; for it is about an existing created object: in like manner the act by which God decreed to give glory to all, if they died in grace, places no change in the very many who do not attain glory because of the failure of that condition: yet that act is free: therefore divine liberty is not constituted formally through something extrinsic.

Fourth and last. If the free decree of God consisted formally in the extrinsic denomination taken from the transient action by which God produces creatures ad extra, many absurdities would follow. First indeed it would follow that God is not formally, but only metaphorically free: for the external production of creatures can be called God's volition only metaphorically; and it can be only the will of sign, not of good pleasure. Second, it would follow that God could, without any inconvenience, newly will something that He did not will from eternity, for it is no inconvenience that that transient action productive of creatures be newly posited. Finally, it would follow from that opinion that these propositions from Sacred Scripture would have a nugatory sense; for this one: whatsoever He willed, He did would mean: all things which He made, since He was able not to make them, He nevertheless made. Likewise so God loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son would have to be expounded thus: He gave His Son to the world in order to give His Son, which is ridiculous.

From these things gather that God is not constituted formally free, even partially and inadequately, through something extrinsic, namely through the effects which He produces outside Himself, or through the transient action through which He produced them. Both because it implies a contradiction that a cause, even inadequately, be constituted through an effect by nature posterior to it: but the produced creatures and the productive action of them are effects of the free decree of the divine will: therefore this decree cannot be constituted free, neither through the produced effects, nor through the productive action: then because nothing can freely follow upon the will, unless either the volition itself, or something else through the mediation of the free volition itself; otherwise volition would not be required for the actual exercise of liberty, which is false both in God and in us: but the transient action itself, or the effect produced or to be produced, is not formally the divine volition, as is evident: therefore that transient action, or the effect produced or to be produced through it, presupposes the free volition of God from which it follows, and consequently does not constitute it: then finally because the free volition of creating, v. gr., the world, belongs to God from eternity, and consequently from eternity God has the adequate constituent of that free decree: but neither the effect to be produced, or produced, nor the productive action of it (on the hypothesis that it is transient) are in God formally from eternity, as is clear: therefore that free volition is not constituted, even inadequately, through the produced effect, nor through the transient productive action of it.

Second conclusion. — Divine liberty is not constituted through some intrinsic form distinct from the necessary perfections and contingently found in God. This is against Cajetan 1. p. quaest. 19. art. 2.¹

Proof first. If divine liberty were an intrinsic form which God could lack, it would follow that He is intrinsically mutable: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The minor is evident from what has been said on divine Immutability.

The consequence of the major, however, is proved. He is said to be intrinsically mutable who can have or not have some intrinsic perfection: but if the free volition, or the free decree of God, consisted in some contingent intrinsic form, God could have or not have some intrinsic perfection: and so He would be intrinsically mutable. The major is certain.

The minor, however, is proved. Liberty is an intrinsic perfection: therefore the formal constituent of divine liberty must also be an intrinsic perfection. The consequence is clear: the antecedent is proved: every vital act is a perfection of the living being, for it is life in actu secundo; but life is the most excellent perfection, by which living beings exceed the perfection of those lacking life: but every free act of God is a vital act; for it is the intrinsic exercise of God freely determining Himself to those things which He wills: therefore it is also an intrinsic perfection.

Add that every act of virtue is a perfection, not only physical, but also moral and worthy of praise and of special love: but the free acts of God are acts of the virtues of Charity, Justice, Mercy, Liberality, etc. Therefore truly the acts, insofar as they are free, are perfect; and so divine liberty is a perfection: and consequently the constitutive form of liberty is formally also a perfection, which, since it is free and contingent, can be or not be. For God could have willed not to create the world, not that the Word be incarnated, not that men and Angels be predestined to eternal life, and other things of this kind which He efficaciously willed outside Himself: therefore if liberty is constituted through some intrinsic form, extensive and superadded to the necessary perfections, it follows that God is intrinsically mutable.

Secondly. That form intrinsic to God is either really identified with the divine entity, or it is not: if the first, it cannot entitatively fail, nor be absent from God, and so it will be contingent and free only terminatively and extrinsically, not intrinsically. If the second, it follows that the divine Essence is in potentia to that form, which is repugnant to pure act and to infinite perfection.

Furthermore, every perfection that can entitatively fail imports imperfection; since to be able to be and not to be is the greatest imperfection, and so if that form through which God is constituted free could entitatively fail, God would have something intrinsic that would be imperfect.

Thirdly. That form through which God would will freely, and which would not be necessarily identified with him, would be either God or a creature, for it would be a real being, and so either created or uncreated: if God: therefore two Gods really distinct would be given; and besides there would be given something having the notion of Deity that would not be necessarily existing, since this form could exist or not exist. If a creature, since God would have to be determined intrinsically by that form to act, it would follow that he depends on a creature, and cannot act independently of it: but all these consequences are most absurd, and repugnant to the unity and independence of God: and consequently not undeservedly is the opinion of Cajetan sharply attacked by theologians of better note, and rejected as suspect and less safe in faith.

From these things gather that the free act of God is not also constituted through some real mode distinct from God, which could fail God as to its modal reality, as Fonseca and Salas will. Then because every entity, whether real or modal, mixed with imperfection, is to be removed from God, the most perfect of beings: but that modal entity, since it can fail, has imperfection mixed in, for something's being able not to be is the greatest imperfection, since it can pass into nothing, which is the lowest grade of imperfection: therefore it is to be removed from God.

Add that all the same arguments which fight against the form intrinsically constitutive of divine liberty militate against the real mode itself.

Third conclusion. — Divine liberty is not also formally constituted through some relation of reason to creatures.

Proof first. That relation of reason, if there were one, would be fashioned either by the created intellect or by the uncreated: but neither can be said. Not the first, otherwise it would not exist before the created intellect existed, and so it would not be from eternity, nor consequently would God be free from eternity. Not the second either: both because the divine intellect does not make fictitious beings of reason, as all commonly confess: and because that relation would be fashioned either necessarily or freely: if necessarily: therefore God would necessarily have free volition, because he would necessarily have that fictitious relation of reason through which the free volition would be constituted. If freely: therefore the divine intellect would be a free potency from itself, because from itself it could fashion or not fashion that relation, and so the divine will would not be the root of divine liberty, which no theologian would admit.

If you say that that relation is not fashioned, but results from the position of the necessary volition of God.

On the contrary first: what follows and results directly from the existence and position of a real cause formally not knowing nor fashioning is wholly real: but the necessary volition to which that relation of reason would follow would be a real cause not knowing nor fashioning; and so that relation too would be real.

Furthermore, that relation which would result from the position of the necessary volition of God would result necessarily or freely. If necessarily: therefore God would necessarily will freely to produce the world, v. g. for thus he would will in the manner in which he would have this relation; but he would have it necessarily. If freely: therefore just as that relation could freely result or not result from the position of that necessary volition; so also the production itself of the world could follow per se immediately from the position of the volition itself without that relation; for the difficulty of the one is not greater than that of the other, and so that relation is asserted gratis and without any foundation.

Add to these that God is formally and intrinsically free: but such cannot be constituted through any relation of reason, as is evident, for no fictitious form intrinsically affects and denominates a real entity: therefore much less will it affect and denominate God, the most real of all beings.

You will say from the Doctor in 4. dist. 13. qu. 1. n. 18. the divine production ad intra is a real relation, but ad extra it is a relation of reason. Likewise no. 20. the divine production by which God produces something ad extra is not something absolute in him, according to all, because according to nothing absolute in himself does he regard a creature: therefore all must say that that production by which God is said to be producing is a relation not indeed real, but of reason, as he himself explains no. 23. Therefore by parity the free volition about creatures is also a relation of reason.

I deny the consequence. For this is the difference between creation and the free decree of God, or free volition, that, as the praised Doctor says num. 23. To create signifies a relation of passion and connotes the essential divine act intrinsic, not only absolutely, but as it passes over an external object: but for God to will a creature to be principally, says the divine act, although it connotes its passage over the object, etc. Whence in the form of arguing there is a figure of speech, because ad aliquid is changed: that is, a relation into ad se, that is, into an absolute, just as if one argued thus; to be similar is to relate: but to be white is to be similar: therefore to be white is to relate.

Add that free volition is from eternity, but creation, or the relation of reason of the creating God to the creature, is only in time: whence although God would be constituted and called formally creating through a relation of reason, he would not on that account be called formally freely willing through the same relation.

You will press. the free decree from the Doctor is said to connote a passage over the created object; but this connotation is a relation of reason; therefore in reality the decree is constituted in the notion of free through a relation of reason.

I answer to the major that the Doctor for that reason asserts that the free will of God connotes a passage over the object, so as to signify the difference between the created and uncreated object, inasmuch as it is attained by the same volition: so that that volition is called necessary inasmuch as it regards and terminates at that which is divine: but it is called free when it passes over a creature, which is contingent and can be or not be. But the Doctor does not will that such a passage or tendency constitute the free act formally; for any volition, whether free or necessary, says a tendency, or passage over the object; therefore since the volition is not constituted, nor called necessary, because of the tendency, neither on account of the same will it be called free.

Fourth conclusion. — Divine liberty is the entitative and infinite act itself of the divine will, inasmuch as it tends to objects contingently future or existing, and connotes them in obliquo. This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as is gathered from his various texts, especially from 1. dist. 39, num. 21. where he says,

the divine will is not indifferent to the diverse acts of nilling and willing, because this in my will was not without imperfection of the will, for our will was free to opposite acts, in order that it might be free to opposite objects, and this because of the limitation of each act with respect to its object: therefore, given the illimitation of the same will to diverse objects, it is not necessary on account of freedom to opposite objects to posit freedom to opposite acts. The divine will itself also is free to opposite effects: but this is not the first freedom in God, just as neither in us.

From which he concludes three things. First indeed that divine liberty does not consist in indifference to acts, because that argues imperfection, namely the finitude and limitation of the created will, which by one finite act cannot tend to diverse objects; there remains therefore, he says, in God that liberty which is per se of perfection and without imperfection, namely to opposite objects; so that just as our will can by diverse volitions tend to diverse willables; so that divine will can by one simple and illimited volition tend to whatsoever willables; so that if that will, or that volition, were only of one willable and could not be of the opposite, which nevertheless is of itself willable, this would be of imperfection in the divine will, as was earlier deduced about our will.

The second thing he infers is that just as the created will is called formally free, not inasmuch as it is productive of an effect, nor inasmuch as it is receptive of an act of volition, but precisely inasmuch as it is operative; so, he says, liberty is placed in the divine will per se and first, inasmuch as it is an operative potency, although it itself is not productive, nor receptive, of its volition.

The third, finally, is his inference, that although the divine will can also be said free inasmuch as it is productive of a created effect, nevertheless that liberty which connotes an effect does not precisely connote it according to its being willed, because the being of existence is only in time, but the being willed is from eternity; or, as he himself speaks, the production in esse existentiae does not necessarily accompany the operation of that divine will, because the operation is in eternity and the production of the being of existence is in time: nevertheless the production in esse volito necessarily accompanies its operation; and then that potency of the divine will cannot first indeed be free as productive, but secundum quid and in esse volito, and that production accompanies it as operative. And a little after, the divine will inasmuch as it itself is under volition, is prior to such a tendency, namely free; and so it tends to that object contingently, which in the same instant it could tend to the opposite object.

By which it openly appears that the Doctor attacks the three principal opinions attacked in the prior conclusions: First indeed the opinion which Aureolus afterwards taught, namely that divine liberty arises from the production of a contingent effect according to the being of existence, which he shows to be false from the fact that the free volition is from eternity; but the production according to the being of existence is only in time.

Secondly he teaches against Cajetan that the divine will is not called free through something intrinsic that could fail from it, because that argues imperfection in us, namely that our will is intrinsically mutable from act to act, and also to the suspension and privation of act: but it is otherwise with the divine will, which is altogether intrinsically immutable.

Thirdly, finally, he teaches against the third opinion, that the free volition is constituted through a relation of reason to the willed; because the will is first in itself formally free inasmuch as it is operative, before it is free effectively, inasmuch as it is productive of the effect in esse volito, from which results, or is feigned to result, such a relation of reason of the willing to the willed and of the willed to the willing. These things I have set forth a little more at length, so that the genuine opinion of the Subtle Doctor might appear more clearly, and how wrongly some affirm that he thought otherwise.

The foregoing Conclusion is therefore proved. Through that by which God is formally constituted free, through that he is truly said to will or nill an object contingently future or existing, and that in this or that way; but he does this through the entitative and infinite act itself of his will: therefore in it the divine liberty formally consists. The major is evident; for liberty formally taken is nothing else than the potency itself of the will inasmuch as it is indifferent to willing or nilling this or that, and that in such or such a way.

The minor indeed is proved. God does all that through one unique and indivisible infinite act of his will, which the created will by reason of its finitude and limitation executes by a multiple act and a repeated volition or nolition: but the created will by various and distinct acts can will or nill diverse objects, and that in this or that way: therefore God through one unique infinite act of his will can nill or will any object whatsoever. The minor is evident by experience itself. The major also is certain, both from the first inference of the Doctor placed above; and because the act of the divine Will, inasmuch as it is infinite, on account of its eminence and supreme perfection is entitatively every act of volition and nolition, and is equivalent to all acts of the created will; otherwise it would not be the purest act, nor simple, nor infinitely perfect. Not indeed the purest act, if it said order and potentiality to another act, or to something intrinsic or extrinsic through which it would be constituted formally free; nor simple, if it received a plurality of acts, or the adjunction of some intrinsic or extrinsic form; nor finally infinite, if in itself formally or virtually and eminently it did not comprehend every perfection of any act of the created will: therefore it is necessary that the entitative act itself be per se and immediately free.

Furthermore; if that divine act of the will were not free from itself and without any added thing, it would be made such either through something real or of reason: but it cannot be made such through any relation of reason, as the third conclusion proves; nor through something real, because that added real thing would be either extrinsic, which the first conclusion rejects; or intrinsic, which was wholly attacked in the second. It remains therefore that that divine act of the will is free from itself and without any added thing; and so divine liberty is to be constituted formally in it.

Finally, that perfection cannot be denied to the divine volition which is freely granted to the created will: but the created will has this perfection, that from itself and with nothing added to it it can determine itself to willing something, or to nilling it, or to not willing it: therefore much more will the divine volition, which is altogether infinite and pure act, be able by itself to tend toward some object, or not to tend, and that formally through volition or nolition.

You will say 1. A necessary and a contingent act are formally opposed and really distinct: therefore one and the same act of the divine Will cannot be at once formally necessary and contingent, and consequently not free.

I distinguish the antecedent. Finite necessary and contingent acts are formally opposed and really distinct through the diverse intrinsic forms that constitute and distinguish them, I concede: an infinite necessary act, such as the divine volition is, must be distinguished from itself insofar as it is contingent and free, I deny: for just as the same real divine entity is at once communicable insofar as it is essence, and incommunicable insofar as it is a personal relation, because this entity, since it is infinite, can be one and the same principle of diverse predicates, which in creatures suppose and connote diverse entities; so with all the more right can one and the same infinite divine volition be at once necessary and contingent; necessary indeed, insofar as it is a divine act altogether indefectible from itself and tending to, and terminated at, those things which are divine; contingent, however, by reason of its tendency toward objects which are contingent from themselves.

You will insist. One and the same thing altogether unvaried cannot have diverse opposed denominations: therefore one and the same unvaried act of the divine Will cannot at once be, nor be called, necessary and contingent.

I distinguish the antecedent. Altogether unvaried, both intrinsically and extrinsically; both as regards entity and as regards termination and tendency toward another, I concede: unvaried only intrinsically and as regards entity, but varied as regards tendency and termination toward extrinsic objects, I deny: and I similarly distinguish the consequent: one and the same act of the divine Will cannot at once be, nor be called, necessary and contingent, if it were unvaried both according to entity and according to tendency and termination, I concede: if it is indeed unvaried according to entity, but diverse according to a diverse tendency toward necessary and contingent objects, from which tendency it has those diverse denominations of necessary and contingent, I deny: for if the same altogether finite heat of the Sun, unvaried in itself, can melt wax and harden clay, namely by reason of the diverse and opposed disposition which is in those subjects and from which it borrows the opposed denomination of hardening and melting; how much more can one and the same act of the divine Will, infinite from itself and entitatively unvaried, be denominated necessary and contingent by reason of a diverse tendency toward necessary and contingent objects?

You will press. That tendency and termination toward contingent objects, from which that divine act of the will is denominated contingent and free, is either something extrinsic to the act itself, or intrinsic; but neither can be said: not the first, because if that tendency is altogether extrinsic, it follows that God is not formally free but only denominatively and effectively: just as the Sun is hot only denominatively and virtually, and effectively, because it produces heat in subjects, but is not such formally: but this has been impugned above against Aureolus.

Nor the second, because since the contingent has from its formal notion that it can fail, if that tendency is something intrinsic to the act of the divine will, it follows that something intrinsic to God can fail; and so that God is intrinsically mutable, just as was demonstrated against Cajetan in the second Conclusion.

I answer that that tendency of the divine volition toward contingent objects can be considered either on the part of the act itself that tends and is terminated, or on the part of the object terminating that tendency. In the former way it is the entitative act itself, which by reason of its infinity is borne toward any willable object, in the manner in which it is willable; and that with nothing added to itself, but from its infinite power and perfection, by which it comes about that it is borne from itself necessarily toward necessary things, and freely toward contingent things. In the latter way, however, they are the contingent or necessary objects themselves, which terminate that divine act as they are; and so necessary things terminate it necessarily, and contingent things contingently. Whence in form, I distinguish the major: that tendency is purely intrinsic, or extrinsic, I deny; it is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, I concede: for it is the intrinsic and entitative act itself of the divine Will, which with nothing added, but from itself immediately, is borne toward willable objects as they are willable, and connotes them as they are, so that it is said to be borne necessarily toward necessary things, and contingently and freely toward free things, and so that tendency is intrinsic on the part of the act, extrinsic, however, on the part of the connoted object.

You will subsume. Therefore divine freedom formally considered is to be called partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic; but this consequent is absurd: therefore also the antecedent. The consequence of the major is proved: the act of the divine will is called free insofar as it itself tends toward contingent objects, and consequently divine freedom is such as is the tendency toward contingent objects: but from what has been conceded this is partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic: therefore divine freedom too will be partly intrinsic to God and partly extrinsic. The minor remains sufficiently proved from what has been said, by which we asserted that divine freedom is altogether and formally intrinsic to God.

I deny the consequence of the major. and I distinguish the major of that proof: divine freedom of the divine volition is such as is its tendency on the part of the act tending toward and connoting the object, I concede; such as it is on the part of the object terminating and connoted, I deny. And so the freedom of the act is intrinsic, since it is the intrinsic entitative and infinite act itself, which tends toward anything willable in the manner in which it is willable; and so it tends freely toward the free and contingently toward the contingent.

You will insist again. That connotation of the object either contributes something to the formal notion of freedom, or nothing. If the first: therefore since this connotation is extrinsic, divine freedom too will be at least partly extrinsic. If the second: therefore it is uselessly employed to distinguish that divine free act from itself insofar as it is necessary.

I answer that this connotation indeed contributes something, not to constituting formally and intrinsically divine freedom itself, but to specifying and explaining it. For although the entitative act itself, which is formally necessary, is also formally free from itself and in itself, because it is infinite; nevertheless, since we cannot conceive that intrinsic notion by which one and the same act is formally free and necessary, therefore we are compelled to explain the diversity through that diverse tendency toward necessary or free objects and their distinct connotation.

You will say 2. What is adequately intrinsic to God and adequately identified with him is also simpliciter necessary: but a free act cannot be simpliciter necessary, for from its formal notion it must be contingent and can fail: therefore a free act is not adequately intrinsic to God nor altogether identified with him; and consequently divine freedom does not consist formally in the intrinsic entitative act of God alone.

I distinguish the major: it is simpliciter necessary according to entity, so that in respect of it it is altogether indefectible and immutable, I concede: according to tendency and termination toward extrinsic objects, I deny: for this tendency and termination is altogether free and contingent.

You will insist. That termination and tendency is either something intrinsic or something extrinsic formally; if something intrinsic: therefore it is simpliciter necessary, nor is it indifferent whether it be or not be; and so it is neither contingent nor free. If something extrinsic; therefore divine freedom in its formal concept includes something extrinsic, at least obliquely.

I answer that this termination is at once intrinsic and extrinsic; intrinsic indeed formally on the part of the act terminated and connoted; extrinsic, however, specifically and explicatively, on the part of the object terminating and connoting; yet from this it does not follow that divine freedom is at once intrinsic and extrinsic in its formal concept, for this is formally wholly intrinsic, since it is the entitative act itself of God insofar as it is infinite and is equivalent to all the acts whatsoever of the created will, and is borne toward any willable object in the manner in which it is willable, as has already been said above.

You will press. The entitative act is from eternity, but the termination and connotation of an extrinsic object is only in time; therefore either divine freedom does not consist in actu entitativo, or it does not import this connotation and termination.

I distinguish the antecedent; the termination and connotation of the object in esse existentiae is only in time, I concede; in esse voliti, I deny. For future things have a willed being from eternity through the act of the divine will freely tending to decree their production; whence the termination and tendency of the divine will toward future objects can be conceived by us after the manner of an eternal production of things in esse volito, and insofar as it is a certain emanation of that willed being from the divine will itself, until by the force of such volition and according to the time prefixed by it the things at length emerge to the being of existence.

You will say 3. If divine freedom consisted formally and adequately in actu divinae voluntatis intrinseco et infinito: it would follow that the whole form could be adequately in a subject, to which it would nevertheless not communicate its formal effect: but this is absurd; for the formal effect is nothing other than the form itself united to the subject, v. gr. the wall's being white is nothing other than whiteness's being united to the wall: therefore also that from which it follows. The consequence of the major is proved: God can freely will to create another world: but if his divine freedom consists formally and adequately in actu intrinseco entitativo, since this act is eternal and immutable, it follows that he has now that by which he is said to will to create another world, and yet he is not really said to be now willing to create another world: therefore the divine volition about creating another world can be in God without his being denominated by it as actually willing to create another world: and so the form could be in a subject capable of denomination without denominating it; which is contradictory.

I distinguish the minor. It is absurd for a form to be in a subject capable of denomination and not to denominate it, if the form is finite and natural, I concede: if it is infinite and virtually free, that is, equivalent to a free form as regards bestowing a free denomination, I deny; but the divine volition is infinite and not only formally free in itself, but also virtually, as regards bestowing the denomination of one freely willing, because insofar as it is infinite it is equivalent to all created volitions. And therefore it can bestow this denomination at will, or not bestow it.

You will insist. God, from not willing to create another world, cannot become and be denominated willing the creation of another world, unless something happens to him by which from not willing he is said to be willing: therefore besides the entitative act something else is wanting in him, by which he is said freely to will the creation of another world, which he previously did not will. The antecedent is proved: both because a new denomination is sought from a new form: and because a passage from one contradictory to the other cannot take place without a real or formal mutation of the subject: and finally because Arist. 2. De Generat. text 56: The same remaining the same is always wont to do the same.

I deny the antecedent and to its proofs I say that they are indeed true of the created will, which, since it is said to be willing or nilling through various and diverse acts, therefore from not willing cannot be said to will freely, except through a new volition coming to it. But it is otherwise with the uncreated and infinite volition, which, since it is equivalent to all the acts of the created will, can also bestow on itself the notion of willing, or of nilling, without any intrinsic addition, but only through a new connotation of the extrinsic object willed, or nilled; which the Doctor excellently explains and illustrates with the example of the Sun:

If the Sun, he says in 2. d. 1. q. 2. n. 7., is supposed always to be equally luminous in itself, and some transparent medium is created and brought near, it will newly illuminate it; so that there will be nothing new in the Sun for there to be a new illumination from it; and if it could from itself place a transparent medium under the light, just as it causes light in it; so it would place in esse this whole, namely the illuminated medium, without any newness in itself.

Therefore much more can the divine will, since it is infinite, be said to will, or to nill, objects without any real or formal mutation of itself, but only through a new connotation of the extrinsic object.

You will press. God can really be said now to will to create another world, if nothing is wanting to him by which he is said to be willing the creation of another world: but really nothing would now be wanting to him for this volition, if his divine free volition consists formally in the entitative act alone: therefore he really ought now to be said to be willing to create another world. The minor is proved: if God now has wholly for creating another world that which I have while I will to write, nothing is now wanting to him for willing the creation of another world: but so it is. It is proved; for just as to me willing to write only the actual writing can be wanting, so that I am really said to write; so if anything were wanting to God willing to create a world, it would be most of all another world: but it is absurd to assert that, in order that I be said to be willing to write, the actual writing is wanting to me: therefore it would be equally absurd to affirm that, in order that God be said to be willing to create another world, only another world is wanting to him; and so nothing would now be wanting to God for willing the creation of another world, if his divine freedom consists formally in his entitative and intrinsic act.

I deny the minor: for God really does not have an actual decree about creating another world for this reason, because his divine will, from the dominion which it has over external objects, does not tend toward the creation of another world, although it could nevertheless through the same entitative volition by which it created this world also will the creation of another.

To the proof I say that not only is another world wanting for this divine volition about the creation of another world, but also the tendency itself of the infinite will toward the creation of another world is wanting; which tendency, although it is necessary on the part of the act, is nevertheless contingent and in every way free on the part of the object, namely of another world, which from itself can be or not be.

It is certain that there is no real distinction, and no real order, among the divine decrees; for since the act in God is one and most simple, there can be no distinction in Him, nor consequently any ordering of that act itself; for nothing is truly said to be ordered to itself. Therefore the whole distinction and the whole order, if any exists, within the divine act itself can be considered only in accordance with our manner of understanding and according to the varied tendency and termination of that divine act toward external objects; so that a distinction is then judged to exist when that divine act is understood to tend toward decreeing some object, without its tendency toward another being understood; and order is conceived in it when it is understood to terminate at one decreed object before it terminates at another, yet in such a way that the tendency toward the one is, as it were, the reason why it tends toward the other. On this difficulty there are chiefly two opposed opinions among theologians; for Ockham, in 1. dist. 9. q. 3., seems to deny that there is any order among the divine decrees and pronounces that no priority and posteriority is to be admitted in them, and not a few theologians, both old and modern, subscribe to him. But the other Princes of Theology contend for establishing this order, and St. Thomas upholds it 1. p. q. 19. art. 5. and q. 28. art. 1. and 2. And the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 7. q. 3. n. 3. and 4., with his more faithful disciples. What sort of order this is, however, and by what source it is to be established and from what it arises, so that you may perceive it more clearly.

Note 1. Chiefly a twofold order can be assigned in the divine realities, namely that of Origin and that of Nature. The former is the presupposition of one to another, by whom it is produced and from whom it originates; thus the Son presupposes the Father, and the Holy Spirit the Father and the Son. The latter, however, is the natural pre-requirement of one for another; thus the divine will presupposes the divine intellect by order of nature; and the divine attributes and all the divine excellences can be said to presuppose the divine Essence, because they flow from it as rays from the Sun. But this order of nature is not to be understood in the divine realities as it is in created ones; for in created things the order of nature imports a true causality, according to which the cause is said to be prior by nature to the effect; causality, however, involves the dependence of the effect on the cause. Hence, since in the divine realities there is no dependence, neither can there be any priority of nature according to causality, but only according to presupposition: whence it is rather called a priority of a sign of reason than of the thing, that is, a priority according to concept, not according to reality.

Note 2. The order among the divine decrees can be derived from the objects in two ways, namely either permissively or positively. Permissively indeed, insofar as it is not repugnant to the nature of the objects themselves to have such an order among themselves; rather a certain capacity and proportion is in them, whether natural or obediential, by which they can be said to be congruously ordered among themselves in this way. Positively, however, when the objects themselves seem from their own nature to demand such an order, so that they cannot be ordered otherwise except with a certain violence and incongruity. Moreover, for means to be ordered to an end by a permissive ordering, it is not necessary that God impress something on them by which they are ordered to a preternatural end; rather it suffices that God wills such means to be employed and ordered to attaining the appointed end. For example, for the works of Christ to be meritorious and satisfactory for the whole human race, it suffices that the divine Father accept those works for that purpose and decree that, given those meritorious works, He will grant grace, the remission of sins and eternal glory to men.

Note 3. The authors who defend the order among the divine decrees chiefly go in three opposed directions. The first is that of Cajetan, 3. part. q. 1. art. 3., who affirms that the order of the divine decrees is to be borrowed from the order which the terms observe among themselves; so that, just as nature seems to be presupposed to grace and grace to the hypostatic union, so he assigns three orders to divine foreknowledge and providence: in the first of which are comprehended all those things which pertain to the uprightness or disorder of nature and reason; in the second are comprehended all the helps of grace and all the supernatural gifts with which Angels and men are adorned; in the third, however, are involved all those things which pertain to the order of the hypostatic union. And thus Cajetan concludes that God first ordered those things which pertain to the order of nature rather than those which pertain to the order of grace, and first those which pertain to the order of grace rather than those which pertain to the order of the hypostatic union; and hence that the union of the Word with human nature was ordered after the foreseen sin of Adam.

Some affirm that the order among the divine decrees is to be derived from the perfection of the divine objects, so that God first decreed those things which are more perfect, and afterwards those which are less perfect. Others, however, judge that this order is to be derived from the objects themselves, as they are subject to the divine will, insofar as He orders them as He wills, although from their own nature they do not demand to be ordered in such a way.

First conclusion. — Among the divine decrees there is truly, actually and intrinsically, an order of priority and posteriority, insofar as, namely, the one and most simple entitative act of the divine will, by reason of its infinity, intrinsically and per se is equivalent to the really distinct acts of creatures, one of which presupposes another. This is the teaching of the Doctor in many places, but especially in 3. dist. 7. q. 3. n. 3. and 4., where he teaches that the divine Word was to be incarnated even if Adam had not sinned, because the predestination of the soul of Christ to glory presupposes no foreseen sin; indeed it precedes the foreknowledge, at least the absolute foreknowledge, of all sins, and also of good works, because one who wills in an ordered way first wills the end rather than the means, that is, first glory rather than good works. Whence he concludes: It can therefore be said that, before anything was foreseen concerning the sinner, whether concerning sin or concerning punishment, God pre-elected to that court all those whom He willed to have as Angels and men in certain and determinate grades. Here it is to be observed that the Doctor, by order of nature, does not understand an order of causality, nor of duration, as the Nominalists and some Thomists falsely interpret; but he calls order of nature only that pre-requirement, or supposition, of one divine notion for another; in which manner even St. Thomas himself, 1. part. quaest. 42. art. 3., admits an order of Nature in the divine realities.

Hence the Conclusion is proved. For there to be a true intrinsic order among the divine acts, two things are required and suffice: first, that there be among them a certain at least virtual distinction, insofar as, namely, the one and same entitative and infinite act of the divine will virtually is equivalent to several acts of the created will; second, that among those acts, distinct through this equivalence, there be a virtual presupposition of one for another, that is, that there be, as it were, a dependence of one upon another; so that if those acts were really distinct, one would truly presuppose the other and in some measure depend upon it, as happens in the acts of the created will. But among the divine acts there is such a virtual distinction and presupposition: therefore among them there is an order of priority and posteriority. The major is evident from what was noted above: for by the order of priority and posteriority in the divine acts nothing else is understood than the distinction and presupposition which is conceived by the human intellect in that same infinite entitative act through its equivalence to the acts of the created will, one of which is ordered to another.

The minor is proved. If anything were to hinder that in that same entitative act there is no distinction and presupposition, it would chiefly be because distinction is repugnant to the divine Simplicity, and the priority and posteriority of order must be excluded by God's supreme actuality; but both of these are false.

Proof 1. from the comparison of the act of the intellect with the act of the will: since truly between the acts of the divine intellect and will there is a true distinction and priority of order; for each act is formally distinguished from the other, as has already been proved several times. Likewise the act of the will presupposes the act of the divine intellect; for the act of the will by which God freely wills some object presupposes the knowledge of it, and the act by which He wills efficaciously to do something presupposes that it can be done; for the divine will cannot be borne toward the unknown any more than the created will, nor is it attracted and moved to love by a good unless it is first known. Hence knowledge is a necessary and pre-required condition for the divine will to be borne toward its object under that notion under which it is foreknown; and the following contexts of Sacred Scripture signify this, Exod. 2. God saw the affliction of his people and took pity; that is, the knowledge of the affliction moved and stirred Him to have mercy: likewise Psal. 102. The Lord has had mercy on those who fear him, since he himself has known our formation. That is, the foreknowledge of human frailty was the incentive of divine mercy, etc.

Proof 2. by comparing the acts of the will with one another: among the acts of the divine will, on account of their equivalence to many acts of the created will, there is some at least virtual distinction, that is, it is equivalent to several distinct acts. Likewise, among some of them there is a virtual presupposition, insofar as one is conceived as being virtually the cause of another, and the willing of one object moves to the willing of another; thus, v. g., He willed Christ to be passible because He willed to redeem men. Therefore the will which He had concerning the salvation of men was, as it were, the cause and reason why He willed Christ to be passible; and hence among the acts of the divine will there is some presupposition and ordering.

Further, without such an order among the acts of the divine will, those things cannot be understood which Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers teach about the mystery of the Incarnation and Predestination; for everywhere they affirm that God willed the Incarnation for the salvation of men, and the whole Church professes this in the Nicene Creed, where it is read that the divine Word, for us men and for our salvation, came down from the Heavens. Likewise Scripture and the holy Fathers for the most part affirm that God willed glory for the Elect partly by an antecedent will and from Himself, out of His good pleasure and pure mercy; partly by a consequent and efficacious will, from the prevision of works and by way of reward; but that He in no way willed damnation from Himself, but only on the occasion given by the reprobate on account of their sins. But these things cannot be understood and reconciled without an order among the acts of the divine will, so that the prevision of good works was the reason why He efficaciously predestined us rather than them to glory, while the prevision of sins was the reason why from eternity He reprobated others: therefore this order must be asserted. The major is evident from the following texts of Scripture and the Fathers: Your perdition is Israel (supply: from you) only in me is your help: likewise 2. ad Timoth. 3. He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, namely by the antecedent will by which He wills no one to perish, but all to be converted to repentance, as St. Peter explains, Epist. 2. cap. 3. Since, however, not all are saved, nor are all efficaciously elected to glory, but some are reprobated and destined to eternal punishment; Christ the Lord teaches that this is to be traced back to the prevision of good or evil works: whence Matth. 25. He says: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was hungry and you gave me to eat, etc.: that is, as St. Chrysostom expounds, Hom. 80. in Matth.: Because I knew that you would be such before you were born; these things have been prepared for you by me: as if He said, the prescience of good works was the cause why God prepared glory for some, or decreed to give it to them rather than to others. St. Ambrose expresses the same thing elegantly, lib. De Fide, cap. 3.: Those whom he foreknew, he says, he also predestined, because he did not predestine before he foreknew; but those whose merits he foreknew, for them he predestined rewards.

Finally, the order of priority and posteriority which Scripture and the Fathers affirm to be among the acts of the divine will is not derived only from an extrinsic denomination to be sought from the objects, or from our manner of understanding and willing, insofar as we conceive one thing as prior and another as posterior: therefore that order is truly intrinsic. The consequence is evident; for if such an order were extrinsic, it would nonetheless have to be affirmed as intrinsic.

The antecedent is proved. The order of priority and posteriority belonging to the divine acts is often contrary to the order of the objects, and with the same order of the objects standing, such an order can be diverse: therefore it does not belong to the divine acts only through an extrinsic denomination. The consequence is evident: for if it belonged to it only by reason of the order of the objects, it would follow that whenever the order among the objects was the same, the order among the acts of the divine will would also be such. But the antecedent is proved as to the first part: the order of the objects is either an order of time, insofar as one is prior to another in duration; or of causality, insofar as one is the cause of another; or of dignity, insofar as one is more perfect than another; or one of the other modes which Aristotle reports and the Philosophers gather from him in the Categories. But God for the most part wills first that which is posterior by any of those modes; for He first willed the Word to be incarnated, v. g., before He willed to permit the fall of Adam from the state of grace conferred through Christ, and yet that fall of Adam was prior in time to the incarnation of the Word. Likewise He willed the blessed Virgin and her ancestors for the sake of Christ; nevertheless the blessed Virgin and her ancestors were prior to Christ not only in time but also in causality. Finally, God willed Christ, at least as passible, for the salvation of men; nevertheless Christ is far nobler than the salvation of men: therefore the order of the divine decrees is not derived from the order of the objects.

The same antecedent is proved as to the second part. Namely, that with the same order of the objects existing, the order in the divine acts could have been diverse: for whether God decreed the incarnation of the Word antecedently to the foreseen fall of Adam, as the Scotists contend, or only consequently, as the Thomists will, the order of the objects is the same: for Adam was created first, and grace was conferred on him, and he fell from the state of grace, before Christ came to repair the fall: and yet in both hypotheses the order of the divine acts concerning the Incarnation is entirely diverse. For in the first hypothesis the willing of the incarnation precedes the will of creating Adam; in the latter, however, it presupposes it: therefore a diverse order can exist in diverse acts, with the same order standing in the objects; and hence that order of the divine acts is not drawn out of the objects themselves.

You will say 1. Although our intellect forms various enunciations and various discourses about God and His will and other perfections, it does not follow from this that there is found in God an enunciative or discursive knowledge, even to be attributed to Him extrinsically: therefore, by parity of reasoning, although we conceive the acts of the divine intellect and of the divine will as prior or posterior in a certain order, it does not follow on that account that there is truly some order in those divine acts.

I deny the consequence: and the reason of the disparity is that enunciative or discursive knowledge involves several imperfections altogether unbecoming to God; for since discourse is the inference of the less known from the more known, it supposes in the one who discourses some ignorance, which is altogether repugnant to God, the treasury and abyss of the sciences. But the order of priority and posteriority in the divine acts argues no imperfection, indeed the highest perfection; because it supposes the one and same entitative act of the divine will, which by reason of its infinity is equivalent to all created acts; and this equivalence includes no imperfection, indeed it signifies the infinity of that act. For just as it is of the highest and infinite perfection that one most simple divine real entity be equivalent to all created beings and infinitely transcend them; so likewise it is a highest and infinite perfection in that simple real act of the divine will that of itself it be equivalent to all the acts of the created will and comprehend in itself whatever the created will can do by its diverse acts.

You will say 2. Where there is a unique and simple entity altogether indistinct, no ordering can be found: but the act of the divine will is unique and altogether simple: therefore it recognizes no intrinsic order; but if there is any order in it, it must be only extrinsic and to be sought from the diversity of our intellections, or from the order of the objects with which it is concerned.

I distinguish the antecedent: where there is a unique and simple entity that is finite and limited, I concede: one that is infinite and indeed unique, and simple formally, but virtually manifold, I deny. It is certain, however, that although that act of the divine will is altogether simple according to entity, nevertheless by reason of its infinity it is virtually and equivalently manifold, as has already been said above: and hence although indeed there is in it no actual real or formal distinction, nevertheless there is to be admitted in it a virtual distinction, equivalent to the distinction which could be found in the acts of the created will; and consequently an order can also be affirmed in it intrinsically, equivalently and virtually.

Second conclusion. — The order among the divine decrees is not to be borrowed from the order which their objects observe among themselves: nor from the dignity of the objects themselves: nor from their natural disposition: but only insofar as the objects themselves are subject to the divine will.

This Conclusion has four parts, of which the first is proved against Cajetan. A diverse order can stand in the divine acts with the same order standing in their objects: therefore the order of the divine acts is not to be traced back to their objects. The consequence is evident. But the antecedent has been proved in the preceding Conclusion.

The antecedent is proved. First, for there are many objects in the order of nature which have no order and no connection with the order of grace; for example, that Peter is to be predestined blind or seeing, white or black. Second, the death of the predestined is of the order of nature, and yet it is posterior to the election to glory which pertains to the order of grace; for that death is an effect of predestination according to that text of Wisdom 4. He was taken away lest wickedness change his understanding. Third, from the foreseen merits of Christ God decreed to confer grace on all, especially that grace which was granted to men after the fall of Adam: therefore the decree of the Incarnation precedes the decree of conferring grace; and hence Cajetan falsely wove his order, and consequently the order of the divine acts is not to be borrowed from him.

The second part also remains proved from those things which we said in the preceding Conclusion, namely that that order in the divine acts does not arise from the dignity and excellence of the objects: for Christ the Lord, although far nobler than the salvation of men, is nevertheless ordered by God to the salvation of men themselves, so that God first willed the salvation of men rather than the Incarnation of the Word, because He first intends the end rather than the means.

Nor does it matter that the Subtle Doctor in 3. d. 7. quaest. 3. n. 3. asserts that one who wills in an ordered way universally seems first to will that which is nearer to the end, and so, just as he first wills glory for someone rather than grace, so also among the predestined to whom he wills glory, he seems in an ordered way first to will glory for him whom he wills to be nearest to the end, etc. For the Doctor, by that which is nearer to the end, did not understand that which is nearer in dignity precisely and absolutely, but that which is indeed nearer in dignity insofar as this dignity more conduces to the attainment of the end. In which manner, since the incarnation and glorification of the Word more conduces to the divine honor than the glorification of the rest of the predestined, therefore the Doctor rightly concludes in that place that God wills glory for the Soul of Christ before He wills glory for anyone else, and first wills grace and glory for everyone else before He foresees the opposites of those habits, namely of grace and glory, that is, sin and damnation: therefore He first wills glory for the soul of Christ before He foresees that Adam will fall.

But so that these things may be perceived more easily, it is to be observed that among the divine decrees there are two opposite orders, namely of intention and of execution, according to the diverse consideration of the end and of the means. The order of intention is that which first regards the end as to be attained through means; but the order of execution first regards the means themselves by which the intended end is in fact acquired. And since in intention the end is the cause of the means, which are not sought nor taken up by the one operating except for the sake of attaining the end, therefore in the order of intention the end is prior to the means: but since in the actual attainment of the end the means are taken up as efficient causes, so that the one operating obtains the intended end, therefore in the order of execution the means are prior to the end. Hence by the order of intention God first decrees the end rather than the means, and among the means first chooses that which is nearer to the end, and which contributes last to the attainment of the end.

Then He orders the less remote means, and so on with the rest up to the last: which the praised Subtle Doctor understood, saying that one who wills in an ordered way first wills the end, and afterwards those things which are the means to attaining the end, and among the means that which is nearer to the end according to causality and efficacy, whether it be the more worthy in the meantime, or have this efficacy from its own nature, or from divine ordering. But the order of execution is altogether opposite to it: for God first wills and decrees the last means, and each of the rest in its order; and last He intends and decrees the end to be attained, which St. Paul clearly discloses, ad Rom. 8., saying: Those whom he foreknew he also predestined... and those whom he predestined, these he also called; and those whom he called, these he also justified; and those whom he justified, them he also glorified. By which Words he signifies that divine foreknowledge is the first means of the predestination of the just, that final justification is the last means, and that glory is the end which is attained last.

The last part is proved, namely that the order of the divine decrees is not to be traced back to the natural order which the objects themselves observe among themselves; both because the act of the divine will is the cause of the order which creatures observe among themselves and toward God Himself: therefore the order of creatures cannot be the cause of the order which is to be found in the divine acts: and because there are many objects which from their own nature have no order among themselves, or toward God, but receive it from the divine will: therefore such an order in the divine acts is not to be traced back to the natural order which the objects observe among themselves. The antecedent is proved by various examples; for God instituted the Sacraments, as sensible signs, as means to the justification of the sinner and to the increase of grace, to which end from their own nature they have no order. Likewise He permits the Elect to fall at times into grave sins so that they may thereby be humbled and become more cautious and more fervent; between that good and the permission of sin there is no order ex natura rei, but rather the permission of sin by its own nature regards only the evil of fault. Likewise He willed the Incarnation of the divine Word for the redemption of the human race, to which that Incarnation is not ordered by its own nature.

Finally, to pass over other countless things, He willed to be served both in the old and in the new law by various ceremonies for Himself, which are not determined by nature to the worship of God: for ex natura rei it is all the same whether such an animal, for example, or another is offered in sacrifice, or whether bare bread and bare wine, or the accidents of bread and wine insofar as they contain the body and blood of Christ, are the holocaust of the new law.

It remains, therefore, that the order of the acts of the divine will is to be borrowed entirely from the order which the objects observe among themselves, as they are subject to the divine will itself and insofar as the divine will itself disposes and orders them; so that the intrinsic ordering of God is rightly gathered from the extrinsic ordering of the objects.