Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

In the preceding Question we said that the secondary object of the divine intellect is twofold: one indeed uncreated, the other created. In the first order are all the perfections of the divine Essence and all the relations of origin, which surround the divine essence. For although these have the notion of a terminating object, since divine cognition terminates at the very entity of the Deity, and so even terminates at all those things which are really identified with the Deity itself; they do not, however, have the notion of an object primarily moving; for, as has been proved, this notion befits the divine Essence alone as essence. In the latter order, however, are all creatures, whether according to their ideal being, or their entitative and real being. Of these alone will there be speech here, namely whether God beholds distinctly and individually any creatures whatsoever, even the mean and the very smallest, and that either in Himself, or in them; but first

Note 1. There was no light controversy among the ancients as to whether God beholds all creatures; for not only did wicked men, so that they might more readily indulge their unbridled desires, deny to God all knowledge of worldly things, saying with Job c. 22. He walks about the hinges of heaven and does not consider our affairs: and likewise the Psalmist 71.: How does God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High? but even the more clear-sighted philosophers fell into this most serious error, asserting that the knowledge of mean and tiny creatures is unworthy of God. This in the first place Aristotle himself taught, 12. Metaph. text 51., as the Subtle Doctor understood him: and Averroes, affirming in his Commentary on the cited place of Aristotle that the divine intellect would be debased if it knew these lowest things: indeed, which is greatly to be wondered at, some even of the holy Fathers seem to have slipped into that opinion, whom we shall set forth as objections and explain below. Likewise it must be known that all those to whom it is settled that absolutely all creatures are known by God do not agree in the same opinion about the mode in which God perceives them; for some think that God does not know possible Creatures in Himself, but in the creatures themselves, an opinion which some Thomists falsely attribute to the Subtle Doctor. Some, with Aureolus, in 1. dist. 35. art. 1. q. 2., affirm that God knows creatures in Himself, but not in the creatures themselves; so that He perceives only their virtual and eminent being, not their formal and entitative being. Finally, the rest teach that creatures are known by God not only in Himself, but also in the creatures themselves. What, however, appears to us truer in this doubtful opinion of the Doctors will have to be resolved here.

Note 2. From the philosophers we learn that the object of the intellect and of the will is twofold, the motive and the terminative; among which, although the motive also terminates, the terminative nevertheless, which is purely such, does not move. For example, someone loves Doctrine; here Doctrine is the terminative object, since it terminates the act of the will; and at the same time it is the motive, for by the force of this act he is moved to pursue the doctrine and to employ the means to be used for attaining it. Hence there is no motive object which is not at the same time terminative. But when someone in a storm throws merchandise into the sea, the merchandise is indeed the terminative object of that act, not however the motive; rather it moves toward the contrary and renders that action in some way involuntary. But that which moves to the throwing of the merchandise is the goodness and love of life. Therefore the end is the motive object, the means for the most part the terminative.

Note 3. Creatures existing, or future and past, have a threefold being: namely eminent in the divine Essence, since, as it is the most excellent of all beings and their fount and origin, it also eminently contains all beings. Second, virtual, which they have in their cause, namely in the divine omnipotence, which is productive of all things. Third, finally, entitative, which they have in themselves. It is asked, however, at present whether creatures are known by God not only according to their eminent and virtual being, which they have in God, but also through the entitative being which they have in themselves.

First conclusion. — God knows most distinctly absolutely all creatures, even the very smallest.

This is of faith.

Proof from various texts of Sacred Scripture. For first, Genesis cap. 1., at the very origin and establishment of things it is said: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, which gaze of God signifies an exact knowledge and approval of each thing. Likewise Job. cap. 28.: He has set a time, he says, for darkness, and He Himself considers the end of all things; the stone also of gloom and the shadow of death. And in the same place: He Himself beholds the ends of the world and looks upon all things that are under heaven. Likewise Psalm 49.: All the beasts of the forests are Mine, the cattle on the mountains and the oxen. I have known all the birds of heaven. Again Psalm 138: Lord, You have proved me and known me, You have known my sitting down and my rising up, You have understood my thoughts from afar, You have searched out my path and my line: behold, Lord, You have known all things, the newest and the oldest, etc. With these the Royal Psalmist extends divine intelligence not only to men and their bodies and members; but also to any movements whatsoever. With him Job 31. concords: Does not He Himself consider my ways and count all my steps? All of which Ecclesiasticus 23. declares most plainly, where, rebuking the impious man and the sinner, who thought that he could perpetrate a crime with impunity and without even God knowing:

He does not understand, he says, that the eye of Him sees all things, since the fear of a man of this sort casts from himself the fear of God, and the eyes of all who fear Him; and he did not know that the eyes of the Lord are much brighter than the sun, surveying all the ways of men and the depth of the abyss, and beholding the hearts of men in hidden parts. For all things were known to the Lord God before they were created, and so after their completion He looks upon all things.

Again cap. 39.: The works of all flesh are before Him; and nothing is hidden from His eyes; from age to age He looks upon them, and nothing is wonderful in His sight.

Second. In a wonderful way the holy Fathers press this argument, especially St. Cyril lib. 15. Thesauri. Likewise Cyril of Jerusalem, in the sixth Catechesis, explains the breadth of divine knowledge by the example of the drops of rain, all of which He knows: whence Irenaeus lib. 2. cap. 45. says: *All things that have been made, will be made, and are being made, I see to be so known, that He gives to each of them species, habit, order, number, quantity. Wherefore the proud and insolent thoughts (says St. Jerome on Psal. 137.) do not deceive God. He knows all things, and nothing is impenetrable to His knowledge. Indeed this truth did not escape the pagans; for, as St. Clement of Alexandria reports lib. 5. Stromatum, the Egyptians, fashioning ears and eyes of exquisite material, used to consecrate them to the gods, hanging them in the temples, so that by this they might signify that God sees and hears all things. Again, in the same author lib. 6., Thales of Miletus, to someone asking whether a man doing anything could be hidden from God: And how, he said, could he, who is not hidden even in thought? Whence St. Augustine cannot be brought to believe that Aristotle denied to God the knowledge even of minute things, because He is the Creator of all; for since actions are concerned with singular things, Aristotle himself says lib. 2. Ethicorum cap. 2., it ought to suffice, says St. Augustine lib. 5. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 13., that each one know, or unshakenly believe, that God made all these things; for I do not think him so senseless, as to judge that God made what He had not known.

It is objected 1. St. Jerome, who on those words of Habakkuk, Your eyes are pure, so that they do not see evil, seems to have taken away from God the knowledge of individual living things besides man:

Just as, he says, among men the providence of God runs even through individuals: in the other animals we can understand a general disposition and order, and the course of things; v. g. how the multitude of fishes is born and lives in the waters: how reptiles and quadrupeds arise on the earth and by what foods they are nourished. But it is absurd to bring down the majesty of God to this, that He should know at each single moment how many gnats are born, or how many die: what may be the multitude on earth of bugs and fleas and flies; how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller ought to fall as prey of the larger. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God, that while we drag His power down to the depths, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that the providence over rational beings is the same as over irrational ones:

therefore St. Jerome thinks that the knowledge of God is not extended to all creatures individually. —

I deny the consequence. For St. Jerome by these words only affirms that the knowledge and care, namely that benevolent and paternal care alone, which God has of men and Angels, is not applied to brutes and inanimate things: or, as he himself speaks, the providence over rational, not over irrational beings: for although I frankly confess that these things could have been conceived and expressed better by Jerome; I do not, however, think that so great a man was ignorant of what Christ Himself taught us in the Gospel, namely that God has care of individual sparrows, Matth. 6. Indeed Jerome himself on that cap. 6. of Matth.: If small, he says, and vile animals do not fall without God as their author, and in all things there is providence, and those which in them are to perish do not perish without the will of God; you who are eternal ought not to fear that you live without the providence of God.

You will say 2. If God knew creatures individually, He would have to know infinite possible creatures: but He cannot know them distinctly and determinately. Then because whoever distinctly knows infinite things must also distinctly know that which is necessary for the infinite to be infinite: but God cannot know this: for once a hundred possible creatures are taken away, and again and again a hundred, there will always remain an infinite number of creatures to be distinctly known: Then because, if God actually knew infinite possible creatures, it would follow that an infinite created in act is given, because those infinite units would be at once actually distinct in the divine mind: but this implies a contradiction; otherwise the infinite syncategorematic would be an infinite categorematic: Then finally because, if God saw all the divisions of the continuum distinctly, v. gr., He would also see the continuum divided into all its parts, and consequently would see it reduced to indivisibles, because He would see that they are not further divisible: but this implies a contradiction, for the continuum is divisible to infinity: therefore God does not see absolutely all the divisions of the continuum, nor consequently does He see all creatures individually and distinctly. —

I answer. That God knows distinctly and determinately any possible creatures whatsoever, even infinite in number, as St. Augustine expressly proves lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 18.:

The infinity of number, he says, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to Him whose intelligence has no number. Wherefore if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the one who knows; surely also every infinity is in a certain ineffable way finite to God, because it is not incomprehensible to His knowledge.

Thus God not only knows the infinite, but also knows that which is necessary for the infinite to be infinite, because He knows the infinite units in number which make up the infinite in number. Nor does it follow from this that the syncategorematic infinite is categorematic; because although all its units are actually represented in the mind of God; nevertheless since they are known as they are, and have no other notion of infinite than the syncategorematic, truly that syncategorematic infinite persists. Likewise God sees the possible divisions of the continuum in the way in which they are possible, and therefore sees them always as divisible to infinity in that way; nor does He determinately see the last, because truly there is no last, beyond which another may not be assigned as possible.

You will say 3. Every knowledge depends on the object, both in fieri and in being conserved: but the Knowledge of God cannot depend on Creatures: therefore God does not know creatures. — I distinguish the major. It depends intrinsically on the motive and primary terminative object, I concede: on an object merely terminative, and secondary and less principal, which is in no way motive, I deny. To the minor I say that creatures have only the notion of a secondary terminative object, or less principal, with respect to divine Knowledge, which primarily and principally terminates at the divine essence itself as at the motive object, and primarily terminative.

You will press. Knowledge is also changed at the change of the secondary object, as the Doctor confirms at length: therefore if the Knowledge of God terminates at creatures even secondarily, it follows that at the change of creatures it itself is changed: but the Knowledge of God cannot be changed, just as neither can God Himself: therefore neither can it terminate at creatures even secondarily. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is changed extrinsically and only denominatively, I concede; intrinsically and formally, I deny: for divine knowledge is always intrinsically invariable in itself, even insofar as it terminates at creatures; then because it first tends into the divine Essence as into the motive and primarily terminative object: then because it also terminates at creatures, insofar as they are in God unchangeably and have objective and virtual being: whence although this divine Knowledge also terminates at the entitative being of creatures, which is variable and changeable, nevertheless since this termination is entirely extrinsic, the change of termination also will be entirely extrinsic.

You will say 4. Through the knowledge of a thing, the intellect intentionally becomes the thing known, as Aristotle says 3. de Anima: but God cannot intentionally become a creature: therefore neither can He know a creature. — I distinguish the major. He becomes the thing known primarily and immediately, I concede: He becomes the thing which is known only secondarily and mediately, I deny; for the intellect by understanding becomes all the things which it understands; because it does not perceive a thing except through an intelligible species, or an object bearing the role of the intelligible species, which is the image of the known thing informing and denominating the intellect itself: but since God does not know creatures through an impressed species received from them, but only sees them in His Essence, or in His Omnipotence, in which that creature shines forth; hence it is that He does not become that which He knows outside Himself.

Second conclusion. — God knows Creatures in Himself, as in a means previously known.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as is clear both from question 14. Quodlib. Art. 2., where he most fully and most clearly proves that the divine intellect is moved only by the divine Essence, both for the knowledge of itself and for the knowledge of other things. Likewise in 3. dist. 14. q. 2. n. 8., where, inquiring whether the soul of Christ sees in the Word all things which the Word sees, he responds: It can be said that this Conclusion could be posited in two ways; in one way, that the soul of Christ would have one vision with respect to the Word as first object, and of all the objects shining forth in the Word as secondary objects, to which secondary objects it would have distinct relations: therefore the Doctor thinks that Creatures shine forth in the divine Word, and consequently that the divine Word knows them in Himself. Likewise q. 3. of the Prologue he says: I say the same thing in another way, that divine Theology is about all knowable things, because the first object of Theology, which is God, makes all other things actually known in the divine intellect. Many other similar texts of the same Subtle Doctor could be brought forward, by which it is plainly clear that he did not assert that God sees creatures only in themselves, not however in Himself, as some Thomists wrongly affirm, especially Cajetan on the first part of St. Thomas q. 14. art. 6.

The conclusion is therefore proved. First indeed from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Dionysius, lib. De divinis Nominibus c. 7.:

For the divine Mind does not know the things that are, by learning them from the things that are: but from itself and in itself, according to the cause, it pre-has and pre-comprehends the knowledge, and the notion, and the essence of all things: not attending to individuals according to the species of each; but knowing and containing all things according to the single combination of the cause. Then he adds: Therefore the divine Wisdom, knowing itself, knows all material things without matter, and divisible things indivisibly, and many things singly, all things by the one itself, both knowing and producing. Then he concludes: Therefore by this reason God, knowing things, knows them not by the knowledge of things, but by the knowledge of Himself.

With him St. Augustine agrees, both lib. 6. De Trinitate, cap. 10., where he calls the Word of God a certain Art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all living things: and he concludes: There God knows all things which He made through it: And lib. 5. de Genesi ad litteram, adducing that passage of Ioann. 1.

That which was made in Him was life, he says: In which life He saw all things when He made them, and as He saw, so He made, not seeing on account of Himself, but in Himself.

It is proved moreover by reason. God knows creatures in a nobler way than Angels and blessed Souls know them; but Angels and blessed Souls know creatures in the divine Essence in a more perfect way than in the creatures themselves: therefore much more does God likewise know them in Himself. The major is clear. The minor is proved from St. Augustine lib. 1. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 28. and 29., where he distinguishes a twofold knowledge of creatures in the mind of the Angels; one indeed in the Word, which he calls the morning one; the other in their own nature, which he names the evening one, because it is less clear and less perfect than the former: or as he himself says lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 7. The knowledge of a creature in itself is paler, than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art through which it was made. — Second: that which is a sufficient means for the comprehensive knowledge of the cause can also be a means for the comprehension of the effects: but God in Himself is a means for the comprehension of omnipotence and essence: therefore He is also a means for the comprehension of all possible effects. — Third: divine knowledge must necessarily have a formal motive object by which it is specified: but it cannot have a formal object distinct from itself, otherwise it would depend on creatures, and need them for some perfection of itself, namely for its knowledge, etc.

You will say. God cannot know creatures in Himself, unless the divine Essence represents creatures in esse intelligibili: but it cannot represent them in that way. Proof: the divine Essence cannot represent creatures in esse intelligibili, unless it contains their intelligible being formally, or is similar to them in esse intelligibili: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, otherwise created being would be formally in God, and so God could formally be called a creature, just as He is formally called just, wise, etc., which is repugnant. Not even the second, because the divine Essence cannot become similar to creatures in esse intelligibili; for intelligible being follows entitative being: therefore since the divine entity cannot be similar to created entity, neither will the divine intelligible being be able to be similar to created intelligible being. —

I deny the minor. For since the divine Essence contains eminently, or actually, absolutely every entity, because it is infinite entity, so likewise the divine Essence in the notion of the intelligible contains all the intelligibility of any thing whatsoever, both eminently and virtually: and so this divine intelligibility, since it is infinite, not only renders the divine Essence intelligible, but also any other being represented in it.

You will say 2. Between the means of knowing and the thing known there must be a necessary connection: but such is not between God and possible creatures: therefore God cannot be a means for knowing possible creatures. The major is clear: otherwise the means could not lead into a certain and infallible knowledge of the object; for a means which is probable, for that reason does not lead into certain and scientific knowledge of the conclusion, because it does not have a necessary connection with it. The minor is proved: first: if the divine Essence had a necessary connection with possible creatures, it would follow that, those possible creatures being destroyed, the divine Essence itself would also necessarily perish. Second, it would follow that it would be equally necessary that a creature be possible, as it is necessary that God exist; and so the possibility of creatures would be no less necessary than the existence of God, which seems repugnant to the principles of faith and to the light of reason. Third: finally it would follow that the divine Essence depends on possible creatures, and cannot subsist without them, for things which have a necessary connection with one another, one cannot exist without the other; all of which are absurd: therefore also that from which they follow. —

I answer, the major being conceded and the minor denied. and to its first proof I distinguish: with possible creatures destroyed, the divine omnipotence and essence would also be destroyed, a priori and by an intrinsic locus, I deny; a posteriori and by an extrinsic locus, I concede: for since the possibility of things is nothing real, except in omnipotence itself and the divine Essence, it follows that the reality of possible things cannot perish, unless in like manner the essence itself and omnipotence, which is the whole ground of the reality of possible things, is to be regarded as perishing; for a possible effect, since it has no other being outside the cause, cannot be destroyed except in the cause, and consequently unless the productive power of it is destroyed, which is the cause itself, and so unless the cause itself is destroyed. To the second proof, I deny the consequence of the major; for although among necessarily connected things one cannot fail, without the other failing; from this it does not, however, follow that one is not more necessary than another; since the necessity of the one rests on a firmer foundation. For although it is more necessary that a man be rational than risible, nevertheless, risibility failing, rationality in man would also fail: similarly, although principles are more necessary than conclusions; nevertheless, the truth of the conclusions failing, the truth of the principles would also fail. Finally, to the third proof, I deny the consequence; for although the divine essence and omnipotence cannot exist without possible creatures; from this it does not, however, follow that they depend on them; since the divine Father, v. g., cannot subsist without the Son: and yet He does not depend on Him: similarly among created things, the essence which is the root of the properties is so intrinsically connected with them, that it cannot subsist without them, and yet it does not depend on them: therefore a pari, although the divine omnipotence cannot subsist without possible creatures, nevertheless it does not follow from this that it depends on them.

Third conclusion. — It is not even improbable that God knows creatures in themselves, so that His divine cognition is borne toward creatures as toward a terminative object.

First proof. The infinite intellect, such as the divine intellect is, perceives things according to all their intelligible being: but creatures have not only an eminent and virtual being in the divine Essence, but also a formal being in themselves: therefore God sees creatures not only in himself, but also in those very things. —

It is confirmed. If God did not know creatures according to the formal being which they have in their own nature, but only according to the eminent and virtual being which they have in him, he would not know them according to every mode in which they are knowable; for the formal being of creatures is not in God, because creatures are not contained in God formally, since God is not formally a man or a lion: but it is absurd to say that God does not know creatures according to every mode in which they are knowable.

Then, God knows things in the more perfect way in which they can be known: but it seems more perfect for a thing to be known in itself than in some medium; for it is more perfect, v. g., to see a man in himself immediately than in a mirror in which he is represented: therefore God, in order to have altogether perfect knowledge, must know creatures not only in himself, but also in those very things.

Finally, God knows creatures in every mode in which they are knowable: but they are knowable not only in the divine Essence, but also in themselves; for the Blessed see them with morning knowledge in the Word, and with evening knowledge in those very things: therefore likewise it is not improbable that God knows creatures in himself and in those very things, so that his divine cognition is borne to those creatures as to an object, not indeed a motive one, but a terminative one.

The Thomists object 1: this conclusion openly fights against the holy Fathers praised in the previous Conclusion, but most of all against St. Dionysius; as will evidently appear from his own words, for he says: He does not apply himself to individual things according to vision, but he knows all things according to the containment of the cause. And below:

for the divine mind does not know the things that are by learning them from the things that are, but from itself and in itself it has, through the cause of all things, a cognition and knowledge anticipated and grasped beforehand; not that it considers individual things through a species, but that it knows and contains all things in one embrace of the cause.

And again: Therefore God knows the things that are, not by the knowledge of the things, but of himself. But if God, besides the knowledge of possible things in himself, knew those things immediately in themselves, he would apply himself to individual things according to vision, and he would know them not by knowing himself, and by a knowledge not of himself but proper to creatures: therefore, according to Dionysius, God does not know possible creatures immediately in themselves, but only in himself and mediately, that is, in the divine Essence first seen and known.

The minor, for its first part, is manifest; for the knower applying himself to the object according to vision is not receiving a species from it, because in this the knower does not apply himself to the object; but rather the object applies itself to the knower: therefore this is to be immediately engaged with the object; for it is not seen in what else it could consist: and consequently, if God knows possible creatures immediately in themselves, he applies himself to creatures according to vision.

The same minor, for its second part, is likewise established: for if God knew possible creatures mediately in himself, and immediately in those very things, then he would know them not only with the knowledge by which he knows himself, but also with another knowledge, which is denied by Dionysius: for his sense is exclusive; otherwise he would not have sufficiently explained the mode in which creatures are known by God.

Finally, for the third part it is urged: the knowledge of that object is said to be that to which it is immediately and primarily terminated: but the knowledge by which God would know possible creatures immediately in themselves would have them for its immediate and primary object: therefore, if such a cognition were given in God, he would know creatures not by the knowledge of himself, but by the knowledge of them.

I answer. by denying all these consequences: for in the aforesaid words St. Dionysius signifies only three things: first indeed, that God does not beg the knowledge which he has of creatures from their existence, but knows them before they exist; second, that God does not know creatures through species received from the creatures themselves, as we know them, but through his essence playing the role of the species concurring with the divine intellect for the knowledge of them; third, that God does not know himself with a knowledge distinct from that which he has of creatures, so that he would require a double act of cognition, one namely by which he perceives himself, another by which he perceives creatures, but that with one simple, indivisible and infinite act he knows himself and the things other than himself.

He indicates the first with these words, which he had premised before the words cited above:

Therefore the divine mind contains all things by a knowledge which is hidden from all, because through the cause of all things it has in itself an anticipated knowledge of all things, so that it knew the Angels and brought them forth into the light before they were made, and had all the things that are known from itself and from him, as I might say, from the beginning, and brought them forth into the light. And I think that the divine writings hand this down when they say, he who knows all things before they were made.

For not, etc. He indicates the second with these words cited in the objection, saying: Not that he considers individual things through a species, but that he knows and contains all things in one embrace of the cause. He then adds the third: Therefore God does not have a knowledge proper to himself, and another which commonly and generally comprehends all the things that are; for he, the cause of all things, knowing himself, will in no way whatsoever be ignorant of the things which have proceeded from him and of which he is the cause.

From these things it is clear that St. Dionysius intends only three things. First, that God has an anticipated knowledge of things before they exist, namely by beholding them in his Essence representative of all things, and in his omnipotence as in the cause of all things: second, that he does not know creatures one by one through individual species begged from them, but only either through the comprehension of his omnipotence, or through his infinite power of knowing: third, finally, that his cognition, by which he perceives himself and creatures, is not divided.

They object 2. St. Augustine, lib. 83. quaest., quaest. 47, saying: For God did not behold anything placed outside himself, lest he should constitute what he was constituting according to it; for to think this is sacrilegious: therefore God does not know things in those very things, but only in himself.

I deny the consequence. For St. Augustine only means there that God had no need of some exemplar outside himself, at which he would look, so as to fashion things after its likeness, as a painter, v. g., looks at the panel which he undertakes to paint: but God established all things according to the divine ideas which he had eternal in himself. Whence Augustine adds:

But if these reasons of all things to be created or created are contained in the divine mind; and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and immutable; and Plato calls these principal reasons of things ideas: not only are they ideas, but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain such and immutable, by participation in which it comes about that whatever is, is in the way it is:

by which words it clearly stands that St. Augustine there speaks only of the divine ideas, which God beheld not outside, but within himself in the creation of the world, so as to produce all things after their likeness: and so this authority of St. Augustine does not oppose the aforesaid conclusion.

They object 3. If the divine intellect were really terminated at creatures as they are in themselves, several absurdities would follow: first, since knowledge depends on the object, divine cognition would also depend on creatures: second, since knowledge is proportioned to the object, and is more excellent or less perfect according to the greater or lesser dignity of the object, divine knowledge would be debased if it tended toward a created object: third, since the cognition of a created object is not beatifying, but only the cognition of God; if some cognition of God tended toward a creature, it would follow that some cognition in God is not beatific; all of which are most absurd: therefore they are not to be asserted.

I deny the antecedent. and to all its proofs I say that all those absurdities would indeed follow from this, if divine knowledge tended toward creatures not only as a terminative object, but also as a motive one; since, however, the divine intellect is moved to the knowledge of creatures only by the divine Essence, not by the creatures, all these absurdities do not follow from this; most of all because creatures have only the notion of an object secondarily terminating divine cognition.

You will insist. If divine knowledge is formally terminated at created being, it follows that it is not absolutely necessary, but mutable; for such is knowledge, as is its object: therefore, since creatures are not necessary but only contingent, such likewise will be the knowledge of God terminated at them.

I deny the antecedent. For these things would indeed be true if divine knowledge tended toward creatures not only as a terminative object, but also as a motive one; since, however, creatures known by God have only the notion of a terminating object, not of a moving one, hence it is that their cognition is not such as their entity is. Hence it follows that even if no creatures were possible and future, divine knowledge would no less be infinite and necessary, because it would no less be terminated at the infinite object primarily motive and terminative. It would indeed be true that in this hypothesis knowledge would not be terminated at some creatures: but this defect of termination would not come from the side of the knowledge, but from the side of the creatures; for knowledge of itself is the representation of all representable things without any change of itself: as, by way of simile, the sun is illuminative of all illuminable things, and if it does not illuminate some, that is not traced back to a defect of the sun, but of the things which are not exposed to the sun. It is certain, therefore, that divine knowledge depends intrinsically only on the divine Essence as the primary motive and terminative object; on creatures, however, only extrinsically, and as an object, not indeed motive, but only secondarily terminative.

They object 4. In God, as being infinitely perfect, a double mode of knowing creatures cannot be admitted, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect: but the mode of knowing creatures in the divine Essence as in a cause is much more perfect and nobler than the mode of knowing them immediately in themselves: whence in the blessed Angels the morning cognition, by which they see creatures in the Word and in the divine Essence as in a cause, is much more perfect than the evening cognition, by which they know them outside the Word and immediately in themselves, according to that saying of St. Augustine which we cited above concerning the beatific vision: The cognition of a creature in itself is more discolored than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made: therefore, besides the mode of knowing possible creatures in the divine Essence as in a cause, there should not be admitted in God another mode by which he beholds them immediately in themselves and independently of his essence first known.

I distinguish the major. In God a double mode of knowing creatures cannot be admitted, such that each would have the notion of an object moving per se to that cognition, and which would be done through a distinct act, as the angelic and beatific cognition is, I concede: for this indeed denotes imperfection: that this double mode, diverse by reason of a diverse immediate termination, to various objects, namely to the essence and to the creatures, cannot be admitted, I deny: for so far is this diverse mode of knowing from denoting some imperfection; rather it connotes the supreme power and infinite activity of the divine intellect, by which it can be immediately terminated both at the divine Essence and at the creatures themselves with one and indivisible act.

They object 5. Creatures are known by the divine intellect in that mode in which they are represented through the species by which it understands: but they are not represented in themselves and by reason of themselves, but mediately and in another, namely in God as first represented: therefore they are not known immediately in themselves, but through God first known. The major is evident: for since from the intellect and the object an adequate principle of intellection is constituted through a species, the intellect can understand nothing unless it is represented through a species: therefore neither will it be able to understand immediately what is not contained immediately in the species. The minor, however, is proved: the species by which the divine intellect understands is the divine Essence alone: but this does not represent creatures immediately, but through God first represented; therefore the species by which the divine intellect understands does not represent creatures immediately, but only mediately.

I deny the major. For it is false, as we proved in the previous Question, that the divine Essence has the notion of an intelligible species both with respect to itself and with respect to creatures; for since the divine intellect is of infinite activity, and since the divine Essence is per se and immediately infinitely intelligible, and is per se and immediately proportioned to the divine intellect itself, the divine intellect itself needs no species, both to perceive the divine Essence and to be moved by it to the knowledge of the creatures which it presents to the divine intellect itself to be known, through its infinite power of representing.

They object finally from St. Thomas, 1. Contra Gentiles, cap. 48., with the first argument, where he reasons thus:

An intellectual operation has its species and nobility according to that which is understood per se first, since this is its object: if, therefore, God understood something other than himself as first understood, his intellectual operation would have its species and nobility from another rather than from himself: but this is impossible, since his operation is his essence; and this, being a being from itself, cannot take its species from another distinct from God: thus, therefore, it is impossible that what is first and per se understood be something other than himself.

From these words this argument can be deduced: if God knew creatures immediately in themselves and independently of the divine Essence first known, the formal and specifying object of the divine intellection would be created being, or being as such abstracting from the created and the uncreated: but this cannot be said; therefore neither can that. The sequel of the major is evident: for that is deemed to be the formal and primary object of some potency or operation which is primarily and immediately attained by it and independently of another first attained, as is evident in potentia visiva, whose formal and primary object is color, which it attains per se first; the secondary and material object, however, is the wall, or another subject affected with color; because that is not attained immediately and per se first, but only secondarily and through color.

They prove the minor: first indeed, cognition takes its species and its essential perfection from the primary object and is measured by it: but the understanding of God, since it is his nature, cannot take its species nor be measured by creatures: therefore created being cannot be the formal and primary object of the divine intellection. Second, the formal primary object of the divine intellection must be something most actual, just as the intellection itself is: but a creature is not the most actual being, but a potential one: therefore it cannot be the formal primary object of the divine intellection.

I distinguish the major. Created being is the specifying object of the divine intellection, if it moves the divine intellect per se first to the knowledge of itself, I concede: if it does not move it at all, but only terminates the divine intellection itself, I deny: it is certain, however, that creatures do not have the notion of a motive object, but only of a terminative one with respect to the divine intellection; for the divine intellect is indeed immediately terminated at creatures known in those very things, but it is moved to that cognition only by the divine Essence, which, since it contains the being of creatures eminently and virtually, and that in a more perfect way than the creatures themselves contain their formal being in themselves; and so has the power of representing creatures to the divine intellect in a more perfect way than they are represented in themselves; hence also the divine Essence alone has the power of moving the divine intellect itself to the knowledge of creatures; and thus creatures do not have the notion of a moving object, but only of a terminating one.

That, however, only the motive object is specifying of cognition, and not the terminative one, is openly evident; for cognition is diversified according to the diversity of the medium by which it is made; where, however, there is the same motive object, there likewise the same medium is deemed to be, and the same mode, and so also the same specification: therefore, since the divine intellect is moved by the divine Essence alone, the divine intellection also receives its formal specification from that same one alone.