Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

It is certain that God loves existing creatures, inasmuch as they are good and lovable; for the sacred text says that He saw all the things which He had made, and they were very good: whence the Sage, addressing God in cap. 1., says: You love all things that are, and You hate none of the things which You have made: for You did not appoint or make anything: but how could anything endure, unless You had willed it? Or how could that which was not called by You be preserved? By which words the Sage, with no less subtlety than elegance, gathers the divine love toward creatures from their creation and conservation: for both are the surest indication of divine love. Hence there is no need to weave more at length in confirmation of this truth; since not only the whole world and whatever creatures are in it, but even the individual pages of the Scriptures exhibit a special token of divine love toward creatures.

— But no light difficulty arises as to how God loves the creatures themselves. Hence three things especially are to be resolved in this Question; first indeed, whether God truly loves purely possible creatures. Second, whether He loves creatures both actual and future, as well as possible, necessarily or freely as regards exercise. Third, whether He loves them on account of their formal goodness, or only on account of His essential goodness. So that these may be resolved more evidently and easily

Note 1. That since creatures can be considered according to their threefold being, namely, either according to eminent being, which they have in the divine Essence, which since it is

an infinite sea of being, says St. John Damascene, is not only being by essence, nor only the fountain and origin of all beings by participation, nor finally only the supreme of beings by majesty and dominion: but is also every being by eminence and superexcellent dignity, because it comprehends all the perfections of all beings in a more sublime grade and state.

Or they can be considered according to virtual being, which they are said to have in the divine Omnipotence, which is productive of them: namely, in that manner in which any effect is virtually contained in its productive cause. Or finally according to the formal and entitative being which they have in themselves. So likewise a threefold goodness can be distinguished, namely, eminent, virtual and formal. The first and second belong not so much to them as to God, in whom they have eminent and virtual being. For it has already been said often that that eminent and virtual being is not proper to creatures, but to God alone; or rather, that it is the divine being itself: whence only the difficulty about formal goodness remains, namely, whether God loves creatures on account of their formal goodness, which they have in themselves.

Note 2. According to the Subtle Doctor in 3. dist. 32. num. 2., a twofold love can be distinguished in God, namely, efficacious love, or of benevolence, and inefficacious love, or of complacency. The former is an efficacious volition of God, by which He operates something with regard to creatures, either by leading them from the state of possibility to the state of futurition, and from futurition to actual existence; or by operating something in them when they exist; whether in the order of nature through their conservation and His cooperation in acting; or in the order of grace, through their sanctification, excitation and supernatural motion; or finally in the order of glory, by beatifying them through the manifestation of His Divinity. The latter, however, is a simple affection which He has toward creatures, yet operating nothing about them, but only taking complacency in them; or, as the Doctor says, God loves some things with an efficacious love, namely those which He sometimes produces into being: some things with a certain non-efficacious complacent volition, which however He never produces into being: they are nevertheless shown by His intellect, as possible things, to have so great goodness, just as those which He loves with efficacious love.

Note 3. That this is the difference between indifference, necessity and essential liberty: First, that indifference cannot subsist with necessity; for what is indifferent is contingent, and can be or not be: but the necessary and the contingent are mutually at odds; and so they cannot subsist together: necessity, however, stands with essential liberty, which involves no indifference but only the voluntary inclination of the divine will toward its object. Secondly, indifference is the companion, indeed the formal notion of liberty as regards specification and as regards exercise; for what is free as regards specification can tend to this or that object, and that through an act of love, or of hatred, of flight or of pursuit: likewise what is free as regards exercise can elicit the act, or not elicit it, or suspend it, even with all the circumstances required for acting being present; which indifference is in no way found in essential liberty; for this is neither indifferent to loving or hating its primary object, nor indifferent to eliciting its act or not eliciting it, but necessarily, yet voluntarily, inclines to both.

First conclusion. — God truly loves possible creatures with a love of simple complacency.

So the Doctor teaches in many places¹, most especially in 1. dist. 8. quaest. 5., and in 3. dist. 32. n. 2., as well as in quaest. 16. Quodlibetica, Litt. I.

Proof 1. God loves that which is good: but those possible creatures are good: therefore they are also loved by God. The major is evident. The minor is proved: those possible creatures are truly possible beings: therefore they have the properties of being, which are truth and goodness, and consequently just as by reason of their entitative truth they are knowable and known by God, so likewise by reason of their goodness they are lovable and loved by Him. — Next, the divine will is no less universal than the divine intellect: but the divine intellect is concerned with knowing possible creatures: therefore in like manner the divine will ought to be concerned with loving them. The major is certain; for just as the divine intellection would not be comprehensive unless it knew everything knowable; so by parity the divine love would not be comprehensive unless it reached everything lovable: but the love of God ought equally to be comprehensive, as is the divine intellection: therefore just as this is concerned with everything intelligible, whether actual, future and possible, so in like manner that ought to be concerned with everything lovable, whether actual, future and possible.

— Finally, if God did not love possible creatures with a love of complacency, it would be chiefly because they are only possible: but this reason does not hinder divine love; since when we intend some thing on account of an end and are moved to its pursuit, for the reason that we take complacency in it when it is proposed through the intellect, then such a thing is only proposed as possible: therefore with regard to a possible thing simple complacency and an inefficacious love can exist.

Add. that God takes complacency in His Omnipotence, by which He has a connection with possible things: therefore in like manner He takes complacency in those possible things.

You will say 1. A possible thing is pure nothing: therefore it is not a being, nor consequently is it good, nor therefore is it an object of the will.

I distinguish. It is pure nothing actually and according to actual existence, I concede; it is pure nothing as possible and according to essential truth, I deny; therefore although possible things formally considered and in act are pure nothing, or at least a being of reason; nevertheless they are something real and possible, and the divine intellect considers in them a possible goodness, and presents it to the divine will, which suffices for them to be loved by God. For God truly loves future creatures, because they will one day have real goodness, although in fact and in act they are nothing.

You will say 2. To love is to will some good to someone: but to possible creatures God wills no good; indeed He wills to them the greatest evil, namely the lack of existence and of actual reality: therefore He does not love them.

I distinguish the major. To love something with a love of friendship is to will good to it, I concede; to love something with a love of simple complacency is to will good to it, I deny: for this it suffices that the lover take complacency in the loved object, forming no volition about its good or evil; for besides benevolence there is simple complacency, just as besides malevolence there is simple displeasure. But God takes complacency in possible creatures, for the reason that they are certain participations of His own being: nor does He will non-existence to them: but He merely takes complacency in them and behaves merely negatively as regards the volition or nolition of existence. For neither is there need, for love, to confer something on the beloved; for God loves Himself, and yet confers nothing on Himself: similarly God rejoices and takes pleasure in the beatitude and gifts which He confers on the Blessed without any new interior conferral, lest one proceed to infinity: for the love of complacency does not require the conferral of good, but presupposes it.

You will say 3. If God loves possible things, He will also love possible sin: the consequence is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved: possible sin is truly possible: therefore it has the true notion of a possible being, and so has a possible goodness, and consequently a lovability.

I distinguish the antecedent. He will love possible sin as regards the physical entity of the act, which is producible by God and a certain participation of His own being, I concede: as regards the moral deordination and the lack of rightness, which is not producible, nor has any efficient cause, but only a deficient and exorbitant created will, I deny.

Second conclusion. — God freely loves creatures both actual and future; but possible ones He loves necessarily.

This Conclusion has two parts: of which the first is proved, namely that God freely loves actual and future creatures: God freely operates ad extra: therefore He freely wills and loves the creatures which He either decrees as future, or produces as existing. The antecedent is determined de fide in the Council of Constance, sess. 8. art. 7., against Wycliffe, and is established by several texts of Sacred Scripture, for Ps. 93. the God of revenge hath acted freely: And Rom. 9. He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will, He hardeneth. — Next, the will is not a necessary principle of producing any love of any object, says the Doctor in 1. dist. 10. n. 9., unless it be a necessary principle of loving that object: but the infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving a finite object, because then God would necessarily love any creature whatsoever, indeed everything lovable: therefore neither is it a necessary principle of producing His love by comparing it to any object whatsoever. — Finally, he who necessarily wills the end, ought not on that account necessarily to will the means ordered to the end, especially while such an end can be obtained without the means: therefore although creatures are means ordered to God, as to their end, since God possesses and loves Himself independently of creatures, even if He necessarily loves Himself, He nevertheless ought not necessarily to love creatures.

You will say 1. God necessarily knows existing and future creatures: therefore He necessarily wills and loves them. The consequence is proved: for there is no greater reason why divine knowledge should extend to all knowable things, than divine will to all lovable things.

I distinguish the antecedent. God necessarily knows existing and future creatures, presupposing their free futurition and existence, I concede; absolutely and simpliciter, I deny: whence the knowledge of vision, by which God knows future and existing creatures, is simpliciter free, because it supposes the free determination of God and His voluntary decree about the futurition and existence of those creatures; whence it is only necessary consequently, namely from His presupposed immutable decree; and this necessity the divine will also has.

You will say 2. That God communicates Himself to creatures through their futurition and existence is an effect of His goodness and liberality: but God necessarily loves His liberality and goodness: therefore He also necessarily loves His communication of Himself to creatures in decreeing their futurition and existence.

I distinguish the minor. God necessarily loves His goodness and liberality, as regards entity and inasmuch as it is a virtue and perfection of His Divinity, I concede; as regards the exercise of liberality and His actual communication, I deny; for since this is rather a perfection of the creature than of God, it is only freely loved and intended by God.

The second part of the Conclusion, namely that God necessarily loves possible creatures as regards exercise, is the express opinion of the Doctor, as appears from several of his texts, most especially from q. 16. Quodl. art. 1., near the end, where, having distinguished a twofold necessity, namely the necessity of Immutability, which excludes succession, and the necessity of Inevitability, or of determination, by which it excludes not only succession, but also the power of not doing something; he adds:

Of the second necessity it can be said, that although the divine will necessarily has an act of complacency with respect to anything intelligible, inasmuch as in it a certain participation of His own goodness is shown; nevertheless He does not necessarily will anything created with an efficacious volition, that is, one determinative of it to existing; indeed He thus contingently wills that a creature be, just as He contingently causes it, because if He willed it to be necessarily with this second necessity, He would also necessarily, with the necessity of inevitability, cause it.

by which words the Doctor distinguishes the love which God has toward future and existing creatures from that which He has toward possible ones, for the reason that He loves the former freely, but these necessarily.

It is further proved. if God freely loved possible creatures from eternity with freedom as regards exercise, He could love them or not love them, just as He can love and not love future or existing creatures; because He can decree or not decree their futurition and existence; but this cannot be said.

Proof. if God could love or not love possible creatures, it would follow that they could become loved from being unloved: but the consequence is false.

Proof. something cannot become loved from being unloved unless some change intervenes, either in the lover, or in the thing loved: but no change can fall, neither in God loving, because He is immutable; nor in possible things, because they are always necessarily possible in the same way: therefore they cannot become loved from being unloved, nor consequently can they be loved or not loved by God. And so either they must be necessarily always loved, or always not loved: but it cannot be said that they are necessarily not loved by God, since some goodness belongs to them by which they can please God: therefore the will of God necessarily loves, both as regards specification and as regards exercise, because they cannot displease God, and because they cannot not be loved by God.

It is confirmed. for this reason God is said to freely love future and existing creatures, because His divine will is judged to be terminated toward them otherwise than it was terminated toward their possibility; since from possible things they become future, and from future things they become existing. Therefore since that divine will is always terminated in the same way toward possible creatures, it cannot be said that He freely loves them.

Further, if God were free from eternity to take complacency or not to take complacency in possible things, it would follow that even now He could refrain from taking complacency in them: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved; because if God from eternity could, without any change in Himself, not take complacency in creatures in which He now takes complacency, He could even now, without any change in Himself, take complacency in those possible creatures in which He previously took complacency; but this is absurd, since there is no transition from one contradictory to the other without some change: but no change can be conceived, either in the possible creature loved, or in God loving: therefore there is none.

— Finally, the freedom or necessity in the act of the divine will is drawn from the free or necessary state of the object to which it terminates: but possible creatures are necessary: therefore God necessarily loves them. The major is evident, both because we must reason in the same way about the knowledge as about the love of God concerning external objects: but the knowledge of God which is concerned with necessary objects, such as possibles are, is said to be necessary; while that which is concerned with free objects, such as future and existing things are, is said to be free: therefore by parity the love of God concerning necessary objects, namely concerning possible things, must also be said to be necessary.

You will say 1. God loves nothing necessarily except that by which He is necessarily moved: but He cannot be necessarily moved by any finite object, such as possible creatures are: therefore He does not love them necessarily. The major is evident: for such is judged to be the love, as is judged to be the formal motive object. The minor is proved by the Doctor in q. 16. quodlib. litt. M., where he expressly affirms that the divine will is not moved necessarily by anything finite:

An infinite will, he says, necessarily has an act about an infinite object, because this belongs to perfection: and by parity of reason, it does not necessarily have an act about a finite object, because this would belong to imperfection: for it is an imperfection to be necessarily determined to the posterior, and it belongs to required perfection to be so determined to the prior.

I distinguish the major. God cannot necessarily love anything primarily and principally except that by which He is moved, I concede: secondarily and less principally, I deny: for the primary object must indeed be motive, and motive necessarily, if the love is necessary; but the secondary object need not be motive in this way: rather it suffices that it be terminative; whence since God is moved to the love of creatures only through His essential goodness, as will immediately be proved; hence it is that those creatures should not have the notion of a moving object, but only of a terminating one. As to the Doctor's saying, I say that it must be understood of the primary object of the divine will, which indeed cannot be anything finite, as has now often been said.

You will say 2. If God necessarily loved possible creatures, it would be especially either on account of their goodness, or on account of the necessary connection which He has with them: but neither can be said. Not the first indeed; because future and existing creatures have greater goodness, since they have a more perfect dignity, than possible ones, and nevertheless are freely loved by God. Not the second; for God has no necessary connection with possible things, for even if there were no possible creature, nevertheless God would truly exist most perfect.

I answer. that necessity of divine love does not indeed arise from the goodness of possible creatures, nor from the necessary connection of God with them; but only from the immutability of the divine will itself, by which it cannot be related to an object in a different way, nor be said to love or not to love it, unless some variety and change, physical or moral, intervenes in that object, or in God loving: whence since in a possible creature no variety intervenes from the love of God, it follows that if there were some variety and change in this love, as there truly would have to be if such love were free, that change would have to be traced back to God: and since this is repugnant, it is also repugnant that that love be free.

You will say 3. If the love by which God loves possible creatures were necessary, it would follow that God loves possible creatures in the same way as Himself: since indeed He necessarily loves Himself as to specification and exercise: but this is absurd: therefore so is that from which it follows.

I deny the consequence of the major. for the necessity of love is gathered from the necessity of the object: whence since possible creatures are not of so great necessity as is the necessity of the divine being, even their love cannot be said to be equally necessary as the love of the divine essence.

Add. that there are also several other reasons of disparity between the love of each object; for God loves Himself as the primary and adequate object of His will and on account of His own goodness; but possible creatures only as a secondary object, and not on account of their goodness, but solely on account of His own, as will be disclosed.

Third conclusion. — The formal motive object of divine love toward creatures is the essential goodness of God alone, not however the goodness of the creatures themselves.

Thus the Doctor in several places², but especially in 3. dist. 32. n. 5. Only the divine essence, he says, can be the first reason of acting both for the divine intellect and for the will; because if something else could be the first reason of acting, that power would be debased. St. Thomas agrees with him 1. p. q. 2. art. 2. ad. 2., where he says:

In those things which we will for the sake of an end, the whole reason of moving is the end, and it is this which moves the will... Whence since God wills nothing other than Himself except for the sake of the end which is His goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will except His goodness.

Proof 1. The motive object of the divine will is the end, for a means as means is willed only insofar as it leads to the end: but only the uncreated and essential goodness is the end of those things which the divine will wills, according to that saying of Proverbiorum 16: The Lord has wrought all things for Himself: therefore that alone is the motive object of the divine will. Again, the will is specified by its formal motive object: but the divine will cannot be specified by created goodness: therefore neither can it be moved by it. The major is certain. The minor is proved: to be specified by something is to depend on it in the notion of a formal cause: for the specifying thing has the notion of a formal cause, at least an extrinsic one, with respect to the thing specified: but the divine will cannot depend on created goodness: therefore neither can it be specified by it. Finally, the love of God toward creatures is not affective, but effective: therefore it is not attracted, nor moved, by created goodness. The consequence is evident; for effective love is not moved by the goodness of the object; because it does not suppose it in the object, but places it. The antecedent is taught frequently by the holy Fathers, especially by St. Bernard in cap. 4. of the De amore divino, where, explaining the difference between the love of God toward us and our love toward God, he says: You are not affected by us, or toward us, when You love us: we are affected by You and in You and toward You when we love You. It is also urged by reason; for affective love transforms the lover into the beloved and in a certain way subjects him to it: but effective love transforms the beloved into the lover and communicates to it its own goods: but it is repugnant that God be transformed into a creature: therefore it is also repugnant that He love it with affective love.

You will say 1. Sacred Scripture nowhere indicates that creatures are loved by God on account of some goodness of theirs, either moral or physical; thus Christ in Ioannis 10: Therefore does the Father love Me, because I lay down My soul. By which words Christ indicates that He is loved by the Father on account of His moral goodness, namely on account of His charity and obedience. — Then, St. Augustine in lib. 11. De Civitate, cap. 21., on those words: God said, let light be made, says: If we ask who made it, it is God: if by what He made it, He said let it be made and it was made: if why He made it, because it is good. By which words St. Augustine indicates that light was therefore created because its future goodness attracted and moved God to create.

I answer. by these or similar ways of speaking, both of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers, it is only signified that one created object is the cause of another, so that it may have an order to the will of God, not however that the creature is the motive of the divine will itself. Or I say that by that manner of speaking it is designated that the goodness of creatures is indeed the secondary terminative object of divine love itself. Finally, with regard to St. Augustine and similar authorities it can be said that God made light because it is good, that is, because it is useful for the good of the universe and for the rational creature to which He orders all things, not that the goodness of the universe, or the rational creature, is the motive reason of divine love.

You will say 2. Creatures have in themselves a formal goodness: therefore they are in themselves formally lovable by God.

I deny the consequence. for from this it only follows that the formal goodness of creatures is terminative of divine love, not however that it is its motive.

You will say 3. Merits move the will of the rewarder, by attracting and inclining it to confer the promised reward: therefore our merits move the divine will, and incline it to reward; and consequently they have the notion of a motive object with respect to the divine will.

I distinguish the consequence. our merits move the will of God insofar as they are considered in themselves, I deny; insofar as they are virtually and eminently contained in the essential goodness of God and represented in the divine essence, I concede.

You will insist. Merits, insofar as they are contained in the goodness of God, cannot have the notion of merit, since divine goodness cannot be merit: therefore if they move the divine will only insofar as they are contained in its essential goodness, they do not move it insofar as they are merits.

I distinguish the antecedent. if they were contained formally, I concede; if eminently, I deny. And so merits are not formally contained in the goodness of God, because indeed divine goodness cannot have the notion of merit; but they preserve it insofar as they are eminently contained in the essential goodness of God.

You will say 4. In God are found Justice and Mercy: but if only uncreated goodness is the formal motive object of the divine will, those virtues cannot subsist in Him; for the formal motive object of those virtues is not something uncreated, but created; for the object of mercy is the misery of another as to be relieved; while the object of justice is the right of another as to be safeguarded; therefore, etc.

I deny the minor. and to its proof I say that although created justice and mercy are truly specified and moved by created goodness and honesty; it is otherwise, however, with divine mercy and justice, which are moved only by uncreated goodness; mercy indeed insofar as it is the reason of showing mercy, and justice insofar as it is the reason of rewarding; which the divine goodness itself provides, insofar as it eminently contains the objective honesties of created mercy and justice.

You will say 5. God wills and loves all things for Himself to that extent that He wills them for His glory: but that glory which God intends is something created, namely the knowledge, love and worship of Himself; therefore not on account of His essential goodness, but also on account of something created does God sometimes love creatures.

I answer. that the end is twofold, namely the end which is intended by the agent, and the end by which, or the means by which the end is intended and acquired; whence formally: I distinguish the minor: Glory is the end by which God orders creatures to His own goodness, I concede; it is the end which is intended by God Himself, I deny; for this end which is intended by God is none other than God Himself to be glorified. Whence while Sacred Scripture frequently admonishes that all our works are to be done for the glory of God, it is not to be understood of created glory, otherwise these works would be imperfect, since they would be done for the sake of a creature; but it is to be interpreted of divine glory objectively considered, that is, of God Himself to be glorified.

You will say 6. If God loved creatures only on account of His essential goodness, it would follow that that goodness has the notion of an end, and that creatures have the notion of a means ordered to that end: but the consequent is false as to both parts: therefore so is that from which it follows. The minor is proved: First, it is certain that God has no end, since He Himself is the ultimate end of all things; and so He cannot act for the sake of an end. Second, it is equally certain that creatures do not have the notion of a means with respect to essential goodness; for something has the notion of a means only insofar as it leads to the attainment of the end: but creatures do not lead to the attainment of the essential goodness of God, since that does not depend on creatures: therefore they do not have the notion of a means in order to it.

I deny the major as to both parts. and its first proof I distinguish with the Doctor in 1. dist. 1. q. 5. n. 6: God has no end of Himself, I concede; He has no end of His effects and creatures which He orders to Himself, I deny. Although therefore, says the Doctor, God is not the end of Himself, nevertheless with respect to His will He is that object to which the notion of end is naturally suited to belong; because He is the highest good. However, the notion of end cannot belong to Him with respect to Himself, just as He is not an end with respect to Himself; but with respect to all things capable of being ended, such as are goods orderable to something else. Then the Doctor objecting to himself, How therefore is God said to act for the sake of an end; and also that the end of a superior agent is a superior end? He answers to the first, that it must be understood that He acts for the end of the effect, not for the end of Himself; because He is not the agent of Himself; for, as he had premised, with respect to nothing is He a final cause, except with respect to that of which He is the efficient cause; because the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act. He answers to the second, that it must be understood of the end of the effect; because the superior agent orders, not Himself, but the effect to a more universal or superior end: and so that superior end belongs to the agent, not as its end, but as that to which He orders what He does.

— To the second proof of the same minor, I say that in means a twofold respect to the end can be distinguished, namely of dependence on the end in the order of intention, insofar as means are loved for the sake of the end; and of fitness to the end in the order of execution. Whence formally: creatures do not have the notion of a means in the order of dependence with respect to essential goodness, I deny: for they are loved only insofar as they are referred to that divine goodness, and participate something of it. They do not have the notion of a means in the order of fitness to the end, because divine goodness is altogether independent of creatures, nor can they have any causality, nor any influx with respect to it, I concede: and I deny the consequence.

You will say finally. If God loved creatures only on account of His essential goodness, it would follow that He does not have the love of friendship toward rational creatures, namely Angels and Men: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence of the major is evident; for with the love of friendship the object is loved for its own sake and on account of its formal goodness: for if someone loves another, not for the good of the beloved, but for the good of the lover, that love will not be of friendship, but of concupiscence.

I deny the consequence of the major. for for true friendship it suffices that love terminate at the beloved object, and that the friend will good to the friend for his own sake, in the way in which he is capable of that good and according to the rules of honesty; but it is not necessary that the beloved object be the motive of that love. And such is the case of the rational creatures which are loved by God with the love of friendship. For although they do not have the notion of a motive object with respect to divine love, they have at least the notion of its terminative object: and although God loves them for Himself, as for the ultimate end; nevertheless that love is true friendship; because since our greatest good and our highest perfection is to be ordered to God as to the ultimate end, while He loves us for His own sake, He also loves us for our good: just as when someone loves another out of charity, he pursues him with the perfect love of friendship, although he loves him for the sake of God.