Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

Three things are especially to be resolved in the present Question: First, whether God truly beholds intuitively, distinctly and clearly, the quiddities, properties and appendages of all possible things: Second, whether this knowledge pertains in no way to the knowledge of vision: Third, finally, whether He beholds those possible creatures intuitively in His essence, or in His omnipotence, or in His very divine knowledge itself; so that they may become known more clearly.

Note 1. In any possible being two things must be distinguished: one, which it signifies in recto; the other, which it signifies only in obliquo. The first is the being itself according to its whole entity, which it would have if it truly existed in act; for that is called a possible being which can exist, and it is true that an existing being, according to its whole entity, was first possible. The second, however, is that twofold possibility which that being imports: one intrinsic and logical, which is the non-repugnance of the thing to existing, that is, whose extremes involve no contradiction, so that they are united with one another to constitute some thing, as animal and rational to form man; the other extrinsic, which consists in the relation and order of reason which those possible things are conceived to bear to the divine omnipotence, by which they can be produced. The former possibility is as it were radical and remote, the source and origin of the latter; for this reason indeed the divine power can produce possible creatures, because they import no contradiction in their concept and existence.

Note 2. The difference of the knowledge of simple intelligence from the knowledge of vision does not consist precisely in this, that they know the same object abstractively and intuitively; for each cognition of God is intuitive and penetrating; nor is it required for intuitive knowledge that the thing be known inasmuch as it is existing; but only inasmuch as it is present, whether in itself, or in another as in a previously known medium, just as, v. g., some object is seen intuitively either in itself, or in a mirror in which, as present, it is represented. Nor again do the two kinds of knowledge differ in this, that the former is terminated at non-beings, the latter at beings, that is, one at possible things, the other at things actually existing; for both can be terminated at things actually existing, since the knowledge of simple intelligence perceives in things actually existing their possibility; for existing things still retain their logical possibility, since truly they have no repugnance to existing, although they do not have physical possibility and the order to the divine omnipotence by which they could be produced, being already de facto produced; and thus they have a relation to that omnipotence productive of them, not further as producible, but as produced. Therefore the whole variety of the two kinds of knowledge consists chiefly in this, that God perceives the same things by both these kinds of knowledge in a diverse manner and by a diverse notion.

Note 3. Philosophers commonly distinguish a twofold medium leading into the cognition of another thing: one as that by which, which is called the unknown medium, such as is the impressed species, which is not known as that which, but is only the reason for knowing the object that it represents; the other as that which, which is called the known medium, such as is a mirror, v. g., which must first be seen before the objects that it represents are seen in it. The doubt, however, is whether possible creatures are seen in the divine Omnipotence more distinctly and expressively than in the essence, or in the divine knowledge as in a known medium.

First conclusion. — God knows possible things most distinctly as regards their quiddities, properties and appendages. This is the common teaching, and it remains sufficiently proved in the last Question of the preceding Article: nonetheless it is strengthened again by this reason: God is a productive agent of things through intellect and will: but such an agent has knowledge of the things to be made and produced by itself: therefore God distinctly knows the things which He can produce, and which He has produced.

Proof of the major. To the most excellent cause must be attributed the most excellent mode of producing and causing: but God is the first and most excellent of all causes; and the most excellent mode of producing things is effected through intellect and will: therefore that manner of causing must be attributed to God.

Proof of the minor. An agent acting through intellect and will acts in the manner of an artisan: but the artisan first knows the thing before he produces it; for as Aristotle says in 7. Metaphysicorum lib. 5., The house ad extra comes from the house which is formed within the mind of the artisan.

Add. that an agent acting through the will necessarily presupposes knowledge of the object about which it operates; for nothing is willed unless it has first been known: therefore an agent acting through the will necessarily has foreknowledge of the thing which it effects; and so, since God acts most excellently through the will and does all things according to the counsel of His will, He must necessarily foreknow the things to be made by Himself.

It is confirmed. from the Apostle speaking to the Romans about God: He calls those things that are not as those that are: that is, according to the common opinion of the interpreters, God knows equally well the possible things and those which do not yet exist, as those which are in the nature of things. Which the Apostle himself again proves to the Hebrews 4.: There is no creature invisible in His sight, but all things are naked and open to His eyes; and consequently possible creatures are not hidden from Him, and He beholds them distinctly.

You will say. If God knows a possible being inasmuch as it is a possible being, He knows a non-being inasmuch as it is a non-being: but God cannot know a non-being: therefore neither can He know possible things. The major is evident from the preceding

Question, in which it was proved that possible creatures, considered formally and in themselves, are not something real, but a pure being of reason. The minor is proved: God cannot know except what is knowable: but a non-being is not knowable, for knowability is a property of being, which consequently cannot belong to a non-being.

I answer 1. That although possible creatures, considered formally and in themselves, have nothing real, nevertheless they are not pure nothing; for they are conceived as the exemplars of those things which are someday to come forth really, and therefore they have at least some exemplar intelligibility. Secondly, although those creatures, inasmuch as they are possible, are not per se formally intelligible; nevertheless they can be understood in the divine Essence, in which they shine forth as soon as they have been produced according to their diminished and objective being by the divine intellect: they can likewise be understood from the comprehension of the divine Omnipotence, to which, as to the cause productive of them in esse reali, they have a relation of reason, which suffices for them to be distinctly perceived by the divine intellect, as we will prove in the third following Conclusion.

Second conclusion. — Possible creatures are known by God only by the knowledge of simple intelligence. The conclusion is evident from the second Note: for in this the knowledge of simple intelligence differs from the knowledge of vision only in this, that the knowledge of simple intelligence is concerned with things inasmuch as they are possible and in their causes, and inasmuch as they import no repugnance in their formal concept to existing. But the knowledge of vision is borne toward present, or past, or future things, or as St. Thomas speaks in quaest. 2. De Veritate Art. 9. ad 2., The knowledge of vision is said to be in God after the likeness of bodily sight, which beholds intuitively the things placed outside itself. Whence by the knowledge of vision God is not said to know anything except what is present, or past, or future: but the knowledge of simple intelligence is also of those things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. By which words St. Thomas openly confesses that the knowledge of simple intelligence is distinguished from the knowledge of vision, because the former is concerned with the possibility of things; the latter, however, with the existence of the same things.

Nor does it matter that God beholds possible things intuitively, and thus has them present in esse cognito et obiectivo. For this presence does not suffice for the notion of the knowledge of vision, which per se demands to be terminated at the real existence of things, whether present, or past, or future. Nevertheless it could not incongruously be said that the knowledge of simple intelligence is distinguished from the knowledge of vision precisely not by the variety of the object, but by the notion of the adequate and the inadequate; so that the knowledge of vision totally and adequately comprehends the whole breadth of divine knowledge, for this reason, that all divine knowledge per se properly is intuitive: but the knowledge of simple intelligence only signifies and imports the inadequate and partial notion of that divine knowledge, namely inasmuch as it is terminated at things as they are only possible.

Third conclusion. — Possible creatures are distinctly known in the divine Essence and Omnipotence, in which they shine forth as effects in the cause, able to produce and represent them. This is the common teaching; for in this possible creatures are known as in a known medium, in which they have their distinct intelligible being, and from which they can truly have their real being: but they have both, the first indeed in the divine Essence, which, since it has infinite power of representing any being whatsoever, immediately distinctly represents possible creatures in their known and objective being, and the second they have from the divine omnipotence, to which as to a cause they have a relation and order of reason, from which they have that they are completely and proximately producible. For although from themselves they have the non-repugnance to be produced, nevertheless they would not be proximately producible, nor consequently completely producible, if there were no cause which could produce them.

You will say. What is known in the Essence and Omnipotence is only perceived as in a general and universal cause: but what is so perceived is not known distinctly: therefore either possible creatures are not known in the divine Essence and Omnipotence, or they are not known distinctly. The minor is evident: for to know a thing in a universal cause is nothing other than to attain the thing in genus and in the universal: but so to perceive a thing is not to know it distinctly and inasmuch as it is such a being, adorned with such special properties: therefore, etc.

I distinguish the minor. To know a thing in a universal cause concurring only generally and in common to the production of things, just as the Sun, v. g., is said to be the universal cause of all generable and corruptible things, because it concurs to certain of their common principles — so not to know the thing distinctly, I concede: but to know the effect in a universal cause, not only in genus and universally, but also in species and in the individual, concurring to the production of any particular effects whatsoever, such as is the divine omnipotence with respect to all formable things — not thus to know the thing distinctly, I deny: for just as God through His Omnipotence distinctly concurs to the production of any things whatsoever, however particular, and since the divine omnipotence virtually and distinctly contains all particular things, the consequence is that the divine intellect, by comprehensively knowing the divine omnipotence, also comprehends all those things themselves to which it has relation and order.

You will say 2. If God knew creatures in His Omnipotence as in a previously known medium, it would follow that the knowledge of God would be posterior to the attribute of Omnipotence: the consequence is absurd: therefore God does not know possible creatures in His Omnipotence. The major is evident, for the formal object specifying and the previously known medium must be prior to the cognition: therefore if Omnipotence is the previously known medium and specifies the cognition, it will be prior to the cognition itself: but this is absurd; for omnipotence is an attribute posterior not only to the intellect, but also to the will. Next, the Knowledge of God directs omnipotence; therefore it is prior to omnipotence. Finally, God is not omniscient for this reason, that He is omnipotent; for if per impossibile He were not omnipotent, it would not therefore follow that He would not be omniscient.

I distinguish the major. That the knowledge of God would be posterior to the attribute of omnipotence, inasmuch as that knowledge is terminated at its primary object, namely at the divine essence, I deny; for considered in this way it is a divine attribute prior to omnipotence itself, even as operative in actu primo: that it would be posterior to omnipotence operative in actu primo, inasmuch as that knowledge is terminated at the secondary object producible by that omnipotence, I concede. And so the divine Omnipotence can be considered operative, either in actu primo, namely inasmuch as it is that divine power by which God can produce other things besides Himself, and thus it is prior to the intellect and will of God inasmuch as it is terminated at secondary objects and at creatures known and willed: secondly, inasmuch as that divine omnipotence is considered as it is operative and productive in act, and thus it is posterior to the intellect and knowledge; since the knowledge of God directs that omnipotence operating in actu secundo, but not that operative in actu primo; whence it follows that God de facto is omniscient with respect to creatures, because He is omnipotent, and that if He were not omnipotent He would not be omniscient in the way in which He now is.

You will insist. Omnipotence is not completed except by the knowledge by which it is directed: therefore also the Knowledge of God is prior to omnipotence as operative in actu primo, and thus omnipotence will not be able to be a known medium perfecting the divine cognition.

I distinguish the antecedent. Omnipotence is not completed adequately in the notion of the proximately operative except by the knowledge directing it, I concede; it is not completed in actu primo in the notion of operative potency absolutely taken, I deny; whence the divine knowledge is indeed prior to omnipotence as proximately operative in actu primo: but it is not prior to omnipotence itself absolutely taken.

You will say 3. If God knew secondary objects in His omnipotence as in a previously known medium, it would follow that He would not know sins, beings of reason, and impossibles; for these have no connection with the divine Omnipotence, since they cannot be produced by it: but the consequence is false: therefore so is the antecedent.

I distinguish. That God could not know those things at least mediately and indirectly in Himself, inasmuch as He sees in Himself the secondary causes from which sins and beings of reason can be made, I deny: that He could not know them first immediately and directly in those things themselves, but only secondarily, I concede. And so God, by comprehending His omnipotence, also comprehensively and intuitively knows all that which is factible by it; He likewise knows whatever can be done, or not done, by the creatures themselves to be produced through His Omnipotence; and thus He does not see sins, beings of reason, and impossibles directly indeed and first, as He sees the creatures themselves; but only secondarily does His divine cognition terminate at them.