Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

It is certain that the entitative act of the divine will is one and indivisible, really undistinguished from the will itself, whose principal properties are the following: First, that that act of volition and love is not an accident, but a substance; since it is identified with the divine essence and is God Himself; and therefore it is likewise eternal, necessary and immutable, since it is the very entity of the real Divinity. Second, it is infinite and terminates at all lovable and willable objects, and is virtually equivalent to all the acts of the created will, so that the same one divine entity of act is at once volition and nolition, love and hatred of the same object, according to the diversity of time, and also of diverse objects according to their various affections. Third and finally, that act of the divine will is one and most simple both really and formally; for just as that act is infinite, so likewise it is necessarily one; for there cannot be several infinite things of the same notion. Hence the whole multiplicity of acts of the divine will, if there be any, is not intrinsic but extrinsic, and must be regarded not in terms of entity but in terms of tendency and termination toward diverse objects. Since, therefore, the acts and effects of the created will are diverse, in this Question too it is asked whether that diversity of acts and effects, at least according to tendency and termination, can be formally admitted in God; in order that this may be done more easily

Note 1. The acts and effects of the created will can be distinguished into three kinds: for some regard the end and the means ordered to it; and these are simple volition, intention, election, consent, command, execution, fruition. Others regard either good or evil, and these are especially called affections: and they are of two sorts; for some proceed from the concupiscible appetite; others arise from the irascible. The former are love, hatred, desire, flight, delight, sadness. The latter, however, are hope, despair, fear, daring and wrath. Hence in the present Question it must be resolved whether all these acts and affections of the human will can likewise be formally attributed to the divine will.

Note 2. It is certain that neither Hope nor Despair in any way befits God. Both because hope is about an arduous good, while despair is about an arduous evil; and for omnipotent God nothing can be arduous; and because hope is not about what is evidently known to be future, for, as St. Paul says in Rom. 8., Hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man sees, why does he hope for it? But if we hope for what we see not, we hope with patience: God, however, evidently knows every future thing, and therefore cannot hope. Finally, because hope regards him from whom something is hoped for, as a superior and more powerful one, who can grant what is hoped for; for no one is properly said to hope for something from himself: but God can regard no one of this sort, and therefore cannot have the affection of hope or despair.

Note 3. Likewise in God there is no Sadness, nor Fear, because sadness is about one's own present evil: fear, however, regards an absent but imminent evil. Although fear and sadness can be about the evil of one's neighbor, from the affection of love and charity toward him, nevertheless even so they cannot be in God: because although fear and sadness are about the future or present evil of a friend, they are nevertheless about it as apprehended as if it were one's own evil; whence it happens that even in us it excites and moves a passion of the appetite. But although our future or present evil displeases God, He nevertheless never apprehends it as if it were His own, which however seems necessary for the notion of fear and sadness about the good of a friend. Hence there remains only the difficulty about the other acts and affections of the will to be examined; and so that it may be solved more evidently, we shall discuss all these affections and acts individually in the following paragraphs.

§ I. — On divine Love. It is certain and stands by faith that God loves creatures; since Sapientiae 11: You love all things that are, and hate nothing of what you have made; Ieremiae 31: I have loved you with an everlasting charity; Ioann. 4: God so loved the world, etc. But because love is an affection midway between desire and joy or delight, insofar as joy is about a present and possessed good; desire, however, about an absent good which can be possessed; love, however, about good considered in itself and prescinding from presence and absence; since divine goodness does not abstract from presence and absence, but is intimately present to God and possessed by Him; therefore it seems to some Theologians that God does not have love formally considered with respect to His divine goodness, although perhaps He has it with respect to goods ad extra. Moreover, since in love there is a twofold respect, one toward the thing to which we will good, the other toward the good itself which we will; by reason of the former it is called love of friendship, while by reason of the latter it is named love of concupiscence: not that there is really a twofold act of love, but only because in the same act there is a twofold respect of love. Hence two things are to be resolved here: First, whether God really has love distinct from desire and joy. Second, whether He has the love of friendship toward creatures.

I say 1. That in God there is true Love formally distinct from joy and desire: both because Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers constantly attribute to God love toward Himself; and they affirm that the Holy Spirit proceeds through love; which certainly must not be explained of improper love, but of formal and most perfect love; especially since this formal love in no way misbecomes God, as will be clear in the solution of the objections. Then because whoever has will formally also has love formally; for, from Aristotle 2. Rethoricorum, cap. 1, to love is to will good to someone and to have complacency in him; and therefore to love befits Him no less properly than to will: but in God there is will formally: therefore also love. Finally, because if anything stood in the way of love taken most strictly, and as distinguished from joy, being attributed to God, it would be chiefly because this love would have to terminate at an absent good, not at a present and possessed good: but the consequent is false.

Proof. Love terminates no less at that which is suitable, whether it be meanwhile existing or prescinding from existence, than at a good object as it is formally good: but it really terminates at good insofar as it is good: therefore it can really also terminate at a suitable object insofar as it is suitable, whether it be meanwhile considered as actually existing, or insofar as it prescinds from existence.

It is confirmed 1. If the presence of the object were repugnant to love, it would follow that joy and love could nowhere subsist together, and no one could rejoice in a possessed good because he loves it, but because he loved it when he did not yet possess it: but this consequent is shown to be false, from the fact that the good about which we rejoice begins to displease when it begins not to be loved, and the joy about it is diminished together with the love of it. Then, so far is it from being the case that the presence of the object is repugnant to love and extinguishes it, that rather it increases and perfects it; which is especially evident in spiritual goods, whose possession does not diminish love but increases it: in which they differ greatly from temporal goods, which before their possession kindle desire, but once possessed generate disgust on account of their smallness. Finally, beatific love truly tends toward God as possessed, not however insofar as He abstracts from possession or non-possession: therefore such precision is not of the concept and essence of love. The antecedent is clear: for beatific love is regulated by intuitive cognition regarding God as He is in Himself; and consequently not attaining God insofar as He prescinds from possession or non-possession: therefore such precision is not necessary for love.

You will say 1. Acts are distinguished by their objects: but the object of love is good as such, abstracting from presence and absence, from possession or non-possession of it: therefore since the act of the divine Will terminates at the divine will, as present and possessed, it will not have the notion of love or hatred.

I distinguish the minor. The object of love is good abstracting from possession and non-possession, so that the notion of possessed and attained holds only materially and as the notion which is attained, I concede: so that it holds formally and reduplicatively insofar as it is the notion under which, or motive, I deny. In the first way indeed it terminates the act of love: in the second, however, it terminates and specifies the act of fruition and joy. But in order that love be distinguished from joy, a positive precision of goodness from possession is not necessary, but a negative one suffices: that is, it suffices that the object be indeed possessed, yet not be loved precisely and formally insofar as it is possessed.

You will say 2. In God there is no knowledge of simple intelligence about Himself: therefore neither is there strict love about His own goodness. The consequence is proved: God does not have knowledge of simple intelligence about Himself for this reason, because the object of this knowledge prescinds from existence; but God cannot know Himself except as existing: but the object of love also prescinds from existence, insofar as it differs from the object of joy: therefore, etc.

I answer 1. by denying the consequence: for God truly knows Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence, nor is it required for that knowledge that its object prescind from existence, as has already been said in treating of divine cognition. Second, there is a disparity between love and simple knowledge, insofar as the latter is concerned with creatures, namely that simple knowledge knows creatures only as possible and insofar as they positively prescind from existence; while knowledge of vision attains them as existing, or as about to exist: love, however, insofar as it is distinguished from joy, need not terminate at a possessed good insofar as it positively prescinds from actual possession, but it suffices that it prescind from it negatively, that is, that it not be attained through love precisely and formally insofar as it is possessed, but only insofar as it is suitable.

I say 2. In God there is true love of friendship. So the Doctor in 3. dist. 27. n. 20. And it is proved first from several texts of Sacred Scripture by which men are proclaimed friends of God; thus Ps. 138: Your friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable. Sap. 7: Wisdom passes into holy souls and makes friends of God. Ioann. 15¹: I will no longer call you servants, but friends: and you are my friends. Then Scripture admits all the conditions of friendship between God and us, namely mutual love known on both sides: Ioann. 10: I know my sheep, and mine know me: finally communication, Proverb. 8. My delights are to be with the children of men. Ioann. 14: We will come to him and make our abode with him. Apocalyp. 3²: I will come in to him and will sup with him, and he with me.

It is proved secondly by reason. The love of friendship consists chiefly in this, that someone wills good to another insofar as it is suitable to him, and that this benevolence is mutual: but God can, without any imperfection, will the good of a rational creature not for His own sake, but for the creature's sake, since God receives absolutely no utility from the good communicated to the creature: He can therefore have the love of benevolence toward it. Likewise, a rational creature can love God in return, and will good to Him, namely glory and honor; and therefore this benevolence can be mutual.

You will say from Aristotle, 8. Ethic. cap. 7. friendship is only among equals: therefore no friendship can exist between God and rational creatures.

The cited Doctor answers. that Aristotle there speaks of perfect and strictly taken friendship, such as indeed is not between God and rational creatures; but he did not deny friendship between God and men, nor between a Prince and a subject. Rather, between them there is a certain friendship of excellence, for that excellence of the object, says the Doctor,

does not remove what is of perfection in the object, but what is of imperfection. For honesty in the lovable and being loved in return in the beloved are conditions per se in the lovable, not indeed of imperfection; indeed it would not be perfection if it did not love in return: but equality in these is a concomitant condition. God, however, has honesty and being loved in return, as well as loving, and the friendship toward Him can be more excellent, thus it is called Superfriendship. — And if it be argued that equality is the notion of friendship; that is true given the honesty which is the first notion of the lovable, but equality is the notion of friendship strictly taken; but excellence is the notion of a habit more similar, or more perfect, than friendship; such a one in the present case I call charity.

As for irrational creatures, however, it is certain that they are loved by God, not indeed with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence, insofar as He wills them for the advantage and utility of rational creatures. Since, therefore, God loves all inanimate and irrational things for our utility and advantage, it follows that they are not the object of the love of friendship and benevolence, unless perhaps imperfectly. Or as the Doctor speaks in 3. dist. 32. ad secundum,

Although inanimate things are not properly lovable out of charity, which is friendship, and toward them friendship is not properly to be had, nevertheless some willing out of charity can be had toward them, namely such as is to be had toward them; for I can out of charity will that a tree exist, and that the tree serve me for such an act, insofar as such an act helps me further to love God in Himself.

And in this way it can be conceded that God loves all things out of charity, not with a volition of friendship, but with such as is to be had with respect to them.

From these things it is clear that joy is formally in God; for it is the affection about a possessed good insofar as it is possessed: but God truly possesses Himself, the greatest of all goods, and enjoys Himself, and therefore has joy formally.

§ II. — Whether hatred formally befits God. A twofold hatred is distinguished, one indeed of Abomination, the other of Enmity. The hatred of abomination is displeasure at an evil which we or others suffer. In which two acts are involved: the first indeed of love toward the person; the second, however, of displeasure toward the evil that befalls him; for this is why we grieve that evil befalls someone, because we love him. The hatred of enmity is to will evil to someone under that notion by which it is evil to him. In which hatred likewise there are two acts, namely displeasure at the person and complacency about the evil that befalls him; thus, v. g., in hating the person of Peter, his enemy takes pleasure in the loss of his reputation or goods. But it is asked whether each of these hatreds is formally in God.

I say 1. That in Him there is formally the hatred of abomination; for, as St. Thomas speaks in 1. 2. quaest. 29. n. 1, hatred is a dissonance of the appetite from that which appears harmful and repugnant: but the impious man and impiety are repugnant to divine honor: therefore they also dissonate with the divine appetite, and therefore in Him there is hatred. — Then, sin displeases God no less properly, and He would not will it to be done by man, than He desires the just and upright life of man: but sin displeases God for a twofold reason, namely insofar as it is contrary to Himself, and insofar as it is harmful to man: therefore God hates sin out of complacency in Himself and in man, and therefore has the hatred of abomination toward sin together with love toward Himself and toward men. — Finally, God is deemed formally to hate that which is in every way repugnant to His will: but sin is in every way repugnant to the divine Will, since God forbids that it be committed, and severely punishes it once committed, and consequently has the hatred of abomination toward it.

You will say. Hatred is referred to subsisting things, as also love which terminates at a subsisting thing, not indeed at an accident: but sin is not subsisting, for it is a privation and a lack of rectitude: therefore God cannot hate it.

I deny the major. For the hatred of abomination is not concerned with the person, but with that which is repugnant and unsuitable to him, whether it be a substance or an accident. Whence with this hatred we hate death, sickness, sins, etc., which are accidents, and that formally and properly; otherwise we would not properly be said to hold sin in hatred, about which we grieve and repent.

I say 2. That the hatred of enmity is also formally in God, as is clear from that passage of Exodi 23: I will be an enemy to your enemies. And Sapientiae 14: The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God. And Psalm. 5: You hate all who work iniquity. These texts expressly affirm that God hates not only sin, but also the sinner. Second, God not only wills punishment to the sinful man, but also wills it to him out of displeasure at the person himself and insofar as it is his evil: therefore He holds the sinner himself in the hatred of enmity. The antecedent is clear: for although the person himself, insofar as he is a creature of God, does not displease Him, yet he truly displeases Him insofar as he is defiled with sins, which suffices for the notion of hatred and enmity; for it is enough that a person displease for some reason, on account of which the affection is moved to will evil to him insofar as it is his evil. But God, in inflicting punishment on account of the offense, wills evil to the sinner, as it is his evil; for punishment, as punishment, is the evil of him who suffers it: therefore God wills evil to the sinner, as it is his evil, out of displeasure at him.

You will say 1. To will evil to someone, insofar as it is the evil of the sinner himself who justly deserves that evil, is an act of the love of justice: therefore it is not formally hatred.

I deny the consequence. For that volition is formally an act of hatred, because its proper object is evil under the notion of evil, although that hatred sometimes proceeds from the love of justice.

You will say 2. The will of God cannot be borne toward evil as evil: therefore God cannot hate in this way; and so when God inflicts punishment on some sinner, He always intends some notion of good, namely the manifestation of His justice toward sinners.

I distinguish the minor. The will cannot be borne toward evil insofar as it is evil, unless it have some notion of good joined to it, I concede; if it has it, I deny. But while He wills evil to the sinner, He indeed always intends some good arising therefrom, namely the manifestation of His justice, which nevertheless does not stand in the way of the hatred of enmity which He has toward the sinner, because He truly inflicts punishment on him as it is his evil, insofar as sin displeases Him; otherwise we could hate no one with the hatred of enmity, for we will evil to no one, except because some true or apparent good accrues to us therefrom.

You will say 3. The hatred of enmity is directly against charity; but in God there cannot be any act opposed to charity: therefore neither can there be the hatred of enmity.

I answer. The hatred arising from displeasure at the person of the sinner to whom punishment is inflicted is not opposed to charity; otherwise a Judge, in punishing the guilty man, would sin against charity, which is false. Only, therefore, is hatred opposed to charity when the utility which follows from that volition of evil is only to appease the wrath of the one who hates. But God does not will punishment to the sinner in this way, but for the manifestation of His vindicative justice; indeed, out of charity someone can will the evil of punishment to a friend who sins, so that, chastised, he may be amended thereby. Whence in this hatred there are three things. 1. The object, namely the evil of punishment. 2. The subject, the person of the sinner. 3. The motive, namely sin.

§ III. — On the other Affections. Desire is not formally in God, nor Flight, with respect to Himself, because desire is the inclination of the one willing toward an absent good, while flight is the avoidance of an imminent evil. But God, since He is every good, and can hope for no future and absent good, and no evil can approach Him, hence He can neither desire nor flee His own good or evil. Since, however, desire and flight can be referred to the good and evil of others — for we desire good and flee future evil not only for ourselves, but also for others — for this reason God can be said to desire and flee something, since He desires eternal salvation for us, as St. Chrysostom expressly indicates, Hom. 1. in Epist. ad Ephesios, To will this to be done vehemently, he says, this was His desire, etc. Nor does it matter that nothing is absent to God, for it suffices for the notion of desire and flight that the good and the evil be absent to him for whom we desire such good and flee such evil.

— Wrath is formally in God; for wrath, according to the Doctor in 3. dist. 31. n. 16, is the appetite of vengeance according to apparent reason, on account of apparent contempt. Or, as Lactantius says, lib. De Ira Dei cap. 17, Wrath is the movement of the mind rising up to coerce sins: but such an affection is formally in God, as is clear from several texts of Scripture: therefore, etc. Nor does it matter that the holy Fathers, especially Basil on that Psal. 37. Nor in your wrath chasten me, Cyrillus lib. 5. contra Iulianum, Cyprianus ad Demetrianum, etc., remove wrath from God, and affirm that it is attributed to Him by Scripture only through metaphor. For they speak of wrath insofar as it carries with it a commotion and perturbation of mind, in which manner Sacred Scripture also sometimes takes divine wrath. Thus Psal. 37: Lord, do not rebuke me in your fury, nor in your wrath, etc. Likewise Psalm. 29: For wrath is in his indignation. And Psal. 105: The Lord was angry with fury. These and similar texts are to be interpreted metaphorically and tropically, that is, according to our manner of speaking. The holy Fathers do not, however, speak of wrath insofar as it is the affection of vengeance in one who can avenge himself.

Nor should you say. that wrath always has sadness joined with it, for this is true only, says the cited Doctor, when the angry man desires to avenge but does not avenge; when, however, he actually avenges, then his act is perfect, assimilated to fruition on the part of the concupiscible, and then for the irascible to be angry is without sadness; indeed it is with a great delight proper to it, according to Arist. 2. Rethoric. The wrath of a man is like honey.

— As for the acts of the divine will, however, which regard the end or the means, they will be discussed in a more fitting order and method in the Disputation on the Providence of God, where we will set forth how God intends the end, to which He destines and orders all things through chosen, more fitting means.