Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Note 1. It is established by supernatural faith that God is endowed with will; for Sacred Scripture itself celebrates the divine Will with many praises, and the adorable Savior Himself teaches His disciples to address the divine Father while praying with these words: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven; and especially the Apostle exhorts the faithful Romans in cap. 12. to prove what is the good, well-pleasing and perfect will of God. All those Councils likewise confirm this, which decreed against the Monothelites that there is in Christ the Lord a twofold will, namely divine and human. Whence it comes about that no one can deny will to God without the stain of heresy. Only this, therefore, remains to be resolved here: whether the divine will itself can become known and be demonstrated by natural reason.

Note 2. According to St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 45. art. 1. quaest. 1., the divine Will is used in the Sacred Scriptures in a twofold way: namely properly and metaphorically. In the former way there is signified God's very complacency and power, by which He pursues good, turns away from evil, and intends an end. In the latter way there is designated some eternal sign of the divine good pleasure itself, whereby it happens that God's precepts, prohibitions and counsels, etc. are called the wills of God, namely in that way in which someone's testament is wont to be called his last will. Again, the will used in the former way can be distinguished in a twofold manner: namely the will which is the faculty and the willing potency, and the will which is the volition and operation of the volitive faculty. The former is called first act; the latter, however, is called the second act of volition. Whether, however, both these wills are to be admitted in God is no slight controversy among the authors, which, that it may be more easily solved

Note 3. The divine Will can be considered in a twofold way: first indeed essentially, and insofar as it says an order to the willed object within God Himself; second notionally, insofar as it says the order of the one producing to the product, namely to the Holy Spirit. In the former way it is common to the three adorable Persons; in the latter, however, it belongs only to the Father and the divine Son. In the former way it is said to be only operative; in the latter, however, it is called productive, because it is truly the principle by which the Father and the Son breathe forth and produce the Holy Spirit. No theologian denies that the divine will taken notionally has the true notion of a potency; whether, however, it is also to be called a true potency insofar as it is taken essentially and is distinguished, at least formally, from actual volition, as first act from second act, this is to be resolved here; but first let there be

First conclusion. — By natural reason it is established that God has a will.

It is proved first by the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 2. quaest. 2. n. 20.: The first agent must necessarily be intelligent: therefore it must be endowed with intellect and will. The minor is evident. The major is proved: The first agent must necessarily intend an end, and choose and order means to the attainment of it: but it cannot accomplish these unless it knows and wills the end; nor can it accomplish these unless it has intellect and will: therefore it must necessarily have both.

The major is evident: both because every nature tends to an end, not indeed per se, but by the direction of a Superior and of the first Agent, and consequently the first Agent must intend the end to which it directs and orders nature itself; and because the first Agent acts in an orderly manner, and consequently directs all its actions to an end. The minor is proved: the first agent tends to an end either from the impulse of nature, or through knowledge and love of it: but it does not tend to an end from the impulse of nature, for this smacks of imperfection: therefore through love and knowledge, and hence through intellect and will.

Secondly: Something is caused contingently: therefore the first cause causes contingently: therefore it causes as willing. The first consequence is proved: a second cause does not act except insofar as it is moved by the first: therefore while it acts contingently, it is necessary that it be moved contingently. The second consequence is proved: there is no principle of operating contingently except the will, or something accompanying the will; for what operates otherwise acts only from the necessity of nature, and therefore does not act contingently: therefore the cause which operates contingently must necessarily be willing, and hence have a will.

Thirdly: To the most perfect agent there must be attributed the most perfect mode of operating and causing: but the mode of causing through will is far more perfect than the mode of acting through nature; for a natural agent does not act with dominion over its acts, nor does it direct itself to an end, but is directed by another, as an arrow by an archer; a free and voluntary agent, however, directs itself to the end and has dominion over its acts: therefore this mode of acting through will is to be attributed to God.

You will say 1. According to St. Augustine lib. de libero arbitrio, The will is a rational movement presiding over sense and appetite. And in lib. de duabus Animabus: The will is a movement of the mind toward pursuing or fleeing something: but in God there is no movement, nor sense, nor appetite, nor pursuit, nor flight: therefore neither is there will.

I answer. St. Augustine is to be understood of the created will, not however of the uncreated, which is not subject to these imperfections.

You will say 2. There is no will where there is no object of the will: but in God there is no object of the will: therefore neither is there will. The minor is proved: The good is the object of the will; for just as the true is the object known, so the good is the object willed: but in God there is no good as an object willed; for good and end are the same, and nothing in God can have the notion of an end; both because God cannot have an end; and because an end is a real cause, and in God nothing has the notion of a real cause; and finally because, says the Doctor in 1. dist. 1. q. 5. n. 6., nothing is a final cause with respect to anything except that with respect to which it is an efficient cause, since the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act; of God, therefore, who cannot be effected, nothing is a final cause, because in Him nothing depends on another as on a cause: therefore in God there is no end, and hence neither a good as willed, nor consequently an object of the will, nor accordingly is there will in Him.

I deny the minor, and to its proof I say that a twofold end can be distinguished: namely the end willed, and the end of the things willed. The former is the one toward which the agent tends; the latter is the one toward which the agent orders the things it wills. The former indeed is not in God, because God does not tend to some end outside Himself, since He is Himself the end of all things, having no end, just as He is the principle of all things without a principle. The latter, however, is truly intended by God, because He directs and orders all creatures, which are willed objects, to Himself, as to the ultimate end of all things, or, as the cited Doctor speaks, God acts for the sake of the end of the effect, not for the sake of His own end, because He is not an agent of Himself, which suffices for it to be truly said that there is in God a true end as a willed object.

You will say 3. The will is toward opposites: but in God there cannot be a will toward opposites: therefore neither is there will. The major is evident from Philosophy. The minor is proved: a will toward opposites is contingent and variable: but in God there is no contingency, nor variability: therefore, etc.

The Seraphic Doctor, cited above, answers, denying the minor, and he distinguishes its proof: that in God there is no variability, nor contingency in actu, he concedes; in effectu, he denies. It is certain indeed that there is no contingency in the act of the divine will; for this act, since it is really identical with the will itself and with the substance of God, cannot be varied in any way, just as neither can the divine will and substance themselves, but from eternity the divine will is in one and the same uniform act of willing what it wills. But there is variability and contingency in effect, for God does many things which He could not do and not will, and hence He does and wills them contingently.

You will say 4. The will is the appetite of the intellective nature, by which it is borne toward the good agreeable to itself: but in God there is no appetite, because appetite is an inclination toward a good not possessed, and accordingly presupposes the lack of the good terminating the appetite; in God, however, there is no lack of good, since He is Himself the supreme good and the fount and origin of all good: therefore neither is there will in God.

I distinguish the major: The will is an appetite, that is, a desire and pursuit of an absent good, I deny; it is an appetite, that is, a weight and tendency toward a suitable object, I concede.

I similarly distinguish the minor: in God there cannot be an appetite insofar as it is a desire of an absent good, I concede; insofar as it is a weight, inclination and complacency in an object suitable to itself, I deny.

Therefore in God a twofold appetite can be affirmed: namely natural and elicited. Natural indeed, insofar as from its own natural propensity it is as it were inclined toward some suitable good; thus the divine Essence, insofar as it is the principle and root of the attributes, can be said to have a natural appetite and inclination toward them, because it is perfected and illumined by them. Likewise in the divine Father there is an appetite and inclination to communicate Himself to the Son, and in the Father and the Son there is an innate appetite to communicate themselves to the Holy Spirit: for every productive potency is naturally inclined to the production of its adequate term, especially when it exhausts its whole fecundity in it. There is also in God an elicited appetite, which presupposes knowledge of the term of such an appetite. For God, with respect to His own perfection, has not only an innate appetite, but also an elicited one, because He knows and loves it: but this divine inclination is more rightly called complacency in a possessed good than appetite, which is ordinarily borne toward an absent good.

Second conclusion. — The divine will is a potency formally distinct both from the divine Essence and from actual volition.

This is the Doctor's teaching, as is evident from what we have said by way of likeness concerning the divine Intellect, and it is moreover urged from the same Doctor in 1. dist. 13. question 1. n. 31. where he says:

God is simpliciter blessed in the operations of His intellect and will, but He is not simpliciter blessed in the essence as it is infinite, unless He comprehends it. And just as the intellect comprehends by seeing, so the will in its own way must comprehend by loving, in order that it be perfectly blessed, and consequently both potencies and both acts of each potency, with respect to the divine Essence insofar as it perfectly beatifies itself, will be infinite.

By these words the Doctor teaches three things: First, that intellect and will are distinguished formally from the essence. Second, that they have the notion of a faculty and operative potency in actu primo. Third, that each potency is formally distinguished from its act, namely the intellect from intellection and the will from actual volition.

The Conclusion is proved: Those things are formally distinguished to which contradictory predicates belong: but contradictory predicates are enunciated of the divine essence, will, and volition: therefore they formally differ from one another. The major remains sufficiently proved from what we have said concerning the formal distinction of the attributes both among themselves and from the divine Essence. The minor, however, is proved; for many things are enunciated of the will which cannot be enunciated of volition and of the divine Essence, for example that the divine will is the immediate principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit and also of divine love; that it is immediately operative; which things belong per se neither to the Essence nor to the divine volition.

For the divine Essence is not per se the immediate principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit, nor even of essential divine love; similarly divine volition, or divine love, is not formally the principle of love and volition, but is itself actual love and actual volition itself.

You will say. For something to have the notion of a potency and first act, it is necessary that it really be a productive principle of the second act and respective to it, if such a second act is immanent: but the divine Will is neither productive of divine volition, nor receptive of it, as was observed in the preliminary notes: therefore it is not a potency and first act with respect to divine volition either.

I distinguish the major: If such a potency is not only operative and a metaphysical principle, but also productive and a physical principle, that is, productive of the act, I concede; if it is only operative, but not productive, I deny.

To the minor I say that the divine will is not a productive potency, nor a principle physically influencing the divine volition itself, namely in the way in which physical causes produce their acts through a true and real action: but it is only an operative potency and a metaphysical principle, from which the divine volition emanates immediately, namely in the way in which the will itself and all the divine attributes emanate from the essence. Whence it should not be receptive of that same volition, inasmuch as it is distinguished from the will itself not really, but only formally.

The other things which could be objected against this Conclusion have already been solved in the First Conclusion of the Disputation on the divine Intellect, in which it was proved that the divine intellect itself is formally distinct both from the Essence and from actual intellection.

Third conclusion. — The division of the divine will is various and manifold.

For first it is divided into the Will of Good Pleasure and the will of Sign. The former is the will really existing in God, by which He pursues some good or turns away from evil. The latter, however, is not really in God, but is some created effect signifying and connoting the will of God, in the way in which a testament is called the last will of a man who makes the will. Both these divine wills are celebrated in Sacred Scripture. The former indeed is signified by these passages: Psalm 118, He has done all things whatsoever He willed. And Rom. 12: That you may prove what is the good, well-pleasing and perfect will of God, etc. The latter, however, is signified by these words of Psalm 110: Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.

St. Bonaventure, however, offers this reason for this division in 1. dist. 45. art. 3. quaest. 1.:

Just as the intellect is not absurdly called the intellective power, and its object is called the understood, so the will is called not only the potency of willing itself, but also the willed object itself: but the willed is a sign of the will: therefore besides the will of good pleasure there is also to be assigned a will of sign.

Next, the divine will is taken either properly for the volitive faculty, or improperly and metaphorically for the willed thing. In the former way the will of good pleasure is designated; in the latter, however, the will of sign. Finally, the divine will is either that by which God wills, or that which God wills. The will by which God wills is the will of good pleasure; the will, or willed thing, which He wills, is the will of sign. For since we do not know the divine will per se, but only through willed objects, these willed objects are rightly called signs manifesting the internal will, and hence are rightly called wills of sign, or rather signs manifestative of the divine will.

This division, however, is not made according to the thing, but according to the word, so that the name of the divine will is attributed both to the volitive potency and to the willed object: to the former indeed properly, to the latter only metaphorically and on account of the likeness which there is between the sign of our will and of the divine. For just as a command is a natural sign of our will, so too a divine command, v. g., is said to be a natural sign of the divine will.

Both these wills in turn admit various subdivisions. For the will of good pleasure is subdivided into Antecedent and Consequent. The Antecedent Will is commonly said to be that which God has from Himself alone and from His native inclination with respect to an object, insofar as it is not clothed with all the circumstances with which it is to be consigned to execution. The Consequent, however, is that which God does not have from Himself alone, but from certain presupposed circumstances, with which removed, He would not will the object. Thus, v. gr., by the antecedent will God wills all to be saved, not attending to their merits, but because He created and ordained all men to glory, as to their ultimate end. By the consequent will, however, He wills to save efficaciously only the just, but wills to damn the impious, for the reason that the former have made use of the suitable means for attaining beatitude, while the latter have not.

St. Thomas explains this twofold will in this way in 1. part. question 19. art. 6., where, after he had said that the division of the Will into antecedent and consequent is not taken from the side of the divine Will itself, in which there is nothing prior or posterior, but from the side of the things willed, he adds:

It must be considered that each thing, insofar as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be good or evil in its first consideration (according as it is considered absolutely), which nevertheless, according as it is considered with some circumstance added (which is its consequent consideration), is disposed in the contrary way. Just as for a man to live is good, and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if it be added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living in danger, then it is good that he be killed, and evil that he live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills a man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Likewise God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain men to be damned according to the requirement of His justice.

This division, however, into the Antecedent and Consequent will is not taken from the side of the divine will, in which in reality there is nothing prior nor posterior, but from the side of the thing willed, which can be considered either in itself and insofar as it prescinds from all circumstances, or according as it has circumstances joined to it. And since the consideration of a thing in itself is said to be prior to the consideration of the thing according to its circumstances, for that reason the divine Will, insofar as it terminates at things considered in themselves, is called antecedent; but insofar as it terminates at things insofar as they have their circumstances joined to them, it is called the Consequent will.

Again, the will of good pleasure is subdivided into Efficacious and Inefficacious. That will is called efficacious by which it always carries out its effect and obtains the intended end; but inefficacious, which neither has the willed effect nor attains the intended end. Thus the will of saving all men is efficacious on the part of the Predestined, and inefficacious on the part of the Reprobate.

Moreover, one will of good pleasure is Absolute, another Conditional. The former is concerned with the object without the supposition of that condition; thus God absolutely wills that those persevering in final grace be given eternal glory. The conditional will, however, is borne toward the existence, or non-existence, of the object from the supposition of some condition; thus God wills all men to be saved, on the hypothesis that they themselves will it and use the fitting means ordered to attaining salvation.

The will of sign is also said to be manifold, but chiefly fivefold according to the five different signs manifesting God's internal will, which are: precept, prohibition, counsel, permission and fulfilment, or operation, all of which are explained in this verse.

He commands and prohibits, permits, counsels, fulfils:

St. Bonaventure assigns the fitness of this division in the Compendio Theologico, lib. 2. cap. 32., in these words:

The divine will, properly speaking, is either of present or of future things. If with respect to present things, either it is good, and so it is Fulfilment, or evil, and so it is Permission. If with respect to future things, it is threefold: either evil, and so it is Prohibition; or necessary good, and so it is Precept; or good of supererogation, and so it is Counsel.

St. Thomas, however, in 1. part, qu. 19, art. 12., gathers the fitness of this division in this way:

The signs of the will are said to be those by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. Now someone can declare that he wills something either through himself, or through another. Through himself indeed insofar as he does something, either directly, or indirectly and per accidens. Directly indeed when he operates something per se, and in this respect it is said to be the sign Operation. Indirectly, however, insofar as he does not impede the operation, and in this respect it is said to be the sign Permission. Through another, however, he declares that he wills something insofar as he orders another to do something, either by a necessary induction, which is done by Commanding what one wills and Prohibiting the contrary; or by some persuasive induction, which pertains to Counsel.

Alexander of Hales, however, in quaest. 36. member 1., gathers these signs in this way:

The divine will either regards an act while it is being done, or while it is to be done. If while it is being done, either that act is good or evil. If good, its Operation is a sign of the divine will. But if while it is to be done, likewise that act to be done is either good or evil. If evil, then the Prohibition of it is a sign of the divine Will. If good, either it is necessary for salvation, and then the Precept of it is a sign of the divine Will, or it is not necessary but nonetheless conducive to salvation, and then the Counsel of it is a sign of the divine will.

Finally, the Subtle Doctor, in 1. d. 17. n. 2., in order to gather these five signs, judges that certain things must be presupposed. The first indeed, that in us there is a twofold act of the will and each is positive, namely volition and nolition, which, when they are concerned with the same object, are called contrary, and are signified by Loving and Hating. The second is that each of these two acts is either efficacious or inefficacious. An efficacious volition is said to be that by which we order the means and strive, as far as in us lies, that the thing willed come to be. But an inefficacious or remiss volition is that by which we would indeed will the willed object to come to be and exist, yet we do not will to apply the means necessary for its production and existence. Likewise, an efficacious nolition is said to be that by which we apply the means required for impeding the production and existence of a thing; or we would truly apply them if they were in our power. But an inefficacious nolition is that by which one would truly nill some thing to be, yet nevertheless does not apply the fitting means to impede its existence.

These things being presupposed, the Doctor answers: The sign of an efficacious volition, if it is made immediately by the will, is Fulfilment; if through another, it is a Precept. But the sign of a remiss volition is Counsel, or admonition and persuasion. Likewise, the sign of an efficacious nolition is Prohibition; but of an inefficacious and remiss one, Permission.

You will say 1. Sign and thing signified are correlatives: therefore where one is not manifold, neither can the other be manifold, as Aristotle says; but the will of God is not manifold but one: therefore it should have only one sign, and consequently there are not five signs of the divine will.

I distinguish the minor: The divine will is not manifold according to internal entity, I concede; according to external connotation, I deny; for it connotes many things in the creature, for through a precept it connotes the things necessary for salvation, through counsel it connotes the tendency toward the more suitable good, and so on for the rest.

You will say 2. Just as prohibition is opposed to precept, so dissuasion is opposed to counsel: therefore just as prohibition is a sign of the divine Will, so also is dissuasion, and consequently there are more signs than five.

I deny the consequence: For counsel comprehends suasion and dissuasion; for to dissuade from marriage, for example, is to counsel and urge Virginity, and so dissuasion is not a sign distinct from counsel.

You will say 3. The disposition by which God prepares Himself to do something, as though He willed to bring it to perfection, which nevertheless He does not will, is a sign of the divine Will: but this will of preparation is not comprehended under any of the assigned five signs of the divine Will. Not indeed under precept, prohibition, counsel and permission; for when one commands, prohibits, counsels, permits, he is not said to will to do it, but to will it to be done or not done by another, or to nill to impede that they be done by another; nor is it the will that is called work or fulfilment, because one who operates no longer prepares the work but does it: therefore there are more signs than five.

I deny the major: For that will of preparation, which Estius in 1. dist. 45. admits as a sixth sign, is nothing other than the antecedent will by which God wills something in its cause, when He so disposes and prepares it that from it an effect can follow. But the antecedent will is not the will of sign but the will of good pleasure, as we will prove below when treating of the will of God by which He wills all men to be saved, which same will of preparation Estius calls it.

You will ask 1. Whether the Will of Sign always corresponds to the will of good pleasure, that is, whether the aforesaid five signs always designate some positive act of the divine Will?

I affirm with the more subtle disciples of the Subtle Doctor, and this is plainly evident concerning operation, since God works all things according to the counsel of His will, as the Apostle speaks in Ephesians 1., and that counsel of the will is without doubt signified through operation, as the cause through its effect. Likewise precept and prohibition import an act, not only by which God wills to command and prohibit something, but also by which He wills efficaciously, as far as in Himself lies, that what He commands or prohibits be done or not done. The same is clear concerning counsel, for although God does not will to oblige man to execute what He counsels to be done, nevertheless He efficaciously, as far as in Himself lies, wills what He counsels to be done, for to fulfil it counsel supplies the necessary means.

But as for Permission, there truly seems to be a greater difficulty, in solving which the Doctor praised above in 1. dist. 47. remains wholly doubtful. For although he had said that permission is nothing other than an inefficacious nolition of God, nevertheless, because this nolition seems to bring some sadness to the one nilling, as happens in us when that occurs which we would nill to be done and to exist, or at least this nolition would attach something imperfect and superfluous; for that reason he explains divine permission in another way, saying that it consists in the negation of a volition of placing an obstacle and impediment to the thing which is said to be permitted, which God knows will be done and absolutely could impede if He willed, and yet does not will to impede.

Then, objecting to himself that on this account God would be said to be willing to allow and permit what He permits, and accordingly this permission would seem always to import an act of the divine will; the Doctor answers by denying the consequence, because, he says,

that he who is said to be willing to allow this can be understood, not as having a right willing about what He permits, but a reflexive act. For when this man about to sin, or to sin, is offered to His will, first His will has no willing about him, for it cannot will that he have sin. Secondly, He can understand His will as not willing this, and then He can will that His will not will this, and so He is said to be willing to allow and to permit voluntarily. Just as on the other side, when Judas is presented to Him, first God has a non-willing of glory for him, and not a first nilling, according to that last position, dist. 41., and then secondly He can reflect upon that negation of act and will it, and so, willing or voluntarily, He does not choose Judas as one finally to sin, nor a nolition of glory, but a volition of glory.

I say, therefore, for the clearer explanation of the matter, that a twofold divine permission can be distinguished: physical, namely, and moral. The moral is that by which no moral impediment is placed to the act to be done, namely precept, counsel, prohibition and other similar things. But this moral permission does not seem to be a positive act of the divine Will, but for it only the non-position of a precept, or counsel, or sign suffices; for by this very fact, that God neither commands, nor counsels, nor prohibits something to be done, He morally seems to permit it.

But physical Permission is that by which God does not place a physical impediment to the act to be done; which permission is either with respect to a simple omission of an act, and for this permission the negation of concurrence to the act opposite to that omission suffices; or it is with respect to a positive act, and this necessarily requires a positive will of God, because no positive act can be without a positive concurrence of God; but this concurrence cannot be without a positive volition of God. Hence permission with respect to a positive act always connotes and presupposes a positive act of the will of God.

You will ask 2. Whether a created will is always morally right, whenever it is conformed to the divine will?

The Doctor answers in 1. dist. 48. sole quaest., since good arises from the whole cause, and evil from any defect, that for the goodness and rectitude of a created will it does not suffice that it be conformed to the divine Will as to the object which God wills, and as to the end which He intends; because some circumstance can be lacking which would take away rectitude. Hence although God willed that Christ, God, should die for the salvation of men, nevertheless the Jews sinned by killing Him; indeed they would even have sinned gravely had they crucified Him for that very end, that His death might profit men to be saved, because God did not will them to kill Christ.

Whence St. Augustine in the Enchiridio, cap. 101.:

Sometimes, he says, a man wills something with a good will which God does not will, willing something much more abundantly and much more certainly good; as if a wicked Son should will the Father to die, and God should also will this. It matters what it befits man to will, what it befits God to will, and to what end each one refers his own will, so that it may be approved or disapproved.

Whence St. Bonaventure, lib. 1. Comp. Theol. cap. 23., says:

that full conformity to God comprehends four things: First, that we will what God wills: Secondly, that we will what He wills us to will: Thirdly, that we will for the sake of what He wills: Fourthly, that we will in the manner in which He wills. He adds further that non-full conformity is threefold: First, if one is conformed to God in the willed object only, just as the Jews also were conformed to God in the death of Christ: Secondly, if one is conformed in the willed object and in the end, but not in the manner, as when something is not done out of charity: Thirdly, when one is conformed in the willed object and in the manner, but not in the end, as when the intention is turned back to another end, yet a good one.