Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: Creatures are said to be like God insofar as they participate to-be from Him, not according to the same account of species or genus, but according to a certain analogy. The reason is, because to-be itself is common to all things analogically.

Second conclusion, to the first: The same things are like and unlike God, for different reasons.

Third conclusion, to the fourth: Although a creature is like God, nevertheless God is in no way like a creature. The reason is, because in those things which are of one order mutual likeness is received, but not in cause and caused.

COMMENTARY.

IN the exposition of this article two things are to be noted from Cajetan. First: To what end does St. Thomas, in this question which is about divine perfection, mix in a question about the creature, whether it is like God? And Cajetan answers excellently that the question of this article conduces to manifesting the immensity of the divine perfection, which all creatures imitate in some way, but fall far short of its likeness.

Note second, in the reply to the fourth, how the dictum of Dionysius is to be understood, chap. 9 of De Divinis Nomin. where he says: «In those things which are of one order mutual likeness is received, but not in cause and caused».

It is argued, first, against this doctrine; for that division between things of one order on one side, and cause and caused on the other, does not contain opposed members. For a cause together with its caused effect can well be of one order, as is plain in univocal causes, which are of the same order as their effects. It is confirmed, because things of one order ought to be distinguished against things of diverse orders, rather than against cause and caused.

Second it is argued: When fire generates fire, there is cause and caused, and yet there is mutual likeness between the generating fire and the generated; therefore the dictum of Dionysius is false. To this difficulty one could answer that Dionysius is speaking of equivocal causes; but this solution is false, for Dionysius speaks universally of cause and caused. Cajetan therefore answers excellently that, speaking universally, cause and caused are never of the same order. For the understanding of which, note that by the name of cause and caused are not understood the relations or causality-relations: but one must understand the thing which is the ground of causing, and the thing or form which the caused receives from the cause: for these things are the foundations of likeness between cause and caused. Note, second, that the foundations of likeness between certain things can stand in two ways, as is gathered from the doctrine of the article: in one way, that they be of the same order, for example this whiteness and that whiteness; and thus the likeness is a relation of equiparance and mutual. In the other way, that the one according to its proper account be caused by the other, for example the image of Peter and Peter: for there is an intrinsic dependence of the image on Peter: hence the likeness of the image to Peter is not of equiparance or mutual, but is reduced to the third genus of relatives, enumerated by Aristotle, 5 Meta., text 20, just as it is in knowledge and the knowable, namely the relation of the measured to the measure. These things laid down, the conclusion of Cajetan is universal: Whatever things taken formally are cause and caused are also foundations of likeness of diverse orders. It is proved, because it is impossible that things of the same order so stand that it belong to the formal account of the one to have dependence on the other; but whatever stand, taken formally, as cause and caused, in them there is dependence of the one on the other; therefore the conclusion is true. The major is proved, because since the things which are of the same order are foundations of likeness, whatever is of the account of the one is of the account of the other; therefore there cannot be dependence of the one on the other, otherwise it would depend even on itself. The minor is proved, because every effect, as such, depends intrinsically on its cause, and not the converse.

To the first argument it is answered that that division is most sound, and the members are opposed formally, although materially cause and caused can be of the same order, as happens in univocal causes; in which, if we consider the univocation formally, we shall find that the forms of both extremes do not have an intrinsic dependence on each other, for example John generates Peter, and is the cause of Peter; nevertheless, if we consider the account of the univocation to be humanity common and equal in both, we shall find that John is not the cause of humanity as such, but of this humanity, as it is this and distinct from the humanity of the generator: whence it follows that the humanity which is the foundation of likeness between Father and Son is not of the genus of cause and caused, except materially and by accident, insofar as it is this humanity. And by this the answer to the confirmation, and to the second, is plain. For the dictum of Dionysius, formally understood, is universally true.