Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

THE distinction having been supposed, St. Thomas answers by a twofold conclusion. The distinction is: to be in some genus stands in two ways, namely first and simply and properly, in another way reductively.

FIRST conclusion: God is not in any genus directly and per se, as a species is in a genus. This he proves by a threefold reason.

Second conclusion: God is not in any genus, even reductively.

COMMENTARY.

IT IS DOUBTED concerning this article, on the truth of both conclusions. And it is argued first that God simply pertains to a genus and a predicament. Christ is simply placed in a predicament; therefore God also. The antecedent is conceded by all Theologians. The consequence is proved first: because Christ is an infinite substance, like God. Likewise, because on account of the communication of idioms, whatever is said of Christ is said of God.

Secondly it is argued from St. Aug., 5 On the Trinity, ch. 8, where he says that Sacred Scripture speaks of God according to the categories, which the Latins call predicaments: sometimes indeed improperly, as when God is said to have a disposition or a habit, sometimes however properly, as when God is said to be a substance or a spirit. Almost the same he says in sermon 88 On the time; and Damascene, book 3 On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 8; therefore, etc. It is confirmed: for in God the relations which are found of Paternity and Filiation are most proper relations; therefore they pertain absolutely to the predicament 'to something'. It is confirmed secondly: for certain Theologians probably say that relation, according to what is ultimate and proper to relation, is said univocally of real relation and of relation of reason; for St. Thomas, below, q. 28, art. 2, says that those things which are said 'to something' are most properly found in relations of reason; therefore it is also said univocally of the relations which are in creatures and in God; and accordingly, as the former are placed in a predicament, so also the divine relations.

Third. God is properly a substance; therefore he is placed in the genus of substance. The antecedent is proved from Aristotle, 12 Metaphysics, at the beginning, who, distinguishing substance into corruptible and incorruptible, asserts that one of the incorruptible substances is God. The consequence is proved: for if anything excluded this divine substance from a predicament, it would be that it is infinite; but this does not stand in the way: for if there were an infinite line it would pertain to the genus of quantity, and an infinitely intense whiteness to the predicament of quality; therefore, etc. It is confirmed: for if God is not in a genus, it is on account of the reason adduced by St. Thomas, that things placed in a genus consist or are composed of genus and difference, and of potency and act, etc. But this reason is not efficacious. It is proved: for this composition is in the intellect conceiving the same thing in diverse ways, for on the part of the thing animal and rational are the same; but our intellect can conceive of God something after the manner of potency, and something after the manner of act. It is proved: because although God is altogether simple, nevertheless our intellect, on account of its imperfection, conceives simple things in a composite way; therefore, etc. It is confirmed secondly: for the angels, which are abstract forms, in which there is not something from which the account of genus and the account of difference is taken, are nevertheless in a predicament; therefore the same will be the case with God. It is confirmed thirdly: God is conceived by us after the manner of a universal; therefore after the manner of genus and species, and consequently he is placed in a predicament. The antecedent is proved: for God is conceived by us without individuating conditions; therefore.

Fourth it is argued. For from the divine substance we can abstract one limited and contracted account; therefore in it there can be genus and species. The antecedent is proved: for in God we conceive mercy as distinct from justice.

Fifth it is argued: for the third reason which St. Thomas here adduces, and which seems most weighty, has a manifest equivocation; for in the antecedent, when he says that all things which are in one genus communicate in the essence of the genus and differ according to to-be, he seems manifestly to speak of the to-be of essence; but in the consequent, when he says that it is necessary that whatever are in a genus differ in them according to to-be and what it is, he speaks openly of the to-be of existence; therefore this reason has an equivocation. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas in 1 Sentences, d. 8, q. 4, art. 2, ad tertium, says that God, although he is not placed in the predicament of substance directly, since he is the most perfect being and the measure of all substances, is nevertheless placed reductively. And q. 7 On Power, art. 3, ad ultimum, he says that although God does not pertain to the genus of substance as something contained in a genus, like a species and an individual, it can nevertheless be said that he is in the genus of substance reductively, as a principle and a point are in the genus of continuous quantity, and unity in the genus of number; therefore, etc. And finally, because each thing is measured by something of its own genus: but God, since he is the most perfect substance, is the measure of the others; therefore he is in the same genus. To this question certain Theologians hold that God is properly placed in a predicament: so Ockham thinks, in 1, d. 8, q. 5, and Olcot, and Gregory in 1, dist. 8, q. 3; Gabriel, q. 5, and Marsilius in 1, q. 12, art. 2, conclusion 6.

FOR the resolution it must be noted, first, with St. Thomas, ch. 6 of On Being and Essence, that to-be is so much of the essence of God himself that it is of his quidditative concept, so that God includes no potentiality, but is pure to-be without admixture of potentiality. Hence as animal, if it were not determined to some species, would be pure animal, and whiteness, if it were not coarcted to some subject, would be pure whiteness, so the to-be which in God is unlimited is his essence itself. Note secondly, from the same St. Thomas, On Power, q. 8, art. 3, that although matter is not a genus, nor is form a difference, nevertheless the account of genus is taken from matter, as the account of difference from form. As is clear in man, that the sensitive nature, from which the account of animal is taken, is material with respect to the account from which the rational difference is taken: for animal is what has a sensitive nature, but rational what has reason. Hence Cajetan, On Being and Essence, ch. 6, notes that in things composed of matter and form four things are understood: matter, which is a part of the specific composite; form, which is the other part; the whole quiddity as it has the account of perfectible by a further formal perfection; and the whole quiddity itself as it gives the ultimate formal perfection. For in this we can consider the matter in which its form is received, and the form received in it, and man himself insofar as he is a substance, and as a substance he has the account of perfectible through the corporeal and the rational. But the root of potentiality in sensible things is matter; and therefore genus is taken from matter, but difference from form. Note thirdly that in any predicament whatsoever, the higher genera are contracted to lower species through certain differences contracting those genera, which are outside their formal account, and conversely, as Aristotle teaches, 3 Metaphysics, text. 10; and for this reason being is excluded from the account of genus, and accident too according to the common account of accident. From which it follows that the composition of genus and difference, although it is not as a third thing from two things, as St. Thomas teaches in the opuscule On Being and Essence, ch. 3, is nevertheless not from the intellect's conception alone, but has a foundation in reality, and can be called a real metaphysical composition. Which is proved: for genus is compared to difference as the perfectible to its own proper act by which it is perfected; therefore they are distinguished in reality itself, and not only through the operation of the intellect. Likewise, because Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, text 54, arguing against Plato, says that if the idea were separate and simple it could not be defined, because a definition is a discourse including distinct parts. Therefore Aristotle holds that the parts of the definition, which are genus and difference, are distinct in reality itself and not from the operation of the intellect alone. Furthermore, because otherwise it would follow that if the account of genus and the account of difference were not diverse according to reality, the one could be predicated of the other in the abstract, nay even in the first mode of saying per se, as animality and rationality: which nevertheless is against all the Metaphysicians. It must be noted fourthly, with master Cajetan in On Being and Essence, ch. 6, that in substances separated from matter, genus and difference cannot be taken from matter and form, since they do not have these parts: therefore both genus and difference are taken from the whole essence, yet in diverse ways. For the genus is taken from the essence of an angel insofar as in it he is assimilated to other angels, but the difference from the same, by reason of that in which one angel differs substantially from others; for the angelic essences differ among themselves by a greater nearness to the pure act. Whence Cajetan infers that every individual, really distinct from its own to-be, has several quidditative predicates, by progress through which it approaches more and more to its own to-be. Secondly he infers that among the aforesaid quidditative predicates there is this order: that a thing is the more actual the closer it approaches to to-be, and the more potential the further it is from to-be; for example, Peter, really distinct from his own to-be of existence, has several quidditative predicates, namely substance, body, living, etc.; and it is certain that Peter as substance is very far removed from his existence; for in order that Peter be, there is required not only that he be a substance, but also a body, etc. But when Peter is considered as an animated sensible substance, etc., then he can already receive actual existence: for no other intrinsic formal thing is required for him to be, although extrinsic causes and individual properties are required as a condition of the one existing. And this is proved by reason of Cajetan himself in the same place. And so among the quidditative predicates there is this order: that what is nearer to to-be itself is more actual, but what is further is more potential. From which it is inferred thirdly that genus is taken from that which is potential. Hence it is a most general rule that genus and difference are taken from the whole essence of a thing according to its removal from and nearness to the very to-be of existence.

It is answered therefore to the doubt that the conclusions of St. Thomas are most certain, namely that God is placed in a predicament neither directly nor indirectly. This is proved from St. Aug., book V On the Trinity, ch. 1, and book VII, ch. 5, who teaches so. Very many Theologians agree, even Scholastics, with the Master in 1, d. 8: Albert, Bonaventure, Richard, Scotus, in the same d., q. 2, and Durandus in 1 Sentences, dist. 3, q. 1. The same St. Thomas holds everywhere: here, and 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 25, and On Power, q. 7, art. 3, and his disciples. It is proved by reason. First: for any predicament whatsoever imports a limited perfection of being, since being is divided into ten genera primarily diverse, whose accounts are distinct among themselves: but God has an infinite and unlimited perfection of being; therefore he is not in a genus. It is confirmed: since relation, goodness, etc., which are in God, are the very substance of God. Secondly it is proved: as the account of being is not said univocally of God and creatures, of substance and accident, so the account of substance is not said univocally of God and of us; therefore if we pertain to a predicament, God ought not to pertain. Furthermore, because being is not placed in a predicament because it is intrinsically enclosed in all things of all predicaments: but whatever is in God is intrinsically included in all things which pertain to God; therefore he is not placed in a predicament. The consequence is proved: for whatever difference is added to some genus so that it be contracted to the to-be of God, it intrinsically includes it. It is confirmed: for God does not pertain to the predicament of substance according as substance is said from substanding; since God does not underlie accidents, as will be said in the following article. And in this way St. Aug., VII On the Trinity, ch. 5, says that God is said to be substance improperly and abusively. Nor is he placed in the genus of substance insofar as substance says a per se subsisting predicamental being: since a being of this kind is determined by differences to a certain species; therefore he is placed in no predicament.

To the arguments to the contrary it is answered. To the first, the antecedent is conceded, and the consequence denied. To its proof it is answered that although Christ is an infinite substance, he nevertheless has some finite nature, namely the humanity, by reason of which he can pertain to a predicament. To the other proof, concerning the communication of idioms, it is spoken more amply in the 3rd part. But for now it is answered that in real predicates there is a communication of idioms, but not in intentional ones. Hence Christ is called a first substance, but not God. The universal rule, therefore, is that when a predicate is verified of Christ only with a reduplication, namely insofar as he is man, so that for the truth of the proposition such a condition must be expressed formally or virtually, there is no communication of idioms except with the same reduplication; so that it does not follow, Christ insofar as he is man begins to be, therefore God begins to be; Christ insofar as he is man is a creature, therefore God is a creature, unless that particle 'insofar as he is man' is added: for we would be arguing from what is said in a qualified sense to what is said simply, or from what is formal to what is identical, or, as the moderns say, the appellation is varied: for in the antecedent the appellation is made over the humanity, but in the consequent over the Deity. Sometimes, however, the reduplication or condition is posited implicitly and virtually, when the predicate signifies an interior act of the soul, as when we say, Christ is predestined. Hence the consequence does not hold, therefore God is predestined: because the term 'predestined', in that it signifies an interior act of the soul, appellates over the humanity. And the same must be said of this consequence, Christ is in a predicament, therefore God is in a predicament: for to be in a predicament is a term of second intention belonging to things through an order to the intellect, and hence it appellates.

To the second it is answered that of those things which belong to creatures, some are said properly even of God, yet not univocally, but analogically, as substance, spirit. Hence the consequence is denied, that God pertains to a predicament. But Augustine and Damascene teach nothing other than that these predicates, which in creatures pertain to a predicament, are said properly of God, yet not according to the same predicamental account by which they are said of creatures. To the first confirmation it is answered that although Paternity and Filiation in God are simply relations, they nevertheless do not pertain to a predicament, on account of the reasons already given. For they are an infinite perfection, and so are not coarcted to one predicamental account. To the second confirmation it must be spoken ex professo below, in the matter of the Trinity. But for now it is answered that relation, insofar as it says 'to', is not said univocally of the divine relation and of that which is in creatures, nay not even of a real relation and one of reason.

To the third it is answered by denying the consequence: for substance is said analogically of God and creatures. Yet Aristotle made that division, because God is naturally known from the things which are in creatures. But to the proof of the consequence it is said that that reason is the best by which God is excluded from a predicament, namely because he is an infinite substance. To the disproof of which it is said that the infinite is twofold: one according to essence, the other according to quantity. The infinite according to essence is that which does not have essential terms, which are genus and difference; the infinite according to quantity is that which lacks the terms of quantity. God is infinite in the first way; wherefore he is not placed in a genus, because he does not have essential terms, namely genus and difference. But a line is infinite according to quantity, because it does not have the terms of length; yet it is finite according to essence, because it is enclosed within essential terms, namely genus and difference, which suffices for it to be placed in a genus. To the first confirmation it is answered that the composition of genus and difference, as we noted, is not from the operation of the intellect alone, but has a foundation in reality; but in God, since he is altogether simple, there cannot be such a foundation on the part of God himself, from which a composition of genus and difference might arise. To the second confirmation it is answered that in angels there is something potential, from which the account of genus is taken, and something actual, from which the account of difference is taken. To the third confirmation it is answered that although God is conceived by us after the manner of a universal and after the manner of a species, nevertheless because this conception has no foundation in reality, but only in the imperfection of our intellect, which cannot know God in this state as he is, but only through an order to material things, therefore God is simply not a species or a genus, nor is he even in a genus; but when an angel is conceived by us after the manner of a species, such a conception has a foundation in reality, as we were just saying to the second confirmation, and therefore it is properly a species.

To the fourth it is answered that although, from the imperfection of our intellect, we can conceive God, who is infinite, according to a certain limited account, as he says a respect to things outside, nevertheless in the account of being God is in himself infinite, and whatever account existing in God is infinite simply, and consequently includes all actuality and perfection, and hence is outside every genus.

To the fifth it is answered, from Cajetan, here and On Being and Essence, ch. 6, that in the antecedent of that third reason St. Thomas takes to-be both for specific to-be and for the to-be of existence, for it is verified of both; nay, the truth of the one infers the truth of the other. See Cajetan, in the preceding article, at the end. To the confirmation it is answered that there is no repugnance between the sayings of St. Thomas. For when in those places he says that God is placed reductively in a predicament as a principle, he understands as a principle containing the genus itself, not as something contained in the genus; and in this way God is in a certain way in all genera, and, by a certain appropriation, in the genus of substance, which more closely approaches God. But when he says here that God is not in a genus even reductively, he understands as contained by the genus itself. The explanation is that of Capreolus in 1, dist. 8, q. 2. See Cajetan here. But if you ask whether it must be said absolutely that God is reductively in a predicament, on account of this explanation given, it is answered that rather it must be absolutely denied that God is reductively in a predicament. For that God contains all genera and is their first cause does not suffice for us to say that God is reduced to some genus; nay rather, from this it is gathered that all genera are reduced to God. Hence that manner of speaking of St. Thomas in 1 Sentences is not altogether proper. One must speak, therefore, according to the tenor of the doctrine which he hands down in this article. But to that which is adduced there, that each thing is measured by what is most perfect in its genus, it is answered that when the measure is of the same order, it is placed in the same genus as the thing measured, as rational animal pertains to the predicament in which the other animals are placed. But when the measure is not of the same account, but superexceeding and most eminent, as God, it is not necessary that he be in the same genus.

But it is doubted how the reason of St. Thomas is to be understood, which he assumes in the argument On the contrary, saying that nothing is prior to God, neither according to reality nor according to intellect. For this seems to be false: for the predicates common to God and creatures, as being, substance, etc., seem to be prior to God himself according to the intellect; and this is clear, because the consequence of subsisting is not converted. To this Cajetan answers, saying that on the part of the thing or of the formal accounts, no account is prior to God; but as regards us, something is prior according to our intellect, as wisdom is prior to divine wisdom as regards us, according to the intellect. A second explanation of St. Thomas is that he is speaking of a univocal account, and thus his proposition is universal, both according to reality and as regards us. And the sense is: no univocal account is prior to God, neither according to reality nor as regards us, even when abstracted through the intellect. But that some analogical accounts abstracted through the intellect are prior to God is no unfitting thing. In a third way the proposition of St. Thomas can be explained: that something be prior to another according to the intellect occurs in two ways. First, according to the reason that reasons, and thus it is not unfitting that something be prior to God according to the intellect. In the second way, according to the reason that has been reasoned, or according to the formal concept of the thing, and thus nothing can be understood as prior to God.

Concerning the corollary which St. Thomas infers in the third reason, that there cannot be demonstration of God, it is to be understood of demonstration a priori, which is given through a true and proper cause according to reality: on which see Ferrariensis, 1 Against the Gentiles, ch. 25. But if we speak of demonstration a priori which is given through a formal account, this has place in God: for we demonstrate a priori that God is eternal by this, that he is immutable. For if the eternity of God were causable, immutability would be its cause.