Scotus Academicus, Tomus secundus: De Deo Intelligente et Volente

The dispute among theologians is no slight one, whether an intellective faculty is to be admitted in God, distinct from His essence formally, or virtually, or at least by reason: those who defend it do not agree among themselves about its proper characteristics and object. Wherefore we have judged that the three following Questions should be proposed, in the First of which we shall resolve the existence, the quiddity, and the distinction from the divine Essence of the divine intellect itself; in the Second, the primary object of the same divine intellect; in the Third, indeed, we shall set forth its secondary object.

Note 1. The intellective potency in God can be taken in a threefold way: first, precisively, insofar as it signifies that to which it is not repugnant actually to understand, abstracting namely from the fact that God actually understands, in that way in which someone is said to be able to speak while he actually speaks; for he would not in fact speak unless he had the power and capacity of speaking: second, negatively, insofar as it denies actual intellection: just as when Peter is said to be able to be in act, that possibility denies the actual existence of Peter, who when he will be existing will no longer be possible; so likewise I can actually understand that which I do not actually understand: third, finally, actively and operatively, for the faculty vitally eliciting actual intellection. This potency, however, thus taken, is again said to be threefold, namely: 1. productive, which truly produces intellection, or the mental word, as a term really distinct from itself. 2. receptive, insofar as it receives the intellection, or the produced mental word. 3. operative, which truly and really does not produce actual intellection: but is, as it were, a fountain and root, whence the immediate intellection itself metaphysically emanates, just as the attributes immediately flow from the essence. It is precisely about this alone that the present Question is raised, namely whether such a faculty is to be admitted in God.

Note 2. This is the difference between intellect and intellection, that the former is the actus primus of understanding, namely the activity of the spiritual substance for knowing and perceiving the intelligible object: but the latter is the actus secundus, namely the very operation of the spiritual substance by which it in fact perceives the intelligible object. The former, however, is called first act, because it is the first reason why the spiritual substance is capable of perceiving the intelligible object: the latter is called second act, because it emanates from the very power and capacity of understanding, as effect from cause: whence the former is called not only act, but also potency, because it is ordered to a further act, which emanates from it and finally perfects it: but the latter is simpliciter named act, because it is, as it were, the form of the intellective power itself finally perfecting it in the order of understanding.

Note 3. For something to be said to understand and to know in actu primo, three things are customarily required. First indeed, that it have the power and activity, namely the potency for understanding. Second, that it have the intelligible object present, either through itself immediately, or through a vicarious species of itself. Third, finally, that it have the facility of perceiving such an object, whether through an activity innate to it, or through an acquired habit. Whether however these three are found in God, at least according to some proportion and likeness, the Authors do not agree among themselves; for some will that in God, besides the intelligible object, something also be necessarily prerequired which has the character of an intelligible species determining the intellect to the perception of the object. Some likewise will that a certain formality after the manner of a habit is also to be admitted, by which the divine intellect promptly and expeditiously perceives the intelligible object. Three things therefore are to be resolved in this Question. The first, whether there is some intellective power in God, formally distinct both from the essence and from actual intellection. The second, whether this power must be conceived as needing completion by an impressed species or habit, before actual intellection is conceived. The third, whether this divine intellective power has various and manifold acts, or rather one single act, simple and really undivided.

First conclusion. — An intellective power formally distinct from the divine Essence and from intellection is to be admitted in God.

This is the expressed opinion of the Doctor, as can be gathered from his various assertions which Smising recounts at length. Tract. 3. disp. 2. n. 13. First indeed, that the intellect, as it is a power and intellective potency, is formally distinguished from the divine Essence, the Doctor openly indicates in 1. dist. 18., where he says:

That the divine Persons and productions are formally distinct of themselves, and yet are distinguished principiatively, that is, by origin, from their principles, namely intellect and will, which are not only distinguished by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion, but the intellect formally is not the will ex natura rei: therefore likewise the Essence, on account of the parity of reason.

Moreover, in dist. 26., quaest. unica: Production does not belong to the Essence alone, as Essence, as to that which produces; but also to the intellect and the will, as to a productive principle together with the Essence. By these words the Doctor openly acknowledges two things: first indeed, that the intellective power in God has the character of a principle, namely of a potency: second, that that potency is distinct from the essence. This is confirmed from the same dist. 8. q. 4., especially q. 2. Quodlibetica, in the 3rd response to the first opinion, where he teaches that the divine Essence is the principal, but not the total principle of ad intra production, but together with the intellect and the will constitutes one total principle.

If you ask, he says, of these two concurring in the formal principle, is not the one the formal principle and the other a concomitant? Therefore, from that other formal one, it would either be said to be formally the same principle or wholly another. I answer: the two which concur in the principle, namely perfect memory, essence and intellect, and in the perfect will, the will and the present lovable object, do not relate per accidens, nor as a remote principle and a proximate one: but this whole, the infinite intellect having the infinite intelligible object present to itself, is per se one (total) principle; so that the one without the other is not a principle of producing: and therefore it is the one total principle simpliciter productive, not distinguished into two productive principles per accidens accompanying each other. Likewise of the will and the object with respect to spiration, and in like manner of the terms with respect to the productions. If you ask why the Essence alone, as it is distinguished against the will and the intellect, cannot be the principle of communicating itself? I answer: a merely intellectual essence is not the principle of any production, except as it coincides with memory and will. —

That he moreover also judges the intellective power to be distinguished from actual divine intellection, he indicates openly enough in 1. dist. 2. q. 2., where he proves that intellect and will are really identified with the divine Essence, because intellection and volition are really identified with the divine Essence itself; yet since intellection and volition are posterior in the order of reason to intellect and will, To will, he says, is understood as it were posterior to the will; if therefore to will is the same as that nature, much more is the will. He adds the same about the intellect: The reason for understanding must be from itself necessary being, if actual understanding (that is, intellection) is necessary being; for the reason for understanding is, as it were, pre-understood before understanding itself. By these words the Doctor openly indicates that intellection and the power of understanding are distinct ex natura rei. The same is evident from his almost innumerable texts, especially in 1. dist. 2. q. 7. and dist. 13. q. unica, to the second principal argument, and dist. 35. q. unica, to the second, and Quodlibeto 1. art. 3., where he expressly affirms that intellect and will are potencies and first acts, not only productive with respect to the Persons proceeding in God, but also operative with respect to the essential act of understanding and willing, common to the three adorable Persons.

This same truth is proved by reason: first indeed, that the intellective potency is formally distinguished from the divine Essence has already been proved more than sufficiently, where we treated of the formal distinction of the divine attributes from the divine Essence. That this divine intellective power is likewise formally distinguished from actual intellection is also openly evident: both because many things are verified of the divine intellect which do not belong to actual intellection; for the intellect is the reason why there is intellection in God, which does not fit intellection itself; for the same thing is not the reason of itself; moreover, intellection denominates God as understanding; but the intellect only denominates him as intellective: therefore they are not the same; finally, the intellect is, together with the divine Essence, the principle of the procession of the Word, which does not belong to intellection: therefore intellect and intellection are distinguished. — Second, in order that the intellective potency in God be truly understood after the manner of a first act, it suffices that the power of understanding be conceived, without the divine Essence and the actual knowledge of God being conceived: but we can understand that power, without the essence itself and actual intellection being thought: therefore an intellective potency distinct from the essence and from actual intellection can truly be understood in God. The minor is evident: for in order that such an intellective power be conceived, it suffices that God be apprehended insofar as he is a spiritual substance endowed with the power of understanding and willing, not attending to his essential predicates, nor to his actual knowledge. — Third, the intellective potency is a perfection simpliciter simple, involving no imperfection in its concept: therefore it is to be asserted of God. The consequence is evident; for God, as has already been abundantly proved, formally comprehends absolutely all perfections simpliciter simple. The antecedent is proved: for it is better to have the power of understanding than not to have it, and all those imperfections which surround created intellection, for instance that it is an act really distinct from the intellective faculty and received in it after the manner of a quality, can easily be removed from the divine intellective power: and so nothing prevents this divine power of understanding from being judged a perfection simpliciter simple. — Finally, if anything would hinder an intellective potency being attributed to God, it would be chiefly because, since God is pure act, every potency is unseemly for him: and consequently the intellective potency also is repugnant to him: but this reason is worthless; since all the Adversaries confess that in God there is found the intellect after the manner of the productive potency of the divine Word, why therefore could an intellective potency also not be found? not indeed productive of intellection, but only operative of it, namely that perfection from which, as from a root, another perfection metaphysically emanates; in that way namely in which the divine attributes flow from the essence and are distinguished from it.

You will say 1: Saint Maximus the Martyr, part. 1. tit. 3., expressly affirms that every intellective potency and intellection must be removed from God:

God, he says, is neither properly called understanding, nor intellect, lest he be thought composite; for that which is understanding has, considered together with itself, the faculty of understanding: and that which is understood, in order that it be understood, has the same faculty: but neither can intellection be said of him, for intellection by its nature has as subject a substance capable of itself. Wherefore it remains that he be constituted above all these things. —

I answer. This is to be understood of the intellect after the manner of a receptive potency of accidental intellection really distinct from it, and likewise of intellection insofar as it is a quality accidentally affecting and perfecting the intellective potency by which it is produced and in which it is received: but not of the intellective potency and intellection only formally distinct from the divine Essence and really identified with it: whence he adds: Unless perhaps we say that he is that intellection; so that it may be intellection itself according to substance, and wholly intellection, and only intellection, and intellection above, intellection.

They object 2. Whatever excludes divine simplicity, purity and infinity should not be admitted in God: but if the first act of understanding properly so called is in God, even by reason, and if there is a potency of understanding properly taken and as it is distinguished from the second act, it excludes these three: therefore the first act of understanding properly so called is not in God, even by reason. They prove the minor: that which essentially includes reception and distinction excludes simplicity, purity and infinity: the first act of understanding properly so called essentially includes distinction and reception: therefore it excludes simplicity. They prove the minor: the first act of understanding, as it is distinguished from the second act, is constituted formally by the productive and receptive power of intellection: but the productive and receptive power of intellection formally includes distinction and reception, for where there is production there is real distinction: therefore the first act of understanding properly so called formally says reception and distinction. They prove the major: the first act of understanding is constituted by something which cannot be common to it with the second act of understanding: but nothing else belongs to the first act which does not belong to the second act, besides the productive and receptive power: therefore by these the first act of understanding is constituted. —

I deny the minor. and to all its proofs I say that the Adversaries, in assigning these things, stray far from the truth, and do not grasp our opinion; for we do not assert that the divine intellect is productive and receptive of intellection, but only that it is operative and, as it were, an original perfection, from which intellection, like a rivulet from a fountain and a ray from the Sun, flows out; in that way namely in which the divine attributes emanate from the essence; since therefore the attributes in no way harm the divine simplicity, purity and infinity, so neither does the formal distinction of the intellective potency from the essence and intellection harm anything.

They object 3. from Durandus: The divine Essence is no less the same with its intellection, than some quality is the same with created intellection: but a certain quality is formally the same with created intellection: therefore likewise divine intellection is formally the same with the essence; and so there is no intellective potency in God from which this intellection emanates. —

I deny the major. for it is false that a stricter identity cannot be found in a created concept than in an uncreated one: for greater and stricter is the identity between man and humanity, than between the divine Essence and the divine Paternity: therefore although some quality is formally the same with created intellection, it does not follow from this that divine intellection is formally the same with the divine essence.

They press from the same author: The divine Essence is formally living: therefore also formally understanding and willing; and consequently intellection and volition do not formally differ from the divine Essence. The first sequel is evident, because intellectual life does not consist in any other operation than in intellection and volition. The second is also evident: for if intellection is formally distinguished from the essence, this will not be formal intellection, and so neither will it be living formally by intellection; for what is formally living is not distinguished from its life. The antecedent is proved; for the divine Essence by reason of its infinity involves every perfection which is without imperfection, but life includes no imperfection: therefore the divine essence is formally living. —

I distinguish the antecedent. The divine Essence is formally living, if formal life is taken for the primary act of vital operation together with it, namely for the principle of life, I concede; if life is taken for the vital operation itself, which is intellection and volition, I deny: for thus the divine essence is said to be living not formally, but only identically, because namely the operations of life, which are intellection and volition, are not really distinguished from it, but are identified with it.

They insist again from the same author: if volition and intellection are not formally the same as the divine Essence, this will be in potentia to intellection and volition, and so will not be pure and ultimate act: not indeed pure act, because it would involve potentiality; nor even ultimate act, because it would say an order to a further act, namely to intellection and volition by which it would be determined and perfected: but the consequence is absurd: therefore so is the antecedent. —

I distinguish the major. the divine essence would not be pure act really, and insofar as act is opposed to potential existence, I deny: it would not be pure act formally, insofar as namely it would be ordered to some formality which would emanate from it and identically perfect it, I concede: likewise it would not be ultimate act, that is, it would say an order to some form really distinct from it, I deny: it would not be ultimate act, that is, some formality would be given flowing from that divine Essence, identically perfecting it, and which would be really the essence itself, I concede: and thus I deny the minor: for as we have already said of the divine attributes, there is no imperfection in the divine Essence in that it has attributes formally distinct from itself and perfective of itself.

They object 4. For this reason in creatures there is given a potency which is a principle of action distinct from the created essence, because this essence, by reason of its finite perfection and limited entity, cannot be the immediate principle of its operation: but the essence of God is infinite: therefore it itself is immediately the principle of operation. It is confirmed: just as in creatures the properties immediately flow from the essence, since actual divine intellection has a stricter unity with the divine Essence than created properties have with their essence, it follows that that actual divine intellection also immediately flows from the divine Essence, and so no intellective potency is given midway between intellection and the divine essence. —

I answer 1. This argument proves too much; for from it it would follow that the divine Essence itself could be called the immediate principle of the divine Persons, and so the Son and the Holy Spirit would proceed immediately from the divine Nature, not however through the mediation of intellect and will, which all the theologians openly deny against Durandus. —

I answer 2. The difference between operations and properties is this, that operations and acts are not immediate perfections of the essence, as properties are, but immediately perfect the potencies from which they arise, and through the mediation of the potencies affect and perfect the essence. For although they flow from the essence itself remotely, nevertheless, since intellection and volition are diverse operations, diverse potencies, or notions, must also be assigned from which they emanate and by which they are distinguished: for volition, v. g., proceeds from the essence in a different way than intellection; for volition emanates from the essence as it is appetitive, whereas intellection as it is intellective. Whence it comes about that two proximate, distinct, and immediate principles must necessarily be assigned, one of which is appetitive, the other intellective, namely intellect and will, which principles are formally distinguished from the divine Essence and from its operations.

Finally, certain Scotists object that the Subtle Doctor directly opposes our opinion; for he himself in 1. dist. 26. q. unica n. 15. denies that intellect and will are divine attributes, but says that they are the very essence of God, and that God understands and wills essentially:

The divine Essence, he says, with everything that is as it were a quality set aside, has in itself, as it is an essence, those things which are the proper principles of the operation befitting God; of this kind are to understand and to will. I concede, therefore, that if we call attributes properly those alone which, as it were like qualities, perfect in esse secundo a thing presupposed in perfecto esse primo, namely as regards every perfection which befits it insofar as it is a substance, in this way intellect and will are not attributes; rather they are certain intrinsic perfections in the essence, as it is pre-understood to every quantity and quality. And a little later: since intellect is a certain life and will a certain life, they will not be properly attributes. And again: just as rationality is not an attribute of man, so neither is intellectuality of this essence. Finally: intellectuality, he says, expresses an intrinsic mode of this essence; but the attributes properly are wisdom and charity, and in another way the transcendentals, namely truth and goodness. —

Likewise in the Quodlibeta, quaest. 1. art. 1. § De Altero termino, he says:

Intellectuality is essentially the same as the divine Essence, understood in this way, that it is not only really the same as the Essence itself, and this with a simple identity, as perhaps any attribute whatsoever is held to be the same as the Essence itself; but it is the same to it in this way, that if the divine Essence itself were defined, intellectuality would not fall outside its definition, as wise and good would:

whence not a few Scotists infer with Lychetus in 1. dist. 8. q. 3. that intellect and will are not attributes, but either essential predicates or intrinsic modes of the divine Essence itself. —

I deny the major. For that is not the mind of the Doctor; rather the Doctor there speaks only of intellectuality, insofar as intellectuality is a mode of being contracting it to intellectual substance, which is the root and foundation not only of the intellective but also of the volitive potency. Nor does it matter that he says that intellectuality expresses an intrinsic mode of this essence, like infinity, which is not of the quiddity of the Deity, but its intrinsic mode: for I say that the Doctor there does not use intrinsic mode properly and strictly, insofar as it is something distinct from the quiddity; for in that same place he compares divine intellectuality with the rationality of man, which is known to be of the quiddity of man and its essential difference: but he takes intrinsic mode insofar as it is distinguished from the attributes and comprehends every objective notion by which it is involved in the adequate concept of the thing, in which indeed intellectuality agrees with infinity, although it is not properly an intrinsic mode as infinity is.

Second conclusion. — No formality is to be admitted in the divine intellect by which it would have the notion of an impressed species: yet a formality is admitted in it having the notion of a habit formally distinct from the essence: but indistinct from the intellect itself.

This Conclusion has three parts.

The first part is proved. An impressed species is required in the intellect for this reason, either because the object is absent, or because it is disproportionate, or because it is not sufficiently per se a motive of the intellect for forming intellection: but on neither head is such a species necessary to the divine intellect: since the divine essence is an object intimately present and sufficiently proportioned to the intellect itself: inasmuch as the divine Essence is infinitely intelligible and the intellect infinitely intellective, it also by itself sufficiently and immediately moves the intellect itself to the knowledge of itself: for to move the intellect is nothing other than for the object to be manifested to it and exhibited as something to be known; but it is certain that the divine Essence by itself immediately manifests itself thus to the divine intellect, and so it is equally certain that it immediately moves the divine intellect to its intuitive knowledge of itself. —

It is confirmed. The perfection and power of the divine Essence is not less than that of the angelic substance: but the angelic substance suffices per se, and needs no impressed species to determine and move the angelic intellect to the knowledge of itself: therefore much more will the divine Essence per se sufficiently be the motive of the divine intellect to the knowledge of itself: and hence any formality taking the place of an impressed species in the divine intellect itself would be futile.

The second part is the express opinion of the Doctor, who in several places affirms that there is to be admitted in God a habitual Knowledge and Wisdom, formally distinct from the actual and from the divine Essence of which it is an attribute, and this we will prove more fully in the following Article, by disclosing namely the essence and the characteristics of divine Knowledge.

The third part, moreover, is also conformable to the opinion of the Doctor, especially in 4. d. 16. q. 4, where he expressly affirms that the virtues of the divine will are not formally distinct from the will: because, he says, the will, from the very fact that it is infinite, suffices more for every rightness of act than any virtue, distinct in reality or in notion, superadded. As if he would say: where the principle of willing and of understanding is by its formal notion sufficient per se for every act of understanding and willing, no virtue formally distinct from them is required in them: but intellect and will in God are principles per se sufficient for the act of understanding and willing, since each is an infinite principle: therefore they require for this no habit formally distinct from themselves.

Third conclusion. — The act of the divine intellect is not multiple, but one and indivisible, both really and formally.

This is common among the theologians, and the holy Fathers defend it, especially Saint Augustine lib. 15. De Trinitate, cap. 14, where, after he taught that the Father and the Son know each other mutually and all things in themselves, he discloses with these words what sort that knowledge of theirs is:

The Father and the Son therefore know each other; but the one by begetting, the other by being born; and all things which are in their knowledge, in their Wisdom, in their Essence, each one of them sees at once, not piecemeal, or one by one, or as with an alternating concept, from here to there and from there to here, and again from there, or from there into one thing and another, so that it could not see some things unless it did not see others: but, as I said, it sees all things at once, of which there is none that it does not always see.

And in lib. 11. De Civitate Dei: Moreover, the Spirit of wisdom is called manifold in the holy Scriptures, because it has many things in itself; but what it has, this it is, and all those things it is one; for there are not many, but one Wisdom, etc.

Peter Damian also agrees, who affirms that God so embraces all times within the secrets of his foresight that nothing new at all accrues to him, nor does anything recede from him through the moments of their course: nor does he consider different things with different gazes; so that when he attends to past things he would be free from present or future ones: or again, when he considers present or future things, he would turn his eyes away from present ones: but with one only and simple gaze of his most present majesty he comprehends all things at once: nor this confusedly and without distinction, but he discerns all things and distinguishes each according to its own property.

Ammonius likewise acknowledged this truth in the Commentaries on the book of Aristotle de Interpretatione, where, when he had said that the Gods know all things, past, present, and future, but in the way that is befitting the Gods, that is, with one and determinate and immutable knowledge, he adds: for those things too which are divisible, it is necessary that they know indivisibly and without any interval: and those which are manifold, singularly: and those which are temporal, in an eternal mode, and in that mode in which they were made, as unmade.

The reason for this truth, moreover, is evident: first, because the act of the divine intellect, since it is infinite, is equivalent to absolutely all objects, even infinite ones, both intensively, as is the divine Essence, and extensively, if indeed possible creatures are infinite in number. Second, because since God is altogether invariable, he cannot have alternating acts and pass from one knowledge to another; finally, because no reason appears which could persuade the entitative multiplicity of divine knowledge: therefore it is not to be admitted.

Whatever can be objected against this Conclusion has partly been resolved from what was said on divine Immutability, and partly will be resolved from what will be said on the Invariability of divine knowledge: therefore let it be

It is certain by faith, and no less by natural reason, that God knows Himself; whence Christ, Matthew 11: No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son: and 1 Corinthians 2: The Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. This truth did not escape the Gentile philosophers; for Alcinous, expressing in cap. 10 the opinion of the Platonists, says: since the first mind is the most excellent, it is necessary that the most excellent intelligible object be set before it; but it has nothing more excellent than itself: which always understands itself and its own notions.

Another manifest argument urges the same thing; for since God clearly and intuitively knows all things distinct from Himself, it follows that He beholds Himself in the highest degree: for He is not only intimately present to Himself, but is also an object supremely proportioned to Himself, as an infinite intelligible set before an intellect of infinite activity and vivacity: whence Synesius elegantly says: God is the eye of Himself, because He immediately beholds Himself and all His own things through Himself. Only this, therefore, remains here to be examined, how God knows Himself; which, that it may appear more evidently

Note 1. That just as in created cognition, so also in uncreated, a twofold object can be distinguished, namely the material and the formal: and this either primary or secondary: again either motive or terminative. The material object indeed is that which is known; the formal object, however, is that special notion of the object under which it is perceived, which specifies the cognition and distinguishes it from another cognition of the same object according to another formality knowable in it. That is called primary which is known precisely for its own sake: that, however, is called secondary which is perceived only by reason of the connection which it has with another. Finally, the motive object is the notion moving the intellect to this cognition of the object and of those things which are in it: the terminative object, however, is the very entity of the object toward which the cognition of the intellect tends. Here the discourse is about the primary material object of the divine intellect, both motive and terminative; the secondary, however, we shall assign in the following Question.

Note 2. That the opinions of theologians about the primary object of the divine intellect are various; for some affirm that all those things which are formally in God, whether essential or attributive, whether absolute or relative, obtain the notion of primary object. Some teach that the essence together with the attributes is the primary object of the divine intellect; but that the divine relations are to be placed among the secondary object. Others, finally, contend that the divine Essence, insofar as it prescinds from the attributes and is the fount and origin whence the divine perfections flow, alone claims for itself the appellation of primary object. It is indeed certain that the divine Essence is rightly affirmed to be the primary object of the divine intellect, not only by the primacy of dignity, because since it is the fount and origin of all divine perfections, it is also their principal head; but also by the primacy of the order of nature. For each thing is deemed to be intelligible insofar as it is, especially with respect to an infinitely perfect intellect, which necessarily knows all things in that order in which they claim for themselves the notion of being and intelligibility: by which reasoning God can be conceived by us mortals to know first His Essence, then the Attributes, then the divine Relations, finally possible creatures, and at last actual creatures, as the Doctor teaches in 1. dist. 35. num. 10, and q. 14 of the Quodlibet. Only therefore is the present question moved about the primary motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of the Deity and for the perception of all those things which are contained in the Divinity itself.

Note 3. That this is the distinction among the cognitions by which some thing is said to be known in itself, or in another, or from another: that a thing is known in itself when it is to itself the primary and most sufficient notion both for the exact and perfect cognition of itself and of those things which are in it: it is said to be known in another when that is directly known in which the thing itself to be known is contained; thus, v. g., when the essence is directly known, the properties emanating from it are indirectly known; and when the cause is directly known, the effect of which it is pregnant is indirectly detected. Finally, something is deemed to be known from another when the cognition of the one begets the cognition of the other: thus the conclusion is known from the premises; for the premises, once known, cause the cognition and assent of the conclusion itself. With these things premised, two things are chiefly to be resolved in this Question: first indeed, what precisely has the notion of the primary object moving and determining the divine intellect: second, how God knows Himself, namely whether only in Himself, or from creatures, or also in creatures.

First conclusion. — The divine Essence is the primary motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of itself and for the cognition of creatures.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as can be gathered from his various texts, especially q. 3. of the Prologue n. 13, where he expressly teaches that the divine Essence is the first object of all Theology, or of the knowledge of God:

Of all Theology in itself, he says, and of God, and of the Blessed, the first subject is the Essence as this: that is, precisely insofar as it is Essence, and insofar as it prescinds from all those things which are contained in it, either formally, or eminently, or virtually.

He repeats the same in 1. dist. 3. quaest. 3. n. 5: As was said above, he says, in the question about the object of Theology, the divine Essence is therefore the first object of the divine intellect, because it alone moves the divine intellect both to know itself and all other things knowable by that intellect. Finally, in quaest. 15 of the Quodlibet, at the end of the second article, he says: That a stone is seen in the divine Essence, as a secondary object in the first object moving the proper intellect, that is, the divine, to the intellection of the second.

The same truth is evident by reason: For that is the first motive object of the divine intellect, both for the cognition of the Deity itself and of all those things which are in the Deity, which is every intelligible being, and which contains in itself, either formally or virtually, the intelligibility of all beings: but such is the divine Essence, for it itself radically contains all the perfections of the Deity which emanate from it metaphysically; it also contains virtually the intelligibility of all creatures, which are certain participations of the divine Entity itself: therefore this essence, precisely insofar as it is essence, is the first motive object of the divine intellect. — Secondly: If some other thing could be assigned as the first motive object of the divine intellect, it would be most of all either the divine attributes, or omnipotence, insofar as it virtually contains all the creatures which it can produce, just as a cause precontains its effect: but neither can be said: not indeed the first, because since the attributes neither formally nor radically contain the divine Essence, they cannot even move the divine intellect to the cognition of the essence itself. Add that one attribute does not contain another either formally or radically; but only identically, and by reason of the divine Essence and infinity, in which they are really identified with one another, and so none of those attributes can have the notion of primary object with respect to the divine intellect. Nor the second either; for this divine omnipotence indeed virtually contains the creatures which it can produce, and so with respect to them it can have the notion of first moving object to their cognition: but it is otherwise with the divine Essence and its attributes, which, since they are contained in omnipotence itself neither virtually nor formally, therefore cannot be known through it: and so omnipotence cannot have the notion of primary object moving the divine intellect to the cognition of the divine Essence and of the attributes. — Finally: That must necessarily be established as the primary object moving the divine intellect which primarily has the notion of the intelligible: but the divine Essence itself primarily has the notion of the intelligible, since it is that which in God is first knowable and to which, last of all, all the other things which are conceived in God are referred, as to their head and fount: therefore, etc.

You will say. The knowledge of God is simpliciter infinite and absolute in all respects: therefore its primary object ought also to be simpliciter infinite and constituted of all its perfections: but such is not the divine Essence insofar as it prescinds from the attributes, for thus it does not include the perfection of the attributes: therefore the alone and naked essence, insofar as it is adorned with all its perfections, is not the primary object of the divine intellect. —

I distinguish the first consequence. The primary object ought to be simpliciter infinite, either formally and radically at once, I concede: formally alone, I deny. To the minor; the divine Essence, insofar as it prescinds from the attributes, is not simpliciter infinite, nor adorned with all its perfections, formally, I concede: radically, I deny: for thus it is the root and fount of all the attributes; and so it radically contains them. Whence, although the essence precisely is not wise, nor eternal, etc. formally; nevertheless it is such radically, as has now often been said, especially where we proved the formal distinction of the attributes from the divine Essence.

You will say 2. If the essence alone has the notion of primary object, but the attributes and relations of secondary object, it follows that divine knowledge can be terminated at the essence without being terminated at the attributes: but the consequence is false: therefore also the antecedent. The major is evident: for when some potency has two objects, of which one is primary, the other secondary, it can without any repugnance be terminated at the primary and not be terminated at the secondary, as the Doctor openly teaches in 1. dist. 11. n. 5. The minor also is certain: for if divine cognition were terminated at the essence and not at the attributes, it would not be intuitive but abstractive, nor would it be comprehensive but limited. —

I distinguish the major. If divine cognition were not necessarily comprehensive, I concede: otherwise, I deny: for although God cannot know His essence without likewise perceiving His attributes and the divine Persons and relations, and even all creatures, because clearly His knowledge is absolutely and necessarily comprehensive; nevertheless it does not follow from this that the essence has the notion of primary object, knowable of itself apart from the attributes and creatures, which have the notion of secondary object, and without which the divine Essence itself can be seen by the created intellect, as was proved in treating of the beatific vision.

You will say 3. That is the primary object of the divine intellect from whose cognition the divine Word proceeds: but the divine Word does not proceed only from the cognition of the divine Essence, but also from the cognition of the attributes; otherwise the divine Word would not proceed equally perfect as the Father is, nor would it be formally just, wise, etc.: therefore not only the essence, but also the attributes have the notion of primary object.

I deny the major. For the divine Word proceeds from the adequate cognition of the divine Essence, and so proceeds as much from the cognition of the primary object as of the secondary: whence just as the divine attributes are in the Father only in the second mode of saying per se, so also in the Word; for the divine Father primarily communicates to the Word His essence, but secondarily the attributes; for these are communicated in the same way in which they are: therefore, since the essence is prior to the attributes which emanate from it, it is also to be deemed communicated earlier with a priority of sign.

Second conclusion. — God knows Himself in Himself, not however in another, nor from another.

It is proved first. from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Dionysius, cap. 7. of De divinis Nominibus, where he says:

That the divine mind knows the things that are, not learning them from the things that are, but from itself and in itself; and that it has the cognition, knowledge, and essence of the cause of all things anticipated and comprehended beforehand: not that it considers each thing through a species, but that it knows all things in one grasp of the cause:

with which St. Augustine agrees, lib. 83. of the Questions q. 16, saying: that God beholds nothing outside Himself, but in Himself as in the cause of all things. These texts, however, do not deny that God also knows creatures in themselves, as will appear in the following Question, second Conclusion.

It is proved second. by reason: The most excellent mode of cognition is to be attributed to God: but it is more excellent to know oneself and other things in oneself; for thus the cognition is less dependent, and so more excellent: therefore this is to be attributed to God. Next, since the divine Essence is an infinite sea of being and contains absolutely all things either formally, or virtually, or eminently, consequently it presents all things to the divine intellect as knowable per se: therefore God sees Himself and all other things in Himself. Next, if God could be known in another and from another, His cognition would be dependent and discursive: dependent indeed, because that in which He would be known would have the notion of primary object, to the cognition of which God would be perceived as a secondary object; it would also be discursive, for to discourse is nothing other than to infer the cognition of one thing from the cognition of another: but both are absurd, and utterly unbecoming of God: therefore, etc.

You will say 1. God knows creatures comprehensively: therefore He likewise knows the respect and essential order which they are said to have to the Creator: but this respect cannot be known unless God is known, who is the term of this cognition and order: therefore God knows Himself in creatures. — I answer by denying the last consequence. for from this it only follows that God knows Himself together with creatures, not however that He knows Himself in creatures. Or I distinguish: whoever knows God as the term of the dependence which creatures have upon God knows God in creatures; if he knows that creature in God as in a primary and motive object, it is denied: if he knows that creature in itself as a secondary object, I concede: indeed I confess that when an Angel, v. g., knows a dependent creature, he also truly knows God in the creature; because he knows the creature as the primary object moving to the cognition of God. But it is otherwise with God, who knows the dependent creature as a secondary object, but Himself in Himself as in the means and in the primary object.

You will say 2. Although God knows the created effect in itself, nevertheless He also knows it in the productive cause of that effect: therefore by a like argument, although He knows the cause in itself, namely Himself as the Creator of all things; nevertheless He will also be able to know Himself as cause in the creatures and effects produced by Himself, and consequently He will be able to know Himself in other things distinct from Himself. — I distinguish the consequence. That He will be able to know Himself thus as in a primary and explicit moving object, I deny: as in a secondary and, as it were, implicit one, I concede: for since the creature has an intrinsic respect to God, it, once known, implicitly moves to the cognition of God.

In the preceding Question we said that the secondary object of the divine intellect is twofold: one indeed uncreated, the other created. In the first order are all the perfections of the divine Essence and all the relations of origin, which surround the divine essence. For although these have the notion of a terminating object, since divine cognition terminates at the very entity of the Deity, and so even terminates at all those things which are really identified with the Deity itself; they do not, however, have the notion of an object primarily moving; for, as has been proved, this notion befits the divine Essence alone as essence. In the latter order, however, are all creatures, whether according to their ideal being, or their entitative and real being. Of these alone will there be speech here, namely whether God beholds distinctly and individually any creatures whatsoever, even the mean and the very smallest, and that either in Himself, or in them; but first

Note 1. There was no light controversy among the ancients as to whether God beholds all creatures; for not only did wicked men, so that they might more readily indulge their unbridled desires, deny to God all knowledge of worldly things, saying with Job c. 22. He walks about the hinges of heaven and does not consider our affairs: and likewise the Psalmist 71.: How does God know, and is there knowledge in the Most High? but even the more clear-sighted philosophers fell into this most serious error, asserting that the knowledge of mean and tiny creatures is unworthy of God. This in the first place Aristotle himself taught, 12. Metaph. text 51., as the Subtle Doctor understood him: and Averroes, affirming in his Commentary on the cited place of Aristotle that the divine intellect would be debased if it knew these lowest things: indeed, which is greatly to be wondered at, some even of the holy Fathers seem to have slipped into that opinion, whom we shall set forth as objections and explain below. Likewise it must be known that all those to whom it is settled that absolutely all creatures are known by God do not agree in the same opinion about the mode in which God perceives them; for some think that God does not know possible Creatures in Himself, but in the creatures themselves, an opinion which some Thomists falsely attribute to the Subtle Doctor. Some, with Aureolus, in 1. dist. 35. art. 1. q. 2., affirm that God knows creatures in Himself, but not in the creatures themselves; so that He perceives only their virtual and eminent being, not their formal and entitative being. Finally, the rest teach that creatures are known by God not only in Himself, but also in the creatures themselves. What, however, appears to us truer in this doubtful opinion of the Doctors will have to be resolved here.

Note 2. From the philosophers we learn that the object of the intellect and of the will is twofold, the motive and the terminative; among which, although the motive also terminates, the terminative nevertheless, which is purely such, does not move. For example, someone loves Doctrine; here Doctrine is the terminative object, since it terminates the act of the will; and at the same time it is the motive, for by the force of this act he is moved to pursue the doctrine and to employ the means to be used for attaining it. Hence there is no motive object which is not at the same time terminative. But when someone in a storm throws merchandise into the sea, the merchandise is indeed the terminative object of that act, not however the motive; rather it moves toward the contrary and renders that action in some way involuntary. But that which moves to the throwing of the merchandise is the goodness and love of life. Therefore the end is the motive object, the means for the most part the terminative.

Note 3. Creatures existing, or future and past, have a threefold being: namely eminent in the divine Essence, since, as it is the most excellent of all beings and their fount and origin, it also eminently contains all beings. Second, virtual, which they have in their cause, namely in the divine omnipotence, which is productive of all things. Third, finally, entitative, which they have in themselves. It is asked, however, at present whether creatures are known by God not only according to their eminent and virtual being, which they have in God, but also through the entitative being which they have in themselves.

First conclusion. — God knows most distinctly absolutely all creatures, even the very smallest.

This is of faith.

Proof from various texts of Sacred Scripture. For first, Genesis cap. 1., at the very origin and establishment of things it is said: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, which gaze of God signifies an exact knowledge and approval of each thing. Likewise Job. cap. 28.: He has set a time, he says, for darkness, and He Himself considers the end of all things; the stone also of gloom and the shadow of death. And in the same place: He Himself beholds the ends of the world and looks upon all things that are under heaven. Likewise Psalm 49.: All the beasts of the forests are Mine, the cattle on the mountains and the oxen. I have known all the birds of heaven. Again Psalm 138: Lord, You have proved me and known me, You have known my sitting down and my rising up, You have understood my thoughts from afar, You have searched out my path and my line: behold, Lord, You have known all things, the newest and the oldest, etc. With these the Royal Psalmist extends divine intelligence not only to men and their bodies and members; but also to any movements whatsoever. With him Job 31. concords: Does not He Himself consider my ways and count all my steps? All of which Ecclesiasticus 23. declares most plainly, where, rebuking the impious man and the sinner, who thought that he could perpetrate a crime with impunity and without even God knowing:

He does not understand, he says, that the eye of Him sees all things, since the fear of a man of this sort casts from himself the fear of God, and the eyes of all who fear Him; and he did not know that the eyes of the Lord are much brighter than the sun, surveying all the ways of men and the depth of the abyss, and beholding the hearts of men in hidden parts. For all things were known to the Lord God before they were created, and so after their completion He looks upon all things.

Again cap. 39.: The works of all flesh are before Him; and nothing is hidden from His eyes; from age to age He looks upon them, and nothing is wonderful in His sight.

Second. In a wonderful way the holy Fathers press this argument, especially St. Cyril lib. 15. Thesauri. Likewise Cyril of Jerusalem, in the sixth Catechesis, explains the breadth of divine knowledge by the example of the drops of rain, all of which He knows: whence Irenaeus lib. 2. cap. 45. says: *All things that have been made, will be made, and are being made, I see to be so known, that He gives to each of them species, habit, order, number, quantity. Wherefore the proud and insolent thoughts (says St. Jerome on Psal. 137.) do not deceive God. He knows all things, and nothing is impenetrable to His knowledge. Indeed this truth did not escape the pagans; for, as St. Clement of Alexandria reports lib. 5. Stromatum, the Egyptians, fashioning ears and eyes of exquisite material, used to consecrate them to the gods, hanging them in the temples, so that by this they might signify that God sees and hears all things. Again, in the same author lib. 6., Thales of Miletus, to someone asking whether a man doing anything could be hidden from God: And how, he said, could he, who is not hidden even in thought? Whence St. Augustine cannot be brought to believe that Aristotle denied to God the knowledge even of minute things, because He is the Creator of all; for since actions are concerned with singular things, Aristotle himself says lib. 2. Ethicorum cap. 2., it ought to suffice, says St. Augustine lib. 5. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 13., that each one know, or unshakenly believe, that God made all these things; for I do not think him so senseless, as to judge that God made what He had not known.

It is objected 1. St. Jerome, who on those words of Habakkuk, Your eyes are pure, so that they do not see evil, seems to have taken away from God the knowledge of individual living things besides man:

Just as, he says, among men the providence of God runs even through individuals: in the other animals we can understand a general disposition and order, and the course of things; v. g. how the multitude of fishes is born and lives in the waters: how reptiles and quadrupeds arise on the earth and by what foods they are nourished. But it is absurd to bring down the majesty of God to this, that He should know at each single moment how many gnats are born, or how many die: what may be the multitude on earth of bugs and fleas and flies; how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller ought to fall as prey of the larger. Let us not be such foolish flatterers of God, that while we drag His power down to the depths, we are injurious to ourselves, saying that the providence over rational beings is the same as over irrational ones:

therefore St. Jerome thinks that the knowledge of God is not extended to all creatures individually. —

I deny the consequence. For St. Jerome by these words only affirms that the knowledge and care, namely that benevolent and paternal care alone, which God has of men and Angels, is not applied to brutes and inanimate things: or, as he himself speaks, the providence over rational, not over irrational beings: for although I frankly confess that these things could have been conceived and expressed better by Jerome; I do not, however, think that so great a man was ignorant of what Christ Himself taught us in the Gospel, namely that God has care of individual sparrows, Matth. 6. Indeed Jerome himself on that cap. 6. of Matth.: If small, he says, and vile animals do not fall without God as their author, and in all things there is providence, and those which in them are to perish do not perish without the will of God; you who are eternal ought not to fear that you live without the providence of God.

You will say 2. If God knew creatures individually, He would have to know infinite possible creatures: but He cannot know them distinctly and determinately. Then because whoever distinctly knows infinite things must also distinctly know that which is necessary for the infinite to be infinite: but God cannot know this: for once a hundred possible creatures are taken away, and again and again a hundred, there will always remain an infinite number of creatures to be distinctly known: Then because, if God actually knew infinite possible creatures, it would follow that an infinite created in act is given, because those infinite units would be at once actually distinct in the divine mind: but this implies a contradiction; otherwise the infinite syncategorematic would be an infinite categorematic: Then finally because, if God saw all the divisions of the continuum distinctly, v. gr., He would also see the continuum divided into all its parts, and consequently would see it reduced to indivisibles, because He would see that they are not further divisible: but this implies a contradiction, for the continuum is divisible to infinity: therefore God does not see absolutely all the divisions of the continuum, nor consequently does He see all creatures individually and distinctly. —

I answer. That God knows distinctly and determinately any possible creatures whatsoever, even infinite in number, as St. Augustine expressly proves lib. 12. De Civit. Dei, cap. 18.:

The infinity of number, he says, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to Him whose intelligence has no number. Wherefore if whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the one who knows; surely also every infinity is in a certain ineffable way finite to God, because it is not incomprehensible to His knowledge.

Thus God not only knows the infinite, but also knows that which is necessary for the infinite to be infinite, because He knows the infinite units in number which make up the infinite in number. Nor does it follow from this that the syncategorematic infinite is categorematic; because although all its units are actually represented in the mind of God; nevertheless since they are known as they are, and have no other notion of infinite than the syncategorematic, truly that syncategorematic infinite persists. Likewise God sees the possible divisions of the continuum in the way in which they are possible, and therefore sees them always as divisible to infinity in that way; nor does He determinately see the last, because truly there is no last, beyond which another may not be assigned as possible.

You will say 3. Every knowledge depends on the object, both in fieri and in being conserved: but the Knowledge of God cannot depend on Creatures: therefore God does not know creatures. — I distinguish the major. It depends intrinsically on the motive and primary terminative object, I concede: on an object merely terminative, and secondary and less principal, which is in no way motive, I deny. To the minor I say that creatures have only the notion of a secondary terminative object, or less principal, with respect to divine Knowledge, which primarily and principally terminates at the divine essence itself as at the motive object, and primarily terminative.

You will press. Knowledge is also changed at the change of the secondary object, as the Doctor confirms at length: therefore if the Knowledge of God terminates at creatures even secondarily, it follows that at the change of creatures it itself is changed: but the Knowledge of God cannot be changed, just as neither can God Himself: therefore neither can it terminate at creatures even secondarily. — I distinguish the antecedent. It is changed extrinsically and only denominatively, I concede; intrinsically and formally, I deny: for divine knowledge is always intrinsically invariable in itself, even insofar as it terminates at creatures; then because it first tends into the divine Essence as into the motive and primarily terminative object: then because it also terminates at creatures, insofar as they are in God unchangeably and have objective and virtual being: whence although this divine Knowledge also terminates at the entitative being of creatures, which is variable and changeable, nevertheless since this termination is entirely extrinsic, the change of termination also will be entirely extrinsic.

You will say 4. Through the knowledge of a thing, the intellect intentionally becomes the thing known, as Aristotle says 3. de Anima: but God cannot intentionally become a creature: therefore neither can He know a creature. — I distinguish the major. He becomes the thing known primarily and immediately, I concede: He becomes the thing which is known only secondarily and mediately, I deny; for the intellect by understanding becomes all the things which it understands; because it does not perceive a thing except through an intelligible species, or an object bearing the role of the intelligible species, which is the image of the known thing informing and denominating the intellect itself: but since God does not know creatures through an impressed species received from them, but only sees them in His Essence, or in His Omnipotence, in which that creature shines forth; hence it is that He does not become that which He knows outside Himself.

Second conclusion. — God knows Creatures in Himself, as in a means previously known.

This is the express opinion of the Doctor, as is clear both from question 14. Quodlib. Art. 2., where he most fully and most clearly proves that the divine intellect is moved only by the divine Essence, both for the knowledge of itself and for the knowledge of other things. Likewise in 3. dist. 14. q. 2. n. 8., where, inquiring whether the soul of Christ sees in the Word all things which the Word sees, he responds: It can be said that this Conclusion could be posited in two ways; in one way, that the soul of Christ would have one vision with respect to the Word as first object, and of all the objects shining forth in the Word as secondary objects, to which secondary objects it would have distinct relations: therefore the Doctor thinks that Creatures shine forth in the divine Word, and consequently that the divine Word knows them in Himself. Likewise q. 3. of the Prologue he says: I say the same thing in another way, that divine Theology is about all knowable things, because the first object of Theology, which is God, makes all other things actually known in the divine intellect. Many other similar texts of the same Subtle Doctor could be brought forward, by which it is plainly clear that he did not assert that God sees creatures only in themselves, not however in Himself, as some Thomists wrongly affirm, especially Cajetan on the first part of St. Thomas q. 14. art. 6.

The conclusion is therefore proved. First indeed from the holy Fathers, especially from St. Dionysius, lib. De divinis Nominibus c. 7.:

For the divine Mind does not know the things that are, by learning them from the things that are: but from itself and in itself, according to the cause, it pre-has and pre-comprehends the knowledge, and the notion, and the essence of all things: not attending to individuals according to the species of each; but knowing and containing all things according to the single combination of the cause. Then he adds: Therefore the divine Wisdom, knowing itself, knows all material things without matter, and divisible things indivisibly, and many things singly, all things by the one itself, both knowing and producing. Then he concludes: Therefore by this reason God, knowing things, knows them not by the knowledge of things, but by the knowledge of Himself.

With him St. Augustine agrees, both lib. 6. De Trinitate, cap. 10., where he calls the Word of God a certain Art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all living things: and he concludes: There God knows all things which He made through it: And lib. 5. de Genesi ad litteram, adducing that passage of Ioann. 1.

That which was made in Him was life, he says: In which life He saw all things when He made them, and as He saw, so He made, not seeing on account of Himself, but in Himself.

It is proved moreover by reason. God knows creatures in a nobler way than Angels and blessed Souls know them; but Angels and blessed Souls know creatures in the divine Essence in a more perfect way than in the creatures themselves: therefore much more does God likewise know them in Himself. The major is clear. The minor is proved from St. Augustine lib. 1. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 28. and 29., where he distinguishes a twofold knowledge of creatures in the mind of the Angels; one indeed in the Word, which he calls the morning one; the other in their own nature, which he names the evening one, because it is less clear and less perfect than the former: or as he himself says lib. 11. De Civit. Dei, cap. 7. The knowledge of a creature in itself is paler, than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art through which it was made. — Second: that which is a sufficient means for the comprehensive knowledge of the cause can also be a means for the comprehension of the effects: but God in Himself is a means for the comprehension of omnipotence and essence: therefore He is also a means for the comprehension of all possible effects. — Third: divine knowledge must necessarily have a formal motive object by which it is specified: but it cannot have a formal object distinct from itself, otherwise it would depend on creatures, and need them for some perfection of itself, namely for its knowledge, etc.

You will say. God cannot know creatures in Himself, unless the divine Essence represents creatures in esse intelligibili: but it cannot represent them in that way. Proof: the divine Essence cannot represent creatures in esse intelligibili, unless it contains their intelligible being formally, or is similar to them in esse intelligibili: but neither can be said. Not indeed the first, otherwise created being would be formally in God, and so God could formally be called a creature, just as He is formally called just, wise, etc., which is repugnant. Not even the second, because the divine Essence cannot become similar to creatures in esse intelligibili; for intelligible being follows entitative being: therefore since the divine entity cannot be similar to created entity, neither will the divine intelligible being be able to be similar to created intelligible being. —

I deny the minor. For since the divine Essence contains eminently, or actually, absolutely every entity, because it is infinite entity, so likewise the divine Essence in the notion of the intelligible contains all the intelligibility of any thing whatsoever, both eminently and virtually: and so this divine intelligibility, since it is infinite, not only renders the divine Essence intelligible, but also any other being represented in it.

You will say 2. Between the means of knowing and the thing known there must be a necessary connection: but such is not between God and possible creatures: therefore God cannot be a means for knowing possible creatures. The major is clear: otherwise the means could not lead into a certain and infallible knowledge of the object; for a means which is probable, for that reason does not lead into certain and scientific knowledge of the conclusion, because it does not have a necessary connection with it. The minor is proved: first: if the divine Essence had a necessary connection with possible creatures, it would follow that, those possible creatures being destroyed, the divine Essence itself would also necessarily perish. Second, it would follow that it would be equally necessary that a creature be possible, as it is necessary that God exist; and so the possibility of creatures would be no less necessary than the existence of God, which seems repugnant to the principles of faith and to the light of reason. Third: finally it would follow that the divine Essence depends on possible creatures, and cannot subsist without them, for things which have a necessary connection with one another, one cannot exist without the other; all of which are absurd: therefore also that from which they follow. —

I answer, the major being conceded and the minor denied. and to its first proof I distinguish: with possible creatures destroyed, the divine omnipotence and essence would also be destroyed, a priori and by an intrinsic locus, I deny; a posteriori and by an extrinsic locus, I concede: for since the possibility of things is nothing real, except in omnipotence itself and the divine Essence, it follows that the reality of possible things cannot perish, unless in like manner the essence itself and omnipotence, which is the whole ground of the reality of possible things, is to be regarded as perishing; for a possible effect, since it has no other being outside the cause, cannot be destroyed except in the cause, and consequently unless the productive power of it is destroyed, which is the cause itself, and so unless the cause itself is destroyed. To the second proof, I deny the consequence of the major; for although among necessarily connected things one cannot fail, without the other failing; from this it does not, however, follow that one is not more necessary than another; since the necessity of the one rests on a firmer foundation. For although it is more necessary that a man be rational than risible, nevertheless, risibility failing, rationality in man would also fail: similarly, although principles are more necessary than conclusions; nevertheless, the truth of the conclusions failing, the truth of the principles would also fail. Finally, to the third proof, I deny the consequence; for although the divine essence and omnipotence cannot exist without possible creatures; from this it does not, however, follow that they depend on them; since the divine Father, v. g., cannot subsist without the Son: and yet He does not depend on Him: similarly among created things, the essence which is the root of the properties is so intrinsically connected with them, that it cannot subsist without them, and yet it does not depend on them: therefore a pari, although the divine omnipotence cannot subsist without possible creatures, nevertheless it does not follow from this that it depends on them.

Third conclusion. — It is not even improbable that God knows creatures in themselves, so that His divine cognition is borne toward creatures as toward a terminative object.

First proof. The infinite intellect, such as the divine intellect is, perceives things according to all their intelligible being: but creatures have not only an eminent and virtual being in the divine Essence, but also a formal being in themselves: therefore God sees creatures not only in himself, but also in those very things. —

It is confirmed. If God did not know creatures according to the formal being which they have in their own nature, but only according to the eminent and virtual being which they have in him, he would not know them according to every mode in which they are knowable; for the formal being of creatures is not in God, because creatures are not contained in God formally, since God is not formally a man or a lion: but it is absurd to say that God does not know creatures according to every mode in which they are knowable.

Then, God knows things in the more perfect way in which they can be known: but it seems more perfect for a thing to be known in itself than in some medium; for it is more perfect, v. g., to see a man in himself immediately than in a mirror in which he is represented: therefore God, in order to have altogether perfect knowledge, must know creatures not only in himself, but also in those very things.

Finally, God knows creatures in every mode in which they are knowable: but they are knowable not only in the divine Essence, but also in themselves; for the Blessed see them with morning knowledge in the Word, and with evening knowledge in those very things: therefore likewise it is not improbable that God knows creatures in himself and in those very things, so that his divine cognition is borne to those creatures as to an object, not indeed a motive one, but a terminative one.

The Thomists object 1: this conclusion openly fights against the holy Fathers praised in the previous Conclusion, but most of all against St. Dionysius; as will evidently appear from his own words, for he says: He does not apply himself to individual things according to vision, but he knows all things according to the containment of the cause. And below:

for the divine mind does not know the things that are by learning them from the things that are, but from itself and in itself it has, through the cause of all things, a cognition and knowledge anticipated and grasped beforehand; not that it considers individual things through a species, but that it knows and contains all things in one embrace of the cause.

And again: Therefore God knows the things that are, not by the knowledge of the things, but of himself. But if God, besides the knowledge of possible things in himself, knew those things immediately in themselves, he would apply himself to individual things according to vision, and he would know them not by knowing himself, and by a knowledge not of himself but proper to creatures: therefore, according to Dionysius, God does not know possible creatures immediately in themselves, but only in himself and mediately, that is, in the divine Essence first seen and known.

The minor, for its first part, is manifest; for the knower applying himself to the object according to vision is not receiving a species from it, because in this the knower does not apply himself to the object; but rather the object applies itself to the knower: therefore this is to be immediately engaged with the object; for it is not seen in what else it could consist: and consequently, if God knows possible creatures immediately in themselves, he applies himself to creatures according to vision.

The same minor, for its second part, is likewise established: for if God knew possible creatures mediately in himself, and immediately in those very things, then he would know them not only with the knowledge by which he knows himself, but also with another knowledge, which is denied by Dionysius: for his sense is exclusive; otherwise he would not have sufficiently explained the mode in which creatures are known by God.

Finally, for the third part it is urged: the knowledge of that object is said to be that to which it is immediately and primarily terminated: but the knowledge by which God would know possible creatures immediately in themselves would have them for its immediate and primary object: therefore, if such a cognition were given in God, he would know creatures not by the knowledge of himself, but by the knowledge of them.

I answer. by denying all these consequences: for in the aforesaid words St. Dionysius signifies only three things: first indeed, that God does not beg the knowledge which he has of creatures from their existence, but knows them before they exist; second, that God does not know creatures through species received from the creatures themselves, as we know them, but through his essence playing the role of the species concurring with the divine intellect for the knowledge of them; third, that God does not know himself with a knowledge distinct from that which he has of creatures, so that he would require a double act of cognition, one namely by which he perceives himself, another by which he perceives creatures, but that with one simple, indivisible and infinite act he knows himself and the things other than himself.

He indicates the first with these words, which he had premised before the words cited above:

Therefore the divine mind contains all things by a knowledge which is hidden from all, because through the cause of all things it has in itself an anticipated knowledge of all things, so that it knew the Angels and brought them forth into the light before they were made, and had all the things that are known from itself and from him, as I might say, from the beginning, and brought them forth into the light. And I think that the divine writings hand this down when they say, he who knows all things before they were made.

For not, etc. He indicates the second with these words cited in the objection, saying: Not that he considers individual things through a species, but that he knows and contains all things in one embrace of the cause. He then adds the third: Therefore God does not have a knowledge proper to himself, and another which commonly and generally comprehends all the things that are; for he, the cause of all things, knowing himself, will in no way whatsoever be ignorant of the things which have proceeded from him and of which he is the cause.

From these things it is clear that St. Dionysius intends only three things. First, that God has an anticipated knowledge of things before they exist, namely by beholding them in his Essence representative of all things, and in his omnipotence as in the cause of all things: second, that he does not know creatures one by one through individual species begged from them, but only either through the comprehension of his omnipotence, or through his infinite power of knowing: third, finally, that his cognition, by which he perceives himself and creatures, is not divided.

They object 2. St. Augustine, lib. 83. quaest., quaest. 47, saying: For God did not behold anything placed outside himself, lest he should constitute what he was constituting according to it; for to think this is sacrilegious: therefore God does not know things in those very things, but only in himself.

I deny the consequence. For St. Augustine only means there that God had no need of some exemplar outside himself, at which he would look, so as to fashion things after its likeness, as a painter, v. g., looks at the panel which he undertakes to paint: but God established all things according to the divine ideas which he had eternal in himself. Whence Augustine adds:

But if these reasons of all things to be created or created are contained in the divine mind; and nothing can be in the divine mind except what is eternal and immutable; and Plato calls these principal reasons of things ideas: not only are they ideas, but they themselves are true, because they are eternal, and remain such and immutable, by participation in which it comes about that whatever is, is in the way it is:

by which words it clearly stands that St. Augustine there speaks only of the divine ideas, which God beheld not outside, but within himself in the creation of the world, so as to produce all things after their likeness: and so this authority of St. Augustine does not oppose the aforesaid conclusion.

They object 3. If the divine intellect were really terminated at creatures as they are in themselves, several absurdities would follow: first, since knowledge depends on the object, divine cognition would also depend on creatures: second, since knowledge is proportioned to the object, and is more excellent or less perfect according to the greater or lesser dignity of the object, divine knowledge would be debased if it tended toward a created object: third, since the cognition of a created object is not beatifying, but only the cognition of God; if some cognition of God tended toward a creature, it would follow that some cognition in God is not beatific; all of which are most absurd: therefore they are not to be asserted.

I deny the antecedent. and to all its proofs I say that all those absurdities would indeed follow from this, if divine knowledge tended toward creatures not only as a terminative object, but also as a motive one; since, however, the divine intellect is moved to the knowledge of creatures only by the divine Essence, not by the creatures, all these absurdities do not follow from this; most of all because creatures have only the notion of an object secondarily terminating divine cognition.

You will insist. If divine knowledge is formally terminated at created being, it follows that it is not absolutely necessary, but mutable; for such is knowledge, as is its object: therefore, since creatures are not necessary but only contingent, such likewise will be the knowledge of God terminated at them.

I deny the antecedent. For these things would indeed be true if divine knowledge tended toward creatures not only as a terminative object, but also as a motive one; since, however, creatures known by God have only the notion of a terminating object, not of a moving one, hence it is that their cognition is not such as their entity is. Hence it follows that even if no creatures were possible and future, divine knowledge would no less be infinite and necessary, because it would no less be terminated at the infinite object primarily motive and terminative. It would indeed be true that in this hypothesis knowledge would not be terminated at some creatures: but this defect of termination would not come from the side of the knowledge, but from the side of the creatures; for knowledge of itself is the representation of all representable things without any change of itself: as, by way of simile, the sun is illuminative of all illuminable things, and if it does not illuminate some, that is not traced back to a defect of the sun, but of the things which are not exposed to the sun. It is certain, therefore, that divine knowledge depends intrinsically only on the divine Essence as the primary motive and terminative object; on creatures, however, only extrinsically, and as an object, not indeed motive, but only secondarily terminative.

They object 4. In God, as being infinitely perfect, a double mode of knowing creatures cannot be admitted, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect: but the mode of knowing creatures in the divine Essence as in a cause is much more perfect and nobler than the mode of knowing them immediately in themselves: whence in the blessed Angels the morning cognition, by which they see creatures in the Word and in the divine Essence as in a cause, is much more perfect than the evening cognition, by which they know them outside the Word and immediately in themselves, according to that saying of St. Augustine which we cited above concerning the beatific vision: The cognition of a creature in itself is more discolored than when it is known in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made: therefore, besides the mode of knowing possible creatures in the divine Essence as in a cause, there should not be admitted in God another mode by which he beholds them immediately in themselves and independently of his essence first known.

I distinguish the major. In God a double mode of knowing creatures cannot be admitted, such that each would have the notion of an object moving per se to that cognition, and which would be done through a distinct act, as the angelic and beatific cognition is, I concede: for this indeed denotes imperfection: that this double mode, diverse by reason of a diverse immediate termination, to various objects, namely to the essence and to the creatures, cannot be admitted, I deny: for so far is this diverse mode of knowing from denoting some imperfection; rather it connotes the supreme power and infinite activity of the divine intellect, by which it can be immediately terminated both at the divine Essence and at the creatures themselves with one and indivisible act.

They object 5. Creatures are known by the divine intellect in that mode in which they are represented through the species by which it understands: but they are not represented in themselves and by reason of themselves, but mediately and in another, namely in God as first represented: therefore they are not known immediately in themselves, but through God first known. The major is evident: for since from the intellect and the object an adequate principle of intellection is constituted through a species, the intellect can understand nothing unless it is represented through a species: therefore neither will it be able to understand immediately what is not contained immediately in the species. The minor, however, is proved: the species by which the divine intellect understands is the divine Essence alone: but this does not represent creatures immediately, but through God first represented; therefore the species by which the divine intellect understands does not represent creatures immediately, but only mediately.

I deny the major. For it is false, as we proved in the previous Question, that the divine Essence has the notion of an intelligible species both with respect to itself and with respect to creatures; for since the divine intellect is of infinite activity, and since the divine Essence is per se and immediately infinitely intelligible, and is per se and immediately proportioned to the divine intellect itself, the divine intellect itself needs no species, both to perceive the divine Essence and to be moved by it to the knowledge of the creatures which it presents to the divine intellect itself to be known, through its infinite power of representing.

They object finally from St. Thomas, 1. Contra Gentiles, cap. 48., with the first argument, where he reasons thus:

An intellectual operation has its species and nobility according to that which is understood per se first, since this is its object: if, therefore, God understood something other than himself as first understood, his intellectual operation would have its species and nobility from another rather than from himself: but this is impossible, since his operation is his essence; and this, being a being from itself, cannot take its species from another distinct from God: thus, therefore, it is impossible that what is first and per se understood be something other than himself.

From these words this argument can be deduced: if God knew creatures immediately in themselves and independently of the divine Essence first known, the formal and specifying object of the divine intellection would be created being, or being as such abstracting from the created and the uncreated: but this cannot be said; therefore neither can that. The sequel of the major is evident: for that is deemed to be the formal and primary object of some potency or operation which is primarily and immediately attained by it and independently of another first attained, as is evident in potentia visiva, whose formal and primary object is color, which it attains per se first; the secondary and material object, however, is the wall, or another subject affected with color; because that is not attained immediately and per se first, but only secondarily and through color.

They prove the minor: first indeed, cognition takes its species and its essential perfection from the primary object and is measured by it: but the understanding of God, since it is his nature, cannot take its species nor be measured by creatures: therefore created being cannot be the formal and primary object of the divine intellection. Second, the formal primary object of the divine intellection must be something most actual, just as the intellection itself is: but a creature is not the most actual being, but a potential one: therefore it cannot be the formal primary object of the divine intellection.

I distinguish the major. Created being is the specifying object of the divine intellection, if it moves the divine intellect per se first to the knowledge of itself, I concede: if it does not move it at all, but only terminates the divine intellection itself, I deny: it is certain, however, that creatures do not have the notion of a motive object, but only of a terminative one with respect to the divine intellection; for the divine intellect is indeed immediately terminated at creatures known in those very things, but it is moved to that cognition only by the divine Essence, which, since it contains the being of creatures eminently and virtually, and that in a more perfect way than the creatures themselves contain their formal being in themselves; and so has the power of representing creatures to the divine intellect in a more perfect way than they are represented in themselves; hence also the divine Essence alone has the power of moving the divine intellect itself to the knowledge of creatures; and thus creatures do not have the notion of a moving object, but only of a terminating one.

That, however, only the motive object is specifying of cognition, and not the terminative one, is openly evident; for cognition is diversified according to the diversity of the medium by which it is made; where, however, there is the same motive object, there likewise the same medium is deemed to be, and the same mode, and so also the same specification: therefore, since the divine intellect is moved by the divine Essence alone, the divine intellection also receives its formal specification from that same one alone.