Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

FIRST conclusion: The perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent mode. This he proves by a twofold reason. Second conclusion, in the solution to the first: Perfections which are diverse and opposed in themselves pre-exist in God as one, without detriment to the divine simplicity.

Note especially the solution to the third, for the things I said above, q. 3, art. 4, concerning to-be and essence, that all are founded on the doctrine of St. Thomas in this solution to the third.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED, first, whether the first reason of St. Thomas is sound, in which he supposes that to pre-exist in the power of the agent cause is not to pre-exist in a more imperfect mode, but in a more perfect one.

It is argued, first. Seed is the cause of the tree, and the sacraments are the cause of grace, the sun is the cause of living things: and yet these effects do not pre-exist in a more perfect mode in the power of the cause; therefore the reason of St. Thomas supposes something false.

Second it is argued. A man is the cause of another man: and yet that effect is not in a more perfect mode in its cause, since it is an effect of the same species; therefore, etc.

Third it is argued. An effect, while it is in itself, is in a more perfect mode, and is without qualification; but while it is only in its cause, it is not without qualification, but in a qualified sense; therefore.

To this doubt it is briefly answered that the reason of St. Thomas is most sound. This will be plain from the solution of the arguments.

Hence to the first argument it is answered that the reason of St. Thomas is to be understood of the principal cause and not of an instrumental one. Furthermore, seed and the sacraments are an instrumental cause: and the sun itself is an instrumental cause with respect to lower living things: but the principal [cause] is the Intelligence itself moving the heaven so efficaciously that it attains to the generation of living things.

To the second it is answered that an effect can be said to pre-exist in a more perfect mode in its cause in two ways. In one way negatively, that is, not in a more imperfect mode; and thus it is verified even in univocal causes that its cause exists in a more perfect mode. In the other way it can be understood that the effect pre-exists in its cause more perfectly positively, according to a positive excess; and then, if the effect be considered as it is in becoming, it exists in a more perfect mode in its cause even if univocal. The reason is: for as it is in becoming, it is in potency in order to be in perfect being. But as it is in the cause, it is in act. Because every agent acts insofar as it is in act.

To the third it is answered that in truth it is so, that no thing is said to be for the reason that it is in its cause in a more perfect mode. The reason for this is: because each thing is then said to be without qualification when it has its own to-be in itself, limited according to the mode of its species and individuation. But when a thing is considered as only contained in its cause, however eminent that perfection of the cause be, yet because the effect receives nothing in act from its cause, it is not said to be without qualification, but in a qualified sense and in potency. Hence to the argument it is answered that, when an effect is said to be contained in a more perfect mode in its cause, this is understood not materially according to its own specific and individual account: but according to the account of formal or eminent perfection, which ought to be in the cause as an exemplar and a power of effecting.

IT IS DOUBTED, second, concerning the second reason of the first conclusion, in which it is said that to-be subsisting through itself must necessarily have all the perfections which can pertain to the account of being. For the negative side it is argued first. The accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar subsist through themselves without a subject, and yet they do not have every perfection which can pertain to their species; for neither is the whiteness there most intense; therefore.

Second. Every created substance subsists through itself: and yet none has every perfection which can pertain to the account of substance; therefore from the fact that God is to-be itself subsisting through itself it is not gathered that He has every perfection of being.

Third. To-be in creatures is really distinguished from essence; therefore God can separate it from essence. Then the argument is: That separated to-be would not have all the perfections of being, otherwise it would be God; therefore that consequence of St. Thomas is not sound.

To this it is answered that the reason of St. Thomas is most sound, founded on the doctrine of St. Dionysius, chap. 5 of De Divinis Nominibus, who asserts that God is not in some way existing, but without qualification and uncircumscribed, and uniformly pre-accepts the whole of to-be in Himself, that is, that through Himself first and essentially God is to-be itself subsisting, not received nor limited by anything. Hence it is plainly gathered that in Himself He has every perfection of being.

To the arguments on the opposite side it is answered. To the first it is answered that the accidents which receive more and less, if they were wholly separated from a subject, would have every perfection which could pertain to their species. But in the Eucharist, accidents of this kind, although they are not in a substantial subject, are nevertheless in quantity, which supplies the role of substance with respect to the other accidents. And thus those accidents remain with the same intensity as they had in the substance. But quantity itself and figure, whether in a subject or outside one, do not receive more and less, and therefore they always have every perfection pertaining to their species. Second it is answered that, although a diminished whiteness can be wholly separated from a subject by the power of God: yet by its intrinsic aptitude for such a subject it will be able to be limited.

To the second it is answered that, although every substance is said to subsist through itself, that is, not in a subject; yet no substance besides the divine has to exist through itself first, that is, through its own essence, but receives to-be limited in its essence by that very essence. But St. Thomas speaks of the to-be which subsists through itself, not only because it is not in a subject, but because it is not received from another, but is through its own essence. Wherefore no substance besides the divine has to-be subsisting through itself first. Second it is answered, better and more briefly, that the to-be of a substance is to-be received in an essence; for no substance has to-be subsisting through itself, although it does subsist through itself, but it is not in a subject.

To the third it is answered that it can be understood in two ways that to-be is separated from essence by the divine power. In one way, that the essence remain in the universe as a part of the universe, and yet not have to-be or existence. In the other way, that the very to-be of existence, in the way it is received in a created substance, be conserved and remain through the divine Power without being received in any substantial essence. If it be understood in the former way, it seems to me to imply a contradiction that the essence or substance of a thing be conserved in the nature of things without existence: otherwise it would be verified that it is and is not. I do not say that it could not happen that some created essence cannot exist through the divine Power without an existence finite and received in the essence. For this would not be true, since according to the more probable opinion of the Thomists, the Humanity in Christ the Lord not only lacks its own personality (which is to be held according to the Catholic Faith), but also lacks its own existence: although the Scotists hold otherwise. For they say that that humanity has its own existence: which has always seemed to me more than false, and less safe for the dignity of the Mystery of the Incarnation. But of this elsewhere. But if it be understood in the second way, it can well happen through the divine Power that the to-be of existence, which now is in the substance, be separated and conserved without the substance; nay, in fact someone could probably maintain that the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar exist in the manner of a substance, together with the existence which previously was in the substance, which wholly ceases to be. I would say [it] can probably be maintained, because it is a probable opinion, which M. Soto holds, book 1 of the Physic., q. 1, art. 1, near the beginning, that when accidents exist in a substance, they exist secondarily through the same existence through which the substance exists; so, clearly, that the same reality through which the substance exists through itself first in the nature of things is the same [reality] through which the accidents exist secondarily in the substance, or rather in-exist. And in this way it follows by a necessary consequence that, once Consecration has been performed, the accidents which were previously in the substance of the bread remain and exist, the same in number; they remain with the same existence which they previously had, for it is certain (unless someone wishes to deceive, asserting the opposite) that no existence is created anew through which the accidents exist. But, as St. Thomas says, 3 p., q. 77, art. 4, that after Consecration, although the subject of the accidents does not remain, there nevertheless remains the to-be which these accidents had in the subject, which is indeed proper and conformed to the subject. Behold, therefore, the evident consequence. The accidents remain with the existence which they acquired in the subject; but that existence, according to the probable opinion, is not distinguished as one thing from another thing from the existence through which the substance previously existed; therefore already in fact God separates that existence, so that the accidents remain and exist in the manner of a substance; and thence it is that they so nourish man and are corrupted, just as if the same substance of the bread remained, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage above. Nay, Cajetan, on that passage, although elsewhere he holds, namely in 1 p., q. 28, art. 2, in reply to the second, that the in-being of an accident is really distinguished from the essence of the accident and from the to-be of the subject: yet he does not hesitate, in his Commentary on 3 p., q. 77, art. 4, to assert in these words that, because that to-be (he is speaking of the to-be of existence, which remains in the Sacrament) sequestered from matter is corruptible, as before, because it retains its prior nature, hence it comes about that it can terminate corruption without a separation of form from matter, which does not exist. And similarly, because a to-be of this kind is thus separated and, separated, is conserved, as it was proper and conformed to the subject, for instance to the bread or the wine, so it can be terminatively corrupted, as it were at the corruption of the subject, just as before. Thus Cajetan. But there was not lacking one who, having found a less opportune occasion, objected against our assertion that in the Council of Trent, Sess. 13, can. 2, it is said: «If anyone shall deny that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, the species only of bread and wine remaining, let him be anathema». Behold the argument. Therefore by no reason can it be said that there remains the existence which had been in the substance of the bread. The consequence is proved: because then the accidents of the bread would no longer alone remain. To this argument it is answered that those who look at few things are easily deceived. For if the sophistical arguer attended to the fact that, by the very fact that the Council defines that the accidents remain, it also defines that they remain with existence, he would see that the consequence of his argument is null. For it is certain among learned Theologians that existence in this Mystery is not created anew: but that the very same [existence] through which the accidents previously existed remains with them, so that they may exist in the manner of a substance. Therefore the exclusive term only, when it is said, only the species of bread and wine remaining, does not exclude the existence which the accidents previously acquired in the substance itself. But whether this existence be distinguished as one thing from another thing, or the same reality with a respect to the substance be called the existence through itself of the substance, and again be called the in-existence of the accidents, or existence in another, is a question sufficiently impertinent to the religion and faith of the most holy Sacrament. And thus think all the most learned men of Theology whom I have consulted, very many not only of my own Order, but also of another, and secular masters most learned and very Catholic.

IT IS DOUBTED, third, concerning the principal conclusion: Whether any perfection which is formally in creatures is formally in God, or only eminently.

And it is proved first that none is formally in God. If any were formally in God and in creatures, it would follow that such a perfection would univocally denominate God and creatures; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is proved. For such a formal perfection would be in God and in creatures according to the same formal account, with only a difference of more and less, which difference does not make analogy, just as white is predicated univocally of the more white and the less white.

Second, if any perfection were formally in God, wisdom most of all: but this is not, therefore none is found. The minor is proved: because it belongs to the formal account of the wisdom which is in creatures that there be a proper genus, namely habit and quality: but these cannot be formally in God; therefore neither wisdom.

Third, it is proved that no perfection is eminently in God: because by parity of reason it would follow that even in all more perfect creatures there would eminently be the perfections of the other, less perfect, creatures. The consequence is proved: because the perfections of creatures are eminently contained in God for the reason that He has a more perfect to-be; but a man also has a more perfect to-be than a brute; therefore a man is eminently a brute. For the understanding of this difficulty it must be noted, first, that perfection is distinguished in two ways by Theologians following Anselm in his Prosologion, chap. 15. There is a perfection without qualification, and another in a qualified sense in relation to something. A perfection is called without qualification which in each thing is better than its negation, that is, which in whatever being it is found in, constitutes that being in a more excellent grade of being than it would be without it: for example, life and wisdom are perfections without qualification, because a living thing is better than any non-living thing. Likewise a wise man is better than a non-wise [man]. But a perfection in a qualified sense can be defined, as it were, in a contradictory way, namely it is a perfection which is not in each being better than its negation. For it does not constitute a being in a more perfect grade than it would be constituted in by another perfection which would not be that one: for example, the sensitive [power] is a certain perfection which constitutes [a thing] in a grade in a way less perfect than if the thing were constituted by another perfection which would not be it: for example, in the angels there is the intellective without the sensitive, and they are more perfect than all sensitive things. The reason for this difference is that a perfection without qualification does not include any imperfection in its formal concept. As wisdom says in its formal concept cognition through the highest causes. But a perfection in a qualified sense includes imperfection in its formal concept: for example, humanity includes in its formal concept composition from matter and form; rational includes in its formal concept discourse through intellectual movement, through which the intellect proceeds from potency to act.

Note second, that a perfection, whether without qualification or in a qualified sense, can be said to be in something in three ways. In one way formally and precisely. In the second way eminently only and not formally. In the third way formally and eminently together. Example of the first: rationality is in Peter formally and precisely. Example of the second: the nature of the lion is in God eminently only, as in the power of a cause of a higher order. Example of the third: Wisdom is in God formally and eminently together: formally indeed, insofar as wisdom according to its own account imports cognition through the highest cause; eminently, however: because the divine Wisdom is not contained in the genus of quality and habit, but is the divine To-be itself, and an equivocal cause of all created wisdom, both efficient and exemplary, of a higher order.

THESE things supposed, let the first conclusion be: According to the Faith it is necessary to confess that God contains in Himself the perfections of all things. It is proved: because it is necessary to confess that God is the efficient cause of all things. For all things were made through Him, John 1; but hence it follows by natural demonstration that God has in Himself the perfections of all things, at least eminently, as St. Thomas demonstrates, 'because every agent acts insofar as it is in act; therefore. Moreover, it is proved from Psalm 93: «He who planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he who formed the eye, shall he not consider?» Likewise Wisdom 1: «The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world, and that which contains all things has knowledge of the voice». Although the literal sense seems to be that the Spirit of the Lord, by conserving them, contains the things that were made. Again, that text of Rom. 11 is adduced: «Of Him, and through Him, and in Him are all things». Where note that it more proves our conclusion in what it says through Him, as it were through an exemplary cause, than in what it says in Him: for this signifies that all things which were made are conserved in God.

Second conclusion. The perfections which are said to be perfections without qualification are in God properly and formally: for example, wisdom, life; nay, they are God Himself. This conclusion is of Faith, like the preceding. It is proved: because names of this kind, which signify such perfections, are said properly of God; therefore they are in Him formally. The consequence is plain, because if they were only said causally of God, it would be an improper locution to say God is wise, just as to say medicine is healthy. But the antecedent is proved from the sentence of the Saints: for example, of Ambrose, in the Prologue of book 2 of De fide ad Gratianum Imperatorem; of St. Augustine, book 2 of De Trinit., chap. 1, who teach that names of this kind are said of God properly, and not analogically. Likewise it is proved from that text of John 1: «In Him was life», and chap. 5: «As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given to the Son also to have life in Himself». And 1 John 1: «We announce to you eternal life, which was with the Father and appeared to us». And finally: there is a common consensus of all Theologians that certain perfections are in God formally and with propriety of speech; therefore every perfection which is a perfection without qualification is necessarily in God formally. The consequence is proved: because there is no greater reason for one than for another. It is confirmed: because otherwise God would not have intellect and will formally and properly, and consequently neither would the Son proceed through the intellect properly, nor the Holy Spirit through the will.

Third conclusion. The perfections which are called in a qualified sense are not in God formally, but eminently and virtually. It is proved: because if they were in God formally, it would follow that they would be predicated properly and formally of God, and thus God would properly be a body, a horse, a lion, etc. It is confirmed: because if those perfections were in God formally, they would assuredly exclude the other perfections without qualification: for example, if God is a body, He is not a spirit, nor an intellect. Finally, in the Lateran Council our conclusion was defined against Almaric. On which see Turrecremata, in his Summa, book 4, chap. 35.

TO the arguments it is answered. To the first I deny the consequence: because the perfections which are said formally of God, as wisdom, life, are neither of the same species nor of the same genus as the perfections which are formally in creatures, and nevertheless they are said to be formally in God: because according to their proper account, as they are signified in common, with the limitation of genus set aside, they are found in God most properly and most formally: for example, wisdom in its common concept imports cognition through the highest cause, and in this way it is more properly and formally in God than in creatures. But if wisdom is considered with a certain limitation, as it is in the genus of quality, in the species of habit, and inhering in a subject, in this way it is not in God; for He is through His essence whatever He is. Hence, just as to-be itself, which is formally in God and in creatures, is said analogically of God and the creature, because God has to-be through His essence, but the creature through participation: so any other perfection which is said formally of God and the creature will be predicated analogically.

And by this the answer to the second is plain. For it is answered that it proceeds concerning created wisdom as it is a habit in the genus of quality, which consideration with respect to wisdom in common is not formal but material: for wisdom thus is not found in God, except eminently.

To the third it is answered that the reason why all the perfections of creatures are contained in God is not because He is more perfect, but because whatever is in God belongs to Him through His essence, and because He is the principle and cause of all things, existing outside every genus of them. But note that even in creatures certain things are contained eminently and not formally, for example the sun has heat eminently, not formally; but certain things are contained both formally and eminently together in some creature, as the rational soul is formally vegetative and sensitive, and also eminently vegetative. The reason is, for in man there is no other substantial form which is the vegetative and sensitive principle, except that very one which is the principle of reasoning, which indeed on account of its immateriality has eminently the grades of lower living things. Furthermore, there are certain perfections in lower creatures which are not found in higher ones either formally or eminently; as for example man is neither formally nor eminently able to neigh, and this is against Gabriel, in 1, dist. 36, q. 1, where he says: «that one thing is contained eminently in another is nothing other than that the thing in which it is said to be contained be more perfect». From which it would follow that the rational soul would be eminently able to bray, and would contain all the differences of lower things. But we always acknowledge some account of causality in that thing which is said to contain another eminently. But how these perfections are distinguished in God will be plain in what follows, q. 28, art. 2.