Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The divine intellect is not called practical for this reason, that it is ordered to directing the will, which is truly the source and origin of praxis; but because it is concerned with the Ideas of producible things. Therefore, in order that an exact notion of it may be had, it is necessary and sufficient to investigate and explain the nature of the divine Ideas. That this may be done exactly, let there be

Idea is a Greek word, derived from the verb εἴδω, that is, I see, or I behold. It is used by the Latins to signify the exemplary form at which the artisan looks in working, so that he may fashion something to its likeness. But since God, that supreme Artificer of things, produces all his works with a perfectly balanced reason, hence it comes about that he is said to effect nothing except according to the divine Ideas, which he holds hidden in himself from eternity.

Note first. It is false that, as some commonly affirm, Plato was the first author of the divine Ideas; for Eusebius, lib. 11. De Praeparatione Evangelica c. 1., writes that Socrates was the first to discourse on the Ideas, and that Moses long before him recognized the divine Ideas, and Justin Martyr, Oratione paraenetica ad Gentes, suspects that Plato drew from him whatever he knew of the Ideas. With these St. Augustine agrees, lib. 83. quaestionum quaest. 46., saying:

Plato is said to have been the first to call them Ideas; yet even if this name did not exist before he instituted it, it does not follow that the things themselves which he called Ideas did not exist, or were understood by no one: but they were perhaps called by different men under one name or another. For it is lawful to impose any name whatever upon an unknown thing which has no customary name. For it is not likely that there were no wise men before Plato who did not understand those things, whatever they may be, which Plato, as has been said, calls Ideas: since so great a power is placed in them that, unless these are understood, no one can be wise.

Equally false is what Aristotle invented about Plato, namely that he asserted the Ideas to exist not indeed in God, but as it were foreign to him and standing by his side, subsisting per se, abstracted and separated from singulars; so that those Ideas flow from the divine mind into the mind of the Angels; from the Angelic mind into the universal soul of the world; from the soul of the world into the forms of the heavens; from the celestial forms into matter, the receiver of all forms. Whence Aristotle, deriding these Ideas as mere fictions, says: Farewell, Plato's Ideas, for they are nothing, or they are monsters. Falsely, I say, is this fictitious invention attributed to Plato: for Plato truly admitted the divine Ideas as existing in God, as Seneca affirms, Epist. 65., in these words:

God has within himself these exemplars of all things and has embraced in his mind the numbers of all things and the modes of what is to be done. God is full of those figures which Plato calls immortal, immutable, untiring Ideas. Whence men indeed perish, but humanity itself, that is, the Idea of men, which is in God, to whose likeness man is formed, remains, and suffers nothing while men toil.

The same is affirmed by Saint Augustine, lib. 83. quaestionum quaestione 46, where, after he had asserted that the divine Ideas are to be admitted as the notions and images, as it were, of things to be created, he says:

But where must these notions be judged to be, if not in the very mind of the Creator? For he did not behold anything placed outside himself, so as to establish according to it what he was establishing; for to think this is sacrilege. But if these notions of all things to be created or already created are contained in the divine mind, and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and immutable, and Plato calls these principal notions of things Ideas, they are not only Ideas, but they are themselves true because they are eternal.

Whence Marsilius Ficinus, the faithful interpreter of Plato, in his commentary de divinis nominibus, rightly says: The Platonists never wished the Ideas to be separated from the divine intellect, as the Peripatetics falsely slander them, but placed them in the divine mind, distinguished from one another in some way; inasmuch as God, conscious of his own power, comprehends in how many and how great modes he is participable by creatures.

Note 2. That although all Catholic Doctors who assert the divine Ideas affirm that the divine Ideas are stored not outside God, but in God; nevertheless they do not agree among themselves in assigning the notion of Idea: for some Recent authors affirm that the divine Idea is the very act of understanding by which God conceives a creatable creature; so that the notion of Idea is not some objective concept, which is attained by the divine intellect itself after the manner of an object, but is only the formal concept and the actual intellection by which God apprehends the things that can be made by his Omnipotence.

St. Thomas, however, 1. p. q. 10. art. 1. ad secundum et tertium, affirms that the divine idea is some objective concept, which he says is the divine Essence: The divine Essence, he says, insofar as it is compared to other things, is an idea: which comparison, art. 2., he explains to consist in this, that God knows his essence according as it is participable by creatures according to some mode of likeness; and there he says:

The idea of the thing made is in the mind of the maker as that which is understood, not however as the species by which it is understood, which is the form making the intellect in actu. For the form in the mind of the builder is something understood by him, to whose likeness he forms the house in matter, etc.

From which it is clearly evident that St. Thomas places the notion of the divine Idea not in the formal concept, but in the objective concept; and that this ideal objective concept is nothing other than the divine Essence as known, inasmuch as it is participable and imitable by creatures.

The disciples of the Subtle Doctor, however, are split into two opinions; for some affirm that he placed the notion of Idea in that known being which creatures have from the divine intellect: others, however, contend that he assigned no other notion of Idea than the divine Essence itself, not insofar as it is participable and imitable by creatures, but insofar as it is representative of absolutely all producible things. What, however, appears truer to us in this controversy will be resolved below.

Note 3. The Ideas are defined by Saint Augustine, lib. 83. quaestionum qu. 46.

These are, he says, certain principal forms, or stable and unchangeable notions of things, which themselves are not formed, and for this reason are eternal, and always disposed in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence: and although they themselves neither arise nor perish, yet what can arise and perish is said to be formed according to them, and everything that arises and perishes,

or, as the Doctor says more briefly in 1. dist. 35. quaest. 21. n. 12, an Idea is an eternal notion in the divine mind, according to which something is formable outside, as according to its proper notion.

That this definition is the best he demonstrates by weighing it in this manner:

God, he says, causes all things, or can cause them: not irrationally: therefore rationally: therefore he has a notion according to which he forms. Not, however, the same notion of all things: therefore he forms each single thing according to its proper notions. Not, however, by notions outside himself, because in effecting he needs nothing other than himself: therefore by notions existing in his mind, because neither in understanding nor in effecting does he need anything other than himself: therefore by notions existing in his mind. But nothing is in his mind except what is unchangeable and eternal: therefore he can form everything formable according to a notion proper to it, eternal and unchangeable, existing in his mind.

But this eternal and unchangeable notion, according to which, as by its proper notion, God can form something, is nothing other than an idea: therefore the aforesaid definition fits the idea most aptly.

First conclusion. — Truly God has ideas of all producible things.

This Conclusion seems to be de fide, since it is gathered from Sacred Scripture, especially from that of Saint Paul to the Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the ages were fitted together by the Word of God, so that from invisible things visible things were made: that is, as St. Thomas explains, so that every creature might be made from the ideal notions in the Word of God. Saint Anselm indicates this exposition upon the same text, saying: From invisible things visible things were made, that is, the visible from the intellectual world: for the invisible world shone forth in the divine Wisdom through its own idea, and in imitation of it the visible world was made: namely, in that manner of speaking by which Aristotle, 1. Metaph. textu 22., said that the health which is in matter is from the health which is in the soul of the Physician, that is, from the concept, or the art of healing.

It is likewise gathered from that of John 1: What was made in him was life; for from these words Saint Augustine, expounding the same text, gathers that ideas are in God,

what is this, he says, was life? The earth was made, but the earth itself which was made is not life; there is, however, in wisdom itself a certain notion, spiritually, by which the earth was made, and this is life.

Then he adds:

a craftsman makes a chest; first he has the chest in his art, for if he did not have the chest in his art, there would be nothing from which he could bring it forth by fabricating it... Attend, therefore, to the chest in art and the chest in the work: the chest in the work is not life; the chest in art is life, because the soul of the craftsman lives, where all these things are before they are brought forth. Thus, therefore, because the Wisdom of God, by which all things were made, contains all things according to art before it fabricates all things; hence the things which are made through that art are not immediately life, but whatever was made is life in him. You see the earth: the earth is in art. You see the heaven: the heaven is in art. You see the sun and the moon: these too are in art. But outside they are bodies; in art they are life.

The same is proved from the holy Fathers, who affirm that the images of producible things existed in the divine mind from eternity: and first indeed St. Dionysius, libro De divinis Nominibus, cap. 5, when he had said that the Sun possesses in advance the essences and qualities of all those things which fall under the senses, although they be many and dissimilar, concludes: certainly it must be conceded that the exemplars of all things pre-existed with greater reason in him who is the cause of all things.... But we have said that the exemplars are the notions productive of the essence of things, which had before been joined together in God, etc. With him agrees Origen, tomo 1. in Ioannem, who, when he had said that the divine ideas are the figures of the collection of intelligences, adds:

For I think that, just as a house and a ship are fabricated, or built, according to the figures and forms conceived in the minds of those who preside over the construction, the house and the ship taking their beginning from those figures and notions which are in the artisan: so all things were made according to the notions of future things already before manifested by God in wisdom.

St. Augustine treats this same argument more at length, especially lib. 83. quaestionum q. 46, where, when he had said that the vision of the ideas is granted only to purified and wiser souls, he says:

Who, however, that is religious and imbued with true religion, although he cannot yet behold these things, would dare to deny, nay, not even profess, that all things which are, that is, whatever are contained in their own kind by a certain proper nature, in order to exist, were produced by God as their author, and that by him as author all things which live do live, and that the universal safety of things and the very order by which those things that change celebrate their temporal courses with a certain regulation are contained and governed by the laws of the supreme God? which being established and conceded, who would dare to say that God founded all things irrationally? But if this cannot rightly be said and believed, it remains that all things were founded with a notion: nor was man formed by the same notion as the horse, for it is absurd to think this; therefore each single thing was created by its proper notions:

from which words the three following arguments can be formed confirming the same truth: Of which the first can be formed thus: every agent acting through intellect, or endowed with reason, first has in itself the image of that thing which it is about to make: but God is an agent acting through intellect: therefore he first has with himself the image of the things to be made, which we call an idea. The minor is evident per se. The major, however, is proved: for every cause pre-contains in itself the effect according to its form and notion; for if the cause be natural, it pre-contains in itself in a natural way the form of that effect which it is about to produce, as fire producing contains the form of the fire produced: and consequently if the cause be intellectual and an agent acting through intellect, it must also pre-contain the form of the thing to be produced: not according to entity, otherwise it would not know material things, because a spiritual agent cannot receive the forms of material things: therefore it pre-contains that form according to image; but this image is the idea and exemplar of the thing itself: therefore God has ideas of things.

Secondly, God does not operate and produce all things rashly and by chance, but with the highest reason and wisdom: therefore he operates according to the exemplar of the thing to be made which he preconceived and predefined: but that exemplar is an idea: therefore ideas are to be admitted in God. The consequence is evident, for unless God foreknew the effect, and unless he had the form after whose likeness he would produce it, he would act rashly and in a blind manner, or, as St. Augustine says, he would have founded all things irrationally.

Finally, the third argument, which St. Augustine indicates in the same place, can be formed in this manner: each single thing was created by its proper and distinct notions, nor was man formed according to the same notion by which the horse was formed: therefore God pre-contains in himself the proper notions of each thing to be made: but that notion is an idea: therefore God has ideas. St. John Damascene proves the same, lib. 1. De Fide cap. 13: God is the author of all things: therefore he pre-has in himself the notions and causes of all things that are, that is, the ideas.

You will say 1. St. Anselm in Monologio, cap. 29. It is sufficiently manifest, he says, that in the Word by which all things were made there are not likenesses of things: but an Idea is a likeness of the thing to be made: therefore, according to St. Anselm, the divine Word does not have ideas of things. Moreover St. Dionysius, cap. 7. De divinis Nominibus: God, he says, does not know things according to ideas: therefore it is false that ideas are to be placed in the divine mind.

I answer. St. Anselm intends only that in the divine Word there are not likenesses of things derived from the things themselves, as v. g. in a mirror there are images of objects emitted by the objects themselves, but rather that all the forms and likenesses of things are drawn from and flow from the divine Word itself. Whence St. Anselm adds: The Word is not the likeness of things; but things are imitations of the Word. With regard to St. Dionysius, I say that he indeed denies that God knows things in Ideas either placed outside Himself or borrowed from the things themselves; but He knows them only through His own essence having the notion of an idea and exemplar, inasmuch as it has infinite power to represent all things.

You will say 2. An idea is a likeness of the thing ideated; but a likeness implies agreement: but between God and a creature, since the distance is the greatest, there is no agreement there, or if there is any, it is certainly minimal: therefore either there is no likeness between the divine Idea and the ideated creature, or it is minimal: either therefore there is no idea in God, or there is one according to an imperfect notion: but nothing imperfect is to be posited in God: therefore neither is any Idea.

The Seraphic Doctor answers. in 1. dist. 35. art. 1. quaest. 1. that likeness is threefold: one of univocation, or participation, by which those things are said to be similar among which there is some common element in which they agree univocally, as Peter and Paul are said to be similar in humanity and in whiteness; because they agree univocally in humanity and in whiteness, inasmuch as they are men and inasmuch as they are white; and this likeness is not found between God and creatures, because they agree univocally in nothing. Another is the likeness of imitation, and this is the least between God and creatures, because the finite can imitate the infinite only to a small extent. Finally there is the likeness of representation and expression, and this is the greatest between the divine Ideas and the ideated creatures, because the divine Ideas supremely express and represent creatures. Whence formally: that there is no perfect agreement, nor a likeness of univocation and imitation, between God and creatures, I concede: of representation and expression, I deny.

You will say 3. The noblest mode of knowing is to be attributed to God: but knowledge through the essence of a thing is nobler than knowledge through a likeness of the thing: therefore God knows through the essence of the thing, not through a likeness: but an idea is a likeness of the thing, and not the essence: therefore God does not know through an idea: therefore ideas are not to be posited in God.

The same Seraphic Doctor answers. that one likeness of a thing is caused by and received from the thing itself; and this is the intelligible species of the thing, which, since it does not express the thing so perfectly as the thing itself would if it were present, therefore the knowledge of the thing through such a likeness is not so perfect as if the thing itself were seen in its presence, and by this likeness God does not know. There is also another likeness which is the very truth of the thing, expressive of the thing itself, and its likeness, by which it is truth; and of which truth the thing itself is rather to be called a likeness than the likeness of the thing: and this expresses the thing better than the thing itself expresses itself, because the thing itself receives the notion of expression from it, as it also receives its being: whence it happens that through this the knowledge is nobler than through the essence of the thing itself; and thus God knows.

You will say 4. An idea is necessary only for directing in knowing and for regulating in operating: but nothing needs a director or a regulator except what can err and deviate; but God has none of these: therefore ideas are posited in God to no purpose.

The same answers. that being regulated and directed can come about in two ways, namely either through a rule different from what is directed and regulated, and this admits imperfection and the possibility of error: or through a rule which is the same as what is regulated, and this posits the impossibility of error: for because a rule cannot err, and God is the rule itself and the idea, therefore it is impossible for Him to err; and thus it is clear that the idea in God posits no defect and imperfection, but a complement.

Second conclusion. — The divine Idea is not the formal concept which God has of creatures: nor the divine essence, inasmuch as it is imitable by creatures: but only inasmuch as it is representative of that being which creatures have from the divine intellect.

This Conclusion comprises three parts, of which the first is proved: An idea is a known form, which the artisan beholds by looking within himself: therefore that knowledge is not the idea. Again, an idea has the notion of a formal cause with respect to the thing ideated or to be formed according to the idea itself: but intellection has the notion of a formal cause not with respect to the thing ideated and extrinsic, but only with respect to the intellect from which it is elicited and which it informs and denominates as understanding: therefore neither does that intellection, or the formal concept of the intellect, have the notion of an idea. Finally, the divine Idea varies according to the diversity of the things ideated: but the divine intellection does not vary according to the diversity of the things known by God: therefore the formal notion of the divine Idea does not consist in the divine intellection itself.

The second part is proved, namely that the formal notion of the idea does not consist in the divine essence inasmuch as it is imitable by creatures: If the divine idea consisted in this imitability, it would follow that creatures are not known by God according to their proper being, nor according to their contingency: but the consequent is false: therefore so is the antecedent. The major is clear as to the first consequence; for creatures imitate the divine essence only with respect to certain common and transcendental grades, for instance of being, of substance, of living, of intellectual, or similar ones; but with respect to their proper modes and differences by which they are ultimately constituted, and differ from God and among themselves, and in which they involve limitation and imperfection, they do not imitate the divine essence, but recede from it and are dissimilar to it: therefore if creatures are represented and known in the divine essence only inasmuch as they imitate it, they are not represented and known in it according to their proper being. It is also clear as to the second part, for the idea represents the ideatum according to its entity, not however according to its contingent existence; for whether the thing exists or not, it is always similar to its idea, for the house to be built no less than the house built is similar to the idea of the artisan: therefore if the notion of the idea consists in the imitability of the divine essence by creatures, it will not represent creatures according to all their special differences, nor according to their contingency: which is against the notion of the idea. Then again, if the imitability of the cause according to its nature constituted the formal notion of the idea, it would follow that the substance of the generating fire could be said to be the idea of the generated fire; because the generated fire imitates the nature of the generating fire, not only equivocally and extrinsically, but univocally and perfectly.

Nor does it matter that that imitation of fire takes place without knowledge; whereas the idea must concur to forming the imitated thing with prior knowledge, on the ground that the imitability of a thing is artificial.

I answer. that knowledge is extrinsic to ideal imitability; for however much the idea be known, something is not on that account said to be ideated unless it is assimilated to the idea artificially: hence although a man generating a man similar to himself knows and wills that likeness, the nature of the begetter is not on that account said to concur to the generation in the manner of an artificial and ideal form, because it does not concur inasmuch as it represents the man to be generated, but only inasmuch as it is his natural likeness.

Similarly, however much the divine essence be the principle of the divine generation of the Son, and the divine Father, knowing and willing, assimilate to Himself the divine Son, nevertheless this assimilation is not ideal and artificial, but merely natural, because it is not made by the essence precisely inasmuch as it is a representative principle, but only inasmuch as it is a fecund principle: therefore, by parity of reasoning, however much the assimilation of the creature with the divine essence be known and willed by God, this assimilation will not on that account be ideal and artificial.

Finally, if the divine essence were an idea inasmuch as it is imitable by creatures, and as it has respects, whether real or intentional, toward the creatures that are to imitate it; then either it would have the notion of an idea inasmuch as the essence precisely is together with these respects: or inasmuch as it connotes only those respects; or finally those respects alone would have the formal notion of the idea: but neither can be said.

Not the first, otherwise the idea would not be one per se, but only one per accidens, and thus it could not represent the being to be made per se.

Not the second either, because the idea is understood before those respects are understood to be connoted; for the extremes of the relation must be conceived before the relation is conceived: and so the essence of God as imitable, and the creature as imitative, must be conceived before the relation of imitability is conceived.

Not the third either, because the ideatum must be similar to the idea: but the creatures to be produced ad extra are not to be formed according to the likeness of those respects: and so the divine Essence does not have the notion of an idea inasmuch as it is imitable.

The third part is proved, namely that the notion of the divine Idea is the divine Essence itself, inasmuch as it is representative of the known being of creatures: it is proved, I say, first by the authority of the Subtle Doctor in 1. dist. 35. quaest. unica. n. 13., where, after he had set forth the definition of the idea and rejected the opinion of Aristotle, who charged Plato with asserting that the quiddities of things exist per se, he concludes that the Idea is the divine Essence itself, inasmuch as it is representative of the known being which creatures have from the divine intellect.

For although the Doctor there seems to assert that that known being which creatures have from the divine intellect is the idea of the creatures themselves; he does not however intend that that known being, formally considered and inasmuch as it is only an extrinsic denomination resulting in the creature from the knowledge of the divine intellect, is formally the idea of the creature itself; for that known being is a pure being of reason; but the divine Idea is something real existing in God.

And so the Doctor does not judge the notion of the idea to consist formally in that known being, but in the divine Essence, inasmuch as it is representative of that possible being of creatures.

Which he himself explains in 4. d. 50. q. 3. n. 4., where, after he had said that the idea is not a respect of the divine essence ad extra, he concludes: It is necessary therefore that by that essence, by which it most perfectly represents all things, which, as thus representing them as known objects, has the notion of an idea.

Then objecting to himself there, that that known being cannot be represented unless it first have being: therefore unless it first suppose an exemplar from which and whence it is produced under its own and determinate notion, and consequently it cannot be represented before it has an idea: he answers:

I say that this is false; indeed the Essence itself is the unlimited exemplar. And this is the first notion in esse cognito, not however another notion which must first be known, as was said in the first book: and this represents more determinately than anything limited, not to mention anything existing outside, indeed than anything within.

By which the Doctor signifies three things: First, that that known being does not per se have the notion of an idea. Second, that it has the notion of an idea only inasmuch as it is represented in the divine essence. Third, that the divine essence itself has infinite power to represent all things according to their proper being, in which power the notion of the Idea formally consists.

It is proved 2. The notion of the divine Idea is to be formally placed in that which God beholds in creating things and producing them ad extra: but He beholds only His own divine Essence, inasmuch as it is representative of creatable things: therefore the divine essence, inasmuch as it is representative of things, has the formal notion of an idea.

The major is evident. The minor is proved: if God beheld something other than His essence as representative of creatable things, most especially either the things themselves, or the divine essence itself as imitable, or His own divine knowledge as apprehensive of the things to be produced: but neither can be said. Not the first, because the things themselves cannot immediately and per se move and determine the divine intellect, as has been proved quite often. Not the second either, because the divine essence as imitable cannot represent the proper and singular notions of creatures, which it does not formally contain, and according to which consequently it is not per se imitable by creatures. Not the third either, because the divine intellection does not have the notion of an obiectum quod, but only of an obiectum quo, by which God inspects it, so that He may produce things outside Himself according to its likeness.

Therefore it remains that the divine essence alone, inasmuch as it is representative of all things, truly and really has the notion of the divine Idea.

You will say 1. The formal notion of the Idea is to be placed in that to whose imitation the work is immediately made: but the divine work is made immediately to the imitation of the divine knowledge, not however to the imitation of the divine essence inasmuch as it is representative of things: therefore the formal notion of the idea is to be placed in the knowledge itself, or in the formal concept. The major is evident from what was said above. The minor is proved: because the power of the divine agent is not less than that of a created one: but sometimes artisans operate from the bare and mere formal concept of their work, not however from the apprehension of some objective concept; as is manifest not only in those artisans who dispatch their work with such swiftness that they do not seem able to think at once about an external exemplar and about the work itself; for who would say that a quick writer turns his thought in writing to characters other than those which he himself writes and draws? But the same thing is also evident in those who are the inventors of some new artificial work never seen before, and so have no other similar thing set before them to imitate. Whence it happens that those artisans who need an external and objective exemplar need it from the imperfection of the operator, not however from the notion of an agent acting through an idea. Therefore, since in God there is no imperfection, but He exceeds every created agent both in being and in operating, hence it happens that He needs no other idea besides His formal concept. — I deny the minor: and to its proof, I deny likewise that the objective concept is desired in artisans only because of their imperfection; for although this might perhaps be true in created agents, because there is naturally present in us no first object in which we may inspect the rest; whence it happens that our intellect does not dwell on the future work itself in itself: moreover, although that defect also arises from the fact that our intellect has not yet acquired for itself the species of the thing which is to be made; whence it happens that one must look at some external exemplar, to whose imitation the work is made; these things however are far removed from the divine intellect, since it can neither be moved by the things themselves, nor by any exemplar outside God, but contemplates all things only in its essence as in a first and immediate object: and thus from its own supreme perfection it comes about that it beholds and imitates in operating its essence as the objective exemplar and idea of all things that can be made: and consequently, although created artisans sometimes have in the intellect no other objective exemplar of the thing to be made, but only their formal concept; nevertheless God, the supreme artisan of things, always inspects His essence as an ideal object, so that He may produce whatever things according to its representation.

You will say 2. Creatures imitate the divine essence inasmuch as it contains them eminently: but it contains them eminently only as it is participable by them: therefore the divine essence has the notion of the idea of creatures only inasmuch as it is participable by them.

I distinguish the minor: creatures imitate the divine essence inasmuch as it contains them eminently, if that eminent containment be taken for its infinite representative power of that which it contains, I concede: if it be taken only for the supereminent grade of entity in which God excels all other beings, I deny: and thus, the minor being conceded, the consequence is to be denied.

I confess therefore that the divine essence is representative of creatures and has the notion of an objective idea with respect to them, because since it is infinite in its entity, and therefore comprehends all the perfections of other entities without imperfection, whether formally, or eminently, or virtually, it is also representative of them. However, the formal notion of the idea does not consist precisely in that formal, or eminent, or natural containment; but only in the infinite representative power.

You will insist. The divine essence cannot have the notion of representing creatures, unless those creatures are first supposed to have the being which is represented in the essence, and consequently unless they first have an idea: therefore it cannot have the notion of an idea, inasmuch as it is representative. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: nothing is represented except what is: but whatever is supposes an idea of itself, most of all if it is made through an idea. But if it already is, it does not further need an idea in order to be made: therefore creatures, before they have being represented in the divine essence, are already supposed to have some being in themselves; and hence to have some idea of themselves: and consequently the divine essence itself, inasmuch as it is representative, cannot have the notion of an idea.

I distinguish the antecedent: unless creatures are supposed to have true, real, and ideated being, I deny: known being, namely through the sole extrinsic denomination of the divine intellect producing creatures in esse primo possibili, I concede.

Thus creatures can be conceived in this fourfold state: in the first of these they receive from the divine intellect being as first known: in the second they have from themselves that they do not contradict existing: in the third they are conceived to have a relation of reason to the divine omnipotence from which they can receive existence: in the fourth, however, they have being as represented in the divine essence, which, since it has an infinite power of representing, represents those possible creatures, not only according to their being as known, nor only according to their non-repugnance to existing, nor finally only as they express a relation to the divine omnipotence by which they can be produced, but chiefly according to that ideal being which they truly have in God before they are produced, and according to which they will at some time be produced.

You will say 3. That which, the proportion being kept, the idea is in the mind of a created artisan, has the notion of idea in the divine mind: but in the mind of a created artisan the very thing conceived by the artisan has the notion of idea: therefore creatures also, as apprehended by the divine intellect, will have the notion of an exemplar idea.

The major is evident, both from St. Augustine and from the other Fathers saying that creatures are in the divine mind, just as a house is in the mind of the artisan. The minor, however, is proved; for the house conceived by the artisan is the idea of the house to be built, as has already been said from Aristotle.

I deny the minor: For the idea in the mind of the artisan is not really the external work itself as an object of his mind, but is a certain word, or practical dictate, which he forms in his intellect concerning the artificial work to be made. As to the proof, however, I say that when Aristotle, or other philosophers, affirm that the idea of the artisan is the very thing known, insofar as it is to be formed ad extra, they are to be understood of the thing not in its own proper and natural mode of being, but in another, namely the intelligible mode, which it has in the intellect.

Third conclusion. — In God there are not many Ideas really or formally distinct: but only denominatively.

This conclusion has two parts, of which the first is proved: The divine essence, as has been proved, has the notion of idea, insofar as it is representative of creatures: but as such it is not distinct from itself, either formally or really: therefore neither are the ideas really or formally distinct. The major is evident. The minor is proved: first indeed that those diverse ideal notions are not really distinguished; for in God there is no real and entitative distinction, except where an opposition of relation intervenes, by which it comes about that the three divine Persons are really distinguished from one another: but the divine Ideas do not pertain to the Personal relations, nor to the notional acts: therefore between them there cannot be a real distinction. The same minor is also evident with regard to the formal distinction: since a formal distinction intervenes between diverse formalities formally distinct from one another, and of which one is not formally the other, even setting aside any concept of the intellect: but the divine essence itself, insofar as it is representative of man, is not formally distinct from itself a parte rei, insofar as it is representative of an Angel; otherwise in the same essence under its essential notion there would be infinite formalities, just as there are infinite possible creatures; and since this is absurd, that from which it follows is also absurd.

The second part is proved: First indeed from Sacred Scripture and from the holy Fathers, who speak of the divine Ideas as of many things: for first of all St. Paul to the Hebrews 11: By faith, he says, we understand to have been fitted out the ages by the word of God, so that from invisible things visible things might be made. Where by invisible things, we have said above, the ideas of things are signified.

Likewise St. Dionysius, cited by us in the first Conclusion, affirms that in God there are given exemplars of things, which he names the substantifying, predeterminative notions of existing things.

And St. Augustine, cited in the same place, says expressly: All things were established by a notion, nor was man established by the same notion as the horse, for it is absurd to think this. Each single thing, therefore, was created by its own notions. By these words he signifies the diversity and multiplicity of the ideas.

Reason likewise persuades this: For just as things to be made are diverse in themselves, and have their own and special characters by which they are distinguished from one another; so likewise they must have diverse ideas, to the likeness of which they are formed: not indeed diverse intrinsically and according to a diverse entity or formality: therefore at least they must be diverse extrinsically, denominatively, and according to the diverse relation of reason which the divine Essence, as infinitely representative, bears to all represented things.

From these gather 1. that there are Ideas of all things, both of the possible and of the future; for in the same way, says the Doctor in 2. dist. 39. q. 5. n. 7., there are ideas of possibles that are not future as of futures, because that difference of possibles that are not future from futures is only through an act of the divine will: therefore the idea of a future possible no more represents that it will be future than the idea of a possible that is not future. Moreover, the idea of the future no more represented that it itself was to be placed in this now than in that one.

By these words the Doctor indicates that the idea properly and chiefly represents possible things under a determinate state of possibility; because, as he had said above, ideas represent purely naturally that which they represent, and under the natural notion under which they represent something: because the ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will, so that in no way are they there through an act of the divine will: but whatever naturally precedes an act of the will is purely natural: and consequently the notion of idea is chiefly concerned with the representation of things according to their possible being.

Gather 2. That in God there are Ideas of all producible things, whether material, whether spiritual, whether universal, whether singular: for since the idea is the form looking to which an agent operates, it is necessary that of all things which can be formed, even singular ones, there be had ideas: otherwise God would produce something fortuitously and without prevision and foreknowledge, which to assert is impious and sacrilegious, says St. Augustine.

Gather 3. That although the Son and the Holy Spirit are truly produced, nevertheless they do not have an idea of their production; both because the idea has the notion of an exemplar cause with respect to the thing ideated: but the divine Essence is not the cause of the Son or of the Holy Spirit: therefore it cannot have the notion of idea in the generation of the Son, nor in the procession of the Holy Spirit; and because the idea is the form looking to which the artisan operates: but the divine Father is not an artisan in the generation of the Son, nor does He operate in the manner of an artisan, because He is not His cause, but His principle: therefore the Father does not have an idea in the generation of the Son: the same is to be said of the production of the Holy Spirit; and finally because the idea is the formal representation of a thing which does not yet exist: but the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be represented before they exist, since they can in no way have the notion of a possible being: therefore their production likewise does not presuppose an idea.

You will ask 1. Whether God has an Idea of sin?

I answer. with St. Bonaventure in 1. dist. 36. quaest. 1. that sin can be considered in two ways; namely formally under the notion of sin and insofar as it is a lack of the rectitude owed to the act; or materially, insofar as it is namely a positive act and physically elicited. It is certain that that sinful act, considered materially and physically, has its idea in God: because God truly concurs in the physical production of that act, and since it has in itself a real entity, it must also have in God its true idea and likeness.

I answer 2. that sin considered formally, and insofar as it is moral evil, has no idea of itself, nor is it in any way in God. Because, says the cited St. Bonaventure, everything that is in God is in Him either as in a producing principle, or as in an expressing exemplar, or as in a conserving one: but in none of these ways are evils formally taken in God: therefore, etc. The minor is proved, because God is not a producing principle of evils formally taken, that is, of sins, as is evident from the Faith: for to produce sins is to sin, but to sin is to fall short of rectitude and to deviate from divine goodness: but God cannot recede from His goodness, since He is goodness by essence: therefore He cannot sin: therefore in no way can He be a producing principle of sins, that is, of evils formally taken. God also is not an exemplar expressing evils, because the notion of exemplar is taken according to assimilation; but there is no assimilation of God to evils. God is also an exemplar only of those things which He Himself can produce: but God does not produce sins: therefore evils formally taken are in no way in God.

You will say 1. God knows evils within Himself, because God knows nothing outside Himself: therefore evils are in God. The consequence is evident, because everything that is known in something is in that in which it is known.

St. Bonaventure denies the consequence: for, he says, to be in God signifies more than to be known by God, or in God; for in order that something be known by God, or in God, it suffices that in God there be the notion of knowing it: but in order that something be in God, it is required that God be its exemplar: wherefore although God knows evils in Himself, it does not follow from this that evils are in God, because He knows them through the opposite goods, as falling short of those goods themselves. From which it is evident that in that consequence the fallacy of the consequent is committed, because one argues from the position of the consequent to the position of the antecedent.

You will say 2. Everything that is known in something, and not per accidens, is in some way in it as in an exemplar: but evils are known in God, and not per accidens, because God knows nothing per accidens, but knows all things per se: therefore evils are in God.

I answer. that to be known per accidens can happen in two ways: either on the part of the knower, or on the part of the thing known. No knowledge per accidens falls upon God on the part of God Himself as knowing, because God knows all things through Himself: nevertheless it falls on the part of the thing known, namely of evil, because God knows evil not through a likeness of Himself, but through the likeness of the opposite good: for a likeness is the principle of knowing the like and the unlike.

You will say 3. He who knows something, and does not know it through privation, knows it through a likeness and an idea: but God knows evils, and does not know them through privation; because no privation falls upon God, since He is pure act: therefore God knows evils through a likeness and an idea in God: therefore evils are in God as in an exemplar.

I answer. that to know through privation happens in two ways: either so that the privation is in the knower himself, just as the eye knows darkness when it is deprived of light and sees nothing, and the ear knows silence when it hears nothing: and in this way to know through privation expresses an imperfection, and does not suit God, because God is never deprived of light, nor of knowledge; or so that the privation is in the thing known and not in the knower; just as if light had knowledge, it would through itself know darkness, because it would know a thing deprived of light, not because that privation is in the light itself, but in the thing known: and in this way to know through privation does not express an imperfection on the part of the knower: and in this way God is said to know evils through privation, because since He Himself is pure act and light and truth, through Himself He knows positively the good and privatively evil, because He knows in what evil falls short of the good.

You will ask 2. Whether God has Ideas of imperfect things?

He answers 1. St. Bonaventure, in the same place q. 2., that imperfect things formally considered presuppose no idea of themselves; for since formal imperfection is a lack and privation of some owed perfection, it can in no way be had in God: Privation, he says, is not a being, nor consequently is it something makeable by God, nor assimilable to Him: therefore it does not have an idea in God, because the idea expresses the notion of likeness.

He answers 2. that imperfect things considered entitatively have some idea of themselves, because, he says, every effect is assimilated to its cause by some assimilation. Therefore everything that is from God is assimilated to God: but imperfect things materially taken are from God, because as such they are positive entities: therefore as such they are assimilated to God: therefore as such they have an idea, not indeed an imperfect one, but a most perfect one. Because just as of non-living things there is in God a living idea, and of corporeal things a spiritual one, and of temporal things an eternal one: so also of all imperfect things considered entitatively there is a perfect idea, because the idea follows the nature of the subject in which it is, not that of the thing ideated from which it takes only the distinction of representing, because it represents it distinctly.

You will say. Only those things which can be from God have an idea: but imperfect things, in whatever way they are taken, cannot be, nor be made by God; because the works of God are perfect, as is said in Deut. 32.: therefore imperfect things can in no way have an idea.

The Seraphic Doctor answers. that all imperfect things which have the notion of being, such as are matter, the parts of a composite under the notion of parts, and other things of this kind, are from God and are assimilated to Him according to that notion of being, which consequently expresses some perfection, and therefore imperfect things of this kind, according to what they are, namely insofar as they are beings, have being in God.

Then, God perfects imperfect things, v. g. matter through form, and parts through the whole; because therefore God gives to imperfect things perfect being, for this reason all the works of God are perfect.

You will ask 3. Whether the Ideal being which creatures have in God is more excellent than the Entitative being which they have in themselves?

The same Seraphic Doctor answers, in the same place art. 2. quaest. 2. that this question can be understood in two ways, so that the sense is: whether things have more true being, either when they are in the knower and producer, or when they are in themselves: or so that each thing is compared with its likeness, by which it is in God, so that the sense is, which has more true and noble being, the thing itself or its likeness.

These things being premised, He says 1. that if things are compared to themselves according to a diverse mode of existing, then they have more true being in their own kind than in God. The reason is, because things have more true being where they are simpliciter than where they are only secundum quid: but in their own kind they are simpliciter, because they are according to their own entity; in God, however, they are only secundum quid, because they are according to their being as known: therefore, etc. Moreover, things have more true being where they are according to intrinsic and proximate principles than where they are in an extrinsic and remote principle: but in their own kind they are according to intrinsic principles; in God, however, as in an extrinsic principle: therefore, etc.

He says 2. that if each thing is compared with its likeness, which is in God, then the likeness of the thing has more true and noble being in God than the thing itself has in its own kind. The reason is, because in God the likeness of each thing is the same as the divine essence itself.