Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

It is certain by faith, and no less by natural reason, that God knows Himself; whence Christ, Matthew 11: No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son: and 1 Corinthians 2: The Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. This truth did not escape the Gentile philosophers; for Alcinous, expressing in cap. 10 the opinion of the Platonists, says: since the first mind is the most excellent, it is necessary that the most excellent intelligible object be set before it; but it has nothing more excellent than itself: which always understands itself and its own notions.

Another manifest argument urges the same thing; for since God clearly and intuitively knows all things distinct from Himself, it follows that He beholds Himself in the highest degree: for He is not only intimately present to Himself, but is also an object supremely proportioned to Himself, as an infinite intelligible set before an intellect of infinite activity and vivacity: whence Synesius elegantly says: God is the eye of Himself, because He immediately beholds Himself and all His own things through Himself. Only this, therefore, remains here to be examined, how God knows Himself; which, that it may appear more evidently

Note 1. That just as in created cognition, so also in uncreated, a twofold object can be distinguished, namely the material and the formal: and this either primary or secondary: again either motive or terminative. The material object indeed is that which is known; the formal object, however, is that special notion of the object under which it is perceived, which specifies the cognition and distinguishes it from another cognition of the same object according to another formality knowable in it. That is called primary which is known precisely for its own sake: that, however, is called secondary which is perceived only by reason of the connection which it has with another. Finally, the motive object is the notion moving the intellect to this cognition of the object and of those things which are in it: the terminative object, however, is the very entity of the object toward which the cognition of the intellect tends. Here the discourse is about the primary material object of the divine intellect, both motive and terminative; the secondary, however, we shall assign in the following Question.

Note 2. That the opinions of theologians about the primary object of the divine intellect are various; for some affirm that all those things which are formally in God, whether essential or attributive, whether absolute or relative, obtain the notion of primary object. Some teach that the essence together with the attributes is the primary object of the divine intellect; but that the divine relations are to be placed among the secondary object. Others, finally, contend that the divine Essence, insofar as it prescinds from the attributes and is the fount and origin whence the divine perfections flow, alone claims for itself the appellation of primary object. It is indeed certain that the divine Essence is rightly affirmed to be the primary object of the divine intellect, not only by the primacy of dignity, because since it is the fount and origin of all divine perfections, it is also their principal head; but also by the primacy of the order of nature. For each thing is deemed to be intelligible insofar as it is, especially with respect to an infinitely perfect intellect, which necessarily knows all things in that order in which they claim for themselves the notion of being and intelligibility: by which reasoning God can be conceived by us mortals to know first His Essence, then the Attributes, then the divine Relations, finally possible creatures, and at last actual creatures, as the Doctor teaches in 1. dist. 35. num. 10, and q. 14 of the Quodlibet. Only therefore is the present question moved about the primary motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of the Deity and for the perception of all those things which are contained in the Divinity itself.

Note 3. That this is the distinction among the cognitions by which some thing is said to be known in itself, or in another, or from another: that a thing is known in itself when it is to itself the primary and most sufficient notion both for the exact and perfect cognition of itself and of those things which are in it: it is said to be known in another when that is directly known in which the thing itself to be known is contained; thus, v. g., when the essence is directly known, the properties emanating from it are indirectly known; and when the cause is directly known, the effect of which it is pregnant is indirectly detected. Finally, something is deemed to be known from another when the cognition of the one begets the cognition of the other: thus the conclusion is known from the premises; for the premises, once known, cause the cognition and assent of the conclusion itself. With these things premised, two things are chiefly to be resolved in this Question: first indeed, what precisely has the notion of the primary object moving and determining the divine intellect: second, how God knows Himself, namely whether only in Himself, or from creatures, or also in creatures.

First conclusion. — The divine Essence is the primary motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of itself and for the cognition of creatures.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as can be gathered from his various texts, especially q. 3. of the Prologue n. 13, where he expressly teaches that the divine Essence is the first object of all Theology, or of the knowledge of God:

Of all Theology in itself, he says, and of God, and of the Blessed, the first subject is the Essence as this: that is, precisely insofar as it is Essence, and insofar as it prescinds from all those things which are contained in it, either formally, or eminently, or virtually.

He repeats the same in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. n. 5: As was said above, he says, in the question about the object of Theology, the divine Essence is therefore the first object of the divine intellect, because it alone moves the divine intellect both to know itself and all other things knowable by that intellect. Finally, in quaest. 15 of the Quodlibet, at the end of the second article, he says: That a stone is seen in the divine Essence, as a secondary object in the first object moving the proper intellect, that is, the divine, to the intellection of the second.

The same truth is evident by reason: For that is the first motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of the Deity itself and of all those things which are in the Deity, which is every intelligible being, and which contains in itself, either formally or virtually, the intelligibility of all beings: but such is the divine Essence, for it itself radically contains all the perfections of the Deity which emanate from it metaphysically; it also contains virtually the intelligibility of all creatures, which are certain participations of the divine Entity itself: therefore this essence, precisely insofar as it is essence, is the first motive object of the divine intellect. — Secondly: If some other thing could be assigned as the first motive object of the divine intellect, it would be most of all either the divine attributes, or omnipotence, insofar as it virtually contains all the creatures which it can produce, just as a cause precontains its effect: but neither can be said: not indeed the first, because since the attributes neither formally nor radically contain the divine Essence, they cannot even move the divine intellect to the cognition of the essence itself. Add that one attribute does not contain another either formally or radically; but only identically, and by reason of the divine Essence and infinity, in which they are really identified with one another, and so none of those attributes can have the notion of primary object with respect to the divine intellect. Nor the second either; for this divine omnipotence indeed virtually contains the creatures which it can produce, and so with respect to them it can have the notion of first moving object to their cognition: but it is otherwise with the divine Essence and its attributes, which, since they are contained in omnipotence itself neither virtually nor formally, therefore cannot be known through it: and so omnipotence cannot have the notion of primary object moving the divine intellect to the cognition of the divine Essence and of the attributes. — Finally: That must necessarily be established as the primary object moving the divine intellect which primarily has the notion of the intelligible: but the divine Essence itself primarily has the notion of the intelligible, since it is that which in God is first knowable and to which, last of all, all the other things which are conceived in God are referred, as to their head and fount: therefore, etc.

You will say. The knowledge of God is simpliciter infinite and absolute in all respects: therefore its primary object ought also to be simpliciter infinite and constituted of all its perfections: but such is not the divine Essence insofar as it prescinds from the attributes, for thus it does not include the perfection of the attributes: therefore the alone and naked essence, insofar as it is adorned with all its perfections, is not the primary object of the divine intellect. —

I distinguish the first consequence. The primary object ought to be simpliciter infinite, either formally and radically at once, I concede: formally alone, I deny. To the minor; the divine Essence, insofar as it prescinds from the attributes, is not simpliciter infinite, nor adorned with all its perfections, formally, I concede: radically, I deny: for thus it is the root and fount of all the attributes; and so it radically contains them. Whence, although the essence precisely is not wise, nor eternal, etc. formally; nevertheless it is such radically, as has now often been said, especially where we proved the formal distinction of the attributes from the divine Essence.

You will say 2. If the essence alone has the notion of primary object, but the attributes and relations of secondary object, it follows that divine knowledge can be terminated at the essence without being terminated at the attributes: but the consequence is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is evident: for when some potency has two objects, of which one is primary, the other secondary, it can without any repugnance be terminated at the primary and not be terminated at the secondary, as the Doctor openly teaches in 1. dist. 11. n. 5. The minor also is certain: for if divine cognition were terminated at the essence and not at the attributes, it would not be intuitive but abstractive, nor would it be comprehensive but limited. —

I distinguish the major. If divine cognition were not necessarily comprehensive, I concede: otherwise, I deny: for although God cannot know His essence without likewise perceiving His attributes and the divine Persons and relations, and even all creatures, because clearly His knowledge is absolutely and necessarily comprehensive; nevertheless it does not follow from this that the essence has the notion of primary object, knowable of itself apart from the attributes and creatures, which have the notion of secondary object, and without which the divine Essence itself can be seen by the created intellect, as was proved in treating of the beatific vision.

You will say 3. That is the primary object of the divine intellect from whose cognition the divine Word proceeds: but the divine Word does not proceed only from the cognition of the divine Essence, but also from the cognition of the attributes; otherwise the divine Word would not proceed equally perfect as the Father is, nor would it be formally just, wise, etc.: therefore not only the essence, but also the attributes have the notion of primary object.

I deny the major. For the divine Word proceeds from the adequate cognition of the divine Essence, and so proceeds as much from the cognition of the primary object as of the secondary: whence just as the divine attributes are in the Father only in the second mode of saying per se, so also in the Word; for the divine Father primarily communicates to the Word His essence, but secondarily the attributes; for these are communicated in the same way in which they are: therefore, since the essence is prior to the attributes which emanate from it, it is also to be deemed communicated earlier with a priority of sign.

Second conclusion. — God knows Himself in Himself, not however in another, nor from another.

It is proved first. from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Dionysius, cap. 7. of De divinis Nominibus, where he says:

That the divine mind knows the things that are, not learning them from the things that are, but from itself and in itself; and that it has the cognition, knowledge, and essence of the cause of all things anticipated and comprehended beforehand: not that it considers each thing through a species, but that it knows all things in one grasp of the cause:

with which St. Augustine agrees, lib. 83. of the Questions q. 16, saying: that God beholds nothing outside Himself, but in Himself as in the cause of all things. These texts, however, do not deny that God also knows creatures in themselves, as will appear in the following Question, second Conclusion.

It is proved second. by reason: The most excellent mode of cognition is to be attributed to God: but it is more excellent to know oneself and other things in oneself; for thus the cognition is less dependent, and so more excellent: therefore this is to be attributed to God. Next, since the divine Essence is an infinite sea of being and contains absolutely all things either formally, or virtually, or eminently, consequently it presents all things to the divine intellect as knowable per se: therefore God sees Himself and all other things in Himself. Next, if God could be known in another and from another, His cognition would be dependent and discursive: dependent indeed, because that in which He would be known would have the notion of primary object, to the cognition of which God would be perceived as a secondary object; it would also be discursive, for to discourse is nothing other than to infer the cognition of one thing from the cognition of another: but both are absurd, and utterly unbecoming of God: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. God knows creatures comprehensively: therefore He likewise knows the respect and essential order which they are said to have to the Creator: but this respect cannot be known unless God is known, who is the term of this cognition and order: therefore God knows Himself in creatures. — I answer by denying the last consequence. for from this it only follows that God knows Himself together with creatures, not however that He knows Himself in creatures. Or I distinguish: whoever knows God as the term of the dependence which creatures have upon God knows God in creatures; if he knows that creature in God as in a primary and motive object, it is denied: if he knows that creature in itself as a secondary object, I concede: indeed I confess that when an Angel, v. g., knows a dependent creature, he also truly knows God in the creature; because he knows the creature as the primary object moving to the cognition of God. But it is otherwise with God, who knows the dependent creature as a secondary object, but Himself in Himself as in the means and in the primary object.

You will say 2. Although God knows the created effect in itself, nevertheless He also knows it in the productive cause of that effect: therefore by a like argument, although He knows the cause in itself, namely Himself as the Creator of all things; nevertheless He will also be able to know Himself as cause in the creatures and effects produced by Himself, and consequently He will be able to know Himself in other things distinct from Himself. — I distinguish the consequence. That He will be able to know Himself thus as in a primary and explicit moving object, I deny: as in a secondary and, as it were, implicit one, I concede: for since the creature has an intrinsic respect to God, it, once known, implicitly moves to the cognition of God.