Scholastica commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

The conclusion is affirmative. The reason is formed thus: God is His essence, as was said in the third article; but God is His to-be; therefore the to-be of God is His essence: the consequence seems manifest. The minor is proved by a threefold demonstration, as is clear.

COMMENTARY.

The CONCLUSION of this article is asserted by the Theologians as certain according to faith. And they prove it from that Exo. 3: I am who am; and He who is sent me to you — where God signifies His substance by this, that He says He is: for otherwise, the other creatures also are, and God would assert nothing singular and proper to Himself when He says I am. In comparison with whom the other creatures are said not to be; e.g. Isa. 40: «All nations are before Him as if they were not.» This conclusion is unanimously affirmed by the holy Fathers, whose testimonies the Master of the Sentences reports in the cited place, in the preceding article. And finally, if the conclusion were not true, it would follow that the Divine Essence is not infinite simply. The consequence is proved: for the Divine Essence would not intrinsically include to-be itself, which is the greatest perfection. See several other demonstrations in St. Thomas, 1. Cont. Gent., ca. 22, 23. But someone will say: If the conclusion is of faith, how is it demonstrated? It is answered that the same question can be asked concerning all the conclusions of the preceding and following articles, and therefore the solution will be the same. For we do not understand that these conclusions pertain to faith immediately; but as God exists is said to pertain to faith although it is demonstrated — because from its denial there evidently follows the denial of some truth that pertains to faith immediately — so such conclusions are said to be of faith. For from their denial it follows that the authority of Scripture is not infallible, or even that some article of faith is not true: for he who denied that God exists would deny all the articles of faith. And the same we say of the other divine attributes demonstrated by natural reason: if they are denied, consequently it is denied that God exists, which is the foundation of the whole faith.

This article contains a subtle metaphysical doctrine — and (as Cajetan says) one quite foreign to the little moderns, who opine that not only in God but in everything, essence is identified with its existence. Hence I have undertaken to examine and define this question diligently. Before all, concerning the understanding of St. Thomas's reasons and of the doctrine of this article, certain things are briefly to be noted.

Note first, concerning the first reason, how, he says, proper accidents are caused by the principles of the species. For you rightly ask: in what genus of cause are they said to be caused by such principles? It is answered that he speaks here of a genus of cause in a certain way efficient — not through a new change distinct from that by which the substance is produced, but through a certain simple emanation; as light, which is in the sun, is caused by the essential principles of the sun's substance; and as coldness flows from the substance of water — which although it can be impeded, yet, the impediment removed, it immediately follows again, which return to coldness is said to be from the generator. In which way also a stone is said to have a cause in a certain way efficient of its natural motion, inasmuch as through a certain simple emanation downward motion immediately follows, the impediment removed. So therefore the proper passion and the potencies of the soul flow from the soul itself.

Note second, concerning that proposition assumed by St. Thomas in the first reason — that no thing suffices to be to itself the cause of being, if it has caused to-be. For you immediately ask: what is the reason why no thing suffices to be to itself the cause of being, if it has caused to-be? And the reason for doubting is that man has caused risibility, and yet is to himself a sufficient cause of being risible — since the definition of man is a sufficient principle for demonstrating that he is risible; therefore it is no obstacle that a thing have an efficient cause of its to-be, and yet itself be to itself a sufficient cause of being from its own essential principles. Behold, by this argument is already touched the mystery of the difficulty to be examined by us concerning the to-be and essence of creatures. Meanwhile, however, it is answered that there is a great difference between a proper passion in respect of the essential principles of the species, and to-be of existence itself in respect of the same principles. For a proper passion, e.g. the risible, already presupposes the essence in act, and so flows as an accident, which is the being of a being; but to-be itself, since it is that by which formally the essence is, cannot presuppose that the essence itself is the cause from which it flows — for that would presuppose that the essence already is, which implies

a contradiction: as if whiteness, by which something is formally white, presupposed that already, before itself, the subject were white. Therefore it is in no way intelligible that anything having caused to-be be to itself a sufficient cause of being. But perhaps you will say that from our reason it follows that in no way is a thing having caused to-be a cause of being to itself — while St. Thomas yet insinuates in the article that in some way to-be itself is caused from its own essential principles. It is answered that the essential principles are a cause of being materially: because of themselves they are receptive of to-be itself, by which they are first actuated. Indeed they are understood only insofar as they have an order to to-be — as the diaphanous is a cause of light because it is an aptitude for receiving light. And although to-be itself, received in an essence composed of essential principles, is specified by them, yet in that wherein it is specified it receives no perfection, but is rather depressed, and descends to to-be secundum quid — in that for a man to be man, for an angel to be itself, is not a perfection simply. And this is what St. Thomas most often cries out, and the Thomists will not hear: that to-be is the actuality of every form or nature, as in this article he says in the second reason, and that in no thing is it found as receiving and perfectible, but as received and perfecting that in which it is received — yet itself, by the very fact that it is received, is depressed and, so to speak, imperfected. But of these things we shall say more in what follows.

Concerning the second reason of the article there is also a difficulty: how is what St. Thomas says to be understood — that goodness or humanity is not signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be? For this seems false: when I know a rose and name it, I signify it in act, and yet I do not signify it to be — as if, e.g., I said, a rose is a most beautiful flower; therefore etc. To this difficulty one could answer from the doctrine of Cajetan on St. Thomas's second reason, where he says: Note here that this reason is founded upon this, that whatever quiddity or nature, however actual according to its quidditative account, yet referred to to-be has the account of potency — for wisdom and goodness are actuated by this, that I say it is, and likewise humanity and equinity. And therefore it is said both that to-be is the actuality of every form, and that no nature is signified in ultimate act except insofar as to-be is signified in exercised act. Thus far Cajetan. Whose solution does not seem to satisfy fully. For as we understand a thing through its proper concept, so also we signify it: but we perfectly understand the account of a triangle even if it does not actually exist; therefore we also perfectly signify the perfect account of a triangle. Then, what Cajetan says — that St. Thomas must be understood of ultimate act when he says that goodness or humanity is not signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be — does not seem properly said: for to-be is rather the first act of anything than the last. Which is clear, for being is the first thing understood, in which to-be itself is included, or the intrinsic order to to-be as to a first act. Hence St. Thomas seems to me to be explained thus, when he says that no form is signified in act except insofar as we signify it to be — that is, through respect to to-be, as we understand it, whether that thing actually and really exists or in potency. And this doctrine is founded upon this, that being is the object of the intellect. I confess, however, that when a thing is understood to actually exist, it has greater perfection than when it is understood to be in potency. For the rest, the quiddity of things other than God abstracts from being in act or not being in act. Hence it can be perfectly defined according to this abstraction.

Concerning the solution to the second literal argument, Cajetan moves a doubt. For the answer seems (he says) to imply two contradictories. For if we know that this proposition is true, God exists, through the demonstrations made, then we know it to be so in reality that God exists — and this is to know the to-be which is in God Himself; therefore we know not only that the proposition God exists is true, but also that the act of being belongs to God Himself — especially since from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is called true or false. On this difficulty see Cajetan, 2. Post., c. 1. But in his commentary on this article he answers excellently and briefly. And he notes that this is the difference between the to-be of God and the to-be of other things: that the to-be of God is the what it is of God Himself — for this proposition, God exists, is in the first mode of per se predication — while the to-be of other things is not so, but is distinguished from their quiddities. And from this is born another difference: that the to-be of God, speaking simply, is the proper term of the question what is it, and secundum quid is the term of the question whether is it — namely as it founds the truth of the proposition; while the to-be of other things in no way pertains to the question what is it, but simply and in reality to the question whether is it. And therefore when concerning other things we know whether it is, we know not only to-be, which signifies the truth of the proposition, but the to-be of the thing itself, in that it is known according to the proper mode in which it is knowable. But when concerning God we know whether He is, we are said to know the to-be that signifies the truth of the proposition — but we do not know absolutely the to-be of God as it is knowable, namely as pertaining to the what it is; rather we know secundum quid, namely insofar as suffices to found the truth of this proposition, God exists. And in this way, not only the truth of the proposition God exists is the term of our knowledge, but the to-be of God Himself as it answers to the truth of the proposition. But there is still a reply: for through demonstrations we attain not only to the to-be of God as it founds the truth of this proposition, God exists, but we also know what belongs to the quiddity of God, and that God is to-be itself subsisting; therefore the aforesaid solution is false. It is answered that although through natural demonstrations we arrive at knowing this truth — that to-be pertains to the quiddity of God, and that He is to-be itself subsisting and infinite, immutable and eternal, and many other attributes pertaining to His quiddity — yet we know all these things confusedly, and through a certain negation or likeness to creatures, and not through a proper concept expressing the quiddity as it is. And this is what St. Thomas intends to teach in the solution to the second argument. For concerning other things we can know the what it is itself even if we do not know actual existence — since this is extrinsic to quiddity; but concerning God we cannot have distinct knowledge of His quiddity unless we distinctly and openly know the subsisting to-be of God Himself, which is impossible to have from knowledge of creatures, however distinct. Thus far let it have been said concerning to-be and essence as it pertains to God Himself. Yet that we may understand how proper it is to God that His to-be be His essence, and how every creature in respect of the act of being stands as something potential, it has seemed to me worth the labor diligently to examine what existence itself in creatures is, and to what things and how it belongs, and what cause it has. For all these things often come into theological consideration, and are distinctly treated by few.

IT IS DOUBTED, therefore, first: what is existence? For the understanding of which, what the name of existence means must be supposed. For existence is that by which formally a thing is understood actually to be outside its causes. And perhaps existence is so called as standing-outside, that is, actuality outside potentiality. Now therefore we ask not about this or that existence in particular, but in common concerning the existence of creatures, what its account is — on which matter there are various opinions.

The first opinion is that existence is nothing else than a certain accident received in creatures, through which they stand outside nothing. This opinion is proved first. For existence is neither the matter nor the form of a natural thing, nor the whole composite; therefore it is an accident. The antecedent seems manifest, especially in the way of St. Thomas. The consequence is proved: for a substance is nothing else than matter or form, or the composite of both; therefore if existence is none of these, it will not be substance. Second, it is proved: existence informs and actuates the whole essence of the substance whose existence it is said to be; therefore it is totally distinguished from substance, as act is distinguished from potency; and consequently, if it is not substance or something of substance, it will be an accident. It is confirmed: for whatever is understood to come to a thing constituted through form and matter is an accident. But if it be said that it is an act of substance not received in substance, this indeed does not seem intelligible. For how could a substance exist through an existence that is not in it? Besides, no reason could be assigned why Peter exists through this existence rather than through another, through which Paul exists, if neither is received in Peter. Third, it is proved: existence is not distinguished from the duration of a thing, as motion is not distinguished from time, which is the measure of motion; but the duration of a thing is an accident pertaining to the category of quantity or to the category when; therefore existence too is an accident. It is confirmed: for duration seems to be nothing else than the continuation of to-be itself; but the continuation of a thing is not distinguished from it, therefore. It is confirmed, second: for the durations of things are distinguished according to the diverse modes of existence — e.g. aevum is the duration of an existence invariable from within, yet mutable from without, while time is the duration of the existence of a thing mutable within, with succession and continuity; but eternity is called the measure of a wholly immutable thing, whose existence is its essence; therefore the existence of a thing and its duration are the same and pertain to the same category.

The other opinion is that of Capreolus, in 1., dist. 8, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 3, and in the same question, art. 3, ad 3 — of Gerard, against the first conclusion — who holds that existence is the actuality and as it were the form of every created thing, by which it is formally said to exist. And he says that existence in itself is neither substance nor accident, but yet the existence of a substance is reduced to the category of substance, while the existence of accidents is reduced to the category of accidents. So, according to Capreolus, existence does not pertain directly to any category. Cajetan also, De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 11, ad 8. argum., says that the existence of a substance is the substance, and the existence of an accident is the accident, and that the existence of a substance is reduced to the genus

of substance as the ultimate formal principle of substance itself: because (as he says) through this a thing is placed in the genus of substance, in that it is capable of substantial to-be.

FOR the decision of this difficulty, let the first conclusion be: existence cannot, according to its proper account, be an accident. First, it is proved: for existence according to its proper account is a perfection simply; therefore, as such, it is not an accident. The consequence is clear. For no account of an accident, however perfect, is a perfection simply. It is confirmed: for existence is formally found in God; therefore formally it does not import an accident.

The second conclusion: created existence, or that of a created thing, even as such, does not import an accident. First, it is proved: for the account of an accident presupposes a being in which it inheres, but the existence of a substance, that it actually exist, does not presuppose a being already in act; therefore it is not an accident. The major is manifest, for an accident is the being of a being. The minor is proved: for substance itself cannot be understood to exist before it has existence; therefore existence does not come to an existing substance, but is rather that by which a substance formally exists. Second, it is proved: for created or creatable substance itself is not intelligible without an intrinsic transcendental order to to-be or existence; therefore existence cannot be an accident. The consequence is clear: for in its own understanding, substance has no dependence upon an accident. The antecedent is proved: for substance is understood inasmuch as it is a being — that is, inasmuch as it has, or is apt to have, to-be per se, that is, not in another; therefore it cannot be understood except with an intrinsic order to to-be itself — which, although it is not the quiddity of substance (which is therefore called created), is yet that by reason of which substance is understood as being per se. And finally it is proved: for if to-be itself were an accident, all the categories would be of accidents. The sequel is clear: for the categories are distinguished through diverse modes of being; therefore if to-be itself is an accident, every mode of being is an accident.

The third conclusion: existence is something real, and intrinsic to the existing thing. The first part of this conclusion is proved: for existence is that by which a thing is constituted outside nothing. The other part is explained: for I do not understand existence to be so intrinsic to the existing thing as to be a part of it, or its essence, or something essential — for concerning this we shall dispute in the following doubt; but I say it is something intrinsic to the existing thing, inasmuch as a thing is said to exist not by an extrinsic denomination, as it is said to be in a place, but is said and denominated to exist from something it has within itself. For in this way personality too is intrinsic to substance; indeed even accidents, as whiteness, are called intrinsic to a body. In this sense, therefore, the conclusion is proved: for existence is the first actuality by which a thing is drawn outside nothing; therefore it must be innermost to the thing — otherwise it is unintelligible how a thing is outside nothing through some account that is outside the thing. It is confirmed: for if the first actuality of each thing were extrinsic, no other actuality could be intrinsic. The sequel is proved: for the first actuality is the foundation of the others. And then, for all other actualities determine to-be itself to some mode or species of being; therefore it implies that the other actualities be intrinsic while to-be or existence itself remains outside. And finally, if existence is not intrinsic to a thing, it is not received in anything; and consequently it would be per se subsisting and infinite, as is the divine existence.

The fourth conclusion: the proper account of existence considered in common, although it has that it be intrinsic — that is, within the existing thing — yet does not require that it be received as in a subject. This conclusion is clear: for otherwise existence would not belong to God formally, although it is most intrinsic to Him, since it is His quiddity. Just as we also say that wisdom according to its proper formal account does not import that it be received in a subject: for this is an imperfection of wisdom, belonging to created wisdom not because formally it is wisdom, but because it is created and participated.

The fifth conclusion: the account of created existence consists more and principally in this, that it be the term completing the dependence of substance as to its becoming and being outside nothing, than in this, that existence itself be received in substance itself as in a subject and limited by it. This conclusion is proved theologically: for according to the opinion of St. Thomas, the more probable, humanity in Christ the Lord does not have a created existence received as in a subject, but exists outside nothing through the existence of the Divine Word terminating and completing the dependence of the humanity that it be outside nothing. Therefore to the formal account of existence, which belongs to it per se first, we understand only this to pertain: that it be that by which a thing exists outside nothing. But that it further be received and limited in the thing itself rather regards the material and imperfect account of existence: for if this pertained per se first to the formal account by which a creature exists, it could not be supplied through the divine existence that the creature exist — and not through that limited existence. As God could not through Himself supply the place of whiteness that something be white. True therefore is the aforesaid conclusion. It is confirmed by an excellent example: for therefore the Theologians say — and we shall explain at length below, q. 12, art. 2 — that the divine Essence can supply the place of an intelligible likeness, because to the proper and formal account of an intelligible likeness it pertains per se first that it make the union of object with potency. But that in us the other intelligible likenesses are accidents and inhere in the intellect comes from their imperfection. So also now we assert that to the account of existence per se and formally there pertains no dependence upon that which exists through it; but it has this most formally: to terminate intimately the dependence of quiddity or essence that it be outside nothing.

The sixth conclusion: the existence completing the potentiality of substance — not only that it come to be outside nothing, but that it exist per se, that is, not in a subject — such existence (I say) is reduced to the category of substance, not as potentiality, nor as properly a difference, but as the first actuality completing the intrinsic mode of substance, which is to-be per se — that is, by which substance per se first has to-be. Whence it comes about, as I would more properly say, that to-be or existence itself is something more excellent than all the genera: nor is it reduced to any genus as to something more perfect than itself; but its reduction to a genus is rather a limitation of existence, and an imperfection, than an extension to something more perfect. For in this way the parts of a substance are reduced to substance as to something better, and differences are placed at the side of the category. But existence is the completive of genus and difference and of all things in the category. Hence, in my judgment, to-be itself is not properly said to be reduced to a category, but rather to be participated and limited by every category, and by every genus and predicamental difference; while to-be itself participates nothing, but is participated by all — as St. Thomas teaches very often, especially in q. unica De anima, art. 6, ad 2. And this is confirmed: for no one would say that being is reduced to a category; rather we say that finite being is divided into the categories through the diverse modes by which it is limited, as something innermost to every genus and every predicamental difference. Since therefore being imports that which has to-be, as potency has act, how will it be verified that potency itself is not reduced to a category, while act itself is reduced? Let these things have been said for the ingenious and the metaphysical, not for those who consider all things with rude Minerva. From what has been said follows the last conclusion:

The existence of an accident in a proportionate way pertains to the accident, as the existence of a substance to substance. For now we proceed according to the common opinion, which also seems to be St. Thomas's, and which Cajetan explains excellently below, q. 28, art. 2, in the reply to 2 — namely that the inhering of any accidental form whatever is really distinguished from the essence of the accident and from the to-be of the subject; although it does not seem improbable to me that existence itself of the substance, which per se first actuates the substance, secondarily terminate the dependence of the accidental form. The conclusion is therefore proved: for as the to-be of an accidental form stands to the to-be of the accident, so the to-be of a substance to substance; therefore the existence of an accident will pertain to the accident in the way the existence of a substance to substance.

TO THE ARGUMENTS made for the first opinion, it is answered. To the first, the consequence is denied: for an accident presupposes in its own understanding the to-be of substance, that it be truly called the being of a being. And to the proof of the consequence it is granted that existence is neither matter nor substantial form nor substantial composite, but is the first actuality completing and terminating the intrinsic mode of substance. And so, as we have said, it is in a certain way reduced to substance — not as participating substance, but as something first participated by it.

To the second, the antecedent and the principal consequence are granted; but the accessory is denied, when it is said: and consequently, if it is not substance or something of substance, it will be an accident. For this consequence is denied. Existence itself, considered according to its proper account — even in created things — is neither substance nor accident, but is the first actuality and complement of substance or of accident. As for what is commonly said — that there is no medium between substance and accident — it is true if understood as stated: for there will be no being, namely what has to-be, which is not substance or accident. But to-be or existence itself is not a being having to-be; it is that by which, or in order to which, something has to-be. And so it is no wonder if existence itself is neither substance nor part of substance, neither accident nor of the essence of an accident. But by an improper reduction we confess that it is sometimes reduced to substance, sometimes to accident, according as it actuates substance and actuates accident. To the confirmation it is answered that whenever something is understood to come to a thing constituted through form and matter, it is also understood to come to a being in act, either in reality or in reason; and so existence is already presupposed, in reality or in reason. And hence what so supervenes will be an accident. But before existence, either in reality or in reason, there is nothing, or nothing is understood — since being is the object of the intellect. And therefore existence is never understood to supervene upon a composite already of matter and form: for such a composition, with the intrinsic order to existence set aside, is nothing. To the reply, the answer is clear from what was said in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth conclusions.

To the third it is answered first: I deny the minor. For to endure, intrinsically and formally, is to remain in to-be — something absolute importing no relation to anything extrinsic; and although it is explained and known through order to time, yet this order does not pertain to its formal account. For it is prior in the order of nature, as it were fundamentally, that a thing remain in its to-be, than that what so remains be in time — just as it is prior for a thing to have a quantitative mode of being than to be measured by place. Second, it is answered: I deny the major. For duration adds permanence and continuation upon existence. Hence to exist for an hour is not to exist simply — simply (I say) and absolutely; for this is nothing else than to have to-be in act outside causes. But that it have to-be for so much time or so much duration is not included in the absolute account of existence; and therefore existence absolutely is distinguished from the duration of a thing. And hereby the answer to the first confirmation is clear. For although the continuation of a thing and the thing itself are not distinguished as thing from thing, they are yet distinguished as thing and mode of thing. To the last confirmation it is answered that it only proves that duration has some dependence upon the existence of the thing, not that it is formally the same as it. For the rest, concerning the opinion of Capreolus and Cajetan two things must be said. The first is how to understand what Capreolus and Cajetan say: that to-be or existence, as it actuates substance, is reduced to substance. For this reduction, as we have said, is not of the imperfect to the more perfect, but rather of a most perfect actuality to the best potency receptive of to-be per se. The second is that they call to-be or existence itself the ultimate actuality of a thing. This needs explanation. For since to-be or existence is the first actuality — not only in the intention of the generator but also in the account of formality, since nothing is understood except as it has to-be or with an intrinsic order to to-be — it seems false to say that to-be itself is last in the intention of the generator, and that therefore to-be itself is called the ultimate actuality of a thing. And it is confirmed: for in the way of generation, while a man is generated, an embryo cannot be prior to existence. For already in our saying 'it is an embryo', existence is pre-understood. Nor can any form in the way of generation be prior to its own existence. Indeed neither can anything be understood to be in potency prior to understanding that to-be itself possibly actuates potency. And therefore Cajetan's explanation, ubi supra, does not please me — namely that existence is called the ultimate actuality of a thing because it is last in generation. Certainly this way of speaking — that to-be itself is the ultimate actuality of a thing — is rarely found in St. Thomas. You will find it in quaestio unica De anima, art. 6, ad 2, where he says that to-be itself is the ultimate act participable by all. In which place, if you read what follows, you will understand how to-be itself is the ultimate act — namely supreme and most excellent, perfecting all other acts as well. For all other forms are compared to it as potencies to act. Or if it pleases otherwise, say that to-be itself is the first and the ultimate actuality of anything whatever: first in the order of intellectual composition, ultimate in the order of intellectual resolution. As if, e.g., the intellect, from knowledge of being — which is its proper object — descend even to man, it first understands to-be per se, which belongs to substance, then corporeal to-be, living to-be, rational to-be — in all of which to-be itself is considered as first act. And again, if it would ascend resolutively to what is simpler, it will arrive even at to-be itself, and ascend no further. Behold therefore how to-be itself is the first and ultimate actuality, and so simple that no composition at all is found in it — but all things, besides God, are composed of to-be and essence as of act and potency. Thus far let it have been said concerning the quiddity of to-be itself.

IT IS DOUBTED, second, concerning the distinction of to-be itself from essence in created things: whether it is distinguished from essence?

First, it is argued for the negative side. For if it is really distinguished from essence, it follows that God can separate to-be from essence and conserve each. It is proved: for when two things are really distinct, nothing prevents God from conserving one without the other. But the falsity of the consequent at once appears. For if the essence is conserved and exists, then it has to-be; and on the other hand we suppose that God separates to-be from essence; therefore two contradictories will be true: it has to-be and it does not have to-be. By a like reason St. Thomas, in 1. par., quaest. 66, art. 1, says that matter cannot be without form — for otherwise matter would actually exist without act, which is impossible.

Second, it is argued. If to-be is distinguished from essence really, it follows that it is pure act, and consequently would be God. The sequel is proved. For if it is really distinguished from essence, it is an act including nothing of potentiality, therefore pure act. The antecedent is proved. For to-be itself has no source from which potentiality belongs to it, except from being identified with essence; otherwise, if to-be itself were composed of act and potency, there would be a process to infinity.

Third. If to-be is distinguished really from essence, it follows that it exists through itself. The sequel is proved: for since the act of being includes nothing of potentiality, it cannot exist through another act, and consequently will exist through itself — which is proper to God alone.

Fourth. If to-be is distinguished from essence, it follows that immaterial substances are composed of to-be and essence; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is proved: for whatever includes distinct things is composed of them. The minor is proved: for it is impossible that from two components there result one per se, unless one of those components stand as potency in respect of the other standing as act. For from two things existing in act there comes no one per se, as Aristotle teaches, lib. 2 De anima and lib. 7 Metaph., text. 49. But in immaterial substances neither does to-be itself stand as potency, as is clear, nor does essence itself: for it would be potency either simply or secundum quid — not simply, otherwise it would be pure potency, as prime matter; nor secundum quid, for whatever is in potency secundum quid must be simply in act; and so the essence of an angel, with to-be set aside and as distinguished from it, would be simply in act: therefore.

Fifth. If between to-be and essence there is a real distinction, it follows that there is a distinction between two real extremes really existing; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is proved: for a real distinction is a real relation, which must necessarily be between two real extremes really existing. The minor is proved: for essence as distinct from existence is not in act on the side of reality; therefore it cannot be one extreme of a real distinction from the other extreme, which is existence.

Sixth. If to-be is distinguished really from essence, it follows that in material composites there is a twofold real substantial composition, one of matter and form, the other of to-be and essence; and consequently there would be a composite per accidens. But on the contrary, St. Thomas in this article expressly teaches that God alone is His to-be.

On this difficulty there are three principal opinions. The first opinion asserts that essence and to-be are in no way distinguished on the side of reality, but are distinguished only by our concepts — having a foundation in reality, however. This distinction is customarily called that of reasoned reason. This opinion is held by Hervaeus, Quodlib. 7, q. 9; and Gabriel in 3, d. 6, q. 2; Aureolus in Capreolus in 1, d. 8, q. 1; and Durandus in 1. Senten., d. 8, in the first part of the distinction, q. 2; and all the nominalists. For they think essence and to-be differ no otherwise than a course and running.

The second opinion is that of Scotus in 3. Sent., d. 6, q. 1; of Alexander of Hales, 7. Metaphy., tex. 22; and of Augustine Niphus in 4. Metaph., disputation 5 — which Master Soto also follows in 2. Physic., q. 2. The aforesaid doctors say therefore that existence is distinguished from essence not only by a distinction of reason, but formally from the nature of the thing, or really-formally, and not as thing from thing, as Soto says above. The principal reason for this opinion is this: for in this way the authors of this opinion seem to themselves better to satisfy the arguments made against the extreme opinions.

The third opinion holds that essence is distinguished from to-be as thing from thing — so that not only is this proposition false in the formal sense, essence is to-be, but also this: essence is a thing which is to-be. This opinion is held by Capreolus in 1., d. 8, q. 1; Cajetan in the opusculum De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 10; Ferrara, 2. Cont. Gent., c. 52|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52; Soncinas, 4. Metaph., q. 12; Iavellus in the treatise De transcendentalibus, c. 4; and it seems to be the opinion of St. Hilary, lib. 6 De Trinit., the passage cited by St. Thomas in the Sed contra argument.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be ours: Essence and to-be are not distinguished by reason alone. This opinion seems received among the gravest authors, both Philosophers and Theologians, and St. Thomas holds it in the opusculum De ente et essentia, c. 5, and 2. Contra Gent., c. 52 and 53.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-secundus:liber.2/capitulum.52 And this conclusion is proved. Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers, in the passages cited above in this article and the preceding, attribute to God, as something peculiar and proper to God Himself, that His essence and His to-be are distinguished by reason alone; therefore this must not be granted to created things. Second, it is proved. This proposition, essence is to-be, is commonly denied of created things by all Theologians and Philosophers, and does not seem able to be granted. For it is peculiar to the divine Essence that to-be be predicated of it in the formal sense; but if created to-be were distinguished from essence by reason alone, without doubt that proposition would be true — as is this one, The Divine Essence is its to-be — although the divine Essence and the Divine To-Be differ in reason. Third, it is proved: for from the opposite opinion it follows that to-be belongs to creatures per se, so that this proposition, man exists, would be per se; but the consequent is false, therefore. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for this proposition is not of perpetual truth, since before the creation of the world it was false. The sequel is proved: for no instance could be brought of a real act that is really and formally the same as something, and yet is not intrinsic to it and does not belong to it per se. Also it is proved by reason. For if the formal account of one thing is formally the same as the formal account of another, it is impossible that those things not have an intrinsic and per se connexion, therefore etc. Last, it is proved. If essence is really the same as existence, it is hard to understand how the Divine Word assumed humanity without a created existence, communicating to it immediately not only personality but also the Divine existence. Which opinion St. Thomas expressly holds, 3. par., q. 17, art. 2, where he proves that in Christ the Lord there is only one Divine To-Be.

Hence let the second conclusion be. Much more probable, and more accommodated to theological matter, is the opinion that to-be is really distinguished from essence as thing from thing. This conclusion seems to be St. Thomas's in the cited passages. And it is proved. For the constitutive mode of the supposit is really distinguished as thing from thing from the supposit itself, as was said in the preceding article; therefore much more is to-be distinguished from essence. The consequence is proved: both because to-be belongs to essence only through the mediation of suppositality — for to-be itself is the proper act of the supposit, as St. Thomas teaches, 3. p., q. 17, art. 2 — and because the constitutive mode of the supposit is more intrinsic to the supposit than to-be. For it is placed in the supposition of the supposit, while to-be is not placed, but only the order to to-be is intrinsic to everything. Second, it is proved. To-be is received from an efficient cause, and depends upon it in becoming and being conserved; but essence per se first belongs to a creature without dependence upon an efficient cause. For it is of perpetual truth that to be man belongs to Peter. But that Peter exists, he has with precedence from an efficient cause; therefore it cannot be the same thing as essence. Third, it is proved. True potency and true act are really distinguished, as matter and form; but essence is true potency in respect of the act of being; therefore they are really distinguished as thing from thing. Fourth, it is proved. If the to-be of a creature were the same thing as the essence of the creature, it would follow that to-be is not really received in essence — for the same thing is not received in itself. But if in truth it be not in essence, to-be received will be unlimited and simply infinite, as God Himself: for to-be cannot be limited through any other act, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt. Indeed this reason effectively proves, against Durandus in 1. Sent., d. 8, that essence is distinguished from to-be at least really and formally. And it is confirmed: for the divine Essence is infinite precisely because it is its to-be really and formally; therefore if the essence of a creature were its to-be, it would not have limited to-be — nor, indeed, received to-be. And finally the conclusion is proved: for if we say so, we better understand the Mystery of the Incarnation — how humanity is drawn not only to the personality of the Word but also to existence, according to the more probable opinion. For it would be unfitting to say that the humanity of Christ is terminated by the Divine existence, and by another created existence.

Nevertheless, let there be a last conclusion. Yet the opinion of Scotus, placed in the second place, and the opinion of Master Soto — which differs little from it — can probably be sustained; and the arguments made against it by the assertors of the third opinion can be dissolved by this example: namely, that as figure actuates quantity and terminates it, and quantity stands as potency to figure — and yet figure and quantity are not distinguished really as thing from thing, but are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing, or really-formally as others say, or are distinguished as thing and mode of thing — just as, if someone twists a rod into a circle, he does not seem to have produced anything wholly distinct from the quantity of the rod, but to have made quantity be otherwise disposed. We, however, follow the opinion of St. Thomas as Capreolus and Cajetan understand it.

TO THE ARGUMENTS posed in the beginning, it is answered. To the first, the sequel is denied: for by parity of reason it would be proved that prime matter can be without form, or that a vital act can be without a vital principle — which we think involves a contradiction. We say therefore that even if two things are distinguished as thing from thing, if yet one of them has an order of intrinsic dependence from the other as to the account of being, it cannot be conserved without it; and since essence in the account of being depends upon to-be received in it, it implies a contradiction that it exist without existence.

To the second it is answered: I deny the sequel. To the objection it is answered that to-be itself, although it is really distinguished from essence, is yet limited by being received in essence. Hence it is not pure act, but has the imperfection of potentiality — not from its own account of existence, but because it is receivable. And in this it differs from uncreated to-be, which is not distinguished from essence.

To the third, the sequel is likewise denied for the same reason.

To the fourth I grant the sequel, but deny the minor. To the proof I grant the major, but deny the minor. Indeed, essence in immaterial things, besides God, stands as potency in respect of to-be itself; and then to the reply — namely, that either essence stands as potency simply or secundum quid — it is answered that the essence of a substance does not stand as pure potency, as prime matter in respect of substantial form; but nevertheless the very essence of a thing, compared to the act of being, stands simply as potency in respect of it. Nor is it unfitting that at once the essence itself intrinsically have its specific formality. For it has an intrinsic order to to-be as to the first and ultimate actuality. There is the example St. Thomas gives in q. unica De anima, art. 6, ad 3, where he says that nothing prevents one form from being compared to another as potency to act. As diaphaneity is compared to light as potency to act, and yet diaphaneity itself is the form of a diaphanous body. So too the essence of an angel, however much it be a subsisting form, yet in respect of to-be itself stands simply as potency — although in itself it have a formality whereby it determines to-be itself in a more perfect mode than material things.

To the fifth I grant the sequel, and deny the minor. To the proof it is answered that the very essence actually is on the side of reality — actuated, however, through existence really distinct from itself, in the way matter and form are really distinguished, and between them there is a real relation.

To the sixth I grant the sequel. Nor is it unfitting that in material things there be one physical composition of matter and form, and another metaphysical one of to-be and essence. Nor does it follow that the composite itself is one per accidens. For the whole physical composition of matter and form stands as potency in the other metaphysical composition of to-be and essence. For to-be itself actuates the whole substance composed of matter and form. For the rest, there is the greatest difference between these two compositions: that the first composition is of intrinsic and essential parts, while the other composition is of the whole essence and an act supervening from without, as a term filling up the dependence of the whole creatable essence from nothing. And so it is not a part of essence, but is received in essence.

IT IS DOUBTED, third. Whether existence is more perfect than the essence whose existence it is.

First, it is argued for the negative side. Man is more perfect in that wherein he is a rational animal than in that wherein he exists; therefore the essence of man is more perfect than his existence. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved. For for man to be a rational animal is necessary and intrinsic and eternal — but for man to exist is something contingent, therefore.

Second. Stone agrees with man in the univocal account of existing, and does not agree with man in the most perfect account of man, namely in the difference of sensible, living, and rational; therefore to-be itself is not more perfect than the specific essence of man.

Third. To live and to understand are greater perfections than to-be: for they add something upon to-be; therefore in man to-be itself is not the greatest perfection. And it is confirmed: for what is more common and more determinable is more imperfect; but to-be is the most common of all and the most determinable — since it is determined by all other perfections, life, wisdom, etc. — therefore. And it is confirmed, second: for as St. Thomas teaches, De Verit., q. 7, art. 6, ad 7, what is more common in predication is more imperfect; but being is more common in predication, therefore it is most imperfect.

Fourth. To-be is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser perfection of the essence in which it is received — e.g. the to-be received in the essence of man is more perfect than that received in the essence of a horse; therefore essence itself is more perfect than to-be. The consequence is proved from that Aristotelian maxim: that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so.

Fifth. The essence of anything whatever is placed in a category per se and directly; but to-be indirectly and reductively by reason of the essence in which it is received; therefore essence is more perfect.

Sixth. Existence is compared to essence as its term, as point to line: but a point is not more perfect than a line; therefore neither is existence more perfect than essence.

Seventh. The most perfect thing in man is that wherein he was made to the image and likeness of God: but man was made to the image and likeness of God in that wherein he is intellective, or of free will, and capable of beatitude — all of which belong to man by reason of his specific essence; therefore this is the most perfect of all things in man.

Eighth. Christ the Lord assumed a most perfect human nature, and yet did not assume its existence; therefore existence does not belong to the perfection of human nature — so far is it from being more perfect than the essence of man.

Finally, it is argued. The primary effect of the substantial form is the specific essence itself, while the secondary effect is to-be itself; therefore the specific essence is more formal and more perfect.

On this doubt, Scot. in 4. Sent., dist. 1, q. 1, teaches that to-be is the most imperfect of all perfections. His sentence is followed by Soncin., 4. Metaph., q. 13, and Ferrar., 1. Contra Gent., cap. 28.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.28 Other modern Thomists intend to proceed by a middle way, asserting that to-be, speaking simply, is the least of all perfections, but secundum quid exceeds all other perfections — namely in that it is the first actuality of all other perfections, inasmuch as through existence the other perfections are outside nothing. And they contend to prove this in some measure from St. Thomas, 1. Contra Gent., c. 28.|summa-contra-gentiles-liber-primus:liber.1/capitulum.28

FOR the decision of the truth let the first conclusion be. Speaking simply, to-be is a greater perfection than the essence whose to-be it is. It is proved first from the authority of St. Denis, c. 5 De divin. nomin., asserting that among all the perfections we have received from God, to-be is something greater. Also Arist., 8. Ethic., c. 11, says that the greatest benefit bestowed upon us by God is that we are. And St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, says To-be is the most perfect of all — where he openly speaks of the to-be of the existence of creatures. Second, it is proved. To-be is the actuality of all perfections and of all forms, and is compared to essence as act to potency — a doctrine most frequent in St. Thomas. See in particular, in question 4 of this First Part, art. 1, ad tertium, where he expressly says that to-be itself is the most perfect of all, and that it is compared to all things as act, and that it is not compared to other things as receiver to received, but is rather received to receiver: therefore it receives no perfection from conjunction with essence. See also St. Thomas, De Verit., quaest. 8, art. 4. Third, it is proved. As long as an essence does not have to-be, it is not being simply, but is being in potency; but when it has to-be, it is already being simply; therefore to-be is more perfect than essence. Fourth, it is proved. In God Himself, what we principally understand is not that He is life, wisdom, or power, but that He is to-be itself subsisting, in whom all other perfections are understood — in that it is to-be not received, and consequently not limited; therefore to-be is not perfected by being received in an essence. The consequence is proved: for its greatest formality is depressed and limited by being received in an essence. And finally it is proved: to the most perfect cause there corresponds as proper a most perfect effect; but the proper effect of God is the to-be of creatures, whose terminus a quo is non-being; therefore that effect is most perfect. And it is confirmed: for all things most of all desire to-be; therefore it is the best of all.

The second conclusion. Secundum quid, an essence receiving to-be can be called more perfect than it, inasmuch as it limits to a determinate species. This conclusion could be proved by the arguments made for the negative side. But yet this conclusion can be verified only very secundum quid. And the reason is that for to-be itself it were better not to be received nor limited — for if it were not received, it would contain every formality of all species. Hence as a form is not perfected simply by being received in matter, so neither does to-be itself acquire perfection by being received in an essence. It is true, however, that on the supposition that to-be itself must be limitable and receivable, it is in some measure perfected by being received in a more perfect essence than in a less perfect one — which we would more properly say thus: it is less depressed and (so to speak) less imperfected by being received in a living thing than in a non-living one, and in an angel than in a man.

AD ARGUMENTA IN OPPOSITUM. — To the arguments in opposition, it is answered.

To the first it is said that no perfection belongs to man, even that he be a rational animal, unless an intrinsic order to to-be is understood in it, as of potency to act. Hence I deny the antecedent. For in saying that a man exists, we understand that the rational animal is perfected by existence, not that existence is perfected by the rational animal. To the proof of the antecedent it is answered that all that necessity and eternity of truth belongs to man as he is in God, and not as he is something created. But now we compare a created essence with created to-be, and we say that to-be itself is more perfect, since it is the account by which the essence is outside nothing. For before a man exists, he is actually nothing in himself, but is only in his cause as in an efficient and exemplary principle.

To the second it is answered that although, according to the generic account of substance, a stone exists equally with a man, nevertheless the to-be itself of a man is much more perfect than the to-be of a stone: not because it is perfected by the essence of man, but because it is less depressed by the essence of man than by the essence of a stone.

To the third it is answered that if living and understanding did not include to-be, they would not be greater perfections than to-be; but nevertheless, because they include and receive to-be itself, they are greater perfections than the to-be which lacks life and understanding: yet they would not be greater perfections than to-be if to-be were not received in them. To the first confirmation it is answered that what is more common and more determinable is more imperfect when its commonness and indifference stands as matter and as a potency receiving something else; but to-be itself is most common in formality, and is not determinable as receiving something, but as received in all things: and therefore the consequence is worth nothing. It is answered secondly, with St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 20, art. 2, ad 3, and with St. Dionysius, ch. 5 of On the Divine Names, that if living and to-be are considered separately, so that the one does not enter the account of the other, then to-be is a greater perfection than living. But if living includes to-be, it is no wonder that it is a greater perfection than the to-be which is received in a non-living thing. To the second confirmation it is answered that the common by predication, which is determinable as potency by act, is imperfect; but to-be itself, we have already said, is not determined as potency by act.

To the fourth it is answered that to-be is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser perfection of the essence in which it is received, not as on account of a formal cause, but rather on account of a material one, more or less imperfect. As if you were to say that gold is more or less perfect on account of the greater or lesser admixture of another metal; but it would be most perfect and purest if it had the admixture of no metal. To the Aristotelian maxim, however, it is answered that for its verification it is required that the positive term be verified of both extremes, and again that, because the one is such, the other be such, which has no place in the present case. For this causal proposition is false, to-be is perfect and the essence is perfect, and because the essence is perfect, to-be itself is perfect: nay rather, to-be is not perfected by the essence except in a qualified sense, as we explained in the second conclusion.

To the fifth the answer is clear from what was said in the preceding first doubt, in the sixth conclusion, where we said that the reduction of to-be itself, which actuates substance, to the predicament of substance is not as of the imperfect to the perfect, but as of actuality to potency.

To the sixth it is answered that existence is not compared to essence as a point to a line as regards all things, but as regards this: that the point completes the line and is not a part of the line. Moreover, existence so terminates the essence that in the account of being it is more perfect; but a point in the account of quantity is not more perfect.

To the seventh it is said that the matter stands thus: that the most perfect thing in man is that in which he was made to the image of God. But I ask you, how was he made so, unless by receiving a to-be less limited than the beasts', but received in a rational nature? Otherwise he would be nothing. We therefore deny the consequence of the argument, since the essence of man is not being compared as it is co-distinguished against to-be.

To the eighth the major and the minor are granted. To the consequence, however, when it is inferred, therefore existence does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, I distinguish the consequent. To quidditative perfection, I say, I grant the consequence. But to the completive perfection of human nature, first and per se, by which it is formally brought out of nothing, I deny the consequence. Yet the human nature in Christ the Lord has this perfection from elsewhere than from an existence proper to itself, in that the human nature in Christ the Lord was drawn to the infinite existence of the Word, which supplies the place of a proper existence as regards the account of terminating. Which account we said in the first doubt to be the most formal.

To the last we shall speak in the following doubt. Meanwhile, however, I wholly deny that the to-be of existence is a formal effect, neither primary nor secondary, of the substantial form itself, so that it flow from it into itself; but every form is compared to to-be as transparency is to light. But of all these things more amply in the following doubt.

IT IS DOUBTED fourth, whether the to-be of existence which is in all creatures is caused by God. This question, on account of its very great difficulty and the varied opinions of the learned, it pleases us to dispute on both sides. And first it must be noted that we are at present speaking of the to-be of generable and corruptible things. For that the to-be of ingenerable and incorruptible things, as the to-be of an angel, the to-be of the rational soul, the to-be of the heaven, is produced by God alone, is certain according to faith. Furthermore, in this question we intend to explain the dependence of existence on particular causes and on the form of the supposit whose to-be it is. For the opinion of philosophers is divided: for some concede that particular causes simply produce to-be in the effect, yet do not attribute this to the form of the effect itself. Others, on the contrary, admit that to-be flows from the form as from an efficient and formal cause, but not from second causes. In order, therefore, to explain what is to be held on this point, we shall treat of all the causes on which to-be depends.

It is argued therefore first for the negative side, and it is proved that the to-be of existence is not the effect of God alone. For St. Thomas very often attributes it to creatures: On Power, q. 7, art. 2, in the body, where he says that all causes agree in this, that they cause to-be; and in 1. p., q. 42, art. 1, ad 1, he says, The first effect of the form is to-be; and q. 50, art. 5, and q. 90, art. 2, ad 1; On Truth, q. 21, art. 6. In which places he says that to-be follows the form. There is a notable passage in 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 54, where he says that as light stands to the luminous, and whiteness to the white, so the form stands to to-be. Some are also accustomed to argue from St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 3, art. 4, in the body, where he says that it is impossible that to-be be caused only by the essential principles of a thing. From which passage, in expounding that exclusive particle, St. Thomas seems to suppose that to-be is in some way caused by the form. For it is resolved thus: to-be is caused by intrinsic principles, and by something else.

Secondly it is argued by reason. When a horse produces a horse, it truly generates it; therefore it produces its to-be effectively. The antecedent is clear, and the consequence is proved: for to generate is to give to-be. And thus generation is commonly defined by Aristotle and the Doctors as the change by which the to-be of a thing is acquired in a disposed subject. Nay rather, all admit that the formal term of generation is the to-be of the thing. It is confirmed: the horse effectively gives to the horse generated both living and sensing; therefore it also effectively causes its to-be. The antecedent is known, and the consequence is proved from parity of reason. For he who effectively causes the lower degrees, say living and sensing, will also cause the higher degree, such as being. But if perchance you say that this argument proves only that, just as the generating horse produces this living thing, this sensible thing, so it also produces this being, from which it does not follow that it produces existence, against this it is urged: for being formally says to-be; therefore if it effectively gives the degree of being, it will also effectively produce to-be; just as what effectively causes the living thing effectively causes life.

Third. Creatures conserve the to-be of other creatures together with God; therefore they also effect that very thing. The antecedent is certain; on this see St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 104, art. 1, ad 2. The consequence is proved: for no more is required for production than for conservation. Nay, St. Thomas repeatedly reckons the action by which a thing is conserved and that by which it is created to be the same, and that it belongs to the same cause to conserve and to produce to-be.

Fourth. A particular cause is constituted in the account of agent through existence; therefore through that same existence it produces existence in the effect. The antecedent is proved: for an efficient cause operates according as it is in act, as is clear from Aristotle and the philosophers. But a cause is formally in act through existence; for the essence of a cause is compared to existence as potency to the ultimate act. The consequence is proved: for what is the act and form of a cause is for it a principle of operating. And it is confirmed: for an agent produces something like itself; therefore if it is an agent according as it is in act through existence, it produces the effect according as the effect itself is existing, and consequently it also produces to-be.

Fifth. The degree of being is prior to the others which are found in the produced effect; therefore what a particular cause first attains is to-be. The antecedent is clear: for the degree of being is prior and more common; and what is more universal and more common is prior. The consequence is proved: for a cause cannot attain a lower or later degree except by first attaining a higher degree, especially since these are essentially subordinate.

Sixth, it is argued specially concerning the form, that it is a principle of being. For it is the common saying of almost all the Metaphysicians that existence is a secondary effect of the form. Which the Theologians admit, saying that God can supply the place of the form in causing existence. And they hold that this was done in the mystery of the Incarnation: nay, they assert that if Christ were to abandon the humanity, a proper to-be would immediately flow forth from the natural form; therefore to-be is an effect of the form.

Seventh. Existence is the substantial act of the supposit; therefore it is caused by the form of the same supposit. The consequence is proved: for what is substantial to a thing ought not to come wholly from without, but is either the form or is caused by the intrinsic principles of the thing. It is confirmed: for it would follow that accidents would be more intrinsic and more conjoined to the supposit than substantial existence, which is absurd. The sequel is proved: for accidents are caused by the form, mediately or immediately; but to-be, as these men hold, comes from outside.

Eighth. This proposition, an angel exists, is necessary and per se, and, by hypothesis, demonstrable; therefore existence is compared to a subsistent form such as an angel as an intrinsic property flowing from it. The consequence is proved: for nothing can be intrinsically connected with a form unless it follows upon it. It is confirmed: for St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 54, art. 2, ad 2, says that the essence of an angel is the account of its whole to-be.

Ninth. For it would follow that the existence of accidents also is not caused by the essence of the subject, but is immediately produced by God. The consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is clear: for by the same reasoning by which you hold that God causes substantial existence by himself alone, we shall say that accidental existence is produced by God alone. The minor is proved: for then it would follow that the to-be of accidents would not per se depend on the substance, nor would it express an intrinsic dependence on the essence of the supposit. The sequel is proved: for according to you that existence is produced by God alone just like substantial existence; therefore of its own nature it depends on God alone.

Lastly it is argued and proved that it is not from God alone. For it would follow that existence is created. The consequent is false, therefore. The minor is clear: for it seems unfitting that in every production which now is and will be, God should produce something anew. And the sequel is clear: for those things are created which are produced immediately by God alone.

In this question Scotus, in 4, d. 1, q. 1, holds that particular agents simply produce the existence of things. And he refutes St. Thomas for saying that existence is the effect of God alone. And Scotus is frequently followed by authors, especially the more recent. Among the Thomists, however, Ferrariensis, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, establishes this sole difference between God and second causes in the production of to-be: that God simply and without addition causes the existence of things, whereas creatures do not cause it absolutely, but determinately. And in ch. 54 he says that existence is the formal effect of the form, which he explains more expressly in ch. 55. Capreolus, however, in 1, dist. 8, q. 1, at the third of Henry and at the third of Gerard against the first conclusion, says that existence is only from the form, because it is the form that makes the subject capable of existing. And Gerard follows him.

FOR the decision of the truth, let the first conclusion be: Particular causes simply give to-be to their effects, each in its own way: as fire generating fire makes it to be fire, and what heats makes it to be hot. This conclusion is proved first by the authority of all, both Philosophers and Theologians, who very often presuppose this conclusion as a first principle. Secondly it is proved by reason: for a particular cause leads the effect out from potency to act simply; therefore it gives to-be and actuality to the effect. The antecedent is clear: for this is to cause simply, namely to reduce to the act of being that which was in potency. It is confirmed: for corrupting causes, as when fire corrupts air, are said simply to destroy the singular to-be of a pre-existing supposit insofar as it was the act of the supposit; for example, when an agent corrupts Peter, although the same to-be that was Peter's remains in the soul, nevertheless the corrupting agent causes Peter not to be; therefore generating causes are said simply to give to-be to the things generated. Thirdly it is proved: particular causes, on any view, bring it about that to-be is conjoined to the essence of the supposit; therefore they simply give to-be to the effect. The consequence is proved: for a cause is said simply to make such a thing either when it produces the form by which the thing is, as when a horse generates a horse, or when it conjoins a form to a subject, as if someone were to unite a pre-existing whiteness to a wall and so make it simply white; therefore if particular causes conjoin existence, which is the form of being, to the essences of supposits, they are said simply to give to-be to the things produced. And it is confirmed: for it seems absurd to deny that my father conferred to-be on me. And the argument made at the beginning of the doubt from the second point sufficiently proves this conclusion.

The second conclusion: Nevertheless creatures do not cause existence simply and as principal causes in their effects. This conclusion is proved first: for any creature whatsoever in its operation presupposes to-be; therefore it does not cause it simply. The antecedent is clear, first, because no creature can operate out of non-being. And furthermore, because every creature presupposes a subject which it physically attains. On which see Aristotle and the authors, book 1 On Generation, text. comm. 11, and St. Thomas, 1. p., q. 45, last art., ad ult., and q. 44, ad 1. But if you reply that this argument proves only that a creature does not produce that to-be which it presupposes, which is rather corrupted, yet it does produce the to-be which follows in the effect generated: on the contrary: for production and absolute causality is when something from being non-such becomes such. For the white is not produced from the white, but from the non-white; and when a man generates a man, he produces from a non-man, because it is production simply. On which principle see Aristotle, at the place cited above, and 5 Physics, text. commen. 6 and 7, and the authors there when they treat of the species of motion. Therefore similarly in the present case, for creatures to be called causes of existence simply and absolutely, they would have to produce existence out of non-existence, which is impossible. Which conclusion will also be clear from what we shall say in the last conclusion. But if you argue: for creatures, according to the first conclusion, simply give to-be and produce the to-be of the whole, therefore they simply cause existence: the consequence is denied: for, as is clear from what has been said, for them to be said to give to-be, it is not required that they produce the form of being. For in the production of a man the generator gives to-be to the man generated, although he does not produce his soul.

The third conclusion: Particular causes do not produce existence, properly speaking, as an instrument. This is set down against certain authors who, holding with us in the second conclusion, assert that a certain transient power is impressed on creatures by God so that they produce the existence of their effects: namely, through this, that existence is communicated to them by God. Nevertheless the conclusion is proved: because this power is posited arbitrarily. And furthermore, because it seems absurd that a particular cause in causing, with respect to the same total effect, have both the account of principal cause and the account of instrumental cause, namely since in the effect produced something is caused simply by a second cause, and something is caused by the same cause as assumed by God.

The fourth conclusion: Particular causes effectively cause the determination of existence. But that you may understand this conclusion, note that existence has two things. First, that it be the act of a being absolutely, according to which account it expresses no limitation. Second, that it be the existence of this supposit received in it, according to which it is now made this one and is limited; and this limitation belongs to existence as it is received in a particular essence. For, as St. Thomas often teaches, what is received must be limited by the receiving subject. We say, therefore, in the conclusion, that a particular agent concurs as a particular efficient cause of this limitation. It is proved first: for this limitation is not from God alone; therefore it is from some particular efficient cause; but this efficient cause is not the essence which receives existence, as is manifest; therefore it will be the cause itself producing the supposit. Furthermore, the agent cause disposes the supposit that it become apt to receive existence; therefore it effectively determines the supposit to exist. The antecedent is clear: for whatever particular thing the supposit has in order to existence, it has from the agent cause. And the consequence is proved: for that very thing by which the supposit is receptive of existence is determinative of it; therefore if it is the efficient cause of that, it also effectively determines existence. From this conclusion, thus explained, you will understand many passages of St. Thomas. For he often says that creatures do not cause being, but this being. And although he often asserts this, yet for example's sake see him in Disputations On Power, q. 3, art. 1, in the body, where he says that any thing whatsoever has an act determined to one genus and to one species; and hence it is that none of them is productive of being as it is being, but of this being as it is this being determined in this or that species. And he adds the reason for this: for an agent acts upon its like; and therefore a natural agent does not produce being simply, but being pre-existing and determined to this or that, for instance to the species of fire, or to whiteness, or to something of the kind. He asserts moreover that God produces to-be, but creatures determine it. And elsewhere you will find that he said that creatures produce this to-be in particular. All these things, therefore, are explained and understood of the limitation already stated in the conclusion, through which the effect is this being and has a determined and limited to-be. So much for agents; concerning forms, however, it follows,

The fifth conclusion: No created form is an efficient, formal, or final cause of existence, yet it is well a material cause. This conclusion is proved in detail, and first that it is not effective. An efficient cause operates according as it is in act through existence; therefore if a form does anything, it causes it insofar as it is actuated by to-be. The antecedent is certain, and a principle presupposed in Aristotle. And it is explained: for a cause not actuated through existence is only in potency; therefore it cannot bestow act on the effect unless it be considered as under a like act. And it is confirmed: for otherwise the same thing, according to its whole self, would reduce itself from potency into act, which is against Aristotle, 3 and 8 Physics, and 12 Metaphysics. The sequel is proved: for a form per se, before it is under existence, effectively causes its own act. Furthermore: existence first belongs to the whole composite, and then is communicated to the parts; therefore it does not flow effectively from the form. The antecedent is certain, of which, God willing, we shall speak in 1 On Generation. And the consequence is proved: for if it proceeds effectively and immediately from the form, it would be united to and communicated to it before any other thing. On this reasoning see M. Soto, 1 Physics, q. 7, conclusion 2, at the end; and Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 22. Furthermore the conclusion is proved: for it would follow that the form causes itself, which is absurd. The sequel is proved: for if a form effectively causes its own existence, then it makes itself exist and reduces itself from potency into act, and consequently causes itself. See other reasons in St. Thomas, 1 Against the Gentiles, t. c. 22; On Being and Essence, ch. 5 at the end. But that it is not a formal cause is proved: for the form is compared to existence as potency to act and as the receiving to the received; therefore not in the account of form. Then, every existence is the actuality of any form whatsoever; therefore it is the form of every form and not conversely. Moreover it is proved: for it is impossible to explain in what and under what account the essence informs or actuates existence. Finally it is argued: for it would follow that the form of a being would not be to-be itself, or an order to to-be, which is false. The sequel is proved: for that is the form of a being which ultimately terminates and constitutes the thing; therefore if the essence is compared to existence as its form, it will be actuating and ultimately terminating it, and in consequence the essence would be the ultimate act of the being. But if you argue: for the form specifies to-be, therefore it is compared to it in the genus of formal cause: the antecedent is clear: for human to-be is distinguished in species from the to-be of a horse by the form of man, which differs in species from the form of a horse. It is answered that to-be formally and intrinsically takes its specification from the transcendental order which it expresses in the account of act to such a form; but extrinsically, as from a term and subject, it is specified by the form. Moreover, according to this reasoning the form rather has the account of matter: just as the form of the heaven is said to be specified by the matter which is filled by it; and artificial things are said to be specified by the subject. The third part of the conclusion, namely that the form is not the final cause of existence, is proved: for existence is simply the term of the form and not conversely; therefore existence is rather the end of the form than the converse. Secondly: because existence is the ultimate perfection of a thing; therefore the form is not compared to it as an end. The antecedent is proved: for each thing is called good and perfect insofar as it exists. Hence Aristotle, 10 Ethics, ch. 7, and 8 Ethics, ch. 11, says that to-be itself is lovable and desirable in all things. And the truth of this reasoning will be clear below in q. 6. But that the form is the material cause of existence is clear from what has been said, since it is receptive and limiting of the very to-be of existence. And so, just as matter with respect to form has the account of material cause, because it receives and determines the form, so both matter and form, and also the supposit, are compared to existence as a material cause. But nevertheless,

Let the sixth conclusion be: The form, in the genus of formal cause, determines matter to receive existence. It is proved: for the form provides the first act to matter; therefore in the account of form it disposes it to receive the act of existence. Secondly it is proved: for this limitation and adaptation of the subject, which is required for existence to be received, must have some intrinsic form from which it is; but there is no other than the form of the supposit; therefore. Note, however, that the form is called a formal cause disposing to existence, not indeed an immediate one, although a principal one. For besides the form we posit suppositality, by which the supposit is proximately and immediately capable of this existence.

The last conclusion: Existence is the proper effect of God alone. This conclusion is St. Thomas's in this 1. p., q. 8, art. 1, in the body; and q. 45, art. 5; and 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, and book 3, ch. 66, and often elsewhere. Nor is there any Thomist who doubts that this is St. Thomas's conclusion. Moreover, as to his mind, and what the sense of it is, there is doubt among the doctors. Cajetan, in 1. p., at the places cited above, says that this conclusion is set down by St. Thomas only in this sense: that to-be is an effect that per se and primarily depends on God alone; from which it does not follow that creatures do not produce it as second causes. The same manner of speaking is followed by Ferrariensis, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 21, and book 3, at the place cited above. Others of the Thomists say that the sense of the said conclusion, as set down by St. Thomas, is that existence is the formal and adequate object of God alone, since God alone is the cause of whatever participates in to-be, and of whatever pertains to the to-be of a thing, which belongs to no creature. Others, however, say that the sense of St. Thomas is that God alone produces being insofar as it is being, and to-be without any limitation. But we prefer to understand St. Thomas's conclusion as it lies, rather than to follow the pleasing interpretations of expositors or to comment anew. For the aforesaid three senses do not explain what St. Thomas intends, who among all authors everywhere attributes this peculiarly to God and proves it by the most profound reasons, nor would he need them if he intended any of the aforesaid senses. For all those are conceded by all without controversy, nor do they retain any mystery. We say, therefore, that no cause produces to-be effectively besides God himself. And, using St. Thomas's reasons, this conclusion is proved first: God alone is his own to-be through his essence, whereas other creatures have a participated to-be; therefore God alone is he who produces to-be. That you may understand the force of this reasoning, note that to have something by participation occurs in two ways: first, because it is communicated by another. In this way, whatever belongs to a creature is participated from God: for all that we are, we are the Lord's. And in this acceptance it well stands that something be essential to a thing and yet participated from another. Wherefore St. Thomas's inference does not proceed in this sense. In a second way something is said to be participated, because it is not proper to the subject, but comes wholly from without, from the producer and conserver, as light in a transparent body. Secondly note that the power of causing presupposes the nature and essence of the thing. For something is first in itself such before it is productive of its like. But each thing is said to be of such a nature from its proper form, and from that which belongs to it per se. And consequently it will be called causative of its like because it belongs to it from its proper form and nature; for example, water from its essence has it that it be water. And this, to produce its like, and to cool, belongs to it per se, because it has them from its proper form. Nevertheless, just as it is not per se hot, so it does not per se have the power to heat, but as an instrument of what is per se hot. These things being posited, the force of St. Thomas's reasoning is gathered thus: no creature has to-be of itself and from its own nature, but it is communicated and conserved by God; therefore no creature is per se the cause of existence, either in common or in particular, but it is from God alone. The antecedent is most certain and to be held according to faith, and according to philosophy. And the consequence is proved: for the power causative of existence presupposes to-be itself in the agent cause; therefore if the to-be of the cause itself comes and is communicated from without, it does not have per se an operative power of existence, unless you wish to say that it has it as an instrument, which we refuted above. God alone, therefore, whose existence is of his essence, has the power of making and conserving the same existence in creatures. Secondly the conclusion is proved: every creature in its action presupposes something produced by God alone; therefore it presupposes its to-be. The antecedent is proved: for every creature produces from something; therefore it presupposes that, and in consequence something produced by God alone. And it is confirmed: for otherwise there is no efficacious cause why we should deny that the power of creating can be communicated to creatures. For if they in their operations presuppose nothing depending on God alone, then they will be able to operate with nothing presupposed. Thirdly the same thing is demonstrated, and the preceding reasoning is further explained: for prime matter is incorruptible and ingenerable, and is conserved by God alone; therefore God alone gives the existence which is communicated to prime matter. The antecedent is certain, and the consequence is proved: for it cannot be understood how matter is not generated, or how it is conserved by God alone, if he alone does not give existence. For if particular causes effectively give existence to matter, they would consequently produce it and conserve it. But if you say that this argument proves that even with respect to God prime matter is corrupted and produced anew, inasmuch as one to-be is destroyed and another is produced anew by which matter exists: it is answered by denying the sequel: for the term of the divine action is only to-be, which is never lacking to matter. Particular causes, however, determine this to-be into which it is changed. Hence the reasoning has force with respect to particular causes, if they produce this existence and destroy the past one. It is confirmed: we cannot explain that God is the cause of the whole of being in any other way than because he alone causes the to-be of both form and matter and of the whole; or, if creatures effect this very thing, they will be said also to be causes of the whole of being, which St. Thomas never asserts. And we omit other reasons, which you can gather passim from St. Thomas's doctrine. In sum, therefore, we say that particular causes have only this, to dispose and determine the subject, that it be apt to receive existence, through the form. But God is he who causes it from without. Let there be an example suited enough, which St. Thomas often uses when he speaks of the to-be and essence of creatures. For he compares the essence to a transparent body, and existence to the light which actuates the transparent body, for example the air, from whose essence or transparency the light does not flow, but the transparent body is only in potency, by reason of its transparency, to receive the light. Now therefore, when a natural agent, in the sight of the sun illuminating the air, corrupts the air and from it generates water, which in the same instant of generation is illuminated by the same sun that was illuminating the air, no one will say that that natural agent by its action effected the light, or was per se the cause of the luminous, but rather we shall say that that light, in the genus of efficient cause and as regards its coming-to-be and being conserved, depends on the sun; and nevertheless the singular light which was before in the air ceases to be at the corruption of the singular subject, and another singular light begins to be with the singular water generated. Of which singularity and individuation of the water the natural agent was the efficient cause, and consequently it effects that the light which would be produced by the sun be this light with a dependence on this numbered subject. Behold, then, how existence stands, which begins or ceases with the thing generated or corrupted by a natural agent. For it is certain that the same existence does not remain in the thing generated which was in the thing corrupted. And nevertheless the generator will not be said to generate or to effect existence, just as, in the example, the natural agent is not said to produce light in the water. But nevertheless it will be verified that the generator of this singular substance is consequently an efficient cause of the determination of existence, that it be this one, because it is received in this subject. Moreover, the account of existence itself proceeds from no other source as from an efficient cause than from God, who exists through his essence. I confess that I do not know what the reason is why this doctrine is not understood by very many men, even most learned ones, who profess the doctrine of St. Thomas, since in St. Thomas there are such manifest testimonies of this truth, and the very account of existence demands this. For as in 1. p., q. 4, art. 1, ad 3, St. Thomas teaches, to-be itself is the most perfect of all things; and the same he says more expressly in q. 7 of On Power, art. 2, ad 9, for it is compared to all things as act. For nothing has actuality except insofar as it is; whence to-be itself is the actuality of all things and even of forms. Hence, he says, it is not compared to other things as the receiving to the received, but rather as the received to the receiving. So he. Whence, in my judgment, it is most openly gathered that God himself alone can be the efficient cause from which the to-be of existence flows. For if from some form of a thing to-be itself were understood to flow as from a formal principle, as to be white flows from whiteness, or to be capable of laughter flows from the rational as from a root, it will not be verified that to-be itself is the first actuality of all things, even of forms; since that from which to-be itself flows, whether in the genus of formal or of radical cause, is already pre-understood to have an actuality not depending on existence in the genus of formal cause, since existence itself flows from it as from a formal or radical principle. But what they say, that the to-be of existence is a secondary effect of the substantial form, implies a contradiction with this: that existence is the first actuality of all things and forms. For if another primary and formal effect of the substantial form is pre-understood, then existence, if it is a secondary effect of the substantial form, will not be the first actuality of all things, even of forms. It implies, therefore, that the substantial form be understood to have some formal effect without its being first pre-understood as actuated by the first actuality, which is existence. But if those who think the opposite would attentively consider these things, perhaps they would render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's: who, since he is the first being, whose essence is to-be itself not received nor limited, is himself alone the efficient cause of the whole of to-be received and limited by him in whom it is received in the genus of material cause, even if that which receives to-be itself is otherwise a substantial form with respect to matter or with respect to the composite. Which can appear most of all in the rational soul, unless someone wishes to close his eyes. For when a man is generated, we all understand that there all things are found completely which are necessary for the generation of a singular substance, no less, nay much more perfectly, than in the generation of a horse. We also admit that in the generation of Peter the form is not educed from the potency of matter; for this is required only on account of the imperfection of the term of generation. Hence it is necessary that in the generation of Peter the form itself be from no other efficient cause than from God creating the soul out of nothing: whose existence flows from God alone and is received in the soul as in a subject from which it does not flow, but is its first actuality. From which it is plainly gathered that when John generates Peter, he cannot be called the efficient cause of the existence which is in Peter, even as regards its singularity. For this singular existence of this soul is communicated to the soul through creation out of nothing. Therefore the consequence which adversaries are accustomed to make is not good: fire generates fire, therefore it is the cause of the existence of fire. Nor does this consequence hold: the generator is the efficient cause that Peter exist, therefore it is the cause of his existence. For the antecedent is verified only by this, that the generator efficiently disposes the matter to the union of the soul with the body, whence it arises that Peter exists, by this, that the existence of the soul is communicated both to the matter and to the supposit, for which it is not required that it be the cause of that existence. And by this doctrine it will be easy to answer the arguments to the contrary.

To the first argument, which is taken from the testimonies of St. Thomas, it is answered that to those we oppose other testimonies of St. Thomas, in which he asserts much more openly that to-be itself is the proper effect of God alone. Thus he says in express words in On Power, q. 7, art. 2, saying: «It is necessary, therefore, that there be some cause higher than all things, by whose power all things cause to-be, and that the to-be of it, that is, of that first cause, be its proper effect». And in this 1. p., q. 8, art. 1, showing how God is intimately in all things, he says that created to-be is his proper effect, which he causes in things not only when they first begin to be, but also as long as they are conserved in being, as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the illuminated air remains. And since this to-be, he says, is the most intimate to each thing and what is most deeply present, since it is formal with respect to all things that are in a thing, it is necessary that God be in all things, and intimately. See also q. 45, art. 5, where he expressly affirms the same. And in book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 66, he teaches the same. Moreover, the testimonies that were brought to the contrary all have one solution. For whenever St. Thomas says that it is common to all causes, namely efficient ones, to cause to-be, it is to be understood insofar as they determine to-be itself to a supposit or to a nature. Which assuredly they do in no other way than by effectively disposing the subject in which to-be is received. And this is what he says in book 3 Against the Gentiles, ch. 66, in the fifth reason: that all things other than God act upon to-be itself as it were particularizing and determining the action of the first agent, that is, the effect of the first agent. And he says that they act as their proper effects the other perfections which determine to-be. To those testimonies in particular, however, in which it is said that to-be follows the form, and that as light stands to the luminous, so the form stands to to-be, it is answered, from the same St. Thomas, 2 Against the Gentiles, ch. 54, cited: where he says that to-be itself is compared even to the form itself as act. From which it is plainly gathered how to-be itself follows the form. For it follows it as act follows the last disposition of the subject. For although the form itself is compared to the essence of the thing as a formal principle, nevertheless with respect to existence it has the account of potency and of the receptive by which the supposit has to-be, as St. Thomas elegantly discusses in the same place where he says: «For by this, in things composed of matter and form, the form is called a principle of being, because it is the complement of the substance, whose act is to-be itself». And he brings an example: as the transparent body is to the air a principle of shining, because it makes it the proper subject of light. From this doctrine what he had said a little earlier is easily understood. For St. Thomas intended in that chapter to show that substance alone has to-be as that which is; and that the composition from matter and form is not the same as that from substance and to-be. Hence in the third reason he shows that the form itself is neither to-be itself, nor has to-be as that which is, but as that by which the substance is. And as to this he says that it stands as light to the luminous, and whiteness to being white: namely, that as whiteness is not white, nor light luminous, so the substantial form is not to-be itself, but that by which something is. Nevertheless there is a very great difference, which he himself immediately explains. For to be luminous, or to be white, is not the act of light itself, that is, actuating light, or of whiteness itself; but to-be itself actuates the substantial form. And this is what he says: «Then, because to-be itself is compared even to the form itself as act. For by this, in things composed of matter and form, it is called a principle of being, because it is the complement of the substance, whose act is to-be itself; as the transparent body is to the air a principle of shining». So he. When, therefore, you read in St. Thomas that the form is that by which something is, read the aforesaid testimony, and you will understand in what way the form is a cause of being: certainly as transparency is the cause of the luminous, because it is that by which a luminous body receives light.

To the second the solution will now be easy from the foregoing. For we grant that when a horse generates a horse it effectively produces the horse in being. And it effectively determines to-be itself to the to-be of a horse. Yet I shall never grant that the efficiency of a particular cause reaches existence absolutely, but only as regards its determination to this species and to this individual, by effectively limiting it, just as the subject itself materially limits it. Moreover, God himself by his efficiency reaches all things, insofar as to-be itself is his proper effect, which actuates and perfects all things. To the confirmation the consequence is denied. And to the proof it is answered that when a higher degree is contained essentially in a lower one, perhaps it will be verified that he who effectively causes the lower degree also effectively causes the higher degree. But nevertheless to-be itself, as we have often said, is not contained quidditatively in any degree of a creature. Moreover, the solution assigned in the same place is good. And to the rejoinder it is answered that being, according as it is predicated essentially, formally imports an order to to-be. Hence it is not necessary that he who produces this being in the singular produce its existence, as is clear. For he who generates Peter, although he effects this being, does not thereby effect its existence.

To the third it is answered that no creature conserves the to-be of another creature, absolutely speaking, but only insofar as it conserves the determination and limitation of that to-be. For in this way the influences of the heavens conserve a man in being and living, by conserving the necessary disposition of the body and of the individual. But to the testimony of St. Thomas brought in the same place, it is answered that we can bring nothing more convenient for our position than what St. Thomas teaches in that article, which, if it were read attentively by the Thomists, they would never think the opposite of our position. Where, among many other things, he teaches that every creature is related to God as the air to the illuminating sun; and because light has no root in the air, the light immediately ceases when the action of the sun ceases: so, he says, every creature is a being by participation, but God alone is a being through essence. And immediately, in the solution to the first, he says in the same place that to-be per se follows the form of the creature, with the influx of God presupposed; as light follows the transparency of the air, with the influx of the sun presupposed. Let those note these things who say that to-be itself flows from the form as from a root; and let them see how alien their doctrine is from St. Thomas.

To the fourth some say that the existence of a particular cause stands only as a condition necessary for acting to the particular cause itself. But in my judgment they are mistaken. For the existence of a particular cause is the first actuality of every agent form and, as it were, the foundation of all the activity of the form. Yet it must be noted that just as existence itself is received in forms and is limited by them, so it concurs to their effect as regards the limitation of the effect's existence, not as regards existence simply. And by this the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the fifth the consequence is denied. Nay rather, the opposite follows: for from the fact that the degree of being is first, it must be attributed to the first Cause; with whose influx presupposed, a particular cause concurs to the determination and particularization of the effect of this species.

To the sixth the answer is now clear from what has been said. Nor are those to be reckoned good Metaphysicians who say that the existence of a thing is a formal effect, albeit secondary, of the substantial form. But it must only be asserted that to-be follows the form as light follows transparency, and that its cause is material, as the immediate disposition for receiving light.

To the seventh the answer is clear from what was said in the first doubt. For we deny that existence is the substantial act of the supposit, as something of the essence or the quiddity of the supposit. But it can be called a substantial act, that is, one first actuating the substance in the account of form; as light is the act of the transparent body, by reason of its transparency. To the confirmation the sequel is denied: for accidents are not caused by the form unless the actuality of existence is presupposed, which is immediately received in the form, although it has no root in the form. Nevertheless that existence itself, limited by the form, is the root of such accidents as flow from the existing form. To the eighth it is denied that this proposition, an angel exists, is simply necessary; but it is only physically necessary, from the supposition made that an angel has once been created or produced by God. But it must be observed that the necessity of these things, the heaven exists, an angel exists, does not arise from their intrinsic account per se and primarily, as the risible arises from the intrinsic account of man; otherwise an angel exists would be of eternal truth, like this, man is capable of laughter; but they are called necessary because, after they have once received to-be from God, they are conserved by him alone; nor is there in the whole of nature any extrinsic or intrinsic cause of those things by which they would cease to be. But God alone, who is outside the whole order of the universe, can annihilate such things: because they are freely conserved, as they were freely created. To the confirmation it is answered that below, on the same passage of St. Thomas, it will be explained how it is to be understood that the essence of an angel itself is the account of its whole to-be. See the solution there.

To the ninth the sequel is denied: for the existence of accidents is not existence simply, but existence in another. Hence it is not unfitting that it flow from a substance already existing, especially since there flows the existence of accidents, determined to the species and individuation of the accident.

To the last the sequel is denied: for existence is not that which has to-be, but that by which something is. Hence to be created belongs only to what exists per se, and to that which receives to-be out of nothing. Moreover, when after creation something is produced anew through the corruption of another, that thing cannot be said to be created, because it does not come to be out of nothing. But nevertheless, in every action of a natural agent the action of the Creator is presupposed, not indeed of one creating anew, but of one conserving by the continuation of the action by which he gives to-be to things. And therefore the proper effect of God is to-be itself, absolutely speaking. On this matter see St. Thomas below, in q. 104, art. 1 and 2, and q. 45, art. 5, and in q. 3 of On Power, art. 7, where he says to-be itself is the most common effect, first and more intimate than all other effects; and therefore such an effect belongs to God alone according to proper power. So much for this difficult question. But for the completion of this matter, it has seemed good briefly to dispute another curious question, concerning the distinction of the existence of accidents from the existence of substance.

IT IS DOUBTED fifth and last, whether accidents have their own existence, really distinct from the existence of substance. On this matter there are various opinions. Scotus, in 2, d. 12, q. 1, holds the affirmative side. The same opinion is held by Soncinas, 7 Metaphysics, q. 5, conclusion 2; and he proves it by three arguments.

The first is: for no form is in anything without communicating to it its formal effect; since form and formal effect are inseparable. But in Peter there is, for example, whiteness, whose formal effect is to be white; therefore it gives him to be white. But to be white is not to be a man, because the latter can remain without the former; therefore in Peter there is this twofold to-be. And the same argument can be made concerning other accidental forms. It is confirmed: for it is common to every form to give some to-be; therefore it is natural to them to give some to-be, not substantial, therefore accidental, distinct from the substantial.

The second argument is: for no potency can be without its own act. But to-be is the proper act of the essence; therefore no essence can be without its own proper act; but the to-be of a man is not the proper to-be of whiteness or of another accident; therefore, as many as there are accidental essences, so many are the to-bes which correspond to them.

Thirdly it is argued: for in the Eucharist the accidents of bread exist, and not through the existence of the bread, since nothing of the bread remains once the consecration is made; therefore through their own existence, and consequently accidents have their own existence, distinct from the existence of substance. The same opinion is held by Dominic of Flanders, 7 Metaphysics, q. 1, art. 5.

The contrary opinion is held by Master Dominic Soto, book 1 Physics, q. 6, in the definition of matter; yet he does not prove it. But it can be proved.

First, because his is the to-be whose is the becoming: but becoming belongs only to substances subsisting per se; for by one action Peter is produced, and at the same time all the accidents required for his integrity and perfection are co-produced; therefore to-be also belongs to them alone; and consequently accidents do not have their own to-be, but are through the existence of the substance. And it is confirmed: for matter is not said to have its own existence, because it is not created per se by God, but concreated; but similarly all accidents, which begin to be with some substance, are co-produced at its production, and are not produced per se: nay, certain of them, from their nature, demand to be produced in this way, as is clear in proper passions; therefore it must also be said of accidents that they do not have their own existence.

Secondly it is proved. Aristotle, 7 Metaphysics, at the beginning, says that an accident is a being in that it is thus of a being, namely of a substance; therefore only insofar as it is something of a substance; and consequently it does not have its own to-be, because by reason of that it would be a being, and not insofar as it is something of a substance. And it is confirmed: for this seems also to be signified by that common saying, the to-be of an accident is to be in another, because it does not have a proper to-be or a proper existence, but the existence of its subject. And so they do not exist except by the participation or communication of their subject, in which they are.

Thirdly, if accidents had their own existence, it would be inherence; but the consequent is false, therefore. The sequel is clear: for every mode of being in act on the part of the thing is either to-be per se or to be in another: but accidents do not have to-be per se; therefore if they have some to-be, it will be to be in another. The minor is proved: for the existence of an accident is either aptitudinal or actual inherence: not the first, because aptitudinal inherence is the essence of the accident, as Cajetan proves in On Being and Essence, ch. 7, 16; therefore it cannot be its existence, because existence in every created thing is distinguished from essence. Nor can the second be said: because the accidents in the Eucharist truly exist; and not through actual inherence, because this cannot be understood without a subject in act. For that does not actually inhere which does not actually have a subject in which to inhere: but those accidents are wholly actually separated from a subject, as St. Thomas teaches, 3. p., q. 77, art. 1; therefore it can in no way be said that inherence is the existence of an accident, at least if we speak of accidents really distinct from substance.

Of these two opinions, the opinion of Master Soto sometimes seemed to me more probable, because I had not adverted that it was contrary to the opinion of St. Thomas. Now, however, with the matter well inspected, the opinion seems to me much more probable which asserts that the existence of accidents, which are really distinguished from substance, is also really distinguished from the existence of substance. This opinion St. Thomas seems to me expressly to hold in 3. p., q. 17, art. 2: where, asking whether in Christ there is only one to-be, and defining that in Christ there is only one to-be which pertains to the hypostasis as to that which has to-be, he consequently defines that nothing prevents a to-be from being multiplied in Christ, or in one hypostasis, which pertains to an accidental form. For the to-be by which Socrates is white is other than that by which Socrates is musical. So he. The same he asserts, ch. 7 of On Being and Essence, at the beginning, and in 1, d. 3, q. 2, art. 3, and d. 20, q. 1, art. 1, and 4 Against the Gentiles, ch. 14. Likewise Cajetan holds the same opinion as proper to St. Thomas, below, q. 28, art. 2, and in his commentaries on On Being and Essence, ch. 7, where he says that from the conjunction of whiteness with snow there arises the to-be by which both the whiteness is and the snow is white. The same opinion is followed by all who defend the identity of essence with existence. For as an accident has an essence distinct from the essence of substance, so it has an existence distinct from the existence of substance. And indeed they speak consequently, although they are founded on a false opinion. Wherefore we, proceeding from true principles, prove that the proper existence of an accident is distinguished from the existence of substance. For we suppose what was said in the first doubt: that existence is the act by which each thing formally exists. But this act is not equal in all things: for in some it is so imperfect that it depends on the existence of the subject; in others, however, it is more perfect and bestows existence on the subject. The former mode of existing belongs to accidents, the latter to substances. And therefore substance is said to have to-be per se, but an accident in another. The ground of this can be assigned from the very essences, which are diverse, with respect to which to-be itself is limited to a determinate genus and a determinate species. Since, therefore, there is the greatest diversity between substance and accident, because substance is intended per se by nature, but accidents for the completion of substance, it is rightly gathered that substance has to-be per se, but an accident in the substance. Hence a ground can be gathered for this opinion. The same act cannot be both dependent and independent of a subject; but the existence of an accident is by its nature an act dependent on a subject, whereas the existence of a substance is an act independent; therefore they are not the same. But you will say that for this a formal or conceptual distinction suffices. But on the contrary: because this dependence belongs to the act according to its own entity, and proceeds from its imperfection; therefore it is necessary that there be a diversity in the very entity where such dependence is affirmed and denied. It is confirmed: for otherwise, by parity of reason it could be said that the same rational soul is really dependent on matter according to one account and independent according to another, and that according to one account it is mortal and according to another immortal. Secondly I argue thus: an accident is said formally to inhere, or to be inexistent, from its own existence; therefore the existence of an accident is formally inexistence. This consequence is clear: for nothing is said to be formally such except from a form that is formally present; moreover, the existence of substance is not formally inexistence, otherwise substance by reason of it would be formally inexistent; therefore the existence of an accident is distinguished from the existence of substance. Lastly: there are many accidents which according to their intrinsic entity are of a supernatural order; therefore it is necessary that they have a to-be of supernatural order; but no substance besides the divine is of a supernatural order; therefore no existence of substance is the existence of these accidents. The consequence is proved: for existence is proportioned to the essence and is of the same order as it. This opinion, therefore, being supposed, the arguments of the second opinion must be answered.

To the first it is answered: I deny the minor. To the proof I say that although in fact many accidents are produced by the same action by which my substance is produced, of which there is no dispute at present, nevertheless they can be produced by other actions which are terminated at it per se, as a quality is produced by alteration and a quantity by augmentation. It is answered secondly that from the fact that something is co-produced at the production of another, it does not follow that it does not have an existence distinct from it, but only that it is something of it; and so accidents are something of the substance, and are produced for its completion and perfection. To the confirmation it is answered that matter does not lack a proper existence from the fact that it is concreated with simple bodies, which were first produced by God out of nothing: but from the fact that it is created, and from the manner of creation, it does not follow that it has a proper existence, because it is not created per se. Hence although, naturally speaking, what is produced per se has a proper existence, nevertheless from the fact that it is not produced per se it does not follow that it lacks one. As if God were to create men out of nothing as regards both soul and body, then the soul would be said to be concreated, because it would be produced as a part of the man; and nevertheless it would have a proper existence, yet the whole man would not have another, but the same one communicated to itself: because the to-be of the soul pertains to personal to-be, and in the same supposit the to-be that pertains to it cannot be multiplied: because it is impossible that there not be one to-be of one thing, as St. Thomas says, 3. p., q. 17, art. 2.

To the second argument it is answered, with Soto in 4, d. 12, q. 1, that it is not well gathered that an accident has it that it be a being formally from the to-be of the substance, from the fact that it is a being in that it is thus of a being, that is, of a substance. Because that particle, in that it is, signifies not only the formal cause or ground, but also the genus of any cause whatsoever, even an extrinsic one. For it is said 'in that it is' in as many ways as a cause is said, as is clear from Aristotle, 5 Metaph., ch. 17. Wherefore when Aristotle said that an accident is a being in that it is of a substance, he signified only that the entity of an accident is caused by the substance. Which indeed is true, because substance is the extrinsic material cause of accidents. To the confirmation it is answered that the sense of that maxim is that an accident has to-be dependently on the substance in the genus of extrinsic material cause, not however that it is formally in act through the to-be of the substance.

To the third it is answered that the existence of an accident is the actuality by which an accident is in act on the part of the thing: and this actuality is deservedly called inherence or inexistence, because on account of its imperfection it naturally depends, in its coming-to-be and being conserved, on the existence of the subject. For as the essence of an accident stands to the essence of substance, so the existence of an accident stands to the existence of substance. But this dependence is not so great that it cannot be supplied by the power of God, since the dependence of the existence of an accident on the existence of substance is not a dependence as on a formal cause. Nevertheless the existence of accidents remains, with an intrinsic order, as far as lies on its part, to the existence of substance as to its foundation and root.

Moreover, the arguments which have been adduced from Paul Soncinas in confirmation of this opinion are not of great moment, although they also defeat Dominic of Flanders, at the place cited above; for all will easily be solved if one holds that the existence of accidents is indeed distinguished really formally from the existence of substance, but not really as a thing from a thing. In which way a figure is also distinguished from quantity; and according to the opinion of others, the existence of substance is not otherwise distinguished from the substance than really formally, as was said in doubt 3. Nay, by this distinction all the testimonies which have been adduced from St. Thomas can be explained. For St. Thomas can be explained of the real formal distinction. And so the second opinion, which M. Soto holds, is probable. And to the argument made concerning the accidents which remain in the sacrament of the Eucharist you will find an answer abundantly sufficient below, q. 4, art. 1, ad 3. So much for the explanation of article 4.